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The various conflicts of the nineteenth century
and the imposition of British rule permanently weakened
the traditional political systems and institutions thus
rendering them incapable of dealing with the new
challenges of colonialism. The chiefs also came to be
used by the British as intermediaries to establish and
maintain contact between the colonial power and the
African populace. Because their administrative duties
were light, so the chiefs remained in close relationship
with the people. But they were becoming government
agents and mission-educated Africans - the new elite -
began forming Native Associations from 1912 to represent
more effectively the feelings and aspirations of the
African people to the colonial government.
Meanwhile, some other educated Africans were
pursuing political activity through independent African
churches. These African church leaders protested against
the abuses, frustrations and injustices that many
Africans were being made to suffer as a result of
settler, missionary and colonial enterprises. One of
these church movements, led by the Rev. John Chilembwe,
attempted forcibly to drive out many of the hated white
men from Nyasaland in 1915» but the rising was put down.
Chilembwe sought to set up a new African state which
would be wider than the narrow tribal base but his
movement failed to attract widespread African support.
Upto the 1930s, there were no important economic
and social changes to undercut the relationship between
chiefs and the mass of the people, both of whom remained
closely attached to the tribal ways of life. Chiefs also
continued to be the favoured agents of the government
and the new educated elements were unable to gain
admission to the official exercise of power in local
affairs. Nor were the Native Associations successful
either in commanding mass African support or in obtaining
any significant political and social reforms from the
colonial government.
From the early 1930s, the central government
began to take greater action in all fields of economic
and social development. The mass of the African people
were gradually brought into individual contact with the
machinery and personnel of the central government. The
people found that the chiefs were unable to provide any
solutions to their new problems. Educated Africans now
began seeking direct African representation on the
Legislative Council and all other boards directly
affecting the lives of the African population. They also
moved towards the creation of a national-wide political
organization and founded the Nyasaland African Congress
in 1944.
In the post-1945 period, the central government
greatly expanded the scope of its operations. By having
to enforce a number of unpopular measures such as the
regulations governing soil erosion, the chiefs were
further discredited as the mere agents of the colonial
government. The government's land and agrarian policies,
combined with the imposition of the hated Central African
Federation in 1953» led to large-scale disaffection among
the rural masses and considerable bitterness among
African intellectuals. The Nyasaland African Congress
provided the framework for the coming together of the
educated elite and the masses. During the mid-1950s, a
petty rural bourgeoisie came to serve as the spokesman
for the agitated masses (thus replacing the discredited
chiefs) and recruited large numbers of Africans into the
Congress movement. Greater initiatives towards mass
organization also developed from the central Congress
headquarters which was now committing itself to the idea
of an independent African state based on majority rule.
In leadership, membership and ideology, the Nyasaland
African Congress, by 1959» had achieved the status of a
full-scale nationalist movement.
PREFACE
The literature relating to the study of African
politics in colonial Malawi is very small. What exists,
however, is generally of very high quality and I have
benefitted immensely from it, particularly from the
writings of Professors G.A. Bhepperson and J. van Velsen
and Dr. K.J. McCracken. Nevertheless, of all the
countries of East and Central Africa, Malawi possesses
the least documented record of its colonial past.
Numerous topics of a political nature, which have been
the subject of considerable research in neighbouring
countries in recent years, still require to be investi¬
gated for Malawi. It was my desire, from 1966, to do
research on some of these topics and thus attempt to
contribute to the few existing studies on Malawi
politics. I hoped that an examination of materials in
the Malawi National Archives would substantially assist
my work. This institution contains indispensable primary
and secondary information on Malawi's colonial past. The
sudden closure of the archives in February 1967, however,
not only curtailed my access to the most important
source of documentation on Malawi but appeared also to
signal the end of my whole research project. Fortunately,
I had been able to consult a number of important files on
African political activity before the Government of Malawi
closed the archives down. But even after supplementing
this material by research in various British institutions,
a number of gaps still presented themselves in my work.
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A study of African politics in colonial Malawi, it seems
to me, can only "be carried out thoroughly by consulting
people and documentation in Malawi itself. It was only
through gaining access to a number of private holdings
of papers in Malawi and through conducting interviews
with many Malawians that I was able to give my work a
more coherent and systematic shape. Without the full
co-operation of many Malawians my work could not have
gone forward.
To mention names would be invidious: but by
naming my informants in the text, I have provided some
indication of my great indebtedness. I would, however,
like to single out for special thanks the Rev. C.C.
Chinula and J.C. Malifa who not only provided me with
their private papers but were also generous with their
time and personally hospitable as well on many occasions.
Without the very great assistance of my students at the
University of Malawi, who participated with me in my
work and who provided me with their companionship as
well as introducing me to African life, this study could
never have been completed. To all of these Malawians, I
will always be greatly indebted.
I am also very grateful to the Vice-Chancellor of
the University of Malawi, Dr. I. Michael, for his un¬
failing assistance and encouragement. I am more than
grateful to the University of Malawi for research grants
which enabled me to travel throughout Malawi with my
students on a number of occasions.
I would also like to thank G.D. Hazeldine of the
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University of Malawi Library and J.D.C. Drew of the
Malawi National Archives, for their unfailing kindness
and co-operation.
I am deeply indebted to Professor G.A. Shepperson
of the University of Edinburgh, both for the example of
his own work and for his valuable advice and consistent
encouragement. C.D. Raab, also of Edinburgh University,
gave helpful advice on the preparation of the thesis.
My thanks are also due to my colleagues at Chancellor
College, University of Malawi - especially I. Linden, Dr.
B. Pachai, H.L. Vail and N. Wincott. I have been assisted
in a variety of ways by Dr. R.J. Macdonald of Syracuse
University, Dr. K.J. McCracken of Stirling University,
Rev. Dr. J.M. Schoffeleers of the Catechetical Training
Centre Likulezi, and Professor J. van Velsen of the
University of Zambia.
My wife, Gudrun, did the typing and retyping of
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Although this work is not intended to be an
analytical account but rather an historical case-study of
the emergence of a nationalist movement in one African
colonial territory, it is necessary to provide a detailed
examination of the concept of nationalism as employed in
this study.
The years of colonial rule in Malawi (formerly
Nyasaland) were characterized by the imposition of a
political and social system whereby a superior European
authority attempted to exercise its will over a territory
already populated by Africans. This enforced colonial
relationship determined the pattern of political change
within the Protectorate, so that any variation in the
fundamentals of the relationship was bound to have
<1
important repercussions on the total colonial situation.
From the earliest years of British rule in Malawi,
Africans sought to modify or alter the colonial relation¬
ship and it is this sort of African political activity in
reaction to alien control and domination that has come to
be regarded as a manifestation of nationalism not only in
colonial Malawi but also in the other territories of
Africa. Thomas Hodgkin, for example, has lumped under the
1. For a discussion of the concept of the •colonial
situation,' see George Balandier, "La Situation
Coloniale: Approche theorique," Cahiers Internationaux
de Sociologie, 11 (1951)» pp.44-?9. This article has
been translated into English and reprinted in Immanuel
Wallerstein, ed., Social Change: The Colonial situation
(New York,1966), pp.54-6f.
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general rubric of •nationalism1 "any organization or
group tbat explicitly asserts the rights, claims and
aspirations of a given African society (from the level of
the language-group to that of 'Pan-Africa') in opposition
to European authority, whatever its institutional form
2
and objectives." Others, however, although appreciating
the deep roots of African colonial nationalism have
tended to confine the use of the term to the post-1945
period with its emergence of nation-wide movements seeking
self-government and independence. They have argued that
to include every social movement of protest against alien
rule as a part of nationalism obscures the political
meaning of the concept, blurs the important distinctions
that can be made among African responses to the colonial
situation, and makes comparative analysis difficult. On
the other hand, in direct opposition to the two preceding
views, some have refused to employ the concept of
•nationalism' believing it to be wholly inapplicable to
the African situation, and have instead preferred the
adoption of other labels to describe African resistance
4.
and assertion. The argument here has been that 'nationa¬
lism' as traditionally defined in European political
2. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London,
1956), p.23. Similar comprehensive definitions of
African nationalism have been adopted by David Kimble,
A Political History of Ghana (Oxford,1963), p.xlv, and
Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central
Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts,1965), p.2.
3. James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa,"
American Political Science Review, 48 (1954), pp.404-
426.
4. Lord Hailey's 'Africanism' is the best-known of these
other labels. See his An African Survey: Revised 1956
(London,1957)» PP.251-2.
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history in the sense of the supreme loyalty of an
5
individual being due to the nation-state, is not
meaningful in the African colonial experience. African
allegiance and attachment have not been due to the entity
of 'nation1 but to narrower socio-political units such as
the tribe or lineage group. Moreover, common cultural and
linguistic characteristics - objective criteria prevalent
in Europe - have been virtually absent in African colonial
territories, and one is therefore hard put to talk
logically about nationalism. Resentment of European
domination undoubtedly existed, but the mere expression
of African hostility to alien control is not sufficient
6
proof of the existence of nationalism.
In this introduction, we attempt to look more
closely at the two schools which accept the use of
nationalism as an appropriate concept for describing
African responses to the colonial situation and to
challenge the final view that the adoption of the term
would constitute too radical a departure from traditional
European definitions.
Dr. R.I. Rotberg has argued that nationalism in
colonial Africa was "similar in content to the earlier
Asian and European nationalisms." within a few years of
European penetration and take-over, colonial admlnis-
5. Hans Kohn speaks of nationalism as "a state of mind, in
which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to
be due the nation state." See his Nationalism: Its
Meaning and History (New York,1955)* P»9.
6. For a lucid overall review of the various schools of
thought regarding the use or non-use of the term
•nationalism' in colonial Africa, see Martin Kilson,
"The Analysis of African Nationalism," World Politics,
10,3 (1958), pp.484-497.
trations had "begun to impose upon the indigenous peoples
an administrative framework, which gradually resulted in
Africans coming to share common experiences, common laws,
and common aspirations. Not only were "nations in embryo"
created, but also a political pattern was provided within
which national self-consciousness could grow. 4t some
point, soon after European annexation, African colonial
territories "passed into the realm of partial nationhood"
and Africans "antagonized" by the character of white rule
"while educated in and aware of the ideals of the European
national image, eventually asserted themselves with a
patriotic fervour that made real the possibility of
national self-determination." Led and directed by
"upwardly mobile, middle class •agitators'", Africans
"manifested extreme anti-European attitudes, which were in
the best tradition, anti-establishment." To analyze the
"African revolution" in its struggle to achieve "liberty
and equality," Rotberg sketches a "threefold time scale"
for viewing the total unfolding of the process, viz.,
"awakening," "incipient action," and "triumph." Following
Rodgkin, Rotberg concludes that it is this process which
in its entire evolution can be justifiably called African
nationalism, and that the three 3tages constitute the
gradual "rise of different forms of national consciousness
Professor J.S. Coleman would probably concur in
much of this reasoning but would prefer to confine the use
of the term •nationalism' to a much later phase of
7. R.I. Rotberg, "African Nationalism: Concept or
Confusion?" Journal of Modern African Studies, 9 (1966)
pp.33-46.
political evolution during the colonial period, perhaps
O
to Rotberg's final stage. There is, then, in exhibition
a particular type of African response, namely, that
organized by political parties directed by a westernized
elite striving to set up an independent nation-state. For
Coleman certain characteristics are necessary to depict
clearly the stage when a movement may be spoken of as
nationalistic in its aims and character, bearing in mind
its deep roots and antecedents. For Rotberg and Hodgkin,
however, African responses to modify or alter the
colonial situation are all nationalistically-oriented.
'.tudents of Africa, therefore, just like students
of Europe, have come to disagree among themselves as to
what is meant by the slippery concept of 'nationalism.•
All, however, would probably accept that when we talk
about nations we mean that men identify themselves with a
group or national 'image,' and through it with other men
with whom they establish a common solidarity and towards
whom they generate a feeling of mutual sympathy that is
not extended to outsiders. But the criteria for identifying
fellow group or national members have varied quite con¬
siderably, and it is this which has led to so much debate
and argument. Although it is not necessary here to review
the literature on nationalism, a brief discussion of
similar experiences in other parts of the world would be
helpful. Here we will discuss two well-known kinds of
8. J.S. Ooleman, o£. cit., See also his Nigeria: Back-
ground to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los^^igeTeTrT^GO),
pp.^9--17o,4-19-427.
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national self-consciousness, namely those which have
developed from (a) common membership of a political
association and (b) similar cultural and linguistic
q
characteristics.
The rise of nations through common membership of
a political association is best illustrated from the
history of France and England. As a result of monarchs
over centuries gradually strengthening themselves against
the Emperor and the Pope on the one hand and the local
barons on the other, they became, in time, the most
important focus for loyalty. By setting in motion an
increasingly centralized political structure, monarchs
eventually created nations from which (with the develop¬
ment of a common legal system and the spread of a national
language and literature) national consciousness and
sentiment grew. At this stage, therefore, the idea of
nationality was co-extensive with political allegiance.
Such a situation never arose in colonial >lfrica for at no
time did the colonial rulers evoke mass loyalty and
sympathy from their colonial wards. For one thing, the
European oligarchy differed racially and culturally from
the majority of the population. Politically, this meant
that the alien colonial power could harly ever claim for
itself a natural legitimacy stemming from common racial
9. For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in
which nations have come into being, see Morris Ginsberg,
Nationalism: A Reappraisal (Cambridge,1961), pp.6-23
and S.I. Benn and H.'s. Peters, Social Principles and
the Democratic State (London,1959), Chap.11. Such of ray
discussion is based on these two works.
- 6 —
and cultural characteristics. Although, as in Western
Europe, political organization preceded national
consciousness, Africans never gave their allegiance and
attachment to the colonial authorities ruling their
territories.
Another type of national self-consciousness that
may be identified is that which has arisen from the
recognition of similar cultural and linguistic charac¬
teristics which gradually found expression in political
unity. These objective factors constituted the basis of
European nationalism during the nineteenth century which
led to the formation of 3uch nations as Germany and Italy
and to the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish
Empires. Here the national spirit as manifested in
language and custom preceded political organization, but
the two eventually became related. As Hegel and others
argued, only through the creation of a nation-state could
the national spirit find its fullest expression. In order
to pursue common interests and aspirations, the nation had
to seek self-government and independence. This particular
kind of national self-consciousness rarely existed in
colonial Africa where considerable cultural and linguistic
diversities pervaded most territories. In colonial Malawi,
for instance, there was no complete linguistic, ethnic or
10
cultural unity among the various peoples, and recent
10. Two main languages were spoken - Chinyanja and Chi-
tumbuka - and numerous ethnic groups with cultural
differences existed. For instance, the Ngoni and
Tumbuka are patrilineal in descent and inheritance
and virilocal in residence; the Tonga, Oewa, Yao,
Nyanja and Lomwe peoples are matrilineal and uxorilocal.
events have shown the same to he true of many other
states in Africa.
But it is evident that such objective factors are
by no means essential to the existence of nationalism.
Although their absence or presence may have a bearing on
the degree of strength of national unity, they are not
collectively or individually indispensable for national
sentiment to be engendered. A nation cannot be simply
viewed as a group with common cultural and linguistic
characteristics but must also be regarded as an entity
whose very existence lies in the hearts and minds of
those who believe they belong to it. As Hans Kohn reminds
us, "a living and active corporate will" is an "essential
element" in any definition of nationalism.
"It is this will which we call nationalism, a
a state of mind inspiring the large majority
of a people and claiming to inspire all its
members." 11
Switzerland clearly shows that there is no necessary link
between language and national sentiment. Belgium is
generally considered to be a nation despite the existence
of different religious groupings, while the citizens of
the United States have no common ancestry. Numerous other
cases could be cited to show that the subjective idea of
nationalism may emerge in the absence of objective factors.
Moreover, such objective elements existed for centuries
in Europe without producing nationalism. German was a
language spoken by thousands for centuries in Central
Europe, who also shared other cultural attributes, but no
11. H. Kohn, 0£. cit., pp.9-11.
German nation developed until it was created by German
nationalism. Although a German nation was for long
contemplated and mooted by the Holy Roman Emperors, it
would still be correct to argue that it was only when
Germans began to regard their common characteristics as
particularly important, distinguishing and marking them
off as a group from other groups, that a national 'image'
was developed and an emotional loyalty to a German nation
aroused. Only then did a sense of belonging appear and
•German' become a focus for loyalties.
In Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, linguistic
and cultural criteria determined who belonged to the
national group. In colonial Africa, however, such factors
were hard to find in most of the territories. Instead, a
common national image, a focus for loyalties, was created
through a common repudiation by Africans of alien control.
National self-consciousness in colonial Africa was ex¬
hibited in a unity of purpose discovered in striving for
self-government and independence. Just as in Europe,
Africans gradually became self-consciously Nigerians or
Nyasalanders - groups seized with a 'passion of
nationalism' and a community of feeling and will -
functioning within the physical and political framework
established by the European colonialists. African
nationalist leaders gradually came to regard the colonial
territory (often arbitrarily carved out by the European
powers) as the basic unit of social action and the area
for which they claimed the right of self-determination.
Although the various social groups within the colonial
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territory may not have shared a common culture, they did
share "at the very minimum a common authority capable of
maintains itself and propagating its values." It was
within the framework of such a common authority, that
Africans began "to identify more and more with the nation-
12
in-creation." As in Western Europe, political organi-
zation preceded, national consciousness, ^ and the criterion
for determining who belonged to the national group was a
unity of purpose found in common resentment to alien
control.
If one accepts that the criteria for identifying
fellow patriots or nationals vary considerably, and that
one of these is a unity of purpose discovered in the
struggle for independence waged against an alien ruler,
then nationalism is a concept appropriate to describe
certain African responses to the colonial situation. With
this definition, we are now able to meet the statements
of those who prefer labels other than that of nationalism
in the colonial African context. We would agree with Lord
Hailey in his first statement (elaborating on his
preference for the use of •Africanism* rather than
nationalism) that "the population of most of the
countries of Africa south of the Sahara consists of people
who have been brought together under one form of govern¬
ment by the accidents of history." This was, however,
12. I. Wallerstein, oj>. cit., Introduction, p.2.
13. See D. Kimble, 0£. cit., Chap.13 for a good discussion
of the growth oxnational consciousness in colonial
Ghana.
14. Lord Hailey, 0£. cit., p.251.
- 10 -
also true of many European countries such as France,
where as a result of political and military factors areas
not basically French were brought together into France.
"According to Duhamel," observes Morris Ginsberg, "ten
out of the thirty-six provinces of which France then (in
1929) consisted were not French three hundred years ago....
That the process of nation-making was not spontaneous was
clearly shown by Renan:
"Why does Languedoc belong to France? Neither
race nor history nor the character of the
population account for the union. The reason
is that in the thirteenth century Paris kings
exerted unceasing pressure to bring this
about." 15
We would further accept Hailey's observation that
African colonial territories "have for the most part no
tradition of a common origin." As we have already seen,
this was also the case with countries like Switzerland
and the United States, but one does not here refrain from
talking about Swiss or American nationalism. The mere
absence of such objective factors as language, culture or
tradition of origin does not necessarily mean the non¬
existence of the subjective idea of nationhood. It is,
however, Hailey's final statement that requires rebuttal,
namely, his assertion that Africans had no "common out¬
look on their political future." As we have seen, and as
will be more obvious when we consider the emergence of a
nationalist movement in colonial Malawi, Africans did
possess a common political outlook and a unity of purpose
in their attempts to seek liberation from colonial rule.
15. M. Ginsberg, ££. cit., p.7.
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All this is not to suggest that we can to-day
invariably speak of African nations in the sense of
belonging (felt or experienced) by the majority of the
people to a nation. It is probable that few Africans feel
that they belong to a nation, a feeling which involves a
sentiment of attachment akin to patriotism. The community
of feeling and will, prevalent during the last years of
colonial rule, disappeared with the attainment of the
common goal of independence, and African states now find
that they have inherited diverse ethnic and linguistic
elements which have to be welded together into working
units. The process of nation-building has still to be
completed in most of the new states of Africa.
Nevertheless, there is still validity in the
argument that colonial African nationalism may be
considered as a political movement which depends on a
feeling of collective grievance against alien control.
The nationalist grievance was collective and the collecti-
vity in colonial Africa was the nation-in-creation.
Hodgkin, Rotberg, Coleman and others are therefore
Justified in employing the term nationalism to describe
African responses to the colonial situation, but their
various definitions of the concept require certain
revisions. In many ways, Hodgkin and Rotberg are correct
in viewing African nationalism as a process evolving
through a series of 'stages'I''The post-194-5 mass
16. See also K.R. Minogue, Nationalism (London,1967)» P«25.
17* For another scheme of 'stages' based on the criterion
of objectives, see J. van Velsen, "Trends in African
Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia," Kroniek van Afrika,
4-,2 (1964-), pp.139-157* It should be noted that in all
of these 'phase' or 'stage' identifications of African
nationalism, reality, of course, is much less tidy.
political movements, for instance, were in many colonial
territories closely related to the inter-war political
groups. But the precursors of mass nationalist movements
cannot themselves be regarded as manifestations of
nationalism. Using Rotberg's own words, they did not in
most territories adopt "extreme anti-European attitudes,"
or attempt to pursue an "anti-establishment" programme,
or agitate to overthrow the colonial status quo and
achieve self-government and independent statehood. They
operated, instead, like pressure groups and sought to
exert influence on the government within the framework of
the colonial situation. Moreover, at no time did they gain
the support of the masses who continued passively to
^1 Q
accept the "fundamentals of the colonial relationship."
It is the post second World War nationalist movements
that possess these characteristics and are committed to
the overthrow of the colonial state and the replacement of
it by a new political and social order. To use the term
nationalism, as Rotberg does, as synonomous with "redress
19
of grievances" y is to use it in such a broad way that it
tends to blur the important distinctions that can and
must be made among African responses to the colonial
situation. More importantly, such an all-embracing
18. Rupert Emerson and Martin PTilson, eds., The Political
Awakening of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1965),
Introduction, pp.8-10. Such movements of petition and
protest were characteristic of most of the territories
of colonial Africa, particularly during the inter-war
period. See, for instance, such works as J.S. Coleman
(Nigeria), 0£. cit., ; J. van Velsen, o£. cit., ; and,
Carl G. RosHerg, Jr. and John NottingEam, The Myth of
'Mau Wau' (New York,1966).
19. R.I. Rotberg (Central Africa), 0£. cit., p.2.
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definition obscures the political meaning of the concept
"for nationalism must be predicated on at least the
20
aspiration of a future self-governing nation," and this
is a feature mainly of the post-194-5 African political
movements.
Professor Coleman's description of nationalism as
21
"the terminal form of colonial protest" is therefore an
apt one in the African colonial context. But his particular
definition of nationalism requires further refinement. By
emphasizing the role of an acculturated elite striving for
independence of a common alien ruler, he minimises the
important political role of the masses (and, as we shall
see in our study of Malawi, the role of the petty rural
bourgeoisie) in the national movement for independence.
The impression is conveyed that mass disenchantment with
colonial rule was artificially stimulated by a small group
of western-educated elements and that there was nothing
spontaneous about the mass followings they acquired.
Recent research, however, amply demonstrates that issues
capable of evoking mass discontent and bringing it to a
climax existed by the early 1950s in many colonial
territories, and that the subsequent rise of the masses
gave depth to nationalist demands and enabled the national
appeal to strike home along a broad front. When the
educated elite decided to lend leadership to the agitated
rural populace, then the nucleus of a mass anti-colonial
20. C.G. Rosberg and J. Nottingham, 0£. cit., p.34-9.
21. J.S. Coleman (A.P.S.R.), 0£. clt., p.140.
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movement was created and nationalism began.
For a movement in a colonial situation to be
called nationalistic in its aims and character, therefore,
it must possess the following major characteristics: it
must seek self-government and independent statehood; it
must be led and guided by an educated elite which is
conscious of the aspirations of the masses and is willing
to voice their discontent; and it must command a mass
following.^ As a conceptual tool, this restrictive
definition is preferred to the all-embracing ones
suggested by other writers. But to analyze and describe
the rise and emergence of a full-scale nationalist
movement requires, of course, a more comprehensive
approach which will permit consideration of all the
various threads which have gone to make up a complex
pattern. The present thesis is concerned with the develop¬
ment of African political groups and organizations in
22. See, for example, Lionel Cliffe, "Nationalism and the
Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Improvement in
Tanganyika during the colonial period," unpublished
E.A.I.S.R. conference paper, 1965; J.M. Lonsdale,
"Rural Resistance and Mass Political Mobilization
amongst the Luo of Western Kenya," East African
Academy seminar paper, 1965; and Martin Kilson,
"Sociological Aspects of African Politics," Ghana
Journal of Sociology (1966), pp.1-6.
25. See also the excellent article by J.M. Lonsdale, "The
Emergence of African Nations," African Affairs, 67»
266 (1968), pp.11-28 for a similar set of characteris-
tics. It should be noted that our present discussion
is concerned only with territorial, colony-wide
nationalism and not with regional or other types of
sub-nationalisms. For 'tribal* nationalism, see, for
example, Philip D. Curtin, "Nationalism in Africa,
194-5-1965»" Review of Politics. 23,2 (1966), pp. 143-
153. For a discussion of the distinction between
'tribalism' and territorial-wide 'nationalism', see




colonial Malawi and the eventual emergence of a
nationalist movement. In our examination of African
political groups, the stages of transition of movements
are subsumed under headings which designate phases in a
24
continuous but irregular process. In each of these
phases, we seek, among other things, to characterize a
political movement by differences in ideology, leadership
and participation and show, finally, how a conjunction
between the three characteristics of a nationalist
movement was achieved.
The growth of modern African politics in colonial
Africa re-defined the boundaries of African political
activity. Prior to the introduction of colonial rule,
and even during the colonial period itself, politics
took place within tribal communities. With the
establishment of a colonial administrative framework
encompassing the various traditional societies, there
was created the possibility of African political action
on a wider level. The present thesis is not concerned
with intra-tribal politics but with the new and modern
African political activity at the territorial level. The
arena of political debate, argument and struggle for the
purposes of this thesis is the new colonial political
system and not the tribal political system. The present
work, therefore, is only concerned with one sphere of
African political activity in colonial Malawi. Another
24. No attempt is made to argue for smooth transition
from one phase to the next. Orderly sequences exist
only in analysis and ideal types.
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possible approach, would be to consider the inter¬
relations between the tribal and colonial political
systems. Research on politics in colonial Africa has
only Just begun to focus on the co-existence of these two
25
systems x and few detailed studies have appeared as yet
to enable us to consider the implications of this
approach for the present work. Moreover, studies
concentrating on the inter-relations between tribal and
colonial political systems cannot be conducted for
Malawi as yet until government restrictions on access to
local archives have been removed and until greater
interest has been shown by scholars in the peoples of
this fascinating land.
The material of this study is arranged chrono¬
logically. In the first chapter we describe the relevant
features of the physical, cultural and historical setting
of Malawi which have a bearing on political developments
during the colonial period. The remaining chapters of
the thesis are organized on two levels. First, there is
an analysis of the processes of social change which not
only created situations pre-disposing the peoples of
Malawi to political action but also conditioned the
growth and development of African political movements.
Secondly, there is a detailed description and analysis
25« See the two following essays by J.F. Ade AJayi on
this approach: "The Continuity of African Institutions
under Colonialism," in T.O. Ranger, ed.. Emerging
Themes of African History (Nairobi,1968), pp.-139-200;
"Colonialism: An Episode in African History," in L.H.
Gann and P. Duignan, eds., The History and Politics
of Colonialism 1870-1914- (Cambridge,1969), pp.497-509.
of African political movements up to about 1958 which
may be taken as the time when a full-scale nationalist
movement came into being in colonial Malawi.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Cultural and Historical Getting.
The land and people: an overview
stretching down the southern part of the Great Rift
Galley of Africa, Malawi is a narrow, land-locked strip
of territory extending from the frontiers of southern
Tanzania on the north to near the Zambezi on the south,
and bounded on the north-west by Zambia and on the south¬
east and south-west by Mozambique. Comprising a land area
of about 37,000 square miles, Malawi is nearly three-
quarters the area of England (or about one and a quarter
times the size of Scotland). A land of great natural
beauty, more than half of its length of 560 miles borders
on the ^reat lake of the same name. Lake Malawi lies
along the eastern 3ide of the upper part of the country.
From the southern end of the lake issues the Ohire River
which flows southwards into the Zambezi, which in turn
empties into the Indian Ocean. The southern tip of Malawi
is 226 miles from the Indian Ocean seaport of Beira, in
Mozambique, with which it is linked by a railway crossing
the Zambezi. Malawi is essentially the watershed of the
lake and the Shire and it was in accordance with this
geographical factor that most of its boundaries were fixed,
1. Known as lake Nyasa until January 1965 when its nam® was
changed to lake Malawi by the Malawi Government. This new
name has yet to be ratified by Tanzania and ozaabique,
both of which border on the lake. It should be noted
that the forms Nyasaland and Malawi are used inter¬
changeably in this work except, of course, in direct
quotations. lor a more detailed geographical discussion
of Malawi, see J.C. Pike and G.T. Rimmington, Malawi:
A Geographical Study (London,1965).
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in the 1890s, by the European powers. Despite their length
and dispersion, neither the Shire nor the Zambezi have
come to constitute great commercial waterways for trade
since the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the gradual
silting up of the Shire from the 1380s, and the consequent
decline of this water system as an effective means of
communication with the outside world, was to be an import¬
ant factor in hindering economic development in Malawi.
Steep, broken topography is characteristic of
almost the whole of Malawi. Beyond the plains to the west
of the lake, which is itself part of the Great Rift
Valley, the escarpment rises abruptly to undulating
plateau areas between 3,000 and 4,000 feet above sea-
level, punctuated by mountain masses one or two thousand
feet higher. In the northern region (land area: 10,400
square miles), which lies along the northern part of the
lake's western shore and which extends over the area
north of Nkhota-Khota, the high country consists of the
cool and sparsely populated Nyika plateau which rises to
over 8,000 feet in places and the rather similar Vipya
mountains. Because of these high, bleak, and wind-swept
plateaux, no district in the northern region is largely
populated and most people are gathered together along the
lakeshore. Moreover, the fact that these plateaux plunge
steeply to a narrow lake littoral has made the hinterland
virtually inaccessible to lake transport. And since the
southern railway line was never extended to the northern
region, the north has become remote and, more importantly,
severely handicapped in its economic development. This
poverty of communications, when coupled with the area(s
generally unsatisfactory soil, has led to it becoming the
most undeveloped part of Malawi. In some favourable
lakeshore centres, such as Karonga and Nkhota-Khota,
Africans have been able to cultivate cotton and rice
successfully. But, generally, from the late 1380s, the
northern peoples have been compelled to migrate elsewhere
in search of work to earn the cash to satisfy the
increasingly diverse wants that Europeans, mainly
missionaries,have stimulated among them.
In the central region (land area: 13,319 square
miles), the high country is chiefly rolling fertile plain
which, especially in the Dedza and Lilongwe districts,
has become heavily settled during the last thirty years.
The early lack of sufficient markets and adequate
communications was slowly rectified from the 19303, thus
greatly assisting the growth of African cash-crop
production, particularly in fire-cured tobacco.
The southern region (land area: 12,262 square
miles), which lies on both sides of the Shire to the south
of the lake, is the most densely populated part of Malawi,
a fact which reflects its greater proportion of fertile
soils and dependable water supplies. During the colonial
period, the region contained Just about half the total
population of the country. Comprising a series of hills,
some of which, particularly the Shire Highlands, are
blessed with good agricultural soil, it attracted a
number of European planters during the colonial era.
Considerable emphasis was placed on European agriculture
to build up the economy of the country and all the
"Protectorate's major schemes of capital investment came
to be focussed in and around the Shire Highlands. It was
also here that the twin commercial towns of Blantyre and
Limbe grew up as well as the administrative capital,
Zomba. This concentration of the administrative,
commercial and planting aspects of European enterprise
made the Shire Highlands the largest centre of employment
for Africans in Malawi.
At the extreme southern end of Malawi, however,
the Shire falls away towards the slightly-peopled Zambezi
Valley and the land here is only a few hundred feet above
sea-level. The low altitude of the area results in higher
temperatures than in the Shire Highlands and this has
restricted the settlement of Europeans. African cash-crop
farming has become prominent in the Shire Valley and
cotton has been successfully cultivated as it has, to a
lesser extent, along the humid lake littoral in the Upper
Shire district. The development of peasant crops in
Malawi during the colonial period did not go so far as in
Ghana or Uganda. Nevertheless, steady progress was made
especially in parts of the central and southern regions.
The growing importance of peasant production was to be of
great significance in maintaining the character of
Nyasaland as a tropical dependency. It also provided
Africans with a fairly sturdy economic basis for their
political activities in the face of local and outside
European assertions of dominance and control.
Malawi being primarily an agricultural country, the
- 22 -
large majority of its inhabitants are therefore engaged
in farming, although at any given time a considerable
proportion of the country's man-power has, since the turn
of the century, been found working in neighbouring terri¬
tories. In 1960, it was estimated that about 73,500
migrated in search of employment and that the number
working abroad in that year was about 159,500. Migrant
workers have come from all three regions but migration
ha3 been greatest from the northern region and smallest
from the southern region. Where opportunities for local
employment and for cash-crop production are greatest, so
migration is lowest as a proportion of the work force.
Malawi's first full-scale and scientifically based
census was completed in September 1966. The final analysis
showed the country's total population to be 4-,039*533 -
an overall density of 111 people per square mile of land
area. Some 95 per cent, of the population live in the




With the exception of about 13,000 j&tsians and Coloured
persons, and about 9*000 Europeans, the population is
entirely African. About four-fifths of the Africans are
members of five large tribal groups, the Cewa, Lomwe,
Nyanja, Yao and Ngoni, while the rest belong to a number
of smaller tribes.
VTalawi's modern borders are not co-extensive with
the patterns of ethnic distribution or the boundaries of
historic empires. The central and southern regions,
together with some of the eastern parts of Zambia and
neighbouring areas in Mozambique, have been inhabited
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from a relatively early date by branches of a single
cultural and linguistic group known as the Malawi (also
referred to in early records as the Maravi). Of these
various branches, the three main ones in Malawi by the
beginning of the nineteenth century were the Cewa,
Nyanja and Manganja. The Shire Highlands and the Shire
Valley were inhabited by the Nyanja and Manganja
respectively while the Cewa lived in the areas near to
*
the southern half of the lake and west of it. By the
early 1800s, a more complex ethnic pattern had been
established in the northern region of Malawi. A number of
h. 5
different peoples, including the Tumbuka, Tonga^ and
£
Nkhonde, occupied the highland areas and the adjoining
lakeshore. Yet all of these ethnically heterogeneous
peoples throughout the Malawi region shared much in
common. All were agriculturalists, first and foremost,
though some cattle were kept by a number of groups.
Culturally and linguistically the peoples were not too
2. For the Maravi, see E.A. Alpers, "The Mutapa and
Malawi political systems to the time of the Ngoni
invasions," in T.O. Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central
African History (London, 1968), pp.17-26, and J.Wf.
Sclioffoleers, M'Bona the Guardian-Spirit of the
Mang'anja, B.Litt. Oxford, 1966.
3. For historical and cultural details of these three
peoples, see J.M. Schoffoleers, 0£. clt.,
4. See T. Cullen Young, Notes on the History of the
Tumbuka-Kamanga Peoples in the Northern Province of
Nyasaland (London,1932).
5. J. van Velsen, "Notes on the History of the Lakeside
Tonga of Nyasaland," African Studies, 18,3 (1939),
pp.105-117.
6. Godfrey Wilson, The Constitution of Ngonde (London,
1939), Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No.3.
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separated. Though their languages were distinct, all were
related and many were mutually intelligible. Patrilineal
descent and inheritance and uxorilocal marriage patterns
were almost everywhere adhered to. Religious systems were
also similar combining faith in the powers of dead
ancestors with magic and witchcraft. Moreover, by the
early 1800s, all the peoples had basically village-
centred political systems. Larger scale political
structures had been created and some still existed. But
these had developed little in the way of central govern¬
ment institutions and were thus not successful in
establishing effective centralized control. They were
superimposed on a pre-existing village-centred pattern so
that their degree of internal coherence was small and they
remained fragile. People, then, lived in villages, small
groups of which bore allegiance to minor, independent
chiefs.
In spite of the trading involvement of some of the
peoples with the East African coast, Malawi, in the early
nineteenth century, was hardly touched by outside
influences and ideas. All this, however, was to be
changed from the 1840s by the advent of the Ngoni raiders
from the south, the entry of the Arab and Yao slavers
from the east, and the settlement of a small number of
forceful Kololo from the Upper Zambezi. It would be
appropriate here to consider these three groups of
intruders briefly.
Of the handful of Arabs and Swahili that came to
Malawi, the most famous was a Swahili from Zanzibar who,
in the mid-134-Os, set himself up as ruler of the present
day town of Nkhota-Khota on the western side of the lake.
After his defeat of the local Cewa chiefs, he came to
style himself Jumhe, •Gultan of Marimba,' and began to
turn his new settlement into an important centre of Islam,
also making an industry of growing food for caravans and
of ferrying slaves in dhows from west to east across Lake
7
Malawi.' At about the same time, the Yao were being
forced out of their home in northern Mozambique and were
moving towards the southern end of the lake. Eventually,
three main Yao sections settled in southern Malawi{ the
Mangoce Yao in the Shire Highlands, the Macinga Yao in
the upper reaches of the Shire River around Fort Johnston
and also in parts of the Zomba district, and the Masaninga
Yao along the south-eastern arm of the lake. Further small
waves found their way to the Dedza district and others
settled along the southern half of the lakeshore as far
O
as Salima. Because of their previous links with the East
coast Arabs and through their possession of firearms, the
Yao groups were soon able to assert their control over the
disorganized and unarmed Nyanja. Having established their
hegemony, the Yao then turned to either trading or
capturing slaves for the coastal merchants. The rapid
7. George Shepperson, "The Jumbe of Kota Kota and Gome
Aspects of the History of Islam in British Central
Africa," in I.M. Lewis, ed., Islam in Tropical Africa
(London,1966), pp.193-205.
8. Johanna B. Abdallah, Chikala Cha Wayao(The Yaos)
(Zomba,1919); J* Clyde Mitchell, The Yao tillage
(Manchester,1956), pp.22-26.
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growth of the slave trade soon created the need for
stronger leadership among the Yao and a whole series of
chieftaincies developed which became involved in bitter
internecine struggles out of which emerged the more
powerful Yao chiefs (mainly Macinga and Masaninga) who
were to give the nascent colonial government such a
difficult time in the 1890s. The increasing trade in
slaves attracted small numbers of Arabs from the East
coast and the Yao began to be subject to the influence of
Q
Islam and Arab culture.7
Help for the stricken Manganja people of the Shire
Valley came from an unexpected quarter. During his travels
in the Zambezi region in the late 1850s, the famous
British missionary-explorer, David Livingstone, had
associated himself with the Kololo, a people of Sotho
origin and at that time dominant over the Lozi on the
Upper Zambezi. Whilst exploring the Shire region, Living¬
stone employed some Kololo porters whom he left behind at
their own request near Chikwawa at the end of his ex¬
pedition in 1863* Through the possession of firearms and
because a terrible famine in the area at this time had
rendered the Manganja helpless, the few Kololo, numbering
sixteen, were able to become dominant in the district.
The Kololo ruled the indigenous peoples harshly but
helped to save them from probable defeat and extinction
at the hands of the Yao. Although holding large numbers of
9. Henry Rowley, The Story of the Universities' Mission
to Central Africa (London,18^6), pp. 112-113, 1^0-9*
217» 337-34-3; W.H. Rangeley, "The Ayao," The Nyasaland
Journal, 16,1 (1963), pp.7-27*
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domestic slaves, they did not permit these to be sold and
I
did not themselves engage in the slave trade, also
foiling various attempts by the Yao and others to find
10
captives in the area.
While the growth of the slave trade and the
expansion of the Yao were spreading havoc and destruction
in parts of southern Malawi, Ngoni invaders were setting
themselves up as the ruling aristocrats in the central
and northern regions. The Ngoni were the descendants of
Zulu migrants who had been driven out of Zululand in the
1820s and who on their way north had incorporated into
their ranks the survivors of the various African groups
they had defeated. Amongst the several groups that moved
away from Natal were the Jere of Zwangendaba and the
Maseko of Ngwane. With their unified political system,
centred upon a paramount chief, and their superior
military organization, the two Ngoni groups were generally
able to overcome the peoples of Malawi. The main body
under Zwangendaba broke up near Lake Tanganyika in the
mid-1840s and a major section under Mbelwa settled in
northern Malawi on the Vipya plateau. From here a number
of raiding parties were launched against the Tumbuka and
Tonga peoples and many captives taken. One of the raiding
parties dispatched by Vbelwa was led by Ciwere Ndhlovu
who set up an independent Ngoni state over the Cewa
people in the modern Dowa district in the hills near
10. W.H.J. Rangeley, "The Makololo of Dr. Livingstone,"
The Nyasaland Journal, 12,1 (1959), pp.59-73; John
Buchanan, 3hire Highlands (London,1885)» PP.93-7; Duff
Macdonald, Africans (2 vols. London,1882), 1, pp.196-
203.
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Domira Bay. The Maseko Ngoni, after journeying for some
years east of Lake Malawi, eventually returned to the
Malawi region and founded yet another state in the areas
around Dedza and Ncheu. From this base in Cewa country,
the Maseko Ngoni raided into the Shire Highlands, harassed
the Nyanja and weaker Yao sections, and thus added to the
turmoil of southern Malawi. But despite their warlike
character and the havoc and terror caused "by their raids,
the Ngoni provided order and security for all those who
lived within their states. Like the Kololo, the Ngoni do
not seem to have taken any part in the slave trade,
raiding other peoples primarily for cattle, grain and
people to supplement the manpower of the state • and
captives from raided societies were assimilated into the
Ngoni tribal structure and could rise to positions of
prominence in Ngoni society.
By the 1870s, the social equilibrium of much of
Malawi had been shattered. In many parts there was a
widespread breakdown of law and order as African
societies reeled under the impact of Ngoni forays and the
trade in slaves by the Yao. A few areas remained, however,
where groups of agriculturalists retained their political
independence; and within some of the new military states
there was also a semblance of order and security. It was
to such a mixed and changing situation that Europeans
11. Yesaya M. Chibambo, My Ngoni of Nyasaland (London, 194-2);
Margaret Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland (London,1956);
J.A. Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society (Manchester,
1967), pp.1-6jf; J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath
(Evanston,1966), Chap.5.
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began to enter in increasing numbers from the late 1870s.
These new white intruders were to prevent the
stabilizing of African societies around Ngoni or Yao
power. What was more important, they were themselves to
become the pioneers of a new era of even more profound
change and disturbance. We shall concern ourselves with
the activities of these European newcomers in the next
section of this chapter. For the moment, however, we may
note that the settlement of missionaries, traders and
planters was not sufficient, during the 1880s, to under¬
mine warfare and the slave trade. The eradication of
these called for proper government with effective Juris¬
diction. Eventually, in 1891, a British Government
proclaimed a Protectorate over Malawi.
Colonial rule broke the power of the larger Yao
and Ngoni states. In the southern region, a series of
military campaigns led to the dismantling of the more
substantial Yao chiefdoms which had been built up
consequent upon the growth of the slave trade. The result
was that the Yao reverted to their traditional village-
centred pattern organized into a number of small
autonomous chiefdoms. Moreover, they appear to have been
culturally similar to the Nyanja whom they had invaded,
the one major distinction being that some Yao sections
adhered to Islam. As for the Ngoni states, in the central
and northern regions, they were either broken up
militarily or splintered spontaneously. Under colonial
rule the large military towns of the Ngoni broke up into
smaller villages and many of the captives broke away to
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rejoin their own people. Since the Ngoni kingdoms
contained a majority of members captured from the
surrounding populations, the Ngoni groups became
linguistically, and to some extent culturally, assimilated
to the people whom they had subjugated. Similarly, the
Kololo, because they were few in numbers, were not able
to assert a new way of life on the people amongst whom
they settled but rather adopted the language and customs
of the Manganja population in the Shire Valley.
Thus instead of Malawi being divided up into a
number of compact states each possessing a well-defined
sense of separate political identity, it has been possible
for the peoples of the country to develop a sense of
national unity which reflects the underlying similarity
of their cultural traditions. Not even the large and
prolonged immigration of the Lomwe people into the Shire
Highlands from Mozambique during the present century has
altered this situation. By 194-5» the Lomwe were the
second largest ethnic element in the Protectorate but they
had become largely assimilated to the people amongst whom
they had settled. Lomwe intrusion from Mozambique was in
small matrilineally linked family groups which either
attached themselves to existing Yao and Nyanja headmen or
established new villages of their own. The traditional
organization of the immigrants appears to have been
similar to that of the Yao and Nyanja and they have been
absorbed into each others' villages and chieftaincies.
Whatever cultural differences that may originally have
existed have also gradually disappeared and there has
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been increasing intermarriage between these southern
peoples.
Nyasaland was thus spared a struggle between the
national movement and tribal sub-nationalisms because the
highly fragmented, small-scale social structure prevented
the formation of coherent, self-sustaining power centres
with separatist political goals. And not only was there
no dominant tribe in the Protectorate but the various
ethnic groups were mixed together in many districts. The
upheavals caused by the slave trade, Ngoni forays, labour
migration abroad, and the concentration in the southern
region of the major employment opportunities for Africans
within Nyasaland, all contributed to this mixture and
homogenizing process. Even if the various peoples of
Nyasaland still referred to themselves as members of a
particular ethnic group, nevertheless, during the colonial
period, they also became increasingly conscious of their
identity as Nyasalanders. Under colonial rule, Africans
were to share many common experiences and a national self-
consciousness was able 'to grow that was unhindered by any
strong emotional feelings of tribalism. As a result,
modern African political activity, in all its various
forms, was to be essentially non-tribal and when,
eventually, a truly nationalist movement was created in
the 1950s it was to reflect the sense of national unity
prevailing among the African peoples of Nyasaland.
But before concerning ourselves with the character
of colonial rule and the development of modern African
political activity, it is important to examine those
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features of the pre-colonial environment and historical
evolution of African peoples during the second half of
the nineteenth century which have a bearing on subsequent
developments during the colonial period. In particular,
it is of importance to consider the impact of Christian
missions in pre-colonial Malawi. Early exposure to
western education was to enable certain African peoples
to take the lead in modern political activity while
others, without the experiences of missionary influence,
were to remain on the fringes of the new political
developments. It is also necessary to know something
about the character of the various African societies when
the new colonial order began as this will enable us to
explain the different African reactions to the intro¬
duction of colonial rule. Finally, it is necessary to
look at some of the factors which led to the British
take-over of Malawi as this will provide the background
for discussion in subsequent chapters of British colonial
policy and administration. The rest of this chapter,
therefore, will attempt to provide a sketch of the
peoples of Malawi and of their history mainly since their
contacts, from the 1860s, with European missionaries and
traders to the time, in 1891, when a British Protectorate
was proclaimed over the country.
European newcomers and African societies
Of all the band of intrepid explorers who trekked
across Africa during the nineteenth century, it was the
travels and investigations of David Livingstone which had
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the greatest impact on Europe. His lengthy journeys and
voluminous writings captured the imagination of the
British public and increasingly directed British interest
to the Central African regions - the areas of his major
explorations. Livingstone captured the public sympathy in
his endearing remarks on the African peoples and their
customs, and in his disclosures of the brutal Arab and
Yao slave trade with its resultant burnt villages,
slaughter and devastation of crops. His scheme for the
•regeneration* of Africa through the allied promotion of
Christianity, commerce and civilization received wide
attention. His programme of action propounded that the
interior regions had to be penetrated along the waterways
by both missionaries and traders who would then be able
to provide Africans with a living demonstration of
Christian morality and religion and also legitimate
commerce. Partly because of his approbation of the line
of communications into the interior offered by the
Zambezi-Shire water system; partly because of his
laudatory remarks on the Shire Highlands as an area
eminently suitable for white colonization; and partly
because of his belief that the Shire Valley was favourably
suited for cotton-growing, deep interest was aroused in
missionary and commercial societies in Britain about
12
operating in the Malawi region.
12. D. and C. Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition to
the Zambezi and its Tributaries (London,1S65); J.
Simmons, Livingstone and Africa (London,1955); G.
Shepperson, ed7, David LivlngiTone and the Rovuma
(Edinburgh,1965j•
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It was Livingstone's recommendation of the Shire
Highlands as an area admirably suited for European
settlement that "brought the first white missionaries to
Malawi. Under its Bishop, Charles Mackenzie, the high
Anglican Universities' Mission to Central Africa (U.M.C.A.)
arrived in 1861 and chose Magomero in the present-day
Chiradzulu district as the scene for its operations. It
proved an ill-fated venture. The antagonism of the Yao
slavers; the high incidence of disease at Magomero; and
the long and difficult lines of communication to the
Zambezi which led to the mission's often being without
adequate provisions and supplies, all contributed to its
15
withdrawal within a few years. y It was a disastrous
failure which discredited Livingstone for a while, and
some years were to pass before other missionary societies
decided to found stations in the region. With the improve¬
ment of communications between Europe and the East coast
coupled with advances in medicine, conditions were
created by the 1870s to respond more effectively to
Livingstone's fervent appeals. With his death in 1873,
his life and the fame of his achievements now heralded a
movement of missions to Central Africa. Almost
simultaneously there arose in the Presbyterian Churches
of Scotland a movement in favour of organizing mission
stations in Malawi, with the Zambezi and Shire Rivers
providing the inland route and Lake Malawi and the Shire
13. Owen Chadwick, Mackenzie's Grave (London,1959); Henry
Rowley, op. cit.,; Reginald doupland, Kirk on the
Zambezi Tcbcford, 1928).
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Highlands constituting the fields of endeavour.
Towards the end of 1874, the Free Church of
Scotland decided to launch the Livingstonia Mission, an
"institution at once industrial and educational" in
concert with Livingstone's own views that a mission to
the Zambezi region should not only be concerned with
Christianity but with training in practical crafts and
educational pursuits as well. The first party of
missionaries arrived in Malawi in mid-1875 and chose Cape
Maclear on the western side of the lake, thirty miles
from its southern end, as its site. The negative attitude
of the locally dominant Yao, however, together with the
unhealthy and isolated position of Cape Maclear, militated
against the successful spread of missionary enterprise.
The Macinga and Masaninga Yao, the two most powerful
branches of the Yao, were in no need of external allies
so as to be drawn to the Europeans. Moreover, with the
settlement of numbers of coastal Arabs and the growing
influence of Islam and Arab culture, these Yao sections
were becoming acquainted with an alternative historic
religion which may have helped to restrict the appeal of
14
Livingstonia. But the greatest barrier to missionary
influence lay in the slave trading activities of the Yao.
By opposing and attempting to destroy that trade, the
missionaries were purposely attacking the very basis of
Yao economic power and thus making virtually impossible
the cultivation of compatible relations between the two
14. W.H.J. Rangeley, "The Amacinga Ayao," The Myasaland
Journal, 15»2 (1962), pp.40-70.
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groups. It was therefore not surprising that little use
was made of the missionaries during their six years*
sojourn at Gape Maclear and that tension between indi¬
vidual Yao chieftains and the mission should increase as
the latter gave refuge to Nyanja fugitives from Yao
villages to bolster the ranks of its subjects. But even
though the number of settlers at the mission increased,
the prevalence of tsetse-fly and lack of arable land soon
forced it to turn refugees away as there were no means of
feeding them. Hot and unhealthy, Cape Maclear further
took a heavy toll on the white staff before it was
evacuated in 1881 and Livingstonia transferred to Bandawe
15
in Tongaland along the western shores of Lake Malawi. ^
The failure of Livingstonia and other Christian missions
to penetrate Yaoland effectively was to have important
consequences for the development of modern African politics
in this area. There were to be few Muslim Yao literates
here in touch with the 'new' world to start up modern
vehicles of political activity. New forms of political
action were hardly to be developed among the Yao of the
Upper Shire during the colonial period and, in practice,
politics remained essentially tribal politics.
A different pattern existed in the Shire Highlands
where the Blantyre Mission of the Church of Scotland
established itself in 1876. The local Yao were of the
Mangoce section. Forced to migrate southwards by the
Macinga Yao, they found themselves farther away from the
15. K.J. McCracken, Livingstonia Mission and the evolution
of Malawi, 1875-1959. Ph.D. Cambridge, 1^67» Chap.5«
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main east coast trade routes and with fewer opportunities
for extending their power. Chief Kapeni and his colleagues
were thus not so well-armed and destructive as the leaders
of the other Yao divisions at the south end of the lake,
and were also not such active traders in slaves. Again,
in contrast with the other Yao branches, they were
desirous of seeking the assistance of the whites against
the devastating raids of the Maseko Ngoni. They therefore
responded eagerly to the overtures of the missionaries
regarding them as potential allies in the defence of their
16
villages. The Kololo, too, welcomed the Blantyre
missionaries partly because of their previous association
with David Livingstone and partly because they had become
worried about the threat of Ngoni incursions across the
17
Shire which they had been unable to prevent. ' Many
refugees - both Nyanja and Mangoce Yao - together with a
smaller group of Kololo pupils settled in villages under
mission protection round Blantyre. But Blantyre's
successes were not to be easily achieved. Between 1879 and
1881 the mission staff were involved in a serious scandal
of mismanagement and harsh and inhuman maintenance of
criminal Justice in their freed slave villages. After a
commission of inquiry, the missionaries were recalled or
dismissed, Blantyre Mission having to be practically
18
refounded.
16. Duff Macdonald, 0£. clt.t 2, pp.22-5.
17* E.D. Young, Nyassa (London,1377)» p.174- et seq. ; W.H.
J. Rangeley, ''The Makololo,'* 0£. eft., p.91.
18. A.G. Ross, The Origins and Development of the Church
of Scotland Mission Blantyre, Nyasaland 1875-1926,
Ph.D. Edinburgh, Shkp.3.
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Under the atle guidance and charge of the Rev#
Clement Scott, the work of the mission was reorganized
and by the mid-1880s it had begun to extend its evan¬
gelical and educational influence. Unlike the Livingstonia
Mission, the Blantyre Mission pursued a basically resi¬
dential system only setting up a few village schools
around its stations. During the pre-imperial period,
therefore, the impact of the mission was confined to the
places where stations were founded and no schools were
introduced in areas outside of the vicinity of Blantyre
or the out-stations of Chiradzulu, Domasi and Mlattje. The
impact of the Blantyre Mission was further restricted by
the lack of finance which handicapped it for much of the
pioneer period and which prevented the opening of other
stations until the mid-1890s. But even these new stations
continued to be confined to the 3hire Highlands and parts
of the Ncheu district. Like Livingstonia, the Blantyre
Mission failed to make any effective headway in the Upper
Shire district and also never penetrated the lower Shire
Valley. Even though these two latter areas were not
ignored by other missionary societies, they nevertheless
remained little influenced by Christianity. The peoples in •
these areas were therefore unable to break out of the old
traditions which was so necessary for the development of
modern African politics. In the Shire Highlands, however,
Blantyre attracted many pupils from the 1880s and evan¬
gelical and educational activity made some advance. Ele¬
ments of a primary education were provided and pupils were
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introduced generally to the mores and folkways of the
19
western world.
But missionary success was greatest in the
northern region during the pre-imperial period. Tongaland
proved to "be an area far more conducive to the expansion
of the influence of the Livingstonia missionaries than
that at Cape Maclear. Not only were the missionaries not
confronted with the challenges of the slave trade and
Islam "but also the lakeside Tonga enthusiastically
welcomed the European newcomers hoping to involve them on
20
their side against Mbelwa's Ngoni. Yet no less receptive
were the Ngoni to missionary overtures. An incipient
decline in the northern Ngoni state, due in part to their
not possessing firearms because they were not slave
dealers and could not thus obtain guns from the \rabs,
was causing considerable concern particularly at the
mounting ability of neighbouring societies to repel their
attacks. At the same time, internal dissensions between
Mbelwa and his brothers who were important segment leaders
were also becoming serious. Because Mbelwa's kingdom was
the largest of the Ngoni states, it contained several
important territorial sections which were powerful enough
to insist on a measure of autonomy and which were
21
continually challenging the power of the paramount chief.
Paced with these problems, Mbelwa, from 1882, attracted
19. ibid., Chaps.2 and 4.
20. «f. van Velsen, "The Missionary Factor among the
Lakeside Tonga of Nyasaland," The Rhodes-Livingstone
Journal, 26 (1959)* pp.1-22.
21. Margaret Read, o£. cit. , p.80.
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the Livingstonia missionaries to northern Ngoniland,
partly to prevent an exclusive alliance developing
between the Tonga and the whites, and partly to get the
Europeans to act as an integrating force within a
22
splintering Ngoni polity. By 1887, Free Church mission¬
aries were teaching and preaching throughout the state.
When Dr. Robert Laws led the Livingstonia mission¬
aries to Bandawe in 1881, he immediately opened schools
and the Tonga responded enthusiastically to the education
offered. Tonga cultural emphasis upon individual achieve—
25
ment which affected rank status, made them look upon
education as a vital weapon in the effort either to
conserve or to improve status. By the early 1990s, nearly
two thousand pupils were regularly attending school and
more than a dozen schools were operating throughout
Tongaland. Laws attempted to spread elementary education
over as wide an area as possible rather than concentrating
on boarding schools at the main station. Subjects were
taught in the vernacular and the highest available class
was Standard Four. Complementing academic work was
industrial training; Laws hoped that by learning reading
and writing with some instruction in the crafts his
pupils would be of use in the infant European commercial
economy in the Shire Highlands. And, indeed, unable to
satisfy their demand for European manufactured goods
(which the mission had created) by finding employment in
22. For a discussion of Mbelwa's manoeuvres, see K.J.
McCracken, 0£. cit., Chap.4.
23. See J. van Telsen, The Politics of Kinship (Manchester,
1964).
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their homeland, the Tonga soon began making their way in
large numbers to the southern highlands of Malawi and
later to neighbouring countries in search of work and
cash. In northern Ngoniland, too, schools were started
though a few years later than among the Tonga. Although
attendance was at first small and irregular, with pupils
coming mainly from Ngoni captives, the numbers slowly
increased drawing in time upon members of the royal Jere
clan. As with the Tonga, consequent upon the lack of
economic opportunities at home, the Ngoni began migrating
to other areas in Malawi or abroad in search of employment
24
to buy the goods they so eagerly desired. All this was
to be of significance for the subsequent development of
African political activity. The lead taken in the field
of education by the Tonga, northern Ngoni and the
indigenous Tumbuka was to be reflected in the field of
modern African politics. Throughout the colonial era,
mission-educated Africans from these groups were to be
not only the first but also the most politically-active
persons in Nyasaland. And to their political deliberations
they could bring that wider knowledge of events and ideas
derived from their experiences elsewhere in the Protecto¬
rate or abroad.
Backed by superior financial resources than
Blantyre, the Livingstonia Mission introduced further
small stations under European control. A station was
founded at Karonga in Nkhonde country. But the religious
24. J. van Velsen (The Missionary Factor), o£. cit•,
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position of the Nkhonde paramount, the Kyungu, who
through his spiritual authority embodied the unity and
solidarity of the tribe, proved a major barrier to
success. By propagating Christianity against the tra¬
ditional religion, the missionaries were striking at the
unity of the tribe and were consequently unable, for
some years, to make effective inroads into Nkhonde
25
society. ^ Success also eluded Livingstonia in southern
Ngoniland where a station was started in 138? some
distance from the paramount's headquarters in the Livulezi
Valley in predominantly Cewa country. On their settlement
in Malawi, the Maseko Ngoni were divided between two
chiefs, Chikusi and Chifusi, who were continually warring
on each other. It was not surprising therefore that when
Chikusi asked the missionaries for assistance and this was
refused, relations between the two sides should become
strained. Among the northern Ngoni, Laws had been able to
exploit the internal dissensions in a segmentary state
but owing to the unitary nature of the southern kingdom
and the absolute power of the paramount Chikusi, especially
after the defeat and defection of Chifusi, missionary
chances for influence were considerably narrowed. Refusal
to side with the eventual victorious chief, the absence of
any segmentary tendencies within the Ngoni state, and the
geographical remoteness of the mission station, all
conspired to limit the import of the Free Church on the
?6
Maseko Ngoni before the advent of British rule.
25* K.J. McCracken, op. cit., Chap.4.
26. ibid..
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David Livingstone had advocated the conjunction
of economic progress and spiritual advancement for the
redemption of Africa. If the slave trade was to "be under¬
mined, much depended on the ability of the missionaries
to promote the introduction of legitimate commerce. But
Livingstonia*s trading activities at Cape Maclear proved
cumbersome and time-consuming and the missionaries soon
began to see the need for a trading organization which
would take over the responsibility of ordering, trans¬
porting and distributing the commodities that they
required to carry on operations. The Free Church in
Scotland therefore decided on the formation of a trading
company, independent of Livingstonia, the object of which
was to supply both Scottish missions and to establish
commerce on a substantial level to oust the slave trade.
The African Lakes Company (A.L.C.) hoped to buy up
ivory, the main local article of economic value, and to
export it at a price which would undercut the Arab
coastal merchants relying on slave porters. It hoped,
thereby, to induce the Yao to abandon securing slaves and
concentrate instead on the procurement of ivory for sale
to the A.L.C. But the Company found it difficult to
acquire ivory. The prices demanded by Yao traders were
far too high. Yet the Company was not a complete failure.
Gradually, it began to procure ivory either by trading
with such peoples as the Kololo, Nyanja, northern Ngoni
and the northern Arabs or by sending its staff out on
hunting trips. Great efforts were also made to encourage
the cultivation of crops which would provide an export
<4-4- -
trade and plantations were 3tarted in the Bhire Highlands.
The Company's carrying trade also became a major part of
its operations especially with the spread of mission
stations. A thirty-ton steamer was launched in 1387 for
the lower Shire-Zambezi run and water traffic was increas¬
ing. A large employer of labour, particularly porters, the
Lakes Company consequently dispensed much calico and
trade goods to the local peoples with whom, apart from a
few notorious incidents, it maintained friendly relations.
But apart from the activities of the A.L.C., white
planting and trading interests in the Malawi region were
still slight and few Europeans had settled in the country
before the onset of colonial rule. The end of 1337 saw
the outbreak of the Arab Var in which the Lakes Company
became deeply involved. Compelled to carry on the long
drawn-out war alone and unaided, there resulted a serious
interruption in all of its schemes of development,
including the normal trading of the Company, and which
27
brought it to the verge of bankruptcy. '
The assumption of British political control
Unless the slave trade wa3 brought to an end, both
27. Thi3 paragraph is based mainly on an unpublished
seminar paper delivered at Chancellor College,
University of Malawi by H.T. ^acraillan entitled "A
Bketch for the History of the African Lake3 Company
1373-93,H (November 11,1968.).
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commercial and evangelical activity and internal order
were impossible. From their earliest days in the country,
the missionaries had pressed the British Government to
appoint a commissioner with the backing of a steamer on
the lake and a small armed force to counteract the
traffic in slaves. Both missionaries and the Lakes
Company, together with their supporters in Scotland, seem
to have acted as a united pressure group and campaigned
the home government to safeguard British interests in the
Malawi region. Probably as a result of such concerted
pressure, a consul was appointed in 1833 to "suppress"
the slave trade though he was instructed to rely on
persuasion and tact and not armed force to achieve his
end. Despite his obvious impotence, the British Government
continued to turn a deaf ear to demands to extend its
commitments in the Lake Malawi region. With the outbreak
of the Arab War, however, appeals for greater British
pQ
involvement were considerably strengthened.
No attempt can be made here to discuss the causes
and progress of the Arab War which lasted from late 1887
pQ
to October 1390." Suffice it is to say that within a few
years of the A.L.C. starting a trading post at Karonga in
1884, a group of half-caste Arabs, attracted by the
28. A.J. Hanna, The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-
Eastern Rhodesia 4359-95 4956). pp.35-79.
ibid., pp.79-33, 83-9» 92-105» 151-5; L.M. Fotheringham,
/1'dventures in Nyasaland (London, 1891).
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market for their ivory, began to settle around the
station and soon commenced violently to assert their
ascendancy over the local Nkhonde. On the Company agents
granting sanctuary to the fleeing Nkhonde refugees and
on their aiding Nkhonde villagers, the A.rabs became
agitated towards the whites and determined, to oust them
from Karonga. The resultant fighting dragged on with
neither side being powerful enough to bring the
struggle to a successful conclusion, the situation
becoming a stalemate.
Combined pressure from the supporters of the
Company and the missions continued to be applied for
British protection, but the government insisted that it
could do nothing to help. 1888 saw the demand for
British involvement intensify with the growing attempts
by the Portuguese in the south to make good their
historic claims to Malawi by dispatching expeditions to
the southern end of the lake to persuade the Yao to place
themselves under Portuguese protection. Prom the time of
Livingstone's explorations, the Portuguese, settled along
the East coast and lower Zambezi since the late fifteenth
century, had become concerned about British intentions in
interior districts which they regarded as lying within
their 'sphere of influence'. Prom about 1836, the
Portuguese began to send an increasing number of missions
to the Lake Malawi area to strengthen their claims. Local
Portuguese authorities in Mozambique also began inter¬
fering with British vessels plying the Zambezi and even
refusing the passage of certain equipment to Malawi. In
May 1888, the Lakes Company was refused permission to
import guns and ammunition for use in the Arab War and
only after vigorous British diplomatic representations
80
were the goods allowed to proceed.
Growing more alarmed at the simultaneous threat of
the Arabs in the north and the Portuguese in the south,
Britons in Malawi began clamouring more vigorously for
British political control. The British Foreign Office,
however, evinced no desire to take up administrative
responsibility. It was reluctant not only to assume any
additional financial burdens but also to annex territories
to which access could only be obtained through undisputed
Portuguese country. No navigable passage to the Zambezi
was known and vessels had to enter the river from
^uelimane and the KwaKwa mouth which became unnavigable
about forty miles from the coast. From this stage, an
overland journey of four miles through Portuguese
territory was necessary to reach the mainstream.
With rumours reaching Britain of a massive
missao civilisadora, led by the renowned explorer Serpa
Pinto, advancing to the Malawi region ostensibly for
scientific purposes but actually to establish Portuguese
sovreignty over the Shire districts, great consternation
was caused in Scotland among mission and Company supporters.
When the British Government sent a consul Harry Johnston
to Lisbon in early 1839 to come to an understanding with
the Portuguese about Malawi, and he returned with a draft
30. A.J. Hanna, op. cit., pp.127-3, 131-2; Eric Axelson.
Portugal and the Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg,1967;*
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agreement which would have ceded the whole of the Shire
Highlands and the southern half of the lake area to
Portugal, "the Voice of Scotland" wa3 raised to a roar.
Such was the agitation stirred up by the established
Church that no more wa3 heard of Johnston's delimitation
scheme. More important, however, the British Government
had been made abundantly aware of Scottish insistence that
Portugal not be permitted to enter into the land of the
31
Blantyre mission.
In March 1889 Cecil Rhodes had arrived in England
to conclude negotiations for a royal charter for his South
Africa Company which would empower it to administer
territory it had acquired extending from Botswana in the
south to the Zambezi in the north. Harry Johnston and
Rhodes met at a party in May at which they exchanged
their visions of British enterprise in Africa and
concluded that territory north of the Zambezi including
the Malawi region should be secured for Britain.
Acknowledging Britain's financial inability to take over
this area, Rhodes offered to pay for the police and
administration of northern Zambezia, hoping, no doubt,
that he would eventually obtain control of territory both
north and south of the Zambezi. No longer deterred by
lack of finance, the Foreign Office now accepted the
desirability of keeping Portugal out of the Ohire Highlands
though it decided to pay Johnston's travelling expenses in
the Malawi region while Rhodes' money could look after
3-1. A.J. ftanna, op. cit., pp.132-4; Roland dliver, Sir
Harry Johnston and the "Scramble for Africa (London,3959)»
pp.144-151.
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anything else including the presents for chiefs elsewhere
in northern Zambezia. Moreover, the other major obstacle
to British sovreignty in the area — access to the lake
region - had also been overcome. In May 1889» a deep-
water outlet of the Zambezi had been discovered at Chinde
whereby steamers could proceed directly to the Shire and
52
the lake without encroaching upon Portuguese soil.
Arriving at the Ruo confluence in July 1889»
Johnston came across the large expedition under Serpa
.Pinto whose mere size belied the scientific purposes
attributed to it. Pinto was being held up by the Kololo
chiefs of the Shire Valley and Johnston warned him that
if force was used to advance through Kololo country,
Anglo-Portuguese relations might be seriously affected.
Continuing his treaty-making Journey up the Shire to
forestall his rival, Johnston authorized acting-consul
John Buchanan to declare a British protectorate if the
Portuguese crossed the Ruo frontier in force and gave any
evidence of an intention to occupy the Shire Highlands
politically. Johnston then proceeded to sign treaties
with various Kololo, wangoce Yao and Tonga chiefs, and
with the Jumbe of Nkhota-Khota which, though they did not
confer or promise protection, ensured the priority of
British interests in the regions to which they applied.
Kololo acceptance of these 'friendship1 treaties
was based on the assumption that their essential interests
could be better preserved under British than Portuguese
52. \.J. Hanna, op. cit.,' pp.136-142; Roland Oliver, op.
cit., pp.152-6.
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influence. Certainly they do not appear to have entertained
any ideas of ceding their sovreign rights to the Europeans.
As for the other African groups that signed the 1889
treaties, they seem to have done so mainly because they
were threatened by more powerful neighbours. The readi¬
ness with which raided chiefs made treaties was clearly
related to their weak position and their hope of support
against the Ngoni or Yao. The Jumbe seems to have been in
this position in 1889. Although the Jumbe had at one time
been a foremost trader in slaves, he now seems to have
become mainly a dealer in ivory, also finding it more
profitable to keep his slaves on the land to grow rice
for sale to passing caravans. The major reason for his
signing a treaty with Johnston appears to have lain in the
fact that one of his Yao sub-chiefs, Ciwaura, had
increased his power and allied himself with Makanjila, the
most important Yao slaver along the southern half of the
lake. Jumbe may therefore have been looking to the
British for support against possible external and internal
threats. Apart from these treaties, a truce was also
concluded at Karonga between the Arab leaders and the
representatives of the Lakes Company. Both sides were
utterly exhausted and at the end of their resources and
keen to bring reprisals to an end. The treaty evoked
hardly any concessions from either side but it was
sufficient to restore peace for a few years at least. $0
treaties were signed with the northern Ngoni leaders
although one of Johnston's temporary vice-consuls, Alfred
Sharpe, concluded agreements with chiefs Chikusi and Ciwere
in the central region.
In mid-December whilst nearing Lake Mweru in
northern Zambia, news reached Johnston that following a
skirmish between the Kololo and the Portuguese at the
Ruo frontier in September, Buchanan had on the 21st of
that month proclaimed a formal protectorate over the
Kololo and Yao districts. In November the Portuguese had
crossed the Ruo and been engaged by the Kololo in battle.
The Kololo had been repulsed with severe losses and the
Portuguese had then occupied Katunga's (near Chikwawa)
giving notice of their intention to take over the Shire
Highlands. But the question of the definition of spheres
was under discussion between Britain and Portugal. In the
end, the British Foreign Office dispatched a aeries of
telegrams wnich culminated on January 11, 1390 in a
formal ultimatum to the Portuguese Government in Lisbon
requiring the withdrawal of their forces to the south of
the Ruo confluence or British gunboats would 3hell the
capital of Mozambique. Portugal submitted, and the armed
expedition was compelled to retreat below the Ruo, respect¬
ing that river a3 the limit of Portuguese territory in
33
the region.
The frontiers of the new colonial 3tate of Malawi
were soon delineated and the basis of a settlement for
its administration gradually worked out. Agreement was
hammered out between the Eritish South Africa Company of
Cecil [diodes and the Foreign Office whereby Malawi was
separated from the rest of northern Zambezia, annexed and
administered directly by the Imperial government, with
33.Roland Oliver, oj>. cit., pp.157-173.
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Rhodes obtaining title to what became Zambia. Harry
Johnston was entrusted with supreme political control
even over the Company's northern sphere and was provided
with a sum of 110,000 per annum by Rhodes* Company to
administer both the territories. Johnston, however, was
to remain responsible only to the Foreign Office. The
agreement was to last for three years up to January 1,
1894- subject to renewal at the discretion of the British
Government for a further period not exceeding two years.
The Foreign Office thus found itself in a position to
govern Malawi without seeking Treasury financial backing
and the B.S.A. Company's charter was extended north of
the Zambezi. On February 14, 1391, Harry Johnston was
given his formal appointment "to be Her Majesty's
Commissioner and Consul-General to the territories under
British influence to the north of the Zambezi." On May 14,
1391» a British Protectorate was formally proclaimed over
*4
Malawi. British administration had come to Malawi in
name though it would still be a number of years before it
was present in actuality.
34.. The Protectorate was designated initially as the




Indigenous Polities, Colonial Administration and the Rise
of Modern African Politics, 1891-1914.
For five years after Harry Johnston had assumed
charge of the new Protectorate in July 1891* British
administration was confined to a narrow strip of territory
extending from the southern Portuguese frontier to the
northern extent of the Shire Highlands. On the lake and
beyond it, no attempt was made to govern, primarily
because of the paucity of financial and military means,
though two ex-employees of the African Lakes Company
exercised duties of a consular nature. In the Upper Shire
district between Zomba, the Protectorate's capital, and
the southern lakeshore, attempts to impose immediate
British political control were met with stiff resistance
by a number of Yao slaving chiefs. With their eventual
defeat in 1896, and with the colonial regime now possess¬
ing a larger financial and military backing, the rest of
the country was brought speedily under British rule,
though the northern Ngoni only voluntarily accepted
colonial sovereignty in 1904. In the history of East and
Central Africa, Malawi was brought under European control
with a speed exceptional for the period. Nevertheless, the
imposition of British authority was, for the most part, a
halting and piecemeal process, compounded of numerous
petty, though violent, incidents. During the years of
assertion of British supremacy, the colonial government
had also begun fashioning a system of local administration.
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In attempting to establish a sound system of civil
administration, it soon became clear to Johnston and his
successors that it was not possible to govern effectively
unless use was made of those elements whose authority was
recognized in traditional terms by its ordinary populace
as legitimate. But the numerous 'little* wars waged by
Johnston had resulted in the destruction of the political
forms of the larger Yao and Ngoni chiefdoms, which were
the only substantial indigenous polities in the Protecto¬
rate. This destruction of the power of the larger chief-
doms, when combined with the existing political fragmen¬
tation of the rest of the Protectorate, had important
consequences for African political developments. Not only
was the adoption of a policy of indirect rule through
chiefs not very successful but the traditional
authorities were also unsuited for dealing with the new
challenges of colonialism. Meanwhile, a new African elite
was emerging which began to assert its claims to represent
the feelings and aspirations of the African peoples and
which began to seek to supersede the chiefs as the more
efficient intermediaries between Africans and Europeans.
These new educated elements were the originators of modern
secular African political activity and provided the
beginnings for an eventual African challenge to colonial
tutelage itself.
African political systems and the introduction of
colonial rule
Soon after his arrival as Commissioner and Consul—
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General, Harry Johnston set about negotiating treaties
with the African chiefs whereby the Crown acquired
so^rreign political authority of their areas in place of
its far more limited rights under the earlier contracts
which had made it the protecting power. He began by
£
securing a cession of sovreign rights from the chiefs of
southern Malawi. The leaders of the Nyanja, Manganja,
Kololo and Mangoce Yao peoples as well as those of the
other essentially agricultural societies that Johnston
later contacted in other parts of the Protectorate, such
as the Cewa, Tonga and Nkhonde, all acquiesced in British
overlordship. Their previous contacts and relations with
Europeans, mainly missionaries, must have guided them in
their response to the white newcomers and led them to
believe that their vital interests would not be undermined
by the advent of the new British power which could, above
all, promise them protection and peace which would be
such an advance upon their former conditions of life. It
might have been expected that the Kololo would have
regarded white control as a threat to their dominant
position over the Manganja. But their engagements with the
Portuguese in 1889 had left them badly beaten and by
being forced to flee to the Europeans in Blantyre for
help had, accordingly, suffered a profound blow to their
authority. For assertions of African hostility to the new
invaders, it remained for the Macinga and "asaninga Yao
slavers of the Upper Shire region to come into collision
with the new challenges of European power and for them
%
alone, of all the peoples of the southern region, to offer
resistance to the British take-over.
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Johnston claimed that his first major object was
to safeguard the security of the Shire Highlands, where
white planting and missionary concerns were becoming
important, and also maintain the lines of communication
northwards along the lake to secure missionary and
trading interests in that area. The need to exercise
control over the Upper Shire district brought the British
into immediate conflict with the recalcitrant Yao slavers
and especially with Makanjila who was the leading slaving
power along the southern half of the lake. Yet despite
his willingness to confront the Yao, Johnston was in no
position to effectively subdue them. No other British
administration in tropical Africa started out with such a
slender military and financial base. Johnstons army was
composed of a mere seventy-one Indian soldiers supported
by a similar number of ill-trained Zanzibari and Makua
auxiliaries. Its deployment was to be a matter of constant
anxiety. Should it be overpowered, as it easily might be
in a single ambush, no further military support could be
expected. If the powers to subdue were not at hand, the
means of persuasion by way of handsome subsidies were
also lacking. Johnston's financial backing amounted only
to the annual subsidy of £10,000 — an income which to
many of his contemporaries would have appeared equivalent
to the rent-roll of a second-rate English landowner.
Because of these weaknesses in men and money, Johnston
was obliged to pursue a policy of extending his authority
through agreement with weak African polities and resorting
to what Dr. E. Stokes has termed a "spoiling policy of
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weakening, dividing and wearing down every indigenous
political system that possessed any capacity to menace or
resist."
Rivalry among and within the various Yao chiefdoms
made Johnston's methods for extending political control
seem the obvious tactics. The more substantial Yao chief¬
doms, which had begun to develop in size consequent upon
the growth of the slave trade, still lacked internal
«
cohesion. Composed as they were in large part of
indigenous Nyanja, internal divisions could be exploited
along ethnic lines as well as by the support of one group
within a chiefdom against its competitors. And because
the Yao chiefdoms were also riven by disunity among them¬
selves, one Yao chief could be played off against another.
Between 1891 and 1895» Johnston waged a series of 3mall
wars against the Yao chiefs of the Upper Shire region
before they eventually yielded and accepted British rule.
These numerous'little' wars together with Johnston's
various divisive tactics resulted in the power of the Yao
chiefs being broken and their political systems being
permanently weakened. Whatever larger political forms the
Yao slavers had managed to develop were now completely
destroyed. With the defeat of the Yao, Johnston, now
possessing a stronger military backing, turned his
attention to the subjugation of the north-end Arabs. Mlozi
and his allies were quickly overwhelmed and Arab power at
1. Eric Stokes, "Malawi Political Systems and the Intro¬
duction of Colonial Rule 1891-1396," in Eric Stokes and




last obliterated and reduced to insignificance.
Before launching his operations against Mlozi,
Johnston had ensured the beginnings of British adminis¬
tration at Nkhota-Khota. Information had reached Zomba in
early 1894 of a revival in slave trading activity which
the ageing Jumbe was powerless to prevent. Divisions
within the sultanate had rendered it a splintering polity
with Jumbe supporting the Gewa headmen and concerning
himself more with agriculture than trade, and the Arab and
Yao elements continuing to deal with 3laves. In July 1894,
Jumbe 111 died and his successor, the son of a slave wife
of Jumbe 1 and a supporter of the Yao, had soon to be
deposed and deported to Zanzibar for having local nota¬
bilities murdered; for planning to kill all the Gewa
headmen of the old Jumbe; and for seeking to destroy a
5
British station near Nkhota-Khota. No Jumbe was now
appointed. Instead, the district was placed under the
general supervision of a British Resident who began
administering through a council of native rulers. The
indigenous Cewa chiefs and headmen of the eight
territorial sub-districts accepted British sovreignty,
agreed to desist from the slave trade and agreed to
2. For details of the various military campaigns, see H.
"foyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles (Aldershot,
1956), pp.19-22, and for a discussion of British
success in imposing control over the Yao slavers, see
Lewis Gann, "The End of the Slave Trade in British
Central Africa: 1889-1912," The Rhodes-Livingstone
Journal, 16 (1954), pp.46-7.
3. F.0.2/68, Sharpe to F.O., 5 December 1894; F.0.2/38,
Sharpe to F.O., 15 January 1895* P.R.O., London.
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conform to the laws and regulations of the new adminis¬
tration. Following Mlozi's defeat, the rest of the central
region, consisting of a jumble of Cewa, Yao and semi-
Ngoni groups, was quickly brought under British occupation
and control. The indigenous Cewa presented no problem
though a few who had developed contacts with the Yao
offered brief and piecemeal resistance. The larger Cewa
and Yao chiefdoms were defeated and broken up and the
central region, like the southern one, came to be charac¬
terized by a high degree of political fragmentation.
Only the two major Ngoni states still remained to
be brought under direct administration. Mbelwa's Ngoni
was able to avoid direct confrontation with the British.
The remoteness of northern Ngoniland from the sources of
economic power in the south made it less necessary for
Johnston to assume control than was to be the case with
southern Ngoniland. The northern Ngoni were not an
important source of labour for the southern white estates.
At the same time, missionary provision of education and
industrial training had already led to the young men
transforming themselves from warriors into migrant
labourers. Finally, the segmentary character of the
northern kingdom not only prevented the creation of a
concerted effort to withstand white advance but laid open
the state to the views of the younger elements who were
advocating collaboration with the new European forces.
Eventually, in 1904, the northern Ngoni voluntarily placed
themselves under British jurisdiction, thus ensuring that
their political system remained substantially intact. For
- 60 -
the Maseko Ngoni, however, proximity to the Shire
Highlands and the lack of missionary counsel and in¬
fluence, were factors making collision with the British
more likely. Moreover, the southern Ngoni state, during
the 1890s, was coming apart at the ethnic seams. Cewa
labour migrants were acquiring increased status through
their earnings when they returned home and there were
fears that the authority of Ngoni chiefs might be
diminished by the growing independence of the Cewa
populace. The Ngoni rulers thus felt it necessary to re¬
assert their control. When the Ngoni exerted pressure on
the Cewa to remain at home rather than go to work on
white estates, this threatened the drying up of the
planter's labour supply which the government could not
ignore. When a series of raids were made against Cewa
villages and a mission station, which had granted refuge
to Cewa fugitives, attacked by an Ngoni party, the
British had sufficient inducement to dispatch an ex¬
peditionary force. The Ngoni paramount's village was
attacked and his army defeated. Chief Gomani, the para¬
mount, was taken prisoner and shot for murder. His
villages were fired, his cattle seized and his power
iL
broken.
Johnston's military expeditions led to the "dis¬
mantling of the larger-scale systems and the displacement
4. J.K. Rennie, "The Ngoni States and European Intrusion,"
in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown, eds., 0£. cit., pp.
312-331. See also The Central African Times, 34
December 1904, p.13 for an interesting article entitled
"The Gomani Raid" by H.J.R. - H.J. Rutherford, editor
of the newspaper.
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of the political and coercive authority of centralized
institutions and paramounts.This was mainly the case
with the Yao and Ngoni states in the central and southern
regions. The northern Ngoni were not subdued and their
political order was left substantially intact though
existing segmentary tendencies within Rgoni society were
leading to a decline in the power of the paramount vis-a-
vis his sectional chiefs. Elsewhere in the infant Pro¬
tectorate, however, Johnston's military campaigns reduced
the power of the larger pre-colonial polities which
together with the existing political fragmentation meant
that the traditional political authorities were not to be
of any great strength and substance during the colonial
period. More importantly, the old political systems were
to prove themselves generally unsuited for dealing with
the new challenges of colonialism.
African societies, traditional institutions and the new
colonial order
The period of occupation was ended. Primary African
resistance had been a vain and futile attempt to re¬
capture the past and from it Africans derived many
important lessons for the future. They must clearly have
realized that if they were to challenge white authority
or even try to regain their independence, then different
and essentially non-violent means were required. Armed
resistance had proved ineffective and had exposed the
great technological inferiority of African societies.
Professor J.C. Mitchell has written that the "superior
arms of the British left an indelible impression on the
5. E. Stokes, 0£. cit., p.372.
Yao who had long conducted successful military campaigns
and in due course these arms came to he identified with
g
the force of the value system of the Whites.'1 Such an
impression must also have been shared by all the African
peoples of Nyasaland. As well, they must have realized
the need for organizing a unified African reaction to the
colonial authority. Piecemeal African resistance had
proved a serious drawback and a wider and popular
movement was essential if opposition to the colonial
regime was to be more successful. But many years were to
pass before a mass nationalist movement was created.
For the resisting groups, there must have been,
for the future, a continuing significance of memories of
defeat. Professor Margaret Read tells us that in the 1930s
the southern Ngoni "referred repeatedly to the ex¬
peditions sent against them, the defeat of their army,
the death of their paramount and the seizure of their
cattle. They nursed a grudge against their conqueror
which coloured much of their sentiments towards
7
Europeans.A similar and probably more traumatic
experience must also have been felt by the Yao of the
Upper Shire district. But the political significance of
memories of defeated resistance is difficult to explain
Q
in the Malawi context. It may well be that their
6. J. Clyde Mitchell, "The Political Organization of the
Yao of Southern Nyasaland," African Studies, 8,3 (1949),
p.145.
7. M. Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland (London, 1956)* p.43.
8. For a general discussion of this subject in Fast and
Central Africa, see T.O. Ranger, "Connexions between
•Primary Resistance* Movements and Modern Mass
Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Journal of
African History, 9,3 (1968), pp.437-53 and 9,4 (1968),
pp.631-41.
importance was confined solely to the existence of some
lingering feelings of bitterness and resentment against
Europeans rather than their seeking expression in direct
political action against the colonial order. This is
probable in Malawi because neither of the two groups
suffered any serious disadvantages or disabilities as a
result of being defeated. The dispossession of defeated
Africans by the British was not of any great significance
in Malawi, Unlike the Ndebele in Southern Rhodesia,
neither Gomani's Ngoni nor the Yao lost their land except
for the occasional site for a mission, trading or
government station. Again, unlike the Mebele, the
southern Ngoni suffered no similarly large and debilitat¬
ing expropriation of their cattle to their white
overlords. Of equal moment was the fact that the
accommodating societies gained no striking advantage over
the vanquished. None of the collaborating peoples were
rewarded with increased territory at the expense of their
defeated neighbours. Nor were the Nyanja, Cewa or Tonga,
unlike the Ganda in Uganda, used by the British as
government agents in other tribal areas. Thus, even where
an African group in Malawi had done badly out of the
initial encounter with the British, it was still able to
confront the new colonial situation on a par with the non-
resisting ones, and, if it so wished, gain equal access
and opportunity to the new sources of prestige and
advantage like western education and economic development.
The Yao, for instance, although continuing to reject
Christianity, were able to compensate for the loss of
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their slave trade "by marketing their surplus produce for
sale to the increasing number of persons of all races who
were beginning to settle in the Shire Highlands. And the
southern Ngoni soon started sending their youth to the
local mission schools and their able-bodied males began
moving in large numbers either to the Shire Highlands or
to neighbouring countries in search of work and cash. The
fact that even for the defeated there were advantages to
be derived from the new colonial order softened the blow
of military defeat and ensured that few profound feelings
of bitterness were retained during the colonial period.
Eventually, no doubt, all African societies
suffered a blow through the loss of 30vreignty as the
British rulers progressively established the effectiveness
of their rule. Very few of the African leaders could have
desired that political control of their lands be alienated
permanently to the Europeans. Although they could not
have been aware of all the implications of the treaties
they signed they must have realised their significance to
a certain extent. Yet they could not have realized what
the nature of European rule would he, how it would affect
their societies and how long it would remain. And, indeed,
African life was never to be the same again. During the
first years of colonial rule, however, British occupation
and the other western forces impinged only slightly on
the lives of most Africans in the Protectorate. Partly
for this reason, there was no further traditionalist
type of African resistance to European control as
occurred elsewhere in East and Central Africa. Disillusion
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with white rule was certainly not absent, particularly
in the Shire Highlands and parts of the central region,
but it did not lead to any widespread resistance movement
beyond a few small riots. It is important to discuss why
subsequent rebellions of a traditional type did not break
out in Malawi in order to enable us to shed light not
only on the nature of the early colonial impact on the
African peoples but on the suitability of tribal
institutions for dealing with the new challenges of
colonialism.
By and large, during the 1890s, administrative and
settler pressures in Malawi were not as intensive and
harsh as those experienced by Africans in neighbouring
countries and where the indigenous peoples were impelled
into further resistance. In Matabeleland, the element of
settler participation and the expansion of the energies
9
of South Africa were of considerable importance. White
enterprise in Malawi, confined almost entirely to the
Shire Highlands, was a slower and more exiguous affair.
In Southern Rhodesia the pressure of hundreds of white
settlers together with the demands of the British South
Africa Company itself compared significantly with the
much smaller number of planters in Malawi who arrived in
smaller batches over a longer period of time. The demands
of the Protectorate administration were probably more
onerous but there were no exactions as profoundly serious
9 . T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1396-7
(London,1967), Chaps.2-3.
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as those attendant upon the government-enforced schemes
of cotton-growing in German East Africa which were the
10
major causes of the outbreak of the MaJi-MaJi rebellion#
Johnston's administration cared little about African
agriculture and took no actions that would threaten
seriously African subsistence economies. Outside the
Shire Highlands, where white settlement was also of little
consequence, the colonial government, consequent upon
limited men and money, exercised a very frail authority.
Northern Ngoniland remained independent until 1904 while
elsewhere a few white officers faced thousands of
Africans who continued to live much as before.
Be that as it may, governmental pressures allied
with settler demands did create considerable dissatisfac¬
tion from the mid-1890s and, in many ways, the causes for
further rebellion may well have existed, particularly in
the Shire Highlands and some of the neighbouring
districts in the central region. For it was in these
areas that the white planters established themselves and
where the colonial government exercised its greatest
control. Settler intrusion with its usual consequences of
land alienation and labour recruitment wa3 beginning to
turn the Shire Highlands into a microcosm of Southern
Rhodesia and also leading to the creation of a series of
grievances for local and neighbouring Africans which
sometimes produced violent outbursts. Ill-treatment of
10. John Iliffe, "The organization of the Maji Maji
rebellion," Journal of African History, 3,3 (196?)»
pp. 495-512.
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labourers on white plantations and the loss of African
land rights were a major source of discontent. The
unsavoury methods of labour recruiters were another and
were held to be the chief reason for the outbreak of a
11
brief rising among the southern Ngoni at Domwe in 1898.
In another district, also important for the provision of
labour for southern white estates, Central Ngoniland,
there were frequent disturbances which culminated in
serious disorder in 1901 and led to an official enquiry
12
being conducted. Labour recruiters were again condemned
but the real causes went deeper. Africans possessed few
local opportunities to earn cash to defray their tax
obligations to the government and were unwilling to
migrate to the Shire Highlands and work on white estates
where conditions were bad and discipline harsh. But a tax
defaulter was liable to be conscripted for labour on
white plantations until he had earned the amount of his
tax. The imposition of the government's hut tax at an
earlier date in the central and southern regions than in
the north, coupled with its more rigorous collection, was
proving a burden for many Africans and discontent in¬
creased as Africans were forced to obtain employment away
15
from home to work off their tax requirements.
But the possibilities for organization are also of
importance in the creation of any rebellion. The aJi-MaJi
11. British Central Africa Gazette (B.C.A.G.), 30 April
-1898, p.-1; -H June -1898, p.2.
12. F.0.2/472, sharpe to F.O., 31 December 1901, P.R.O.,
London. See also M.W. Retief, William Murray of
Nyasaland (Lovedale,1953), p.67^
13. For a more detailed discussion of these and other
pressures on Africans, see Chap.3.
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rebellion in German r,ast Africa and the 1896-97
rebellions in Southern Rhodesia had been quite different
from the early African resistances to European
occupation. Whereas primary resistance had been tribally
based and fought in terms of the traditional military
system, the subsequent rebellions were mass movements
integrating diverse peoples which involved everyone in
the rebel areas. The achievement of such unity on a
larger scale had been brought about by a traditional
Ir¬
religious ideology. Primary resistance in Malawi had
also utilized independently existing forms of military
organization and there had been no unified reaction on
the part of the indigenous peoples to the British
invasion. But as a result of the series of 'little* wars
fought by Johnston, the larger political systems of the
southern Ngoni and the Yao had been broken up thus
rendering them incapable of organizing any further
resistance on a significant level. As well, the existing
fragmented political structure of the Cewa, Myanja and
Mangoce Yao prevented their political authorities from
promoting effective resistance. The means for further
resistance also did not exist when African religious
institutions proved unable to act as a focus for more
wide and effective opposition to white authority.
The most important territorial spirit in nineteenth
14. John Iliffe, o£. cit. • Terence Ranger, ''The Role of
Ndebele and sKona Religious Authorities in the
Rebellions of 1896 and 1897," in Eric Rtokes and
Richard Brown, eds., The Zambesian Past, op. oit.,
pp.94-136.
century southern Malawi had been M'Bona which was
attributed power with respect to the population and the
land and which was the guardian spirit of the Manganja.
The cult had been controlled by the royal house of Lundu
and only the chief or his deputy had been able to
perform rites, imposters or invading chiefs not being
able to do so since they were not related to the
tutelary spirit. Chief Lundu had maintained a shrine of
M'Bona on Cholo mountain. The spirit of M'Bona was
supposed to have an abode on the top of the mountain and
to him the Lundu resorted for counsel in times of
difficulty and danger. With the advent of the Kololo in
the 1360s, Lundu and his family fled south into
Portuguese territory and only returned to Nyasaland in
1927* M'Bona's worship on Cholo mountain began to die out
and is only vaguely remembered to-day. Another shrine of
M'Bona was to be found in the Port Herald (now Nsanje)
district at the southern extreme of Malawi but this was
mainly of local importance. The northern cult had
therefore been of greater political significance but it
had ceased to exist after the departure of Lundu and his
15
family. The other main rain institution in the
Protectorate, the pan-Cewa rain-cult of Makewana in the
central region, had also vanished completely under
similar circumstances. Shortly after 1366, the cult
centre was destroyed by the Ngoni, and Makewana and her
15* J.M. Schoffoleers, M'Bona the Guardian-Spirit of the
Mang 'an;jat B.Litt. Oxford, 1966.
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court were dispersed or killed. The territorial spirits
of M'Bona and Makewana had therefore not outlived the
pre-colonial era to "be in a position to permit social
mobilization on a wider scale than appeals by leaders of
kin groups. Their importance, moreover, had not been
influential among the Nyanja and Mangoce Yao of the Shire
Highlands, and it was amongst these peoples that the
constraints of the early administrative and planting
systems were most onerous for Africans. In the Shire
Highlands traditional religious authority was vested in
those with kinship and political authority who, because
of their fragmented nature, were unable to provide the
basis for wider political action against the Europeans.
Yet a further traditional type of resistance to
British control and white settler pressures was not
altogether absent from the Malawi scene during the early
colonial period. The hut tax, with its hated labour
rebate which was introduced in 1901, was always a matter
of African discontent particularly outside the Shire
Highlands where few local opportunities existed for
Africans to earn cash. In April 190? a Chikunda
prophetess, Ohanjiri, appeared on the Mozambique/Southern
Wgoniland border and preached that Europeans would leave
the country by the end of the year and that no more taxes
need be paid. Her appearance coincided with the explosion
of a meteor in the area, and she claimed to have
16. W.H.J. Rangeley, "Two Nyasaland Rain Shrinest
Makewana - The Mother of all People," The Nyasaland
Journal, 5,2 (1952), pp.48-9.
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"miraculous powers" and to have "appeared from Heaven".
Her teaching, reported the Deputy Governor, spread "like
wild-fire through the whole Protectorate". This latter
statement was a gross exaggeration but it was clear that
the power of the prophetess was subject to the limits of
neither kin nor territory.
"It appears that she issued an order to all
natives that they must at once visit her to
receive instructions from her, and that no one
must come empty-handed. Natives of all tribes
flocked in thousands to her, hundreds of
natives employed by Europeans leaving their
work to answer the summons. She promised
excellent rains and ample harvests to all who
came to do homage; she also announced that she
would send darkness over that portion of the
country where the white men live (Shire
Highlands) and that no native need pay any
more hut taxes, as the white man would
disappear through her magic".
At first the government took the matter rather lightly
until it discovered that the local tax returns showed a
shortage of 63*000. Official concern mounted when it was
learned that the prophetess had also become evident in
Fort Johnston where several Yao chiefs, through passive
resistance, had refused to collect taxes. The Portuguese
authorities were asked to have the woman removed from the
vicinity of the British frontier and she was warned about
her future behaviour, and "the excitement among the
17
natives...subsided".
But the traditional institutions and systems
were generally incapable of dealing with the challenges
of the colonial situation. They had either been destroyed,
17. C.0.525/18* F.B. Pearce to C.O., 31 August 1907*
P.R.O., London.
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disrupted or permanently weakened "by the various conflicts
of the nineteenth century and their capacity to tackle
the problems of Africans in the new colonial state was
very slight. New forms of political action were clearly
needed which would provide a more effective challenge to
white authority. Because of the early exposure to western
education, the beginnings of modern African political
activity followed quickly after the end of the period of
traditionalist resistance. These new forms of political
organization were to be non-tribal and to be led by 'new*
men deploying new skills of opposition and aiming at full
entry into the European styles of life rather than a
return to the past. How modern African political action in
Nyasaland began is our next concern
Traditional authorities and the rise of modern political
organizations
During the years of assertion of British supremacy,
colonial officials had also begun turning their attention
towards the exercise of administrative control over their
new African wards as well as fashioning a regular local
administration. From 1892, Johnston began dividing his
administrative area into districts, each of which were to
be administered by Collectors. Given the limitations of
staff and money, the early Collectors could do little
more than maintain their position and expand their autho-
/) Q
rity as opportunity offered. They may have been able to
impose their will on Africans in the immediate vicinity of
their stations but were forced to depend on the support
18. C.A. Cardew, "Nyasaland in 1894—5»" The Nyasaland
Journal, 1,1 (194-8), p.52.
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of African authorities for any more positive approach to
the more distant areas. The indigenous authorities who
came to be used as intermediaries to establish and
maintain contact between the colonial power and the
African populace were the traditional chiefs. Although no
clearly defined policy was formulated regarding
relationships between white administrators and traditional
authorities, Johnston seem3 to have given instructions to
the Collectors "to uphold as much as possible the power
of the chiefs" and to regard them as "the representatives
of the people towards the Collector."''^ Chiefs thus came
to be charged with the duties of keeping law and order,
aiding the collection of taxes and supplying labour for
public works. It would have been impossibly expensive to
operate only with expatriate personnel, whether or not it
was thought to be in the best interests of policy to do
so. As elsewhere in colonial Africa, the British found in
Malawi that no system of administration could function
effectively without this buffer of local indigenous
employees who were generally chiefs, selected partly for
their loyalty to the colonial government and partly on
20
the basis of their local influence and legitimacy.
But by the turn of the new century, there had
resulted a general decline in chiefly authority
B.C.A.G., 1 January 1394, p.4, report by J.O. Bowhill,
Collector of Chikwawa dated 1 October 1893.
20. For a good general analysis of this process with
examples drawn from Uganda, see D.A. Low, "Lion
rampant," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
2,3 (1964), pp.235-52.
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particularly in the central and southern regions of the
Protectorate. A leading colonial official, H.L. Duff,
remarked of the surviving chiefs in these regions as
being generally "not chiefs any longer, but only headmen
under British control, with an authority more or less
21
nominal over inferior headmen in their vicinity." A
number of factors in combination explain this general
dissolution of chiefly power.
As we have seen, the series of little wars waged
by Johnston had led to the breakdown of the larger-scale
political systems of the Yao and southern Ngoni. This
dismantling of the power of the larger African polities
in the central and southern regions also appears to have
been a deliberate policy. Johnston seems to have wanted
to preserve the indigenous system only in its inter¬
mediate ranges to help him to administer the rural
African populace; at the level of the larger chieftaincy,
indigenous organization would be "too large, too powerful,
too aggressive to exist side by side with a European
administration, and accordingly it was dissolved.'2- The
effective level of participation for traditional rulers,
as Johnston saw it, would be no higher than tax collecting
and the dispensation of customary law under the
supervision of white officers. But the employment of
chiefs in order to carry out the business of adminis¬
tration further weakened their power. During the 1890s,




before taxation had been imposed in the north, chiefs in
the other regions were used generally in the collection
of hut-tax. Taxation was deeply resented by Africans for
reasons which we shall explain in the following chapter,
and by having to undertake its collection chiefs were
undermining their local standing. Added to this were the
pressures of the white planters. Unlike their counterparts
in the northern region, chiefs elsewhere in the Protecto¬
rate were involved in the requisition of labour for
European plantations. Those chiefs who resided on white
estates in the Shire Highlands were used by the European
landowners to force African residents to provide labour
for the cultivation of crops, and it was therefore not
surprising that Africans should move away from the chiefs
onto neighbouring Crown lands. Similarly, the private
recruitment of labourers from districts in the central
region made people move away from their chiefs who were
being bribed by labour agents with presents and drink
to force their subjects to work for white planters.
Ey 1901 a growing movement of people away from
their chiefs was reported in many parts of central and
southern Malawi and there was a progressive breaking up
of large villages into smaller units often comprising no
more than a collection of a few huts under the leadership
24
of a headman. The power of the chiefs was breaking
23* F.0.2/606, Annual report for the British Central Africa
Protectorate for the year 1901-02, P.R.O., London. For
distinctions between private estates and Crown lands,
see Chap.3.
24. For a different analysis reaching a similar conclusion
see J.C. Mitchell, The "fao Village (Manchester,1956),
pp.39-41.
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down and the administration was increasingly forced to
rely on "the police...for all purposes" as the "merely
nominal chiefs" played "no real part in the affairs of
their country.This general disintegration of chiefly
authority led the government, during the first decade of
the twentieth century, to take over from the chiefs
their duties of tax collection and labour recruitment.
It appears to have realized that the tasks of indigenous
rulers had to be made less onerous if the British were
not to destroy completely their standing and hence their
utility for administrative purposes. The administrative
duties of the chiefs were lightened but they remained
the local agents of the government. The chiefs were thus
being provided with an opportunity to resume their
previous close relationship with the people. To some
extent they were successful in doing this but such was
the decline in their traditional power that they
continued to be looked upon as "headmen under British
control."^
North of Fasungu, however, there seems to have
been a light overrule among the Tonga and Nkhonde after
1896 and the northern Ngoni after 1904, established for
the most part with African consent and which left the
indigenous political systems substantially intact. The
administrative duties that the chiefs were asked to
25. 3.3. Murray, Handbook of Nyasaland (London,1932), pp.
126-8; F.0.2/606, Annual report...for the year 1901-02
P.R.O., London.
26. H.3. Hudson, leport on Development of Local Government
in Nyasaland (London,1951)» p.1; review by 3ir Philip
"itchell in the Journal of African Administration, 3,2
(1951), p.57.
perform were not too onerous. They were concerned with
keeping the peace, looking after roads, sanitation in
villages, etc., Direct European administration was also
not prominent as in the Shire Highlands; the larger areas
for which northern officers were responsible made
'•dictatorial rule more difficult" and, perhaps, less
necessary as there were no "settlers' claims to
27
consider." ' But if the chiefs remained in close
relationship with the people, it was also clear that
they were gradually becoming officials serving a
European colonial administration and that their
traditional authority was declining consequent upon the
control exercised over them by white district officers.
At the same time, evidence of the process of splitting
and scattering of villages was not absent. The northern
Ngoni paramount, Chimtunga, was proving unable to exert
his influence over his sectional chiefs and the unity of
the only large state in the country was collapsing. As
the kingdom contained a majority of members captured from
the surrounding peoples, many of these captives began
breaking away under the new conditions of colonial rule
to rejoin their own people. Under British rule, also, the
large military towns of the Ngoni began breaking up into
smaller villages.^®
Although the tribal system was still continuing to
break down by 1910 throughout Nyasaland, the government
27. Griff Jones, Britain and Nyasaland (London,1964), p.71.
28. C.0.525/29, Sharpe to C.O., 50 October 1909, P.H.O.,
London.
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also appreciated that it could not operate effectively
at the local level without the support of fairly
influential chiefs. The decline in chiefly authority was
a matter of considerable concern for the government and
it now sought to build up the power of the traditional
authorities. There was also a growing realisation of the
need to bring more order and system into ifrican village
life generally. It was felt that there wa3 required Man
organization to control the rising generation of natives
who, finding themselves without the restraining influences
to which their parents were accustomed, have of recent
years evinced an inclination to emancipate themselves
from the disciplinary responsibilities of village life
and obedience to authority• firgt step towards
the solution of these problems was taken by the
enactment of the District Administration (Native)
Ordinance of 1912.
This ordinance provided for the appointment of
Principal and Village Headmen who were to become, in
effect, the executive agents of the Protectorate
administration in the rural areas under the direction,
guidance and supervision of white district officers. In
each district administrative sections were to be
demarcated and placed in charge of a Principal Headman
who would also have two councillors to advise him. In
turn, these sections would be sub-divided into village
areas which were to be under the charge of a Village
29. S.S. Murray (1932 edition), o£. cit., p.129
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Headman. No powers were conferred on Principal Headmen
to hold tribunals and the functions prescribed for them
were mainly in connexion with the maintenance of law
and order, the concentration of villages, the
construction of roads, the reporting of deaths, etc., No
mention was made regarding the utilization of headmen
in the collection of tax, possibly, as suggested above,
to preserve whatever influence they still retained. All
that was indicated was that the Principal Headman was
merely "to exert his influence to accelerate the payment
of hut and poll taxes."
According to 3.S. Murray1s reliable account, which
has sometimes been misinterpreted because of its confusing
and vague presentation, the purpose of the 1912 ordinance
"was in no way intended to revivify or perpetuate
government by native chiefs. The position of Principal
Head-man under the ordinance was in no sense to be
similar to the archaic one of Chief." Thus, even if
traditional authorities were appointed Principal Headmen
they would not be able to function in their traditional,
pre-colonial roles which Murray believed, mistakenly, to
be absolutely autocratic. But this was not to suggest
that no attempt would be made to restore the prestige and
authority of chiefs if they became the new Principal
Headmen to enable them to function effectively along new
lines. For Murray also concluded: "Residents were to
indicate carefully by their attitude towards and dealings
with Principal Head-men the fact that they were
officially recognized as Chiefs of their respective
sections and that, as such, they were entitled to the
30
respect and obedience of their people." Yet the new-
type powers of the Principal Headmen were to be limited
and were to be exercised under the close control of the
white district officer. As Governor Smith pointed out in
1918, it had "been found necessary to build up again
between the Government and the people an intermediate
power" but one that would derive "its authority from and
is directly controlled by the Government." A similar
statement was made by the Attorney-General, R.W. Lyall-
Grant: "Recently the powers of headmen have been
partially revived but only to a very limited extent, not
definitely along tribal lines, and in close subordination
51
to intensive district supervision."^
The enactment of the 1912 ordinance posed the
%
important question whether appointments to administrative
positions in the rural areas should be based on birth or
on education and merit. Governor Manning had stated that
he wanted to see "the formation in the country of a
native subordinate district staff organized from the
people themselves and as far as possible chosen by the
people themselves.Most likely, however, he still
regarded the chiefs as the real representatives of the
30. 3.3. Murray (1932 edition), 0£. cit., pp.128-130. All
quotations in this paragraph are from page 130.
31. C.0.525/78, Smith to C.O., 18 February 1918, and
enclosure no.1 by Lyall-Grant dated 30 November 1917»
P.R.O., London.
32. C.0.525A3, Manning to C.O., 19 October 1912, P.R.O.,
London.
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African peoples and thought that a selected number of
them would constitute the members of the new local
administration. And, indeed, most of the major chiefs
were made the new Principal Headmen with the next
important rulers being appointed as their councillors.
The balance of comparatively minor chiefs and headmen
33
were made Village Headmen,' But, as we shall see in the
next chapter, the impact of western forces had already
brought in its train a gradual cultural transformation
among African societies. Independent sources of income,
western education, Christianity, freedom to travel, were
all beginning to throw up independent-minded Africans and
making it likely that the chiefs would not be so easily
able to command unquestioned obedience. By appointing the
traditional authorities as the new subordinate civil
servants, an arrangement which formalized the previously
convenient situation, the government was thus bound to
alienate and make suspicious many of the younger and
better educated African elements.
In the eyes of the new, mission-educated men -
clerks, school-teachers, ministers of religion - chiefs
had, over the years, become civil servants and no longer
the real representatives of their people. The use of
chiefs to promote British regulations and the open
33. See, for example, the oral evidence of J.C. Abraham,
first-grade administrative officer with sixteen years
administrative experience in Kyasaland, dated 21
March 1928 to the Commission on Closer Union of the
Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa. Mimeo¬
graph in P.C.O. Library, London.
control of white district officers had clearly underlined
the dependence of chiefs upon the Protectorate government
and lessened their traditional authority. Under the new
ordinance, the chiefs were not only being confirmed as
the agents of the colonial administration at the district
level but, of greater importance for the new men, were
also being regarded officially as the authentic channels
of communication between the people of their district
and the European district officer (known after March 1906
as the District Resident). To many of the educated
elements this was an intolerable position. The chiefs
had become essentially government servants and had lost
their role as tribal leaders. Believing themselves to be
the successful pioneers of a new way of life and seeing
themselves as more effective intermediaries between
Africans and Europeans, the new elite began to assert its
claims to represent the African viewpoint and to lead
their people into the new European-dominated society.
They now began forming district organizations to expound
African aspirations and grievances in European terms.
"Members of the Association being natives of
the country and acquainted with all the habits
and customs of the people.•.could adequately
express their desires and needs to the
Government; and being educated...could fully
explain the mind of the Government to the
people." 34-
Because of the destruction of relevant records
burned in the fire in the Nyasaland Secretariat in 1919»
34-. S1/2065/19i Resident to C.S., 6 November 1919,
enclosing constitution of the West Nyasa Native
Association, M.N.A., Zomba.
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there is no direct evidence to support the present
argument which is based partly on similar developments in
35
western Kenya, ^ and partly on a brief interview with one
36
of the founders of these new district organizations. An
article by Levi Mumba, one of the founders of the North
Nyasa Native Association, though written in 1924 does,
however, provide sufficient justification for the
validity of our analysis. Its relevant paragraph bears
quoting at extensive length.
"...from the time when the Protectorate was
organized into districts there has existed
what are termed annual meetings of chiefs and
headmen at which native matters of interest
are supposed to be discussed and thus an
opportunity given to natives to bring any
grievances or matters of interest they have
to the notice of the authorities. The largest
district court house that I know is not
capable of accommodating comfortably more than
15 headmen, guards and interpreter included,
and the low voice of the Resident or that of
his interpreter, both of whom address their
remarks to headmen who are sitting at their
feet, is not heard by the larger number of
people who are sitting all around the court
outside. This procedure is a direct dis¬
couragement to councillors and other men who
accompanied the chief or headman, in some
cases for a journey of 5 or more days, only to
find that they are shut out and are unable to
hear anything of the proceedings. On the other
hand the headman is there deprived of his
councillors and advisers who have always
assisted him at such gatherings in village
life. Such meetings are quite understood by
the native as he regards them as equivalent to
his own custom of a 'purification day' and is
therefore surprised to find that any headman
55. Bethwell A. Ogot, "British Administration in the
Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 1900-60," Journal
of African History, 4,2 (1963), pp.249-53.
36. Interview with the late Robert Gwebe Nyirenda at
Karonga, Malawi. Mr. Nyirenda was one of the founders
of the North Nyasa Native Association.
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who takes a different view from that of the
Resident is looked upon as perverse. For fear
of offending the Resident in this way it is now
a custom to say 'Yes' when they mean 'No* and
vice versa. This state of affairs is not
peculiar to any one district and the educated
natives on seeing it thought that it would not
he good citizenship merely to deplore a
situation without trying to do something to
remedy it, however inefficient their effort;
they therefore decided to organize political
associations because they are convinced that
the information obtained by the Resident in the
way stated cannot be representative native
public opinion." 37
The timing of the District Administration
ordinance may therefore explain the formation in 1912 of
the North Nyasa Native Association and in 1914- of the West
38
Nyasa Native Association. The ordinance was applied, in
the first place, to a few districts outside the southern
region such as North Nyasa and West Nyasa. The centres of
European settlement in the Shire Highlands were
deliberately avoided as many of the chiefs resided on
white estates and difficulties would arise in connexion
39
with the rights of landowners. This fact may help us to
answer the question posed by Professor J. van Yelsen as to
why Native Associations arose initially in the north
rather than the south where the constraints of the
colonial and planting systems were far more severe on
37* Levi Z. Mumba, "Native Associations," Zo Ona, 24-
April 1924-, p.1.
38. J. van Velsen, "The Establishment of the Adminis¬
tration in Tongaland," in Historians in Tropical
Africa (Salisbury,1962), pp.130, 182, where he alludes
Co this connexion with regard to the formation of the
West Nyasa Native Association.
39. S.S. Murray (1932 edition), 0£. cit., p.133.
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Africans and where such political groups were more
4-0
likely to have originated.
Yet these early secular political initiatives
along modern lines did not lie exclusively with the
Livingstonia-trained Africans. Certainly, for reasons
which shall be explained in the next chapter, political
organizations were to be late in appearing in the central
region. But in the 30uth. at least two bodies were formed
before 1912 which although less enduring than the Native
Associations were "surely the prototype of native self-
4-1
help associations" in the northern region. 3hepperson
and Price have brought to our attention the case of the
42
African Industrial Society which was founded in 1911»
and Dr. Rotberg has shown the existence of an earlier
organization, founded in 1909 by the same Blantyre-
educated Africans, and which was known as the Native
43
Industrial Union. These two bodies may have been the
same body, the one continuing into the other under a
different title, or they may have been two attempts at
different times to create a similar organization. They
will be considered more fully in chapter four. At this
stage, however, it simply needs to be pointed out that
these organizations pioneered the way for the later
40. J. van Velsen, "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi,"
in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown, eds., The Zambezian
Past, op. cit., pp.378, 408-9.
41. George Shepperson and Thomas Price, Independent
African (Edinburgh,1958), p.415.
42. ibid., pp.166-171.
43. Unpublished and untitled paper on the 1915 Rising in
Nyasaland by Robert I. Rotberg.
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Native Associations which were formed in the northern
region. It could perhaps be argued that these early
southern ventures were mainly of the self-improvement
category and were not politically oriented as the Native
Associations. Even if this was the case, and it most
likely is not, it is now becoming evident that educated
Africans in the south were also considering the need for
political groups though Native Associations were only to
be started there in the 1920s. For example, and there may
well be even earlier instances, in his evidence to the
1915 Native Rising Commission, the Rev. Stephen Kundecha
of the Blantyre Mission suggested the creation of a
secular "native council" which would be more representa¬
tive of African opinion than the existing meetings of
chiefs and white officials.
No records are available to inform us about what
the two northern Native Associations discussed before the
outbreak of the first World War and their consequent
decision to temporarily halt their activities. Neverthe¬
less, during a period when, as we shall see in a subsequent
chapter, indigenous political activity of a modern type
was being channelled through independent African churches,
there were here the beginnings of a parallel secular
response which was to become the major avenue for African
political agitation during the inter-war years. For our
present purpose, the importance of these early Native
44. C.0.525/66, Smith to C.O., 7 February 1916, enclosure
no.C, notes of evidence of witnesses; Reverend
Stephen Kundecha dated 9 July 1915» P.R.O., London.
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Associations lies in their role in meeting the growing
need for effective political leadership among the African
people. It is necessary here to make a distinction
between politics and administration. The new colonial
invaders were the ones solely involved in the policy¬
making process. It was they who decided how the African
peoples should be protected, exploited or developed. Once
the policies had been determined, it was the task of the
white district officers with the aid of the chiefs and
headmen to ensure their implementation. The traditional
authorities had therefore become wholly administrators.
On the other hand, the mass of the people, including the
new educated elements, were neither participants in the
policy-making bodies nor concerned with the task of
implementing policies. There were no institutions of
local government in which the indigenous people, apart
from the chiefs, could be involved. As a result, Native
Associations were an attempt by educated Africans to
provide effective African leadership at a time when the
chiefs had lost or abandoned or become unable to perform
45
adequately their traditional political responsibilities.
It is essential, however, that differences between
the chiefs and the new aspirant generation should not be
exaggerated. Many chiefs had taken the initiative in
inviting African Christian teachers into their villages
45. For a partially similar analysis, see J.A. Barnes,
"Indigenous Politics and Colonial Administration
with special reference to Australia," Comparative
Studies in Society and History, 2,2 (1960;, pp.147-8.
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and there were no acute conflicts as yet between the
traditionalist leadership and the new converts. Indeed,
it is very likely that many chiefs must have looked to
prominent African Christians for advice and help in their
relationship with the alien administration. Many of the
new men also seem to have been drawn from the families of
chiefs especially as missionary societies tended to base
their evangelical and educational institutions at the
ZLg
headquarters of chiefs. Moreover, the chiefs themselves
may have been critical of the 1912 ordinance to a certain
extent especially as it represented an attempt to introduce
more direct rule and control by European district officers.
There may, in consequence, have been some need for co¬
operation between the traditional and new elements in the
face of the government's native policy.
More importantly, it is necessary to note that
these new men were still a very small minority and that
their behaviour remained extremely untypical. Many
African societies, especially the ones on the fringes of
contact with modernization, such as those in the Upper and
Lower Shire districts and on the western Malawi border
with Zambia had not yet thrown up such men, and continued
to be led and guided by established rulers. Change in and
between African societies, often as a result of European
pressures and opportunities, was uneven with important
4-6. A number of examples could be given but it may be
noted, as a brief illustration, that both I.M. Jere
and Y.Z. Mwase, co-founders respectively of the North
Nyasa and West Nyasa Native Associations, were of
chiefly origin.
ramifications for the emergence and development of
modern-style African political activity. It is to these
western forces and their import for the character and
rise of modern African politics that we must now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
Economic and Social Factors in the Development of Modern
African Politics.
To understand modern forms of African political
action in colonial Malawi, it is necessary to uncover the
various circumstances that have conditioned their growth
and character. Modern forms of African politics have "been
the product of the stimulation or provocation of (a) that
cluster of phenomena known generally as 'Westernism* and
(b) the frustrations and grievances attendant upon the
A
impact of such phenomena. By the term 'Westernism* we
refer to a broad range of situations that have resulted
from the intrusion of Western influences. In the present
chapter, we shall concern ourselves mainly with a number
of economic and social factors that affected the political
scene in Nyasaland before 1914- and consider the ways in
which they have stimulated, or delayed, the growth of
modern African political sentiment and activity. In a
number of ways the consequences of these factors for the
emergence of African politics are obvious. But the impact
of 'Westernism* was uneven throughout the Protectorate
with the result that there were important variations in
the development and nature of modern African politics. To
account for these varied political reactions, to clarify
the context within which these responses arose, and to
1. See James S, Coleman, "Current Political Movements in
Africa," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science. 293 (-1955)7 pp.95-163.
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explain the non-existence or slow growth of modern African
political activity in some areas, we must examine these
western forces and their attendant situations in some
detail.
Revenue and taxation
Harry Johnston's most pressing need during his
Commissionership was a continuous and increasing flow of
revenue. All that the British Government was willing to
finance were the salaries of Johnston and his deputy
Alfred Sharpe and two small gunboats on the lake. The
fe10,000 annual subsidy granted by Cecil Rhodes was wholly
required for the maintenance of an armed force and money
from other sources had to be found to finance the other
government expenditures.
In the second set of treaties that were negotiated
with most of the African societies that peacefully
accepted British political control, a clause was
contained whereby the African peoples agreed to contribute
to the expenses of the administration in return for the
boon of the administration's peace. Again, whenever a
punitive expedition was undertaken against a recalcitrant
Yao chief, a treaty ceding sovreign rights to the Crown
and agreement to pay taxes was made a condition of peace.
At first, a poll tax of 4s. a head was levied but, from
1893* an annual hut tax of 3s• was adopted.
For most of the years of his Commissionership up
to 1896, Johnston could only depend for his revenue on a
limited area confined to the Shire Highlands and Shire
Valley. Only when the Yao slavers were finally defeated
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In late 1895 was tax collected throughout the southern
region; and only "by 1897» when the chiefs in the other
£
regions had accepted British sovreignty, were tax demands
imposed in the rest of the Protectorate with the exception
of the northern Ngoni who began paying tax in 1906. In
addition to this limitation, Johnston was confronted with
the administrative difficulty of enforcing taxation in
the southern region. The principle of taxation was un¬
known to the African peoples and its imposition was
deeply resented. Tributes and gifts from the people to
their chiefs had been common but these were offerings of
a voluntary nature and in recognition and support of the
authority of the chiefs. The white man's tax, however,
was a strange concept involving a revolutionary
innovation in African life. African peoples who lived by
subsistence farming were now being forced to seek paid
labour to earn money to meet their tax obligations. Tax
came to be identified with labour which Africans were not
willing to perform and tax evasion became widespread. Up
to 1896, the pressures of the hut tax were a source of
discontent mainly for Africans living in the Shire High¬
lands. Outside these upland areas, in the rest of the
southern region, Johnston found it difficult to ensure
that his taxes were fully paid. The influence of his
Collectors hardly extended beyond the government station
and the local chiefs, not wishing to court unpopularity
with their subjects, were not always reliable in tax-
collection. Force could not readily be resorted to since
the army was invariably tied up in meeting the threat of
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the Yao 3lavers. Nonetheless, evidence exists which
shows that small expeditions of Zanzibari and Makua
soldiery were sent to punish villagers refusing to pay
tax by burning down their huts and confiscating their
2
grain and livestock. Such aggressive methods were most
probably confined to the areas in and around the infant
townships of Blantyre and Zomba where the administration
exercised its greatest control during the 1890s. It is
probably here, therefore, that the imposition of hut tax
and the "bullying manner" of the soldiers created the
most African discontent and proved that the acceptance of
British protection by the Mangoce Yao and Nyanja peoples
was not an altogether unmixed blessing. And it was here,
as we shall see in the next chapter, that Joseph Booth was
able to attract his main body of early African support by
condemning the government's tax impositions.
Such were the problems and difficulties that
Johnston received only §<700 in taxes in 1392 and §<1,639
in 1893» sums which accounted for a negligible proportion
of his total expenditure. Nor could tax revenues be
bolstered initially by the levying of import duties as
they were forbidden by the provisions of certain
4.
international agreements. By 1394- the Protectorate
2. Rev. Andrew C. Ross, "The African - A Child or a Man...."
in Eric Btokes and Richard Brown, eds., The Zambesian
Past (Manchester,1966), pp.34-4-6. ~
3. James Johnston, Reality versus Romance in South Central
Africa (London,1395)» pp.29^-2.
4. A.J. Hanna, The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North-
Eastern Rhodesia, 1359-1893 (Oxford,1956). pp.224-5.
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administration was in deficit to the sum of £22,766 and
things had taken an even worse turn when a crisis
developed in the relations between Johnston and Cecil
Rhodes which had serious financial implications. In the
end, however, the British Government intervened and
agreed to provide the Protectorate with a fixed annual
grant while prevailing upon the Treasury to assume
responsibility for the colonial administration's debts.
In November 1894- an agreement was also concluded
resulting in the administrative separation of the
Protectorate from Rhodes' Company's sphere and the
ending of the relationship between them in June 1895* At
the same time Johnston was urged to ensure that the
Protectorate became economically self-supporting as
quickly as possible. The grant-in-aid had to be
progressively reduced and the budget balanced by
increasing local revenues. Such demands by a parsimonious
British Treasury during the life of a pioneer and
embryonic colonial administration in a largely undeveloped
territory, were to condition the type of economic policy
evolved initially by Johnston and his successors in their
efforts to achieve self-sufficiency.
The foundations of a revenue which would make the
Protectorate economically self-supporting could not rest
alone on customs duties and annual hut taxes from
Africans. Even if these particular sources of revenue
were to be substantially increased, then the people had
to have the capacity to earn cash incomes on which tax
could be levied, an opportunity which hardly existed
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north of the Shire Highlands. In order to solve his
critical financial problems and to build up a local
revenue, Johnston turned to the European planters to
develop a viable agricultural economy, more especially
as the Protectorate showed no evidence of mineral wealth.
It was a common belief at that time that the African who
lived by subsistence farming, who knew little or nothing
of a cash economy, would not be able alone to produce the
revenue that was required to make the Protectorate pay
its way. In the government's subsequent economic policy,
therefore, African agricultural production for export was
ignored and emphasis placed rather on the growth of a
modern agricultural economy linked to European production.
The contribution of Africans to the economic development
of their country was to lie in the provision of labour
for white planters from whom they could earn cash incomes
on which tax could be levied.
5
Land and labour^
In the few years prior to the promulgation of a
Protectorate in 1891, a number of planters, traders and
concession-seekers of all nationalities had begun
entering Malawi for the purpose of acquiring land. On
$. For a good detailed discussion of these topics, see B.S.
Krishnamurthy, Land and Labour in Nyasaland 1391-1914,
Ph.D., London, 1964, Chaps.3-5* An interesting general
discussion of these subjects is contained in Elliot J.
Berg, "The Development of a Labour Force in 3ub-
Saharan Africa," Economic Development and Cultural
Change. 13,4 (1965), pp. 394-4-12.
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assuming charge, Johnston found that much of the fertile
southern region had been 'sold* to whites for absurdly
low sums by African chiefs who had no customary right to
alienate freehold land. Much land had been sold in exchange
for highly-coveted trade goods which could not otherwise
be easily obtained. Only the Yao slavers in the Upper
Sbire district, who organized trading caravans to the
East African coast and who could thus secure such goods
from the Arabs, saw no need to cede land to the whites.
In most cases, however, the chiefs could not have under¬
stood the bargains they entered into with the Europeans.
African customary law never treated land as a property
and consequently it could not be sold by chiefs but
merely allotted for temporary use. It must also be
emphasized that even in those cases where chiefs received
financial payment in a land transaction, they had no
intention of surrendering permanent freehold ownership.
As a result, throughout the colonial period, Africans
were to condemn these transactions, to claim that they
had been illegally deprived of their lands, and to ask
7
the government to recover these lands from the whites.'
6. For some examples of such 'purchases*, see W.H.J.
Rangeley, "Early Blantyre," The Wyasaland Journal,
7,1 (1954). P.40.
7. See, for example, the various African evidence to the
1946 Land Commission, Vol.2, in the F.C.O. Library,
London. See also NS 2/1/4, Annual report on the
Southern Province for the year 1931 by A.J. Brackenbury,
Provincial Commissioner: "The question whether big
landowners...were entitled to the land which they had
acquired in the old days from the Native Chiefs was
asked at a large gathering of the Native Association
at Chiradzulu which was attended by many natives and
chiefs. This question has also been widely discussed
amongst the educated natives who are bitter on the
subject and take it much to heart." M.N.A., Zomba.
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On his arrival, Johnston set about dealing with
the land question, regularizing the various transactions,
and arranging a land settlement. All existing land claims
were investigated and when Johnston was satisfied that the
vendor had received a fair price for the land sold, and
that sufficient safeguards had been made for the pro¬
tection of original inhabitants living on the land, then
the claim was confirmed and the claimant issued with a
deed called a 'Certificate of Claim'. Every such document
contained a clause safeguarding African rights - that all
land occupied by African villages or plantations existing
at the time of issuance of the deed should not be
disturbed and was to be exempted from the price of the
purchase. At the same time the European owner was
permitted to prevent the opening of any new gardens or
plantations upon his land. An equally important
consideration for Johnston was his need to increase local
revenue and make the Protectorate pay its way. He thus
secured for the Crown "all unoccupied and unclaimed waste
land" and also obtained from chiefs in their treaties
8
territorial rights either as 'purchase' or 'cession'.
He thus hoped to be able to encourage further European
settlement and use the profits derived from land for the
development of the Protectorate. Limited plots of land
would be leased for short periods and even then not more
8. For Johnston's report on the 1893 land settlement, see
F.0.403/185» Johnston to F.O., 14 October 1393* P.H.O.,
London. See also A.J. Hanna, op. cit., pp.190-2,
234-5.
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than a quarter would "be so alienated, leaving the rest
Q
available for African demands.7
By the end of 1893 Johnston had rapidly confirmed
most of the white-owned holdings. Altogether some one
million acres were alienated to European planters apart
from 2.7 million acres granted to the British Eouth
Africa Company in the North Nyasa district. The right to
this latter area had been acquired by the African Lakes
Company between 1885 and 1391 and had been transferred
to the B.S.A. Company in 1893. This territory was never
brought under active occupation by the Company and never
attracted more than a handful of white settlers.
Eventually, in 1936, title to the land was renounced by
the Company. It was the remaining one million acres,
consisting of about one half of the fertile and healthy
Shire Highlands, which attracted white planters and where
a settler-oriented community became established.
Extensive land alienation, therefore, was confined to the
upland areas of southern Malawi though a few thousand
acres were later sold in freehold or granted under lease
in the central region. And it was in the south that
African land grievances and other related economic
injustices were to be most acutely felt.
The majority of Europeans who had purchased land
had done so in the hope of finding exploitable minerals
and becoming rich quickly. But although some coal, silver
9. F.0.84/2197, Johnston to F.O., 13 October 1392;
F.0.2/106, Johnston to F.O., 4 March 1896, enclosure
no.1, P.R.O., London.
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and lead were discovered, the limited extent of the
deposits and the long distance to markets coupled with
problems of transportation, made mineral exploitation
impossible for the time being. Attention consequently
began to be centred on agriculture. Of the number of
crops in which experiments were conducted coffee promised
the best results and became, during the 1390s, the
Protectorate's chief agricultural export. But the high
hopes placed in coffee were dashed shortly after the turn
of the century. Partly the cause of decline was the
adoption of faulty methods of cultivation: partly the
competition of the expanding Brazilian coffee industry;
and partly the lack of adequate transportation and
communications. Iiost important for our purpose, however,
was the growing shortage of labour which became serious
just when coffee production was reaching its peak. The
supply of labour was certainly plentiful in the dry
season but during the vital rainy months when planters
most needed labour and when Africans were most busy
planting and hoeing their own gardens, few workers were
10
available. At the same time the expansion of the coffee
industry led to a corresponding boom in the transport
business which relied heavily on porters for the
carriage of goods, ''ithout a railway, nearly all goods
had to be handled by large numbers of carriers especially
as tsetse-fly prohibited the use of draught animals. The
10. 3ee, for example, letters to the British Central Africa
Gazette (B.C.A.G.), 1$ May 1897» pp.2-3 from wlii'te*
planters complaining of labour shortage during the
crucial rainy season.
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growth of the transport industry, which also paid higher
wages than planters, seriously hampered the development
of white estates and a number of them had to be
abandoned.
At the time, restriction in the supply of labour
was due partly to the poor conditions on white estates.
Africans from outside the Shire Highlands were becoming
less willing to find work on white plantations because of
poor working and living conditions ~ and when government
agents forced them to take up such employment to pay off
13
their hut tax this added to their hatred of taxation.
But of greater importance was the disinclination of a
considerable number of adult males to work anywhere. The
attractions of imported goods and the gradual conversion
of customary obligations into money payments had been
stimulated by missionary activity and had created a
growing propensity to engage in income-earning activity.
But changes of this sort do not happen quickly and it was
clear that the numbers who chose to earn money by wage
11. Bee F.0.2/307, Report on the Trade and General Condit¬
ions of the British Central Africa Protectorate from
1 April 1899 to 31 March 1900, sections on railway and
labour. See also F.0.2/470 for the report for 1 April
1900 to 31 ^arch 1901. Both in P.R.O., London.
12. See, for example, B.C.A.G., 24 June 1899, P»3 for
criticisms of conditions of workers on white estates
by Commissioner Alfred Sharpe. See also F.0.2/470,
Report on the Trade...from 1 April 1900 to 31 March
1901 in which Sharpe wrote with regard to planters not
providing sufficient food for their labourers: "There
is no doubt that in some instances their term of labour
has been a period, of semi-starvation." P.R.O., London.
13* See, for example, M.W. Retief, William Murray of
Nyasaland (Lovedale,l953), p.67.
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earning were still inadequate to meet the demand for
labour. "European planters, however, could not afford to
wait for expansion of wants to incite Africans to leave
the villages for work, and government, with an eye to
revenue, enacted in 1901 tax proposals to pressure
Africans to take up paid employment. Henceforward,
Africans failing to work for a European for one month in
a year were to pay a 5s. tax instead of the normal 5a •
per annum. The result was an immediate increase in the
supply of labour. But the tax 3cheme was tantamount to a
policy of forced labour and evoked deep resentment among
14
Africans. Those who could obtain cash through other
means, 3uch as by selling their produce, and thus meet
their tax obligations were now being forced to work for
whites against their will especially if they did not wish
to pay a higher tax. Certainly for the mass of Africans
taxation had become an even more onerous burden.
African land rights had also begun to disappear.
For some years white planters had been encouraging the
settlement of Africans on their estates to obtain the
labour that was essential to their development. Lomwe
immigrants from Mozambique had teen encouraged to settle
on white holdings and the original residents had also
been induced to move unhindered on to white-owned lands,
which was happening anyway because of the shifting mode of
cultivation and the African habit of periodically moving
14. Fee African evidence to the Commission...to Inquire
into...the Native Hising Within the Nyasaland
Protectorate in C.0.525/66, Cmith to C.O., 7 February
1916, enclosure no.C, P.R.O., London.
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the sites of their villages. At first the planters had
raised no objections to this movement and had charged no
rent. But with the shortage of labour becoming more
serious, landowners, from the early 1900s, began
demanding rent from their African * tenants* or asking
for labour service irrespective of whether these were
original residents, exempted by Johnston from payment of
rent, or new settlers. At the same time Oommissioner
Sharpe, in order to help the planters to acquire their
labour more easily and also to enable his administration
collect revenue more conveniently, had in 1900 allowed
European landholders to pay the tax themselves of
Africans resident on their estates. Landowners could then
recover the amount by getting the Africans to work for
them. Such a policy placed great power in the hands of
white landholders over their tenants with regard to local
labour. Now all African residents were called upon to
work for two months during the crucial wet season, one
month to satisfy their tax requirements and another month
to meet their rent. If they refused to pay their rent
they were liable to be evicted. The new arrangements
struck particularly heavily on the original residents;
by being encouraged to move off their original land
sites they now had to pay rent and had, moreover, lost
their land. The system also seriously hampered the
African's food production as he now had to work at a time
when he required to look after his own garden. Yet the
planters wanted labour, not money rent, and they exerted
all possible pressure on African residents to discharge
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their obligations by working them off. In extreme cases
Africans were forbidden to work for another employer
until they had fulfilled their duties to their landlord.
Johnston's land settlement had been too ambiguous
on African land rights and had not for3een the movement
of people particularly in the course of shifting
cultivation. The consequences were the loss of African
land rights and their becoming little more than serfs
with absolute insecurity of tenure. This situation with
some of its related abuse§ was vividly portrayed by the
1903 Land Commission:
"No tenure is recognized in the native, who is
treated as a tenant at will, and who is
frequently subject to the arbitrary demands of
an often autocratic and sometimes uneducated
master. In some cases the native is not allowed
to sell the produce of his own garden except to
the proprietor of the estate. In nearly every
case the custom of the estate permits him to
work only for the proprietor. The practice,
which should henceforth be abolished, of
informally permitting the planter to pay the
tax of the native direct to the Collector
without the appearance of the native in person
at the Collector's office, has, we fear, in
some cases been abused. The taxpaper has been
retained by the proprietor until the end of the
year as an 'inducement' to the native to
comply with his demands for labour service,
etc., whenever called upon." 15
Many Africans, in order to avoid paying rent,
attempted to move off European landholdings and to settle
on neighbouring Crown lands. But the amount of land at
15. F.0.2/74-8, Pearce to C.O., 7 July 1903, enclosure no.1,
Report of Land Commission dated 6 May 1903» P.R.O.,
London. For similar criticisms of the deterioration of
African land rights, see the Judgement by Judge Nunan
in Supervisor of Native Affairs vs "Blantyre and Fast
Africa Limited, 23 April 1903, which is contained as
a supplement to the B.C.A.P., April 1903.
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the disposal of the Crown in the Shire Highlands was
limited and inadequate to meet rising African needs.
African discontent at having their land taken away from
them was thus heightened and aggravated hy the
government's rather lenient policy of leasing large
amounts of Crown land to new white settlers and white
companies. In 1901 a further "blow was struck when Judge
Hunan came to a decision that the chiefs had no right of
ownership over the soil; only the Commissioner could
alienate land. As a result both the chiefs and their
people became tenants of the Crown and could he moved and
shifted at the will of the Commissioner. Their position
was oust as insecure as those living on private estates.
Africans grew more alarmed as they saw scarce Crown land
being alienated in large amounts, especially the vast
subsidy land being earmarked for the new railway, which
could instead have become available for their own
settlement. Although Charpe tried to confine such land
grants generally to leaseholds and for fairly short
periods, nevertheless, both on Crown lands and buropean-
owned lands, Africans had lost their rights.
The 1903 Land Commission set up to inquire into
African land rights decided that because of the large
Influx of Lomwe immigrants on to white estates and the
shifting methods of agriculture of local Africans, it was
impossible to ascertain either the original residents or
the land they had occupied when the Certificate of Claim
16. P.0.403/215* Cox vs African Lakes Corporation, 23
July 1901, P.E.G., London.
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was granted. Its recommendations therefore included no
distinction between original residents and African
newcomers. The Commission advocated a "limitation of the
rent due from the native upon some proper system" and in
return for such rent "the allocation to him or to his
village community of a defined area of land sufficient
*17
for his cultivation under the ordinary native custom." '
These recommendations were embodied in the Native
Locations Ordinance of 1904 which directed the landowners
to devote one-tenth of their undeveloped lands as native
locations which would become vested in the village
community on a communal tenure and upon which Africans
would be settled on the basis of eight acres per family.
Each tenant was to pay the owner of the land an annual
rent of 3s. per hut. But these provisions were never
implemented, mainly because of planter opposition. Land¬
owners continued to charge rent or demand the performance
of labour services in commutation of rent, a practice
which became known as tangata. African land and labour
grievances were not redressed, continued to remain
unameliorated, and were to be an important underlying
cause of the 1915 Native Rising.
The immigrant communities
Throughout the period up to 1918» the European
community in Nyasaland was always a tiny one. In the
absence of mineral discoveries and reliable and efficient
17» F.0.2/748, Pearce to F.O., 7 duly 1903, enclosure no.1,
Report of Land Commission, P.R.O., London.
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communications, few Europeans were willing to invest or
settle in the Protectorate especially as better oppor¬
tunities existed in neighbouring territories. By 1913 it
was estimated that there were "only some 750 Europeans,
including Government officials, females and children. Of
this number of Europeans about 100 are Government
officials, 200 missionaries and only about 107 planters."
Despite their small numbers the planters were
looked upon as a fundamental element in the economic
development of the country. They also had a certain
community of interests and objectives and their views
were given regular airing in the pages of the local
settler organ, The Nyasaland Times. They were for ever
complaining about labour scarcity, urging government to
adopt measures to increase the African labour supply, and
opposing vehemently any proposals for stimulating African
agriculture. The role that they expected Africans to play
was essentially that of rural labourers. They scorned and
sneered at the educated African and resented the educative
influence of the missionaries on Africans. The provision
of literary education was invariably criticized
especially when they felt that it was at the expense of
practical training which would teach Africans skills
useful for working on white estates.^ In many xvays their
ideas and views were similar to those of the Kenya white
18. GOA 5/3/1» Notes on Nyasaland by Acting Governor, F.B.
Pearce, dated August 1913, M.N.A., Zomba.
19. For an interesting general discussion on the attitudes
and motives of white planters in Malawi, see C.0.595/
4-9, Pearce to C.O., 14 June 1913, P.N.O., London.
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settlers. Like them they may also have looked forward
to the time when, as with British colonists elsewhere,
they would receive self-government. But the Colonial
Office in London refused to build up their hopes in this
direction. It had no intention of handing over responsi¬
bility to the European settlers especially as they were
too few in number and unable to defend themselves, though
it did agree to grant them some limited unofficial
representation in the Legislative Council which was
formed in 190?.21
If the settlers posed no immediate political
threat, their presence had created many economic and
social grievances, particularly for Africans living in
the Shire Highlands. Social prejudice and discrimination
grieved many Africans particularly the educated ones. The
housing and feeding of labourers on white estates left
much to be desired, and the exactions of the landowners
22
were often onerous. The abuses, injustices and insults
that Africans were made to suffer were to provide ample
material for anti-European discussions by \frican political
movements, one of which, led by the Rev. John Chilembwe,
was to attempt forcibly to drive out many of the hated
white men from the country in 1915* But so tiny and aloof
20. See W.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement
in Kenya (Nairobi,1968), Ohap.14 for a discussion of
21. C.0.525/17, Sharpe * to G.O., 28 February 190?; 0.0.525/
19, Manning to C.O., 7 November 1907*, C.0.525/29,
Pearce to 0.0., 2? September 1909 — all P.R.O.,London.
22. P.O.2/747, Pearce to F.O., 18 May 1903, P.R.O., London.
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waa the settler group that few Africans had any direct
contact with the planters,. Most people saw them, if at
all, only as figures in the distance. Of all the white
groups in alawi it was the missionary element that wa3 in
closest contact with the African peoples.
The Blantyre Mission was the only missionary
society in any way closely involved with the white
planters of the Shire Highlands, During the 1390s, when
it was under the leadership of the Rev. D.C. Scott, the
mission was an outspoken critic of the planters and the
administration, and it also attempted "to let the Church
grow 30 as to express both the dignity of individual
Africans and to give an African quality to its
Christianity."2' But after Scott's departure in January
1398 his conception of an African Church gradually broke
down and the Elantyre missionaries also came to reflect
the growing racial consciousness of the European
community as a whole. Under the Rev. A.C. Ketherwick's
leadership, multi-racial services, for example, no longer
became the normal practice at the mission. Nor did
Iietherwick, according to the Rev. Dr. A.C. Ross, achieve
"the personal relations with Africans that Ecott did" and
he was not "so passionately and underatandingly
negrophile." Criticisms were still levelled against
certain government policies and the attitudes and actions
of white planters were also called into question. Eut
23# A.C. Ross, The Origins and Development of the Church
of Scotland ilission Blantyre, ^yaisaland 1375-1936,
A.ID. Edinburgh, 'I'^BS', p.2^4 and Chaps.6-?.
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although they had much to criticize, especially about
African land and labour rights, they tended to emphasize
the need for Africans to work rather than attack
vigorously the abuses which had arisen. The mission had
become part of the imperial establishment and its
opposition was "more of an acceptable 'Loyal Opposition',
basic criticism of the whole colonial structure no longer
OIL
being part of its function."" To a similar but perhaps
more limited extent, Dr. K.J. McCrac.ken has indicated
that the high degree of tolerance which the Livingstonia
missionaries had achieved during the pre-colonial period
later deteriorated into occasions of conflict and
prejudice. Among several of the missionaries and among
supporters of the mission in Scotland there developed
that "trend towards racialism evident in Britain from the
1380s and the consequent disenchantment with African
leadership which one can find in several other missions
at this period, notably on the West Coast." White control
of the affairs and activities of the mission was re¬
asserted which led to differences with leading African
converts.'"^
The result was a greater self-awareness and
resentment on the side of educated Africans. The in¬
flexible attitude of many missionaries towards African
customs and institutions annoyed Africans especially when
24. ibid., pp.213, 221-22.
25• K.j. HcCracken, "Livingstonia as an Industrial
Mission, 1875-1900," in Religion in Africa (Edinburgh,
1964), pp.94-5.
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the abandonment of some meaningful customs was made a
precondition for entry into the church. But for educated
Africans it was most probably the caution of missionaries
in conferring Africans to positions of authority and
responsibility which evoked the most criticism. The
superior living and working conditions of mission-
employed Europeans in contrast to those of African
teachers and licentiates was a further source of
complaint. In consequence, a few educated Africans were
led to seek control of the new avenues of modernization
by founding their own churches and schools many of which
took on a political role and which came to constitute the
major channels for the ventilation of early African
protest•
Harry Johnston had also looked to the Indian for
the regeneration of Malawi. He had considered the
introduction of Indian peasants partly as a method of
conveying •ohject-lessons• in industriousness and
agricultural technique to the African population, and in
1895 twenty-five Indian families had been brought to the
IRrotectorate. But Indian immigration never became as
large as that to the Natal and Kenya. The movement of
large numbers of peasantry, especially under the
stringent conditions in which the Government of India
insisted after its experiences of treatment of Indians in
Bouth Africa, would have required organization and
26. F.0.403/212, Johnston to F.O., 1 June 1895, P.H.O.,
London.
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finance on a scale far beyond the resources of the early
27
Protectorate government. ' Moreover, the bulk of the
Indians who came independently to Africa were much more
interested in obtaining lucrative openings in trade than
in working as peasants. Since opportunities for trade
were greater in neighbouring territories than in
Nyasaland, the number of Indians who settled in the
Protectorate before 1913 was very small, being less than
600. Most of the Indians who entered the country were
engaged as traders though a number also came to be em¬
ployed as soldiers, clerks and artisans in both
government and private service.^
Asian and European settlement in Malawi was
always to be very small. Africans were therefore able to
obtain intermediary positions of some responsibility such
as those of clerks, storekeepers and telegraph operators,
which in neighbouring territories were held by aliens.
Posts of middle-grade administrative responsibility were
thus opened to Africans earlier and in greater number
than elsewhere in East and Central Africa, and despite
large-scale African migration to these surrounding
countries many of the best educated elements of the
emergent African elite were to remain at home either
working within the various mission networks or becoming
employed in civil and commercial services. The resultant
27• F.0.2/88, Johnston to F.O., 31 January 1895» P.R.O.,
London.
28. S.W.P. Appanya, "British Indians in East Africa," The
Indian Review, August 1907» pp.595-98.
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accumulation of that experience and knowledge of the new
social order was to enable many of these literate
Africans to play a key role in the political associations
and groups through which African protest found expression.
Many African civil servants, for example, were members of
the Native Associations, and having gained access to
information as to the government's political intentions
and economic policies, they were able to bring to the
deliberations of these bodies that knowledge so necessary
for the development of informed African pressure groups.
29
Migration and economic development
One of the major task§\of reconstruction to foster
economic recovery after the ending of the Anglo-Boer War
in South Africa in 1902 was the reorganization of war-
torn industry, particularly the mining industry in the
Transvaal. Serious labour shortages in the Transvaal soon
led to officials looking to territories to the north for
their supply of manpower at a time when the economy of
Malawi was stagnant and depressed. The decline in the
Malawi coffee industry had stimulated the production of
cotton and tobacco but owing to inadequate transport
facilities and high freightage charges European planting
enterprise continued to remain severely restricted.
29. Eor a detailed discussion of these two topics up to
1914, see B.S. Krishnamurthy, op. cit., Chaps.6-8.
The final chapter of this workTnowever, does not
bring out clearly the essential differences between
conditions in the various parts of the Protectorate.
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Africans in search of work found few opportunities to
earn cash incomes to defray their taxes. The increase in
the labour supply resulting from Sharpe's double-tax
system of 1902 could not be fully absorbed by local
enterprises. To the Protectorate officials, therefore,
emigration seemed a way of bringing additional employment
to the people and also extra revenue to the country.
Africans who could not earn cash at home to pay their hut
tax would thus be able to do so by finding work in South
Africa and, also, on their return would stimulate the
import trade of the Protectorate through the expenditure
of their deferred pay which would enhance revenue from
customs duties. After some initial hesitation,
Commissioner Sharpe decided to allow an experiment to be
made permitting the recruitment of one thousand labourers
from Malawi for the Witwatersrand mines.
In 1907» however, with mounting mortality rates in
the mines, the experiment was suspended. Certainly the
period of the experiment had brought improvements in the
economic situation of the Protectorate but after 1908 the
position returned to its previous depressed state. As a
result, independent migration of Africans to other
countries continued to increase. Voluntary migration had
been in progress for many years but had been given an
enormous impetus by the implementation of the double-tax
scheme. It had begun to reach serious proportions by 1907
when it was estimated that over 18,000 males were leaving
the Protectorate annually to find employment abroad. With
wages in Malawi remaining relatively low and opportunities
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for employment in the dry season being limited, workers,
stimulated in their wants by missionary teaching and
encouraged by reports of greater opportunities in
neighbouring territories, were streaming out annually to
the labour centres of Rhodesia and South Africa.
European agriculture in Nyasaland was not able to
promote the desired internal economic expansion and its
scope was limited being confined to the Shire Highlands.
Europeans were not willing to invest large sums of
capital; a minute percentage of their extensive land-
holdings remained cultivated; and their farming was
highly dependent on facilities like transport which
nobody could finance on the required scale. On the other
hand there was growing evidence that, given proper
encouragement, Africans could grow cash crops quite
successfully in certain districts. They had started
growing cotton in the Lower and Upper Shire districts
SO
and there had been a steady increase in production.
Governor Smith had begun to realize the importance of
peasant agriculture and could even write in 1914- that
"The prosperity of the Protectorate, in my opinion, is
more intimately bound up in the enlargement of the
native's capacity as an individual producer than in
coercive action restricting his activities to European
S1
plantations...." But there had been no real concept of
African economic development by the time the first World
30. See, for example, Report of the Director of Agri¬
culture for the year 1909-10, p.5.




By 1914- the question of the development of
African agriculture had received little attention in the
southern region. Some slight emphasis was given to the
growing of cotton in the Upper and Lower Shire districts
but little was done to improve African methods of farming
and to provide African producers with markets and communi¬
cations. More critically, particularly in the Shire
Highlands, there was a serious shortage of land for
African farmers. African land grievances were becoming
acute because of the natural increase in population, the
3P
large immigration of Lomwe from Mozambique, and the
alienation of extensive areas to whites. For Africans
resident either on white estates or on Crown land in the
Shire Highlands, sufficient land and other grievances
existed for them to be mobilized by political agitators
against the Europeans. Elsewhere in the southern region,
however, Africans possessed few serious grievances. By
neglecting African agriculture and by not interfering
with African production methods, the government ensured
that Africans living on Crown land outside the Shire
Highlands remained psychologically within the subsistence
economy of tribal life and had few acute problems to
become politicized. Finding money to meet tax obli¬
gations was not a serious problem. Sufficient opportunities
existed for southern Africans to earn cash either by
working on white estates or by attempting to grow cotton in
32. C. Baker, "A Note on Nguru Immigration to Nyasaland,"
The Nyasaland Journal, 14,1 (1961), pp.41-2. The
Lomwe are often referred to as Nguru.
- 116 -
certain districts and the incidence of labour migration
from the southern region was therefore not to be as
great as that from elsewhere in the Protectorate.
Migration was greatest from the central and
northern regions. The problem for Africans lay in the
virtual non-existence of economic opportunities. The
northern region, particularly, was handicapped by poor
soil, few markets and lack of local employment oppor¬
tunities. In several lakeshore centres such as Karonga
and Nkhota-Khota, Government officials had distributed
33
cotton seeds and cotton production had steadily risen.
But in the interior areas to the west of the lake, little
could be done without an adequate system of communications
to promote African economic development. The obvious
answer was to build railways but the necessary investment
was large. With no known mineral deposits to exploit and
the railway from Port Herald (now Nsan^je) to Blantyre
failing to meet its expenses, there was very little
possibility for a railway extension northwards to the
lake. Such an extension could only be financed out of
public funds which were not then available. The causes of
labour migration could not be tackled and the outflow of
northern Africans grew to abnormal proportions. Though
often exaggerated, the social consequences of labour
migration were serious for African social systems and
village communities. Men died or were disabled in the
mines; women were widowed or left at home for long periods
33• Report on the Cotton-Growing Industry - British
Central Africa Protectorate by Samuel Wilson (1905)•
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becoming entirely dependant on their kinsfolk; and many
34
migrants never returned. For our immediate purpose,
however, it is necessary to consider the consequences of
travel abroad on the development of Nyasaland African
political ideas and organization.
Professor G.A. Shepperson has argued that labour
migrants from Malawi to countries to the south produced
"a sort of political cross-fertilization" and that this
was perhaps evident in the formation of the first secular
African political organization in Malawi in 1912. There
were, he argues, "enough Nyasas in South Africa in 1912
to notice the formation of the South African Native
National Congress and to create, on however slender and
informal a scale, a parallel organization for themselves.
Oral testimony confirms much of this argument with regard
to the founding of the North Nyasa Native Association.
It is claimed that when A. Simon Mhango returned home to
Karonga from South Africa in 1912 with knowledge of the
recently-established South African political body, it was
he who, in consultation with some local Africans,
suggested that a similar, but miniature, non-tribal
organization be created to provide a forum for the dis¬
cussion of African aspirations and grievances in that
district
34-. Margaret Read, "Migrant Labour in Africa and Its
Effects on Tribal Life," International Labour Review,
45,6 (1942), pp.605-31.
35* George A. Shepperson, "External Factors in the
Development of African Nationalism with particular
reference to British Central Africa," in Historians
in Tropica1 Africa (Salisbury,1962), p.325^
36. Interview with Isiah M. Jere, one of the founder
members of the North Nyasa Native Association. See
also S1/1481/19, Abraham to C.S., 24 March 1921,
enclosure containing statement by A.S. Mhango dated
17 January 1921, M.N.A., Zomba.
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Yet migrant workers do not appear to have in¬
fluenced greatly the development of African political
movements in Nyasaland. All the major political bodies
formed in Nyasaland were started by Africans who had
hardly been abroad. The North Nyasa Native Association
was founded in 1912 because Mhango's ideas coincided
at that moment with the interests of Africans resident
in Karonga. Apart from a few quasi-political religious
sects introduced into Nyasaland by Africans who had
worked in South Africa, there was little direct influence
of migrants on the creation of African political
organizations in the Protectorate. Again, although there
was some dissemination of radical ideas picked up from
outside, these do not seem to have had much impact on
African political ideology and activity in Nyasaland.
Even in the 1915 Rising with its intricate chain of
contacts with South Africa, the conclusion of the
commission of inquiry that it did not think that "'ideas
disseminated by the ordinary emigrant native affected the
rising"-^' seems to have been essentially correct, A more
likely consequence of residence abroad was that it led
migrants to experience the emotional force of nationalism
and developed in them the sentiment of 'Nyasaland1 natio¬
nality. Thousands of Malawians migrated abroad where they
encountered a world which made little or no provision
for their particular tribal affiliations. Their ex¬
perience therefore seems to have been more nostalgic
than political. But experience of European-dominated
37. Report of the Commission...to Inquire...into the Native
Rising...., 6319 (Zomba,1916), para.17» p.6.
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territories to the south did have some impact on Nyasa
attitudes to their homeland which had important political
consequences. Nyasas returned home with a deep antipathy
to the racial policies of white societies and with
increased affection for their own country with its
relatively more liberal native policy. Feelings such as
these not only aroused both national sentiment and pride
but made Malawians determined not to permit the extension
of settler-oriented situations to their own country. When
European settlers throughout Central Africa advocated
federation or closer union of Nyasaland with Southern
Rhodesia, it was not surprising that African politicians
in the Protectorate were able to mobilize widespread
opposition to such schemes. Ry imposing federation on
Nyasaland in 1953* the British Government united the
African peoples of the Protectorate in a way that few
other issues could have done and stimulated the creation
of a full-scale, mass nationalist movement in the country.
If the "ordinary emigrant native" made very little
impact on African political ideology and activity in
Nyasaland, the Malawian who had studied abroad and
obtained a secondary and even university education was
often to become a key person in Malawi African politics.
We shall refer to the political role of such persons in
later chapters but may merely note here that the wider
knowledge and sense of criticism possessed#by an
educated African enabled him to play a vital role in the
leadership of a political movement, especially in a
country like Malawi where the first secondary school was
only started in 194-0.
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It would "be wrong to suppose that there was only
an external migration from Malawi, within the Protectorate
itself consequent upon limited employment opportunities
in the northern region, many educated northerners came
south to work in the commercial and administrative
centres of the Shire Highlands. Many Livingstonia-trained
northerners came to hold leading positions for a number of
years in the Government Secretariat in Zomba. The coming
together of educated Africans from all over Nyasaland to
either Blantyre or Zomba was important in enabling
individuals to realize their shared problems and to
discuss the possibility of common action for redress. A
strong national consciousness was developing among the
educated elements which was to find its organizational
expression in the formation, in 194-4, of the Nyasaland
African Congress.
An equally important and related factor in the
development of African political consciousness may have
been the African's collective experience not only during
the first World War but also during earlier overseas
service by Nyasa soldiers in the King's African Rifles in
38
such countries as Ghana, Gambia and Somaliland. In the
1914-18 War, small numbers were enrolled in the regular
military units while the majority, between 60-70,000,
were recruited as carriers and porters for the various
33. On Nyasa military service in general, see George
Shepperson, "The Military History of British Central
Africa," The Rhode3-Livingstone Journal, 26 (1959),
pp.23-33.
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East African campaigns. They discovered the weaknesses
39
of the white man whose prestige was lowered, and they
came into contact with peoples from neighbouring terri¬
tories to a certain extent. But because the Malawi tribes
were grouped into separate companies, the War may not,
unlike the 1939-4-5 one, have made them aware of them¬
selves as a distinct nationality in contrast to a distinct
racial group. Perhaps the greatest impact of the first
World War was the heavy casualties sustained by the
Nyasaland servicemen. African carriers suffered large
numbers of fatalities. Governor Smith's brief comment may
therefore be basically correct in anticipating future
African political reactions as a result of their wartime
experiences. The 1914—18 War, wrote Smith, "taught the
African many lessons of the white man's power and the
means he commands which are denied the native of carrying
on war of a character he had no previous knowledge of
nor conception. The lack of organizing power in the
40
African is also another factor." Coupled with the
abortive Native Rising of 1915» the War showed that the
British were too strong to be forced. The need for non¬
violent and constitutional means of political action
became obvious to African leaders. At the same time the
importance of organized African political activity was
recognized which was to be reflected in the bureaucratic
forms of the inter-war Native Associations and the
attempts to co-ordinate their various activities on a
wider than district level.
39. G.A. Shepperson (External Factors), 0£. cit., pp.324-5.
40. C.0.525/78, Smith to C.O., 18 February 1918» P.R.O.,
London.
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Missionaries and western education
The introduction of a more effective form of
government relieved the missions of many of their
previous problems such as those of self-defence and the
complications arising from the assumption of administrative
powers. The advent of the Pax Britannica led to the pro¬
liferation of missionary societies seeking to take
advantage of the opportunities arising from a more
settled situation in the country. A welter of new
denominations entered the Protectorate before 1914- while
those which were already established expanded their
activities.
The growth of missions was greatest in the Shire
Highlands. Most of the new organizations were small and
in order to become self-supporting as quickly as possible
and recoup some portion of their expenditure they entered
frequently into the business of cultivating crops. The
soil was most fertile in the Shire Highlands where trans¬
portation was also most developed and it was consequently
here that these new missions became established. The
Zambesi Industrial Mission, a non-sectarian undertaking,
was the first to start in 1392 at Mitsidi near Blantyre,
4-1. For an excellent discussion of some of the themes
treated in this section, see K.J. McCracken, Living-
stonia Mission and the evolution of Malawi. 1875-
-1939. Cambridge, 1%7. Chap.5. Useful general
summaries on missions and education are contained in
S.S. Murray, Handbook of Nyasaland (London,1932), Chap.
13, and C.0.525/12, Sharpe to C.O., 13 March 1906 and
enclosures, F.R.O., London. A more detailed discussion
is contained in R.J. Macdonald, A History of African
Education in Nyasaland 1375-194-5. Ph.D. Edinburgh,
-1959, flhaps.4-3. *
and was soon cultivating large plantations and by 1906
exporting much coffee and cotton. A year later, in 1893»
the Myasaland Industrial Mission was founded at Likabula,
three miles north-west of Blantyre, and it opened a
second station at Cholo in 1895• Around the turn of the
century was started the South African General Mission at
Lulwe in the extreme south-west of the Lower Shire
district but this was closed in 1914- owing to the
dispersal of local Africans because of famine. In 1909»
however, a second station had been established at Chididi,
near Port Herald (now Nsanje). Another mission that
commenced work was that of the Beventh-day Adventists
which appeared in 1902, one of a number of further small
sects introduced by one Joseph Booth whose activities
will be the subject of some discussion in the next
chapter.
Christianity thus came into Malawi in many
different guises. The character of missionary work
differed considerably according to the background and
denomination of the societies concerned, and this had, as
we shall suggest, a differing impact on the acquisition
of political skills among their adherents.
The longer-established bodies continued to play the
major role in Malawi. The financial resources of these
larger missions were far beyond those of the newer
societies. Up to the outbreak of World T?Tar 1, the Living*
stonia Mission was the most successful of these larger
and older societies. Backed by xvealthy Scottish interests,
it employed the largest European staff; had the most
stations manned "by white clergy; and was the first
mission to start a college for higher education in the
Protectorate. In 1395 was founded the Overtoun
Institution (named in recognition of a contribution of
fe5»000 by Lord Overtoun) at Khondowe near Mount 1aller
in the northern extreme of Malawi, seven miles west of
the lake. This was nearly fifteen years before the
Blantyre Mission could raise the necessary funds to start
work on the Henry Henderson Institute. But even the
schools and stations of the Blantyre, Dutch Reformed and
Anglican missionaries far outnumbered those of the
smaller denominations so that the emergent African elite
was to be essentially the product of the larger and older
missionary societies. Lacking any large financial backing,
the smaller missions were incapable of having much impact
on African societies. Few of their staff also possessed
more than an elementary education and, anyway, most of
their time was devoted to the cultivation of plantations
than on the building up of a series of schools. Indeed,
they used agricultural training as a means of introducing
the Gospel.
Tithin the larger mission societies, further
differences existed to make Livingstonia and Blantyre
play the major missionary role in Malawi especially as
far as the development of modern African politics was
42. Michael Gelfand, Lakeside Pioneers (London,1964),
pp.79-81.
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concerned. It was not only financial backing which
determined this influence but the basic philosophy of
43
the type of society these two missions wished to create.
Both of the Scottish missions, and particularly Living-
stonia up to 1914, were sources of innovation in
traditional African life. Both sought to revolutionize
African societies and to transform them by exposing them
to facets of modern life. Both provided higher educational
and industrial training as well as normal religious
instruction. By 1914 they had built up an elaborate
network of elementary village schools from which pupils
proceeded to attend a central school at the various
stations for instruction up to Standard three. Thereafter,
a small percentage of students were sent to the head¬
quarters station of each mission to receive higher
education. Here they could.study to standard six, the
highest primary level, and a few could proceed further to
the more advanced Normal Arts, Theology and Commercial
courses to be trained as teachers, clerks, ministers of
religion, storekeepers, telegraphists, etc., oreover,
students could bind themselves to learn a trade in the
industrial departments of the mission such as printing,
carpentry and engineering.
These colleges were places where the best African
43. ft. J. McOracken in Religion in Africa, op. cit. t
A.C. Ross, "The Foundations of the Blantyre Mission,
Nyasaland," in ibid., pp.97-113; George A. Chepperson,
(External Factors), op. cit., pp.320-22 for a brief
discussion of Scottish influences in Nyasaland
generally.
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pupils were given both a literary education in English as
well as industrial training. Here the most successful
students were brought together for training that could
last several years in a non-tribal environment, thus
promoting the creation of a close-knit intelligentsia
with a unity of focus beyond the barriers of kin and
tribe. Practically all the significant African political
leaders of Nyasaland were educated at these two colleges
where European missionaries not only helped to introduce
Africans to the modern world but, perhaps unwittingly,
inspired in them the capacity to evaluate and challenge
those features of the colonial situation that antagonized
them. Christianity equipped them with powerful weapons
with which to challenge white pretensions of superiority.
Unrestricted access to the Bible with all its notions of
equality and non-racialism, provided a valid weapon
which the new African elite was to employ in its conflicts
with various European communities. It was these
acculturated Africans who as "self-conscious young men in
44
collars" were able to nurse the ambition for self-
expression and who became the leaders and organizers of
the various African political groups through which they
criticized aspects of the character of colonial rule and
called in question the actions and attitudes of both
white settlers and missionaries. In many of these
political activities, the new literates were guided by
the often outspoken criticisms of government policy
44. H.L. Duff, African Pmall Chop (London,1932), p.14.
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and white planters which appeared in the widely-read
local Scottish mission Journals, notably those which
were published before 1920. One example, and the most
popular one, will suffice to illustrate this point. The
Rev. David Clement Rcott's fervent objections to the
possibility of the Protectorate coming under the control
of the British South Africa Company during the early
1890s, made many Africans who read about his arguments in
the Elantyre VTission Journals, ^alilole and Life and work
in British Central Africa, ^ very suspicious of the
intentions of white politicians in Couthern Rhodesia.
During their bitter campaigns against federation in the
early 1950s, educated Africans were to cite Scott's
objections to closer relationship with "Southern Rhodesia
and its anti-native policy in support of their own case
46
against such a union.
In extreme contrast to the two Scottish missions,
the Universities' Mission to Central Africa (U.M.C.A.) and
the Dutch Reformed Church Mission (D.R.C.M.) which
45. G.A. Shepperson (External Factors), op. cit., p.521.
See also F.0.2/54, Johnston to Sir ViTTiers Lister,
4 June 1893, P.R.O., London, in which he shows his
concern about criticisms of his administration by the
Blantyre missionaries. As these criticisms were
printed in the local mission news-sheet, alilole,
and as that newspaper was published in Chiyao "and
Chinyanja, many Africans could thus become acquainted
with the missionary viewpoints and this is what
Johnston was concerned about.
46. At an emergency conference of chiefs and Congress
leaders held at Blantyre on 17 August 1952, Rev.
Jackson 'fboga related how the Rev. Archibald Scott
had told Africans about 1892 about attempts by Cecil
Rhodes to take over Nyasaland and how the missionaries
had resisted such moves.Further examples can be found
in the African nationalist newspaper, Kwaca.
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operated mainly in the central region and the adjoining
Islamicized lake3hore area including laoland, sought to
impart Christianity with as little social disturbance as
possible. Their declared purpose was not to cut Africans
off from their tribal bonds; at the most, they wanted to
provide just that training which Africans could later put
to practical use in their village communities, '"hereas the
Scottish missionaries saw their functions in terms of the
steam engine and the Bible, the U.M.C.A. missionaries saw
theirs in fairly exclusive religious terms. Their work was
chiefly religious and involved the provision of little
industrial training. Indeed, with their public school and
Oxford and Cambridge backgrounds they were not likely to
be as inclined as their Scottish colleagues, from
generally lower middle-class families and artisan stock,
to propagate the values of the industrial society and
state. They even attempted to adjust their own modes of
living to those of the African societies within which
they operated by living a life of spartan simplicity. The
houses they inhabited were constructed of reeds and
bamboos and they partook of African food. One iuipi'essive
result of such a philosophy was that African institutions
were treated with great respect and understanding and
Africans were frequently and relatively quickly promoted
47
to positions of responsibility within the mission. '
The Dutch deformed missionaries were predominantly
47. A neat summary of the philosophy of the TJ.'f.C.A. is
contained in H. Alan C. Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism
(London,1965), pp.213-21.
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of rural stock and held as their guiding slogan 'The
Bible and the Plough'. As the late J.L. Pretorius wrote,
"At the heart of the story of the D.R.C.M. lies its aims
u a
A Bible-loving, industrious and prosperous peasantry."^
They played down the industrial and European element by
emphasizing agricultural training and simple village
industries and placed special stress on the evangelical
49
side of mission work. Although a very large number of
elementary schools were established, secondary-type
education was resisted and English only introduced into
the training school for teachers at Mvera in 1904 after
much intense pressure by African pupils. Yet if English
was taught as a subject, the chief medium of instruction
in the primary as well as in the training schools
SO
continued to be in the vernacular.' As a result, of all
missions, the Dutch Reformed was the most conservative
and slow in its devolution of authox'ity to Africans. Not
till late 1925 were the first two African evangelists
ordained.
The Roman Catholics had two orders in the
Protectorate, the White Fathers in the north and the
Montfort Marist Fathers in the south. They, too, did not
provide the sort of education that fostered political
48. J.L. Pretorius, "The Story of the Dutch Reformed
Church Mission in Nyasaland," The Nyasaland Journal,
10,1 (1957), p.11.
49. R.I. Codrington, "The Central Angoniland District of
the British Central Africa Protectorate," The
Geographical Journal, 11,5 (1398), p.511; Thomas Jesse
Jones, Education' in East Africa; A Ctudy of Past,
Central"a*nd South Africa (New York, 1925), p.212;
. Ret'ie'f, op. cit., pp.79, 136.
50. M.W. Retief, op. cit ., pp.82, 84.
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skills. Handicrafts and technical training in the
vernacular was preferred to the more literary curriculum
involving the use of the English language and little
51
attention was given to Bible readings.'
The ramifications of such divergent educational
and evangelical policies were to be important in the
creation of an African elite, whereas Africans emerging
from Livingstonia and Blantyre were to secure the best-
paid jobs and .represent all the main sources of
political awareness in Malawi, their counterparts in the
central region and Lower and Upper Shire districts were
to be less thoroughly involved in the new ways of life
and less equipped with the skills to proceed to
positions of responsibility both in civilian and political
life. In consequence, modern political groups were to
appear late in the central region. Then they did appear,
they were led and controlled by returning migrants who
had been trained at one of the Scottish missions and who
were sometimes alien to the region. 'ith the departure of
these leaders, either to another region or to resume work
outside Talawi, the political groups declined quickly and
few educated elements remained to ensure their continued
operation. Similarly, the failure of Blantyre (and also
Livingstonia at an earlier date) to penetrate Yaoland
effectively and the inability of the U.M.C.A. and D.H.C.M.
51. Lor statements by Soman Catholic missionaries on their
philosophy and activities in Malawi, see their
evidence to the 1915 Rising Commission, on. cit., For
an African view on the Catholics, see George "si'meon
"wase, Strike A Blow And Die (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1967), pp.64-5.
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to make much headway along the lower half of the lake
south of NKhota-Khota, meant that there were few Muslim
Yao literates here in touch with the 'new* world to
start up modern vehicles of protest, Come Muslim Yao did
send their children to local mission schools hut soon
stopped doing so as their children became Christians.
Preferring piety to the western form of literacy, the
Macinga and Masaninga Yao decided to have their children
unlettered and Muslim rather than have them turned into
literate infidels. As a result, these Yao peoples were
unable to break out of the old traditions and to move
significantly into new sorts of opposition and political
activity. It was to be left to the immigrant Christian
Lomwe and Africans from other districts to start the
first political movements in Yaoland but these were, for
many years, to be on the fringe of traditional-type
Yao politics.
In connexion with this it is of interest to
observe briefly that there were frequent fears up to 19*18
that Islam would be the major source of local opposition
to British rule and western influence. Islam was able to
present itself, though an immigrant religion, as an
African religion, whereas Christianity was always looked
upon as 'the white man's religion' and therefore the
religion of the colonial oppressors. Islam was for the
52
most pai't propagated by Africans, Christianity by whites.
52. A.L. Hofmeyr, "Islam in Hyasaland," The Muslim
World, 2,1 (1912), pp.6-7- ~
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Islam, too, was better adapted to African society. In
conversion it did not make the same initial heavy demands
as the Christian missionary who often sought complete
abandonment of the convert's old religion. A man could
become a Muslim without needing to understand all the
cz
teachings of his new faith. Moreover, with a history
of anti-European resistance by the Yao and Arabs, the
colonial government was often apprehensive during the
early decades that Muslim penetration into the Pro¬
tectorate might once again provoke rebellion on the part
of a people perhaps still smarting from the overthrow of
their traditional profitable way of life. Warnings about
Islamic aggression abounded up to 1918 but nothing came
of these fears. Islam proved negative in its response to
the new European order and did not come to be regarded by
the new, aspiring Africans as a culture with the same
attractions as the civilization of the Christian Europeans
Education was wholly the preserve of the
missionary societies and most of the burden of work in
the medical field was also carried by them. Apart from
concerning itself with the maintenance of law and order
the government was mainly engrossed with economic matters.
It provided an annual grant-in-aid of £1,000 for education
which had to be allocated among the numerous mission
schools but considering the number of schools and pupils
53. C.0.525/78, "mith to C.O., 13 February 1913, P.P.O.,
London.
54. G. Mhepperson and T. ^rice, Independent African
(Edinburgh,1953)i pp.133-d, 405-3.
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enrolled this amounted to only token support. For all
that, the development of a western form of education was
a major occurrence of these early colonial years and the
Christian missions had by 1914 managed to place an
elementary education within the reach of nearly the
entire population. Nevertheless, African tribal cultures v
as a whole were comparatively slightly affected by
missionary endeavours. With their generally slender
resources and broad base of activities, the missionaries
were able to produce only limited results and the large
mass of Africans continued to live in their tribal
environment. Missionary teaching, however, did lead to
the creation of a small, newly literate elite from which
55
the leaders of modern African politics were to emerge.^
55. For a good general discussion of the early impact of
missionaries, see Lewis Gann, The Birth of a Plural
Society (Manchester, 1953), Chap.3. A'!"Chough this sti'udy




The Politic3 of Early Independent African Churches
Joseph Booth and John Chilembwe^
On August 11, 1892, there arrived in the growing
commercial and missionary centre of Blantyre, a British
missionary by the name of Joseph Booth. A radical and
independent-minded fundamentalist, Booth had great ideas
of founding a series of self-propagating industrial
missions of the Baptist faith in Malawi. His early
ventures in the Protectorate led to the establishment in
1892 of the Zambesi Industrial Mission (Z.I.M.) at
Mitsidi near Blantyre; the founding in 1394- of the
Nyasaland Industrial Mission a few miles north of
Blantyre; and the setting up of the Baptist Industrial
Mission of Scotland the following year at Gowa in
Southern Ngoniland. In the Shire Highlands, Booth's early
evangelical efforts brought him into immediate disfavour
with both the local Blantyre missionaries and the secular
European coffee planters. By commencing his work in the
vicinity of Blantyre, primarily through force of
circumstances, Booth incurred the wrath of the Scottish
missionaries who condemned him for prosyletizing among
their hard-won converts and who repeatedly remonstrated
with him to move elsewhere. By paying much higher wages
1. This section is based almost entirely on George
Shepperson and Thomas Price's monumental work,
Independent African (Edinburgh, 1958)» PP*3-14-7•
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to his African workers (about 13s. against 3s. a month),
Booth naturally came to be abused by white planters who
also resented his preaching and teaching of highly
egalitarian and radical ideas to the local indigenous
peoples. Notwithstanding such criticisms and pressures,
Booth remained in the Shire Highlands and his Z.I.M. in
particular began to become firmly established. To the
chagrin of the Scottish missionaries, he began enticing
some of their African workers and catchumenate by offering
them either higher wages or easier admission to the
church (following speedier baptism in contrast to the long
preparatory period demanded by the Blantyre Mission).
Condemnation was heaped upon Booth by missionary and
planter alike and friction with governmental agents was
also not absent. But for a small band of Africans who had
begun to come into contact with him, Booth's sympathetic
attitudes and ideas were to become revered and respected
and to set in motion an intricate chain of circumstances
and African political reactions which were to reach their
fateful climax in the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915*
Among the Africans who joined Booth's Z.I.M. was
John Chilembwe, the moving spirit behind the abortive
1915 Rising against British colonial authority. Said to
be the son of a Masaninga Yao father and Manganja (or
Nyan^a) mother, Chilembwe was born at Sanganu near
Chiradzulu probably between 1370 and 1871. After briefly
attending one of the Blantyre Mission out-schools at
Chilomoni, he was taken on as Booth's house-servant in
1892 and became the first convert of the Z.I.M. in the
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following year. He proved to be a most reliable and
trusted servant and in other ways became a faithful
2
companion, friend and guide of the Booth family. By
Joining Booth's household and mission, and by becoming so
closely associated with Booth, Chilembwe was to become
acquainted and perhaps infused with the missionary's
religious-radical ideas and highly egalitarian feelings.
An example of this growing pro-African spirit was contained
in the independent African missionary organization which
was started in 1897» though it never went beyond a paper
venture. Chilembwe was associated with Booth in the
formation of the 'African Christian Union of Nyasaland'
which, in its manifesto, called for equal rights for
Africans as well as Europeans and which declared as its
guiding policy the militant aim of 'Africa for the
African'. The aims of this organization probably
summarized the major radical ideas that Chilembwe had
picked up in the course of his five years apprenticeship
with Booth before they left together for the United
States in 1897* Here Booth hoped to raise funds for his
various industrial mission schemes and also further
Chilembwe's education.
In America, Chilembwe was plunged into a milieu
intensely hostile to the black man and he must certainly
have experienced many of the unfortunate inconveniences
of negrophobia of the time. His two to three years stay
2. Emily Booth Langworthy, This Africa was i'Tine (Stirling,
1952), pp.39-41, 134, etc.,
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in the United States, after he had amicably parted
company with Booth, coincided with a period of growing
political and social discrimination against the American
Negro with its attendant race violence, lynchings and
tension. It was also a period of intense Negro reaction
and Chilembwe must have come into contact with the
various Negro churches which constituted one of the major
channels for the black man's struggle to ameliorate the
conditions of the suffering coloured American. From them
Chilembwe could derive ideas and lessons for his own
independent African church which he was to found on his
return to Nyasaland. The zealous approach of the American
Negro cause must have enhanced the radical ideas he had
picked up from Booth and these must have been further
reinforced during the two years that he studied at the
Virginia Theological Seminary and College, a small
Baptist institution at Iynchburg, Virginia, the principal
of which was a militantly independent Negro named Gregory
Hayes. In late 1899 Chilembwe returned home to Malawi
with a fair education and as an ordained minister "to
z
labour amongst his benighted race."^
3. These are Chilembwe's own words contained in a letter
written by him to the Central African Times, 8
December 1900, p.10. In his evidence to the Commission
which enquired into the 1915 Rising, George Prentice,
a Livingstonia missionary, stated: "I think it was in
the Autumn of 1899 that I travelled out in the same
steamer as the native I believe to have been John
Chilembwe. He was then on his way back from America."
(C.0.525/66, Smith to C.O., 7 February 1916, enclosure
No.D, evidence dated 10 July 1915» P.R.O., London.)
This very valuable source will hereafter be referred
to as 1915 Commission Evidence.
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Backed financially "by the National Baptist
Convention of America, an important Negro organization,
Chilembwe acquired 93 acres of land at Mborabwe in the
Chiradzulu district and started his Providence Industrial
Mission (P. I.M.) in February 1900.^ It aimed at being
another self-propagating industrial mission following
the pattern of those set up by Booth during the 1890s.
With the help of two American Negroes sent out to assist
him till 1906, and through the support of small but
regular funds from his American backers, the P.I.M. was
slowly transformed from very poor and modest beginnings
into a fairly large station with congregations extending
not only throughout the Chiradzulu area but also into the
neighbouring district of Mlanje and, to a smaller extent,
into Mozambique. A string of independent African schools
was established at which rudimentary English was taught
with the simple curriculum including basic agricultural
training which emphasized its essentially practical
nature. In addition to teaching and prosyletizing,
experiments in coffee, tea and cotton were conducted
15
though they were not entirely successful. Weekly sewing
classes for women were also launched which helped to
build up the pride and corporate spirit of the little
mission community. By the end of the first decade of its
4. S2/22/34, Chilembwe to Resident, Chiradzulu, 12 January
1914, M.N.A., Zomba. The title deed of the Mbombwe
estate is dated 5 March 1901.
5. See extract of a letter by "E.N. Check" (Rev. L.N.
Cheek) reprinted from the Richmond Planet in the
Central African Times, 2 September 1903,p.4.
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existence, a clean, neatly-attired community with
industrious and sober habits along European lines had
been created at the P.I.M• In the face of much local
white suspicion, initial problems of acquiring land
and continuous economic difficulties, the mission had
managed to struggle along, though it was still based on
small foundations.
In 1905 there was reproduced in the local news¬
paper part of a letter to an American journal by one of
Chilembwe's Negro helpers at the P.I.M. — one T?ev. L.N.
Cheek. To some extent it contained a veiled criticism of
conditions prevailing for Africans in the British
Protectorate t
"...''hen the village hut life is broken up and
the Government will run schools with some of
the tax-money used for standing armies and
Imperialism, we can hpe for a great change.
Will we really hope for this change from any
other race? Can we expect the foreigners in
Africa to plead for higher wages and more
education while they can still barter goods
to natives and get the majority of them for
seventy-five cents per month? — Yours for
humanity, E.N. Check." 6
This letter raises the question of how far these
criticisms were representative of Chilembwe's own feelings
and whether during the period 1900 to 1912 he was himself
criticizing aspects of the white man's rule and even
considering armed revolt. There can be no doubt that he
was not planning any rebellion during these years.
Certainly he was using his churches and schools as forums
for the ventilation of African grievances, though his
6. ibid.,
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criticisms were most probably couched in Biblical
phrases. Criticism of the state of African land rights
and the conditions prevailing on the A. Livingstone Bruce
estates, which adjoined the P.I.M., were openly voiced.
Indeed, as the largest and best organized African church
sited near one of the most important European estates in
the Shire Highlands, the P.I.M. readily became a natural
nucleus for African agitation. No mission work was allowed
to be carried on and schools permitted to be opened on
the Bruce estates, and there was consequently no other
possible guardian and spokesman for Africans resident on
these lands than John Chilembwe. For the Rev. Harry
Matecheta of the Blantyre Mission, this was a factor of
ma^jor importance in the emergence of agitational politics
at the P.I.M. In his evidence to the Commission which
enquired into the 1915 Rising, he maintained that "if
many schools of the other Missions were allowed in the
Estate they would have saved the lives of these gentlemen,
n
for the natives would not have gone to John at all."' As
it was, many of the tenants and workers on the Bruce
plantations were members of Chllembwe's flock and they
and others would naturally bring their complaints to him
for airing and investigation. Yet Chilembwe's criticisms
before 1912 were not subversive and were kept within
legal bounds. There is no evidence available to suggest
that any political militancy was evolving in his inind
before that year and that there was any likelihood of him
7. 1915 Commission Evidence: Rev. Harry Kambwiri
(Matecheta) dated 13 July 1915*
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subverting colonial rule.
The main political threat to white rule seemed to
come from religious movements inspired by Joseph Booth
both on his return to the Protectorate from the United
States in 1898 as well as after his departure from Malawi
for ever in 1902. After amicably parting company with
Chilembwe, Booth had come into contact with an American
sect, the Seventh Day Baptists of Plainfield, New Jersey,
and had been appointed its agent in Malawi where he
founded a body calling itself 'The Sabbath Evangelizing
and Industrial Association.1 Another industrial-type
mission, it was started at a station called Plainfield
(known from 190? as Malamulo), thirty miles south of
Blantyre in the Cholo district of the Shire Highlands.
But before concerning himself with his new mission, the
volatile Booth drew up in 1899, and began circulating for
the signature of Africans, a petition to Queen Victoria
which called for a "Native policy more in keeping with
the Commandments of God than the present." Published in
the local newspaper, the petition called inter alia for
the entire proceeds of the African hut tax to be devoted
to financing African education; that free higher
♦ education be provided for not less than five per cent, of
the African population; and that the Protectorate should
revert to African ownership after twenty-one years. The
colonial government acted swiftly and Commissioner Sharpe
demanded that the petition be revoked immediately or
8
Booth would be deported. The latter evaded arrest and
8. F.0.2/209, Sharpe to P.O., 5 August 1399, and P.O.2/210,
Sharpe to F.O., 5 September 1899, P.R.O., London.
- 142 -
fled to Chikwawa where he told enthusiastic African
gatherings that Queen Victoria had sent him to tell them
q
not to pay any more hut tax.' Eventually Booth slipped
into Mozambique and was only allowed to return to the
Protectorate on his abandoning the petition and agreeing
not to engage in any further political activity.
In giving this undertaking, Booth made an interest¬
ing statement which may provide some indication as to why
he agreed to give up his petition so easily, though it
was not to influence him in putting a stop to his
political propaganda among Africans. "Candour compels me"
he wrote to Sharps, "to confess that after making a test
for a short time of the Native Africans ability or desire
to attempt something beyond, I have reached the conclusion
that the Negro of this part of the world has not attained
a maturity of character fitting him for such effort. It
has however been a satisfaction to me to have placed on
record, before both races, what I had to say."
Booth resumed his evangelical activities which
also included cultivating cotton for the support of his
new mission. A local blight on the crop, however, led to
costly failure which combined with some of his schemes
resulting in the accumulation of large debts and the fact
that he was incessantly quarrelling with a fellow
9. J2/9/2, telegram from the Collector, Chikwawa dated
17 August 1899, M.N.A., Zomba.
10. F.0.2/210, Pearce to F.O., 22 September 1899* and P.O.
2/305* Sharpe to F.O., 2 February 1900, P.H.O., London.
11. F.0.2/305, Sharpe to P.O., 2 February 1900, enclosure
No.2, Booth to Sharpe, 21 January 1900, P.R.O.,
London.
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missionary sent out to assist him, culminated in the
Seventh Day Baptists terminating their contract with
Booth in late 1901. With characteristic persuasiveness,
Booth soon gained the hacking of another American sect,
the Seventh-day Adventists, who acquired title to the
Plainfield mission site. But when an American Negro was
sent out to help him, Booth once again broke with his
fellow missionary. As a result of these personal
difficulties, and his being accused by the government of
preaching seditious doctrines amongst Africans, Booth left
the Protectorate for ever in 1902 and settled in South
Africa.'1^
That official accusations of Booth's teachings
being seditious were not without foundation can be seen
clearly from several contemporary statements by educated
Africans. It was very apparent to them that Booth's
teaching wa3 "against his own countryman's preaching."
Africans were very careful to df>te his denunciation of
the Blantyre missionaries as hypocrites and his
condemnation of them as land grabbers. According to an
African follower of the Scottish mission, Booth admonished
the missionaries for "Using the natives as hoes" while
"they themselves getting a lot of money." That Booth's
pacifist ideals may have been misinterpreted for more
violent activity can be seen from the following African
recollection of Booth's ideas: "'Rise up and save your
12. See GOA 2/4/14, Sharpe to G.O., 15 May 1909, M.N.A.,
Zomba, for an attempt by Booth to re-enter the
Protectorate which was not permitted by the colonial
government.
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country' was the sentence he almost said every time we
met him." There can be no doubt that Booth's propaganda
among Africans of the southern region was highly
unsettling, perhaps even actively seditious, and




Elliot Kamwana and Charles Domingo
Booth did not long maintain his connexions with
the Seventh-day Adventists. In 1906, after much wandering
around, he turned to another American source of support to
finance his missionary schemes in Africa: the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society, forerunner of the modern
Jehovah's Witnesses. Followers of Pastor Charles Taze
Russell, the n'atch Tower adherents believed in the
Millennium, in the Second Coming, when the dead would be
recreated and the worthy would inherit the new kingdom,
the remainder relapsing into annihalation. Russell
projected that the Second Advent would come about 1915
when all unrepentant souls would meet death while the
followers of Watch Tower, the elect, would be saved and
accepted into the New Jerusalem. On returning to South
Africa from the United States in 1907, Booth commenced
13* 1915 Commission Evidence: written evidence of M.M.
Chisuse of the Church of Scotland Mission, Blantyre,
n.d. See also J2/9/2, M.N.A., Zomba, in which it is
reported that in September 1900 Booth was inciting
Africans in Cholo not to pay their hut taxes.
14. Once again my researches on the subjects of this
section have been unable to add very much to the
analysis provided by G. Shepperson and T. Price,
op. cit., pp.147-65.
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the preaching of Russell's millenarian ideas, claiming
that the new age would come in October 1914. In South
Africa he came into contact with a number of ?1alawi
migrants, one of whom, Elliot Kamwana, was to return
home to spread the new gospel
16
Elliot Kenan Kamwana Chirwa was a Tonga from
Chipera village near Bandawe who had been educated at the
Bandawe mission and had briefly attended the Overtoun
Institution from which he had suddenly departed in 1901
for reasons which are not clear.^ Some attribute the
reason for his break with Livingstonia to the introduction
of school fees which he or his parents objected paying;
others suggest that he was suspended because of
immorality; while others point to his dissatisfaction
13
with missionary teachings. Whatever the reason,
Kamwana drifted to the Shire Highlands where he met
Booth at the Plainfield mission being subsequently
baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist faith in 1902. In
15* George Phepperson, "Nyasaland and the millennium," in
Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., Millennial Dreams in Action
(The Hague,1962), pp.144-1^1•
16. I have found useful two unpublished biographies on
Kamwana by two leading Tonga historians, J.C.W.
Malifa and Hanook Hg'oma, which were kindly made
available to me by the authors.
17. See Overtoun Missionary Institution Boys Register,
Vol.1, entry No.234, Church of Scotland Office,
P'-dinburgh, in which "Kenan Kamwana Aphiri" is
reported to have entered the Institution in March
1393 but to have "remained at home after the vacation."
18. Interviews with and biographies by J.C.W. Malifa and
H. Ng'oma; N.O. Moore and Wayland B. Wilcox, "The
Report of the Visit to South and Central Africa," The
Sabbath Recorder. 25 November 1912, p.719.
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that year he moved down to South Africa where, like many
of his fellow Tonga, he worked in the mines and became
acquainted with the various independent African religious
sects that were springing up in that country and which
were serving, like those in America, as a type of safety
valve in a tense racial situation. Sometime in 1907,
Kamwana became reacquainted with Booth in Gape Town and
stayed with him for about six months during which time he
received instruction in Watch Tower teachings. Then, in
late 1908, he returned home to Tongaland as an evangelist
to preach the new doctrine of the Millennium in an already
disturbed social situation.
As we noticed in the previous chapter, the
superior financial resources and relatively revolutionary
attitudes of the Livingstonia Mission had conspired to
make its sphere in northern Malawi the most advanced
region educationally in the Protectorate. Of all the
northern districts it was Tongaland that had the greatest
educational development. In neighbouring Ngoniland, too,
a number of important centres of work had been established
and educational developments were proceeding quite
rapidly. But Livingstonia*s religious policy was proving
incompatible with the educational advances engendered by
the mission and it was constituting a major source of
friction between Africans and the missionaries. Kamwana's




Despite their enthusiastic response to missionary
teaching, the Tonga had been initially reluctant to
undergo religious conversion and only in 1389 did their
first converts appear. Similarly, in Northern Ngoniland,
there were only eleven converts as late as 1392. From the
mid-1890s, however, the educational advance in northern
Malawi, and particularly in Tongaland, began to be
accompanied by a dramatic spread of evangelical
Christianity. Arising from significant improvements in
missionary techniques (such as preaching in the
vernacular) and from the encouragement of new revivalistic
methods by a younger generation of missionaries at a time
when British administrative control was becoming
established, there spread among the Tonga and Ngoni
peoples a highly popular religious fervour. From 1395
onwards, thousands flocked to church services and large
numbers sought baptism and the status of church member¬
ship. The accompanying missionary response, however, was
slow and cautious.
In spite of their aim to revolutionize the social
and economic conditions of African societies, and despite
their adoption of popular religious methods, the
19. For a detailed discussion of the relations between the
Livingstonia Mission and the origins of the Watch
Tower movement, see K.J. McCracken, livingstonia
Mission and the evolution of Malawi, 1375~1959*
Fh.D. Cambridge, 1967» Chap.6. 3ee also his chapter
on twentieth century politics in Malawi in T.O.
Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central African History
(London,1968), pp.192-5. Another good detailed
examination of Elliot Kamwana and the introduction of
Watch Tower is contained in Hans-Jiirgen Greschat,
Kitawala (Marburg,1967)» Fart 1, pp.1-42.
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Livingstonia missionaries were opposed to mass and
instantaneous conversion. They decided that baptism would
only be granted to those who had undergone a few years of
religious instruction and whose characters had been fully
approved. Regular catechismal classes were organized and
minimum periods, measured in years, were prescribed for
20
pre-baptismal instruction. The spread of the popular
religious movement had also introduced a host of
administrative problems which aggravated African frustration
at the length of time involved in acquiring church
membership. Hitherto missionaries had been able to know
and teach personally every aspiring African member but
this now became impossible, with such vast numbers seeking
baptism, and European missionaries being the only ones
permitted to baptise, long and irritating delays ensued.
Without direct personal knowledge and supervision of the
candidates, the tests themselves were made more rigorous
and African discontent mounted especially as the majority
of applicants were rejected.
Although the religious enthusiasm died down for a
20. See the minutes of the Presbytery of North Livingstonia
dated 2 November 1900 which state that the following
recommendation was approved: "That, ag a general rule,
baptism be not granted unless the candidate has been
under definite religious instruction throughout a
period of at least two years, during which the
missionary has had means of ascertaining as to his
life and character* and that the instruction should
include, as a minimum, a course of teaching on the
Lord's Prayer, bhe Ten Commandments, the Sacraments,
and the Apostles' Creed, with the relative passages of
Scripture." (Livingstonia Mission Archives, Livingstonia
Malawi.)
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short while, the revival recommenced in 1903 with vast
numbers seeking entry into the Church but continuing to
remain frustrated by the long preparatory period and other
impediments placed in the path of baptism. But even among
some of the church members themselves tensions were to be
found. As elsewhere in colonial Africa, African and
European Christians came into conflict over African
customs and institutions, white missionaries held that
polygamy constituted the main barrier to the acceptance
of the gospel; that certain forms of initiation ceremonies
were obscene and that various forms of dancing were
licentious. African church members generally accepted
such criticisms but were reluctant to condemn all their
traditional customs outright believing that some of them
served essential purposes in African social life. Of all
these African customs it was perhaps polygamy which came
to be regarded as the most directly antithetical to the
missionary ideal. Undiluted monogamous marriage as
advocated by the missionaries encountered serious African
opposition and there were many cases of African
Christians being thrown out of the Church for having
taken a second wife. A prominent example of such
banishment was the case of Levi Z. ?4umba, the leading
African politician during the inter-war period, who was
an elder in the Church until he was asked to leave for
marrying a second wife in 1911. Although he was not to be
involved immediately in any independent African church
activity in opposition to the Livingstonia Mission, he
was to assist in the formation of the African National
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Church in 1929, one of the beliefs of which .rumba cited
in a letter to another proto-nationalist politician.
"That the commission of the Christian Church to
Africa was to impart Christ and education in
such a way as to fit in with the manners and
customs of the people, and not that it should
impose on the Africans the unnecessary and
impracticable methods of European countries,
such as having one wife etc., which have no
biblical authority. The members of this church
shall be people of good character according to
native traditions, laws and customs as
contained in the first five books of the
Christian Bible, whether polygamists or not,
etc.," 21
A second source of incipient conflict arose from
Livingstonia's caution in conferring authority on
Africans and placing them in positions of responsibility.
Africans completing their theological training and being
licensed to preach had their ordinations delayed and
postponed several times. Only in 1914, over a decade
after they had completed their courses, did the first
three ordinands emerge. In the case of Charles Domingo,
as we shall see, this delay was to be a major reason for
his leaving the Livingstonia Mission and setting up his
own independent African church. Even his colleague and
close friend, Xesaya Z. Mwase, who was one of the first
ordinands in 1914, was extremely concerned about the long
delay in his ordination after being licensed to preach in
1906. At the same time, Mwase demonstrated the resentment
among some educated Africans at the privileges enjoyed by
white missionaries which were not also available to
21. L.Z. Muraba to C.J. Matinga (n.d. but 1930). This
letter was kindly 3hown to me by C.T. Mwalwanda, a
student at Chancellor College, University of Malawi.
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to Africans. From September 1906 to 1907 Mwase volunteered
for work as a licentiate preacher at Serenje in northern
Zambia but refused to return there the following year
unless provided with porters and a machila (hammock) for
the Journey as was the case with all Europeans working
for the mission. As a result he was either suspended for
some time for disobedience or "left Mission service"
voluntarily. In the following year, however, he seems to
have been partially restored to assist the general
22
missionary assault against •Xamwanaism'.
It was to such a situation of mass and elite
African frustration, arising from social and religious
tensions, that Kamwana returned in 1906 with a gospel
offering immediate baptism and opportunities for African
leadership in an independent African church. To his
doctrine of the Millennium Kamwana added the question of
the hut tax. The 1901 increase with its hated labour
rebate had already produced much African criticism and
discontent throughout the Protectorate. Among the lake¬
side Tonga in 1902, a mass demonstration had been
organized outside the Kkhata Bay Boma in opposition to
the new tax regulations and a company of the King's
African Rifles had been dispatched to restore order.It
22. Interviews with J.C.I?. Malifa and H. Ng'oma,and
Overtoun Missionary Institution Boys Register, Vol.1,
entry Ho.138, Church of Scotland office, Edinburgh.
23. F.0.2/605* Sharpe to Hill, 3 April 1902 and enclosure.
Pee also F.0.2/606, Charpe to F.O., 19 Fay 1902,
enclosure No.1, Annual Report for the British Central
Africa Protectorate for 1901-02, P.R.O., London.
was therefore not surprising that "by preaching the
abolition of the hut tax at the time of the coming in
October 1914 of the new age, Kamwana was able to attract
further African support for his movement.
It appears that Kamwana spent about three months
at Booth's old Seventh Day Baptist station at Shiloh
before going up to Tongaland in December 1903. At Shiloh
he seems to have preached both the Watch Tower message
and the Seventh-day Sabbath because although Booth had
turned to Russell's writings he had remained loyal to
OA
some Sabbatarian doctrines. Here in the Shire Highlands,
Kamwana may have come into contact with Chilembwe before
he proceeded north having, for some reason, now rejected
the Sabbath and holding certain modified Watch Tower
ideas.
The response to Kamwana's apocalyptic and
revolutionary preaching was dramatic. Using total
immersion baptismal ceremonies, he is said to have
baptized 9126 persons before he was arrested and deported
25
from Tongaland in March 1909. According to a Living-
stonia missionary, Kamwana, shortly after his arrival in
Tongaland, had undertaken a tour of "the whole district
talking cautiously with the people, carefully noting
their desires and any dissatisfaction that existed among
them, and so getting a grip of the situation." Xamwana,
24. 1915 Commission Evidence: E. Kamwana dated 15 July
1915* See also N.O. Moore and W.D. Wilcox, oj>. cit.,
p.719, and N. Olney ?1oore, Ceventh Day Baptists and
Missionary Work in Myasaland, Africa (Chicago,950
p. 14.
25. The figure, 9126, is cited in the unpublished work on
Kamwana by J.C.W. Malifa and also in H-J. Creschat,
op. cit., p.15.
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the missionary continued, "was a strategist and struck
the weak points of the situation very cleverly." In the
first place he "found an intense desire for baptism and
some discontent because the Church insisted on a course
of instruction before baptizing, and baptized only those
who gave evidence of a change of heart. This desire he
sought to inflame by directly or indirectly conveying to
the people the impression that the one thing needful was
baptism." Missionary demands for the payment of
educational fees "gave Kamwana his second point of
vantage, a point he was not slow to make the most of.
•You are poor; the white man ought to educate you free,
and give you books and even clothes; he ought not to take
anything from you, he is robbing you.'" An admixture of
the elements of the doctrine of the Millennium and some
of his own radical ideas regarding African independence
were offered by Kamwana as a solution to the abuses and
frustrations suffered by Africans in a colonial situation.
Pointing to the Residency on the hill he is said to
have declared: "These people there you soon will see no
more; for the Government will go." He preached in open-
air meetings of the coming in October 1914- of the new age
when British rule in Nyasaland would disappear; when
Africans would govern themselves; when free education
would be provided; and when there "would be no more
oppression from tax gatherers." "In the meantime," he
urged his fellow Tonga not to "let your hearts be
troubled; for the white man whom I represent will not
only educate you freely, but will provide money for
- 154- -
taxes." ^
Evangelism was also introduced into Ngoniland
where, although it had some success mainly in the areas
bordering Tongaland, its impact was lessened because the
missionaries there had baptized converts much more
speedily than their lakeshore colleagues. The large bulk
of persons who Joined Kamwana's movement belonged to the
masses of frustrated Africans who probably did not have
much conception of the true nature of the Watch Tower
doctrines but who saw in it a way of acquiring church
membership and free education, though no schools were
actually started in 1909• The leadership of Watch Tower
was assumed by existing Free Church members such as
teachers and monitors who were at odds with Livingstonia's
strict discipline and who had been suspended.
"Talk of the removal of white governmental control
became rife, amounting in some cases almost to a political
revolt, and the glory of the coming age when there would
be no more •boma' or district resident governor, and no
more taxes, was eagerly anticipated."^ Kamwana's fiery
political doctrines alarmed the government which was also
receiving critical reports from the Scottish missionaries
of the revival of old, pre-European tribal ways involving
the return to polygamy, the reintroduction of obscene
26. All quotations in this paragraph are from R.D. MacMinn,
"The First Wave of Ethiopianism in Central Africa,"
The Livingstonia Newst 2, 4 August 1909» PP»57-3. See
also W.A. Elmslie, "Ethiopianism in Nyasaland," ibid.,
2, 5 October 1909, pp.72-4, and GOA 2/4/14, Sharpe to
C.O., 15 May 1909, M.N.A., Zomba.
27• N.O. Moore and W.D. Wilcox, op. cit., pp.719-20.
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dances and other such practices which whites considered
immoral. With the possibility of the movement developing
into a mass resistance against taxation and as "any
po
delay might have caused serious Native complications,"
Kamwana was arrested and deported. Given the choice of
being detained at Mlanje in the southern region or of
being exiled to South Africa, he chose the latter
alternative but was eventually, in 1914, detained at
Mlanje where he was placed under close surveillance. This
did not prevent him from corresponding with John
Chilembwe and it even appears that he was approached to
join the 1915 Rising but refused.^ After the Rising, he
was accused of preaching seditious ideas in the Mlanje
area and was deported to Mauritius and later to the
30
Seychelles, being finally released in 1937.
With Kamwana's arrest, the Watch Tower movement
quickly collapsed. Many adherents now shifted their
allegiance either to the Free Church or to the new
Seventh Day Baptist sect introduced partly, as we shall
see, by Charles Domingo. But by 1914- the movement still
had around a thousand members and had, moreover, spread
into other districts in the Protectorate. Watch Tower was
31
not an entirely spent force.
28. GOA 2/4/14, Sharpe to C.O., 15 May 1909, M.N.A., Zomba.
29. GOA 2/4/14, Report by A.M.D. Turnbull dated 7
February 1915, M.N.A., Zomba.
30. ibid.,; C.0.525/68, Smith to C.O., 26 August 1916;
C.6.525/72, Smith to C.O., 15 January 1917; C.O.525/
170, No.44195, Hall to C.O., 19 August 1937 - all
P.R.O., London.
31. GOA 2/4/15, Smith to C.O., 6 March 1916 and enclosures,
M.N.A., Zomba.
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Watch Tower, under Kamwana, marked the beginnings
of "the newer type of African reaction to the Europeans'*
though "it had obviously old-style tribal elements in
it."^ A similar observation came from a Blantyre
missionary who noted that "Ethiopianism...has shown
itself up the lake in forms that make for revolt against
Government, and the throwing off of the control of the
European in the Church. It is nationalism at the core,
22
but showing itself in a bad way....'"^ During 1909 Vifatch
Tower had been against the Government of Nyasaland and
not, as in its later manifestations during the inter-war
period, against Government as such. Though it used Watch
Tower literature, in many ways it represented a
separatist African movement independent of its European
parent, in that Kamwana added to it his own teachings such
as the non-payment of tax, the provision of free
education, and the advent of African rule. As such it wa3
a movement for African independence in Nyasaland and was
more racial and specific than Russell's continental or
global teachings. It was also forward-looking in that it
did not reject westernization though it did not seek
either to dfestroy traditional customs and practices. Yet
the movement did not gain the support of either the
majority of African church members, for obvious reasons,
or of the prominent new men in the northern region who
may have been disgruntled with the Scottish missionaries.
32. G. Shepperson and T. Rrice, o£. cit., p. 154.
33* The Rev. Alexander HetherwicIE7 ed., Robert Hellier
Napier in Nyasaland (Edinburgh,1925)» P»49.
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These new Africans were in no way influenced "by Watch
Tower eschatology and were, instead, beginning to see the
redress of their grievances through secular channels. But
'Kamwanaism' had managed to encompass Africans from
various tribal backgrounds and had gained a sizeable
following. Because of its attendant traditional
orientations, however, it may be best regarded as a link
between the older tribal-type resistance and the newer
African reactions along Tftiropean lines.
Another one of Booth's disciples now assumed the
leadership of the growing northern African religious
militancy. This was Charles Domingo, a Kunda, born
around Sena in Mozambique about 1875• As a child he was
taken from Quelimane and brought to Livingstonia where he
began serving in the household of Dr. Laws. In time he
XA
became a protege of the veteran missionary. A very able
pupil, he was sent to Lovedale in South Africa for a period
of two and a half years to further his studies. With the
opening of the Overtoun Institution he was recalled to
study at Livingstonia where he completed his standard six
examinations and then his theological course being
xt;
licensed to preach in May 1903* Thereafter, he became
34. W.P. Livingstone, laws of Livingstonia (London,1923)*
pp.194, 257. 277. 309, 327'. See also 31/927/19,
Resident, Mzimba to A.C.S., 23 May 1919, M.N.A., Zomba.
35- Overtoun Missionary Institution Boys Register, Vol.1,
entry No.2, states that Domingo entered the Institution
in July 1895 and went into the standard five class. See
minutes of the Presbytery of North Livingstonia dated
2 November 1900 for Domingo's grades in his theo¬
logical exit examination, the average being 65.1%• Bee
also minutes dated 13 May 1903 for his being commiss¬
ioned as a licentiate of the Presbyterian Church of
Central Africa to preach the gospel.
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the first African assistant at the Institution and an
elder In the local congregation.
But all the great hopes placed in him by Laws
were soon to be dashed. As early as 1901, Domingo had
demonstrated his critical attitude to missionary teaching
by reading a paper at a conference of African elders in
Blantyre in which he supported certain forms of African
dancing and castigated missionaries for their outright
condemnation of such indigenous customs. In November 1907
he was appointed to the Loudon district with a view to
taking charge of an African congregation in one of its
centres. Shortly thereafter, however, he broke with the
Free Church on one account because of a quarrel with the
European minister in charge of Loudon district, the Rev.
36
Donald Eraser, and on another because of frustration at
37
not being ordained after such a long period of time. '
Moving south to the Shire Highlands he was briefly
associated with Watch Tower as well as with the P.I.M.
but seems to have had some differences with Chilembwe. He
then came into indirect contact with Joseph Booth and
Joined the Seventh-Day Baptists. Booth, the religious
hitch-hiker, had recently shifted his allegiance back to
that sect from Watch Tower and Domingo now became its
38
chief agent in Northern Ngoniland.
36. 1915 Commission Evidence: Rev. Donald Fraser dated
13 July 1915.
37. Interviews with Charles C. Chinula and Robert I.
Ziba, Mzimba, Malawi•
38. S2/68rt/l9» Report by A.M.D. Turnbull dated 20 April
1915; N.O. Moore and w.D. Wilcox, op. cit., p.724;
1915 Commission Evidence: Rev. Donald Fraser stated
that Domingo went to England in 1908.
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Domingo started his independent church in 1910
at Chipata near Mzimba. Booth directed this and the other
African Sabbatarian churches which were set up elsewhere
from his headquarters in the Cape, leaving Domingo and
other African pastors such as Gilbert Chihayi to look
after the work of evangelization and organization. A
tangle of independent African churches and a chain of
independent African schools was established in the areas
to the west of the lake and in the Shire Highlands by
Domingo and other Africans who v/ere often ex-Watch Tower
members. The majority of adherents, as with Xamwana's
movement, most likely came "out of Free Church mission
Bible classes" while the leadership was in the hands of
persons who had been teachers in Free Church schools and
had probably "been dismissed from their places because of
XQ
serious lapses from Christian living." J Booth and his
backers supplied much of the funds, though these were by
no means sufficient, and posted orthodox Baptist
literature as well as Watch Tower Bibles because they
were cheap. All this literature and documentation must
have not only led to a confusion of doctrines being
propagated by these rather superficial Sabbatarian groups
but provided them with ample material for political
discussion. In these little churches, and particularly in
those run by Domingo which were also the best organized,
European rule and white attitudes were called in question,
39. N.O. Moore and W.D. Wilcox, o£. cit., p.716. This
report contains a detailed account of Seventh Day
Baptist work in Nyasaland up to 1912.
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often in a religious guise, thus showing once again
what a magnificent source the Bible is for the expression
of the feelings of the oppressed of the earth.
Some extracts from letters written by Domingo will
illustrate the nature and tenor of his criticisms though
the one cited by Shepperson and Price in Independent
African (pp.165-6) still remains the clearest exposition
of his outspokeness. In similar vein Domingo claimed that
"Many a white fellows become Xtians when they
are in Europe, and as soon as they taste
Hyasaland coffee they turn-tail, and are
unable to acknowledge their way of travelling
within the truth of God. Even the very (so
called) Reverends do loose their God's title
(Psalms 0X1:9) when they come in Kyassaland.
They are not strong enough to stand firmly for
the Truth....as soon as they will be in Zomba
they will not then refuse the Satanic Rules or
Regulations formed by the European here,..."
Another quotation brings out clearly his deep disenchant¬
ment with Europeans:
"White fellows have been here for nearly 36
years, and not one of them sees a native as
his Brother, but as his boy.... Do you suppose
the whites that are in Syassaland are pure
christians? I count not so - they are too
cheaty and destroyers of widows houses. We
Africans are able to manage our powers as
handed over to us by God. We are equal in mind
with the white fellows." 40
Fortunately for Domingo, the authorities did not
realise immediately the seriousness of his antagonism for
otherwise he would have suffered the same fate as Kamwana.
Perhaps no serious suspicion was thrown on Domingo
because the Mzimba District Commissioner believed him to
40. Undated letters by Domingo to Booth in Seventh Day
Baptist Historical Society. I have seen the photo-
copyed set in the Chancellor College Library, University
of Malawi. I have retained Domingo's original spelling
in the above quotations.
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"be "an exceptionally good and competent native." Indeed,
it was felt that, despite his known correspondence with
Booth up to 1915» he taught "no undesirable doctrines"
though it was vaguely realized that some of his letters
showed "that he is probably intolerant of European
control and supervision and aims at an independent native
42
church which may or may not become political also." Yet
it is quite clear that Domingo's criticisms of European
rule and white behaviour were pronouncedly outspoken.
Eventually, however, in 1916 he was deported from the
Protectorate although he played no part in the 1915 Rising.
A letter written by him to Booth, who had now become
absolutely anathema to the government because of his
various indirect links with the Rising, was intercepted
by the wartime censor and was deemed subversive as it
signified Domingo's support for another one of Booth's
schemes, the British African Congress petition of 1915»
45
which advocated equal rights for Africans with Europeans.
But he was not detained for long. Towards the end of 191?
he was released and came to be employed by the government
44
in its offices in Zomba and then Vzimba. Domingo took no
further part in any African political activity.
41. N.O. Moore and W.D. Wilcox, op. cit., pp.721-22.
42. C.0.525/67, Smith to C.O., 6 March 1916, enclosure No.
1, P.R.O., London.
43. For Domingo's letter to Booth see S1/927/19* A.C.S. to
Resident, Mzimba, 8 May 1916, enclosure letter dated
4 February 1916, M.K.A., Zomba. The petition is
contained in C.0.525/68, Smith to C.O., 28 August 1916,
enclosure No.2, P.R.O., London.
44. S1/927/19, A.C.S. to Resident, Mzimba, 7 May 1919,
M.N.A., Zomba.
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In many ways Charles Domingo was the pioneer
African nationalist in Nyasaland which, it must be
remembered, was not his native country. Not only was he
among the first Africans to articulate the sentiment of
Nyasaland nationality but he was the first to voice the
concept of territorial independence. He did not, however,
regard his church as a means of organizing a possible
political movement against European rule. Nor did he
consider renouncing his pacifist ideals to engage in the
violent overthrow of the colonial order. These were the
roles which John Chilembwe was to perform through his P.I.M.
In the Shire Highlands, the Blantyre Mission also
pursued a cautious policy regarding baptism and admission
to the church. But the increased African interest in
mission teaching, consequent upon the establishment of
British political control, never led to the emergence of
a popular religious movement which could exacerbate
African religious grievances as in Tongaland. The
attractions of the Blantyre Mission seem to have been
more than counterbalanced by the opportunities available
to Africans to find work and earn cash incomes on white
estates which served to distract people from the mission¬
aries. Indeed, missionaries were for ever complaining
about their pupils leaving school to obtain paid
employment on white plantations which required few or no
45
academic qualifications. Certainly Africans left the
Mission on account of its arduous discipline and long
45. The Hev. Alexander Hetherwick, ed., 0£. cit., p.34.
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probationary period and thus swelled the ranks of the
welter of sects that Joseph Booth and others had started
up in the Highlands. But although political agitation
among disquieted Africans was also to he canalized
through independent African churches, the sources of
African discontent were to he derived in part from the
economic and social injustices of a settler planting and
commercial economy as well as from frustration in and
disenchantment with European missions.
The 1915 Rising46
Though some of John Chilembwe's following at the
P.I.M. and in the 1915 Rising may have been swayed by
Watch Tower, and the number was probably very small, there
is no direct evidence to suggest that he himself was in any
way influenced by such doctrines. He undoubtedly knew of
the teachings of both Kamwana and Domingo but his
theology appears to have remained constantly of the more
orthodox Baptist type. With Kamwana's deportation and
while financial and doctrinal difficulties were
encumbering Domingo's movement, Chilembwe's P.I.M. was
continuing to grow in strength. Construction of a large
brick church was started in 1911 and completed by the end
of 1913. In 1912 over nine hundred pupils were reported
to be studying at the half dozen P.I.M. schools, and
46. For a detailed account of the planning and character
of the Rising, see the authoritative treatment by
G. Ehepperson and T. Price, o£. cit.. pp.165-359. My
own research adds a number ornew details and
interpretations•
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although the level of instruction provided was limited,
tin
results were fairly promising. r
Hie P.I.M. was also becoming a general meeting
place, a forum for some of the new, aspiring Africans of
the southern highlands. In the first place, Chilembwe had
contacts with members of the Seventh Day Baptist faith in
the Cholo area whom Booth was attempting to supervise
from the Cape. There were also links with the keepers of
the various small independent African churches that had
broken away from the European-controlled Churches of
Christ Mission which had begun operations in the Shire
Highlands in 1908, also as a result of Booth's
inspiration. These independent religious groupings
provided opportunities for Africans who were discontented
with the white missions to find a means for self-
expression and leadership. As well, they constituted
avenues for the channeling of African grievances usually
under a religious guise. In the words of Chepperson and
Price, in spite of "their often pathetic pretentiousness,
they represented the first effective stirrings in
Nyasaland...of a spirit of African independence, not of
the old tribal kind of reaction to the white man's way of
life but of a new kind of response to European culture
along what they considered to be the lines of that
culture's main elements as they saw them in their own
48
little localities." It appears that Chilembwe was
47. NSB 1/2/1, Assistant Resident, Chiradzulu to Resident,
Blantyre, 17 May 1913 with enclosure, M.H.A., Zomba.
48. G. Shepperson and T. Price, 0£. cit., p.241.
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was thinking of uniting some or all of these African
churches with the P. I.M. becoming the organizing centre.
If African church unity was not immediately achieved,
Chilembwe's independent African spirit was revealed in
other ways, particularly in his rejection in 1912 of an
invitation to join the predominantly European ''Federation
49
or a Unified Church of Central African Presbyterian," y
Apart from any ideas of the P.I.M. becoming the
focal point for the various independent African churches,
there was formed there, in mid-1911, the 'African
Industrial Society', "a sort of producers' and consumers'
cooperative."-^ This may have been a continuation under a
new name of a similar self-help association that had been
started up in April 1909 by a leading African businessman
named Peter Mlelemba. The 1909 'Native Industrial Union',
of which Chilembwe became the chairman at its second
meeting, attracted to its membership most of the aspiring,
new Africans in the southern region, including leading
African civil servants and members of the Blantyre
51
Mission. Very little is known of the 1909 organization,
but, most probably, just like its 1911 successor, although
a few meetings were held it never went much beyond the
49. GrOA 2/4/14, Report by A.M.P. Turnbull dated 7 February
1915 containing letter by Rev. R.H. Napier of the
Blantyre Mission to Chilembwe dated 20 May 1912, M.N.A.,
Zoiaba •
50. G. Shepperson and T. Price, 0£. cit., p.166.
51. Some of these leading African members were: Joseph
Bismarck (businessman); T. Lomas Masseah, Oedric
Masangano, John Kufa Mapantha and Harry Matecheta (all
of the Blantyre Mission); A.M. Ohisuse (photographer);
Ruben N. Funsani, John W. Mlanga (Government clerks);
Ardwell ulenga; and K.M. Malinki (of the Z.I.M.).
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paper proposal stage. Yet it emphasized, together with
the ideas on African church unity, the growing national
consciousness of these new men. And at the forefront of
this new consciousness was John Chilembwe. His ambition
was to improve the lot of Africans generally by instilling
in them a sense of self-respect through the achievement
of success on European lines and by making them conscious
of their economic and social power. His social ideal was
the promotion of an industrial mission scheme which
would make the African conscious of his abilities and
potentialities through the development of economic and
other responsibilities. But there is no evidence to
suggest that any political militancy was evolving in his
mind before 1912. Certainly he must have continued to
voice his criticisms of the colonial situation but he
was still acting constitutionally and was not plotting a
revolt at this time.
From 1912 on, however, the indications are that
Chilembwe gradually began to eschew his constitutional
approach of operating within the colonial framework. A
series of personal and social factors may have exacerbated
his feelings, increased his bitterness against Europeans
in the R?otectorate, and moved him to open revolt. For a
number of years he appears to have been heavily in debt
with a local African trader at a particularly trying time
when expenses were mounting and some of his funds were
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52
drying up from his American source.' Attacks of asthma,
the death of a daughter, the worsening of his eyes and
general health added to his financial discomforts and may
have deepened his alienation. Social grievances centring
on the nearby A.L. Bruce estates made his problems even
more burdensome. Some of his followers had, around 1911-12,
built small, grass-hut churches on these estates because
of their distance from the P.I.M. Even after obtaining
permission for their construction, the churches were
burnt down on the instructions of the estate manager, an
action which must have been deeply resented both by
Chilembwe and his flock. Numerous complaints were also
voiced by labourers working on these plantations such as
that their wages were low and often paid in kind which
when sold fetched less than their expected value. The
manager of the estate, W.J. Livingstone, dealt harshly
with his tenants and workers, forcing them to toil long
hours and whipping them for minor offences.^ It is even
claimed that Chilembwe and Livingstone exchanged blows on
54
one occasion.^
52. It seems that Chilembwe borrowed money from a Peter
Mlelemba to start a store which went bankrupt and that
he was thereafter incessantly hounded for the repay¬
ment of the loan. Also, when the African Industrial
Society became moribund, Chilembwe and Duncan Njilima,
chairman and secretary respectively, were unable to
repay all the subscribers. See 1915 Commission
Evidence: L.T. Moggridge, Resident, Blantyre dated
28 June 1915.
53. See Report of the Commission...to Inquire into...The
Native Rising.. .V'ithin the Nyasaland Protectorate (here¬
after R.C.N.R.) 6819 (Zomba,19l6), para.13(e), pp.5-6,
for a description of the major African grievances on
the Bruce estates. See also 31/172*/19» Resident to
C.S., 2 April 1915* M.N.A., Zomba.
54. Interviews with Miriam Joan Chilembwe (a niece of John
Chilembwe) and her husband Yohane «asanjala, Chirad-
zulu, Malawi.
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With Africans taking their complaints to him,
Chilembwe must steadily have become more critical of
white rule and white persons in the Protectorate,
especially when the government refused to respond to his
apparent attempts at protest. All of the foregoing and
other economic and social problems such as the occurrence
of a serious famine from 1911 through to 1913, the
raising of the hut tax in 1912, and the ongoing social
prejudice and discrimination among whites, must have
disillusioned Chilembwe and made him more bitter against
colonialism and the arrogant Europeans in Nyasaland. But
perhaps it was his own personal position and despairing
feelings that most inclined him towards open conspiracy.
Psychologically, Chilembwe was quite likely desperate in
his state of mind consequent upon his financial
difficulties, his generally poor health and the fact that
he "was nearly blind latterly.
As to how far these factors leading to Chilembwe's
growing alienation precipitated the 1915 Rising, we are
still not certain. More probably, it is suggested by
most writers, the outbreak and effects of the first
World War sharpened existing resentments and provided the
key stimuli. The rise in the price of essential goods at
a time when Chilembwe was in dire financial difficulties
must have moved him to the point of desperation. But there
was also the issue of the involvement of growing numbers
of Africans in the fighting against the Germans along the
55* 19*15 Commission Evidence: Rev. R.H. Napier dated 9
July 1915.
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northern borders of the Protectorate. On his return from
America, Chilembwe had criticized the employment of
Central African troops in •European' wars in the Gold
Coast and Somaliland during 1901-2. Now, in 1914, he
was to protest against the recruitment of Malawians in the
Great War. With increasing numbers being called up to
assist and fight in the northern campaigns, and after the
news of serious Vfalawian casualties against the Germans at
Karonga in late September 1914, Chilembwe wrote a long
letter of protest to the Nyasaland Times which was
printed in the issue of 26 November but was immediately
suppressed by the government censor. The letter clearly
conveyed Chilembwe's growing animus towards the white
authorities as well as demonstrating his general sense of
outrage at Africans being "crippled for life" and being
"invited to die for a cause which is not theirs."-^ The
censoring of the letter must therefore have been something
of a last straw for Chilembwe and seems to have been the
point when he actually moved to militancy. The government
had ignored all his complaints and protests and refused
to give him a hearing. So, driven to exasperation, he now
began plotting and organizing for a rebellion. For he
must clearly have possessed those attributes of the
feeling "that he had to give the lead in the 'deliverance'
of his people: the same kind of sentiment which had
inspired many a Negro agitator on the slave plantations
in the New World. The special circumstances of Chilembwe's
56. Letter cited in full in G. Shepperson and T. Price,
op. cit.t pp.2J4-5.
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life, his travels, all reinforced this conviction that he
57
had a special destiny.n"
It is still not possible to provide an entirely
accurate account of the planning of the Rising or of the
strategy and tactics involved. Because of the destruction
and non-availability of certain records, much has to be
drawn from the steadily growing amount of primary
documentation which has so far been released, existing
secondary sources which are generally of little value,
and scanty and often confused oral testimony. Perhaps the
be3t way to make an attempt at tackling this problem is
by looking first at the persons who supported Chilembwe
both as his leading advisers as well as his rank and
file members.
A small group of relatively educated Africans who
had received their training either at the Blantyre Mission
or at the multiplication of African schools in the Shire
Highlands, constituted Chilembwe's leading lieutenants and
composed the members of the inner circle of conspirators.
Of these Kufa, HJilima and Chinyama may be singled out
for greater attention while brief mention may be made of
Mkuluchi and Kaduya mainly because we possess few details
on these latter characters. With all of them Chilembwe
had had long and close contacts. Some of them he had
become acquainted with during his Z.I.M. days; others he
had met initially at a Blantyre Mission out-3chool;
while others had Joined him at the P.I.M. His most
distinguished and respected follower was John Gray Kufa
57* ibid., p.263.
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Mapantha, who was a Sena from Mozambique, and who was to
play something of the role of his second-in-command. A.
highly promising student of the Blantyre Mission, Kufa
had fulfilled the trust and hopes placed in him by
becoming the foremost African assistant and dispenser in
its hospital and also an elder in the Blantyre church.
But he does not seem to have always enjoyed an amicable
relationship with the Scottish missionaries. When he
bought a small plot of land at Nsoni in the Chiradzulu
district and when he insisted on buying a shotgun for a
local hunting trip, he seems, through these actions, to
have come into some sort of collision with the mission
head, Dr. A. Hetherwick, and to have been asked to leave
mission employment. On the recommendation of Hetherwick,
however, he was able to begin work as a dispenser for the
A.L. Bruce estates at Magomero.^ It seems that it was
during this time, between 1913 and 1914, that Kufa may
have come into serious conflict with the manager, W.J.
Livingstone. Dr. Hetherwick mentions, without any
conclusive evidence, that Livingstone made indecent
overtures to Kufa's niece who worked as a nurse on the
estate. Kufa seems to have protested about this incident,
and it may well be that it was this case which, together
with his first-hand experience of conditions on the
Magomero estate, turned him closer to Chilembwe's own
59
growing critical point of view. y
58. 1915 Commission Evidence: Alexander Hetherwick dated
29 June 1915.
59» C.0.525/66, Smith to C.O., 7 February 1916, enclosure
No.D, note of confidential written evidence given by
the Rev. Dr. Alexander Hetherwick, n.d., P.R.0.,London.
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Another one of Chilembwe's fellow conspirators
was Duncan Njilima who may have been of Kololo origin
and who had been a long-standing member of the Blantyre
Mission before being "ex-communicated ten years ago for
bigamy."^0 After visiting Southern Rhodesia and South
Africa and, perhaps, having come into contact with
Booth's plainfield mission in Cholo, Njilima had started
his own estate in the Chiradzulu district and become a
comparatively wealthy property owner. Both ftufa and
NJilima lived at Nsoni, ran a series of small stores,
visited and prayed at the P.I.If., and had close relations
with Chilembwe. They were his right-hand men.
Prom the chain of independent African schools
that had been built up around the independent and
separatist African churches in the Shire Highlands, there
had emerged a further group of less educated persons who
came to constitute both Chilembwe's leading and minor
officials in the 1915 Rising. Stephen Mkuluchi was a Yao
related to Chilembwe who after teaching at the Z.I.M. in
Southern Ngoniland had become a teacher at the P.I.M.
David Xaduya, an Mpotola from Mlanje, had had military
experience in Comaliland and was a deacon at the P.I.M#
Both of these men were prominent not only in organizing
the details of the attacks that were to be launched as
well as instructing the large numbers of followers but
also in leading the various divisions of Chilembwe's
60. See footnote No.53.
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6*1
•army* during the Rising. Of similar importance v*as
Filipo Chinyama in whose hands lay the organization of a
supplementary revolt in Ncheu.
Ohinyama had been born in Mozambique but his
family had moved over the border to Ncheu in the 1390s
probably as part of the group under the Ngoni chief
Makwangwala which had shifted its site to be near the
Baptist Industrial "ission of Scotland station at Dzunje.
Here Ohinyataa had received his early education before
going to the Shire Highlands where he became attached to
at least two of the various sects inspired by Booth - the
Seventh-day Adventists and the Churches of Christ. There¬
after, Chinyama had joined the P.I.M. as a student and
then journeyed to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia where he
became ordained as a pastor of the Seventh Day Baptists.
On his return home in 1911, he had started his own
movement at Nthinda village, a few miles from Dzunje, but
although permitted to open a school he had not been
allowed to construct a church by the District Resident, an
action that he must have deeply resented, "hatever the
cause for his decision to revolt in 1915» he was able to
gather together a large number of discontented Africans
consisting of members of his church movement or simply
local adventurers and build up a fairly sizeable force.
Chinyama's influence, however, seems to have heen
limited to the Dzunje section of Chief Makwangwala and
Africans from the other sections in Southern Ngoniland
61. Interviews with Wylie P. Chigamba and "ilfred B.
Mtambo, Chiradzulu, Malawi.
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took no part in the Rising.^
Chilembwe and his leading followers seem to have
aimed at setting up a primarily African state to supplant
British rule retaining, however, a number of selected
Europeans to profer advice and guidance to the new
African rulers. In a series of meetings held in December
1914- and early January 1915* agreement was reached to
make the initial armed thrusts against the Europeans of
the Shire Highlands and Ncheu district, areas where
groups or individuals existed bearing allegiance to
6-5
Chilembwe and his main followers. v The bulk of Chilembwe's
following was to be made up of adherents of the P.I.M.,
with other independent African churches in the southern
region providing some support. To these groupings, an
attempt may have been made to add discontented African
tenants and workers both on the A.L. Bruce estates and on
other white plantations in the Highlands. Again, it seems
reasonable that attempts may have been made to enlist the
aid of friends and relatives of African soldiers killed or
wounded in the campaigns against the Germans. Many of the
soldiers in the King's African Rifles were recruited from
the Yao peoples and Chilembwe, because of his tribal
links, may have sought to attach them to his cause. Little,
in fact, appears to have been done to attract these two
latter groupings perhaps because, as we shall suggest
below, there was no time to mobilize them. Greater
success was achieved, however, in obtaining the support
62. Interviews with J.R.N. Chinyama, Ncheu, Malawi
65. George Simeon Mwase, strike A Blow And Die (Cambridge,
Massachusetts,1967)* pp.55-6.
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of the independent African church adherents who
bolstered Chilembwe#s P.I.M. following. It is necessary
to consider these persons from the small African churches
before proceeding with the details of the Rising itself.
The Commission of Inquiry into the Rising made a
number of important references to the role of independent
African religious groupings in the rebellion. Prom them,
and from "the parent Churches" it claimed, "John
Chilembwe drew a considerable section of his followers."
It was also "part of his scheme to form a union between
their various sects and his own Mission." Again, the
"rising was not general, but was chiefly confined to
natives connected with independent native Christian sects
or associations, more or less under Chilembwe's influence,"
and that the "objects of the rising were the extermination
of the European population, and the setting up of a native
state or theocracy of which John Chilembwe was to be the
64-
head." Wy own research tends to confirm all of these
statements which we must now develop in more detail.
Chilembwe always seems to have had some conception
of African church unity with the P.I.M. as its organizing
centre. He also seems to have visualized some sort of
role which an independent African church could play in
his new African state as well as in its creation. It is
reported that on 12 January 1915» a meeting was held at
the P.I.M. to establish a union between his church and
the African-controlled Churches of Christ. Indeed, since
such a fairly large number of persons from these independent
64-. R.C.N.R., paras 13(d), 14-, 15, pp.5-6.
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churches were implicated in the Rising, it seems that
Chilembwe was attempting not only to develop closer links
with these sects but seeking to mobilize them in support
of his rebellion. Only a few converts were drawn to
Chilembwe from the Seventh Day Baptists but a larger
number came from the independent African groupings which
had broken away from the parent mission. More importantly,
under the wings of a few lenient Europeans in charge of
the Churches of Christ Mission, a string of serai-
independent African churches had been set up in the
Blantyre, Chiradzulu and MianJe districts. Together with
the little churches that had broken away from the white-
led mission, their members had close contacts with the
P.I.M. and provided the greater part of Chilembwe's
supporters from the independent African churches. Prominent
among these African Churches of Christ leaders were Simon
Kadawere and Barton Makwangwala (no relation of the
Ncheu chief) who between them had had connexions with Booth
and his various religious attachments, had had spells in
South Africa, and became the organizers of the revolt in
the Zomba area.^ After the Rising, it was reported that
in the village of a Zomba headman named Ximu, a brother
of Barton, "the intended operations against Zomba were
organized" and that the "papers seized at John
Chilembwe's village, at Makwangwala's (the Zomba one)
and elsewhere disclose a wide and well organized movement




to attack and massacre the whites...." Certainly the
links "between Chinyama's movement in Ncheu, the
independent Seventh Day Baptist and Churches of Christ
groupings in Zomba, Blantyre and Mlanje, and the
congregations of the P.I.M. in Chiradzulu and Mlanje,
appear to bear this statement out although the actual
details of the organization are not clear.
The plan was composed of three parts. First, a
series of attacks were to be launched on key European
centres in the Blantyre-Chiradzulu-Zomba area with a view
to gaining control of strategic sites and also raiding
stores and depots for arms and ammunition. Simultaneously
Filipo Chinyama and his associates were to revolt in the
Dzunje-Ncheu area, move southwards to Liwonde, Neno and
Blantyre and link up with the main forces under Chilembwe
Finally, a small group of chiefs in the Mlanje area were
to attack the administrative headquarters and seize its
arms. Some of these chiefs, who are said to have been
Chikumbu, Matapwiri and Nyesarera, may have been the ones
or the heirs of those who had collided with the British
66
during the early 1890s. A formidable force of Africans
would thus be Joined together surrounding the main
centres of European concentration in the Protectorate.
Within this area, moreover, it appears that plans were
made to attempt to get house-servants and other African
66. C.0.525/61, Smith to C.O., 3 February 1915, P.F.O.,
London.
67. G.3. Mwase, ££• cit., p.38.
68. GOA 2/4/15, Resident, Mlanje report dated 12
February 1915, M.N.A., Zomba.
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employees to attack their European masters, and it was
hoped as well to persuade some askari or police to Join
gQ
in the rebellion. Shortly before the outbreak of the
Rising, Chilembwe also contacted the German authorities
in East Africa. It is not known what was contained in his
letter to the Germans but it is Just possible that he
sought to enlist their support either directly or
indirectly through their exerting increased pressure on
the northern Ryasaland borders thus leading to the main
British force being stationed there while the southern
region remained undermanned and vulnerable to African
attack. But this latter suggestion must remain mere
speculation for want of any reliable evidence.
It is probable that Chilembwe must have had a
strong inkling that any African revolt, however well
organized, would in the end be defeated by superior
British military force and that the chances of his
rebellion achieving success were extremely slim. Yet the
risks were calculated and accepted. It may therefore be
conceivable that Chilembwe saw the Rising in symbolic
terms, as a way of registering a most effective protest
against colonial authority and the white settlers. By
way of revolt he may have hoped forcibly to show the
white man that African grievances were real and that they
required urgent redress. The rebellion would demonstrate
in the clearest way that some Africans at least would not
69* R.C.P. Maugham, Nyasaland In the Nineties and other
recollections (London,1935)t
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always passively accept the abuses and injustices they
were suffering. Nonetheless, with the British fully
engaged in a war with the Germans, there was a slight
chance that his plans might succeed.
But the government's suspicions had been aroused
by the affair of Chilembwe's anti-war letter of late
November 1914. Already in August a report had been
received from the Roman Catholic Marist Fathers at
Nguludi, a few miles from the P.I.M., that Chilembwe was
planning a rebellion. All correspondence to and from the
P.I.M. was examined but nothing seditious was found. In
December 1914, the Blantyre Resident could write that
"there is very little to be feared from the man; his
70
influence is very limited."' However, these remarks
were probably made on the basis of investigations
conducted before Chilembwe actually decided to rebel and
commenced holding his meetings to plan the organization
of the Rising. For on the basis of perhaps later
findings, Governor Smith could state that "enough was
disclosed in the correspondence, in the mystery assumed,
and in the activity displayed by members of the body to
determine me to deport John Chilembwe and some others....
For this purpose I approached the Governor of Mauritius
70. GOA 2/4/14, Resident, Blantyre to C.S., 11 December
1914. See also Resident, Blantyre to A.C.S., 3
November 1914 and Annual Report of Blantyre Resident
dated 31 March 1915* NSB 1/2/2 contains the monthly
reports for Chiradzulu from 4u.gust to December 1914
which also state that there was nothing seditious
about Chilemb?/e*s activities during this period.
These files are all in the M.N.A., Zomba.
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on the 13th. of January as to the willingness of his
Government to receive native deportees for us. A
favourable reply was received on the 15th., hut John
71Chilembwe has anticipated me."r Oral testimony in Malawi
states that the date when Chilembwe was to be arrested at
72
the P.I.M. was Monday, 25 January. ~ The story runs that
Chilembwe got wind of this intention to deport him within
a few days from a clerk in the Zomba Secretariat who was
a member of the P.I.M., and that he was accordingly forced
to bring forward the time of his proposed revolt which
was actually supposed to break out later on. The
evening of Saturday, 23 January was now chosen as the
73
time to rise in rebellion. ^
71. C.O.525/0I, Smith to C.O., 3 February 1915* P.R.O.,
London. See also R.G.F. Maugham, 0£. cit., p.55 where
he states: "...the Governor...prepared "to deport
Chilembwe. To this end arrangements had actually been
made, and, in a few days, he would have been on his
way to the Seychelles Islands, when the blow fell.
72. Interviews with W.P. Chigamba and W.B. Mtambo. See
also "Robert I. "Rotberg, The Rise of nationalism in
Central Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts,1965), p.36:
"According t'o" "another member of the cabal, on Friday
or Saturday, Chi'lerabwe unexpectedly sent a messenger
to the various Providence Industrial Mission churches
to tell his followers that 'the Europeans planned to
kill the natives on Ponday, and that they must rise.'"
75. Interviews with W.P. Chigamba and W.B. Mtambo. lee
also NRB1/2/2, monthly report for Chlradzulu, January
1915: "As far as one can gather now there was a meeting
held at Chilembwe's place on Friday the 22nd January
1915 at which it was arranged that the Europeans
should be killed...," P.N.A., Zomba. Also 1915
Commission Evidence: B.T. Milthorp, Assistant Resident,
Blantyre dated 28 June 1915: "The only think (sic.) I
know from what I learnt afterwards was, that the plan
was formed on the Friday." And also statement of C.A.
Oardew, Resident at ftcheu dated 5 November 1915? "On
or about 18th January Fiiipo (Chinyama) received a
letter from John Chilembwe telling him to come to a
meeting at John Chilembwe's Church." This last state¬
ment perhaps indicates that Chilembwe was initially
planning to rebel sometime after 23 January.
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The bringing forward of the date of the Rising
must have made the prospects of success even more
unlikely especially if Chilembwe changed his plans only
shortly before 23 January and decided to rise up on that
night instead of on a later date. Certainly in his
hastiness he was not able to make adequate preparations
to ensure the full support of the Mlanje chiefs, and
Chinyama in Ncheu received his instructions as to when to
74
rebel very late. Also it was only a few days before the
outbreak of the Rising that Chilembwe dispatched his
letter to the German authorities which indicates that he
might not have been planning to revolt so soon and that
the news of his imminent deportation impelled him to move
more rapidly. As a consequence of his need to launch an
insurrection quickly, Chilembwe may have realized that the
revolt would now be a forlorn attempt to obtain power. It
is possible that it was at this particular juncture that
he turned his Rising into a symbolical gesture of protest
to demonstrate that Africans were not happy with their
lot and that some of them were willing to die for their
countrymen to give these grievances a wider prominence in
the hope of obtaining satisfactory redress. It may well be
that Chilembwe now sought martyrdom and by way of this most
effective and dramatic protest obtain a better future for
his fellows.^ In the words of one published African
74. G.S. Mwase, op. cit., pp.37-9.
75. ibid., pp.48^9". See also 1915 Commission Evidences
Robertson Namate (Native clerk in the Zomba Secretariat)
dated 6 July 1915 where he alludes to martyrdom.
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biography of Chilembwe, he is said to have declaredi
"Let us then strike a "blow and die," while a similar
expression is used by another but briefer African
discussion of the Rising: John Chilembwe preached "If
death means anything - I would rather die for my people
than to live."^
There is another possible interpretation of this
final episode which may perhaps never be accurately
reconstructed. On receiving information about his
imminent deportation, and there is growing evidence to
suggest that this was the case, Chilembwe decided to
launch his Rising quickly and as effectively as possible.
Some of his initial plans may have had to be cast awry to
make way for a speedy revolt. But he may still have been
confident that the revolt would be successful and that it
might spark off further supporting resistance from the
local African peoples. However, if all was lost, then he
and his followers would flee into neighbouring Mozambique.
It appears that his immediate plans for carrying out the
rebellion were still essentially the same as those worked
out previously. Attacks were to be made on certain depots
to obtain arms and ammunition; a number of European
settlers were to be attacked; and the two risings in
Ncheu and the Shire Highlands were to break out
simultaneously and meet together in Zomba. Perhaps he
could not organize the house-servants, certain askari or
76. G.S. Mwase, op. cit., pp.48-50; K.W. Kulujili, Short
Notes on Past and Present Malawi (unpublished
manuscript), p.12.
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soldiers in time, but they might join the rebellion once
it had broken out. On his realization, however, that
some of his attacks had failed to produce any large
quantity of arms; that some of his leading lieutenants
had lost heart; that no real mass support was forthcoming;
and that Chinyama and his group had suffered reverses and
would not be able to move south and link up with his own
splintering forces, Chilembwe must have at last known
77
that all was lost and fled to Mozambique•'' This inter¬
pretation does not suggest martyrdom or stress the
essentially symbolic intent of the rebellion. That inter¬
pretation, which appears somewhat unlikely, cannot account
for a number of points such as why Chilembwe wrote to
Chinyama to start his secondary rising in Ncheu and why
he himself fled to Mozambique instead of staying to defend
the P.I.M. to the bitter end. The statements attributed
to him that fighting would mean death, and they are not
very clear, may have been made in an attempt by Chilembwe,
on the eve of the Rising, either to rally the timorous to
his cause or to inform his followers that victory would
not be achieved without the loss of African lives. The
1915 Rising, then, was a rebellion initiated in haste and
which proved to be absurdly abortive.
On the night of Saturday, 23 January 1915* Chilembwe
and his followers flared into armed insurrection. From their
centre at the P.I.M., two small forces marched in opposite
directions, one north to the A.L. Bruce estates, the
77» G.S, Mwase, op. cit., pp.39-4-1, 4-3, 50.
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other to Blantyre. The Magomero party attacked the home
of W.J. Livingstone, decapitated him and killed two
other Europeans. The Blantyre party attempted to raid the
African Lakes Corporation's ammunition and gun store but
the attacks failed, as did those of another party against
the Chiradzulu Boma, mainly because a few leading
lieutenants shrank from their tasks which either left the
attacks uncoordinated or led to no attacks being made at
all. Regarding the Ncheu Rising, the local District
Resident seems to have received warnings of a possible
assault from a friendly chief and was able to make
preparations for defence. Chinyama and his followers were
arrested before any attacks could be mounted though there
appears to have been a march of over a hundred men towards
the Boma, with the intent of attacking it, which broke up
when it wa3 realized that government police and soldiers
were waiting to confront the rebels.^8
The revolt was short-lived. No further important
raids were made and Chilembwe and his followers, knowing
that they were doomed, broke up and fled in the direction
of the Mozambique border. Some eight hundred rebels were
captured. Four hundred were soon released, while three
hundred were convicted and about one hundred acquitted.
Forty-six were sentenced to death, eight of whom had
na
their sentences commuted to imprisonment.' And, on 3
February 1915» Chilembwe himself was tracked down, shot
and killed.8^
78. GOA 2/4/15, Report by H.L. Duff dated 3 February 1915•
79. Figures cited in GOA 2/4/15, Smith to C.O., 8 May 1915-
80. For Chilembwe's death, see GOA 2/4/15, report by the
Resident, Mlan^e dated 12 February 1915*
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In the words of Governor Smith, the Rising opened
up "a new phase in the existence of Fyasaland. Fative
risings there have "been in the past, localized in
character and attributable to causes which could be
understood and appreciated in the conquest and settlement
QA
of a savage country." But the Chilembwe Rising was very
different from the initial African resistances to the
imposition of British rule. These had been essentially
tribal revolts which aimed at recovering old conditions
and returning to the old tribal way of life. Chilembwe
and his leading lieutenants, however, envisaged a type
of government very different from the old tribal rule;
they aimed at establishing an African state which would
be wider than the narrow tribal base. They also desired
full entry into the European styles of life rather than a
return to the past. The Rising was in no way a rejection
of the new ways of life. Instead, it was a forcible
protest, as a last resort, against those very features of
British rule which were to educated Africans a gross
betrayal of the promises of European civilization. For
many whites, the vicious slaying of W.J. Livingstone and
the gruesome act of decapitation in the presence of his
distraught wife typified the savage nature of the whole
movement. Certainly there can be no doubt that the
cutting off of Livingstone's head was a brutal act. But
the gentle treatment meted out to the women and children
who were captured at "Tagomero, their eventual release at
81. GOA 2/4-/15, Smith to C.O., 3 February 1915, M.F.A.,
Zomba.
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a time when they could so easily have been harmed whilst
the rebels were fleeing from the P. I.M., and the absence
of any widespread looting and arson, also show that
there was a highly civilized side to the actions of the
rebels.
Led by and composed of Africans of varied tribal
backgrounds, the Rising was also the first real trans-
tribal movement of opposition to British rule, though
Kamwana's Watch Tower movement may deserve a similar
appellation. Notwithstanding its restriction mainly to
the Shire Highlands, the 1915 Rising contained elements
of the concept of nationalism. Chilembwe's aspirations of
creating some sort of united African church which would
play some cultural unifying link in his proposed state,
and his articulation of the concept of the territorial
nationality of Nyasaland, symbolized, at least, the
ideological elements of nationalism.
But not all of the growing body of new men
followed Chilembwe. Leaders of independent African
religious groupings such as Domingo and Kamwana, following
the pacifist lines of Booth, rejected the idea of
militant action; whilst members of some of the European-
controlled missions such as Rev. Stephen Kundecha of the
Blantyre Mission and K.M. Malinki of the Z.I.M., although
approached to join, refused to do so. Many of these and
other new men must have sympathized with Chilembwe and
agreed with him about the nature and extent of African
grievances, but they were not willing to move to the
point of resorting to violence to overthrow the colonial
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order# In the first place, many of them were probably not
confident of running an independent African state# More
likely, most of them must have continued to see the need
for Europeans to maintain their presence and activities in
the Protectorate# For the impression one gets of educated
African opinion at this time is that it viewed British
rule and white activity, despite its shortcomings, as a
great blessing to the African peoples. A statement by
Y.Z. Mwase, whom we have already shown to be critical of
the Livingstonia missionaries, seems apposite in this
context. Although written in 1924 it sums up the views
of the new men regarding the civilizing role of western
forces in the regeneration of Africa, Mwase wrote: "The
expression 'White man makes Africa' goes without saying -
Freedom from slavery, universal peace, cessation of war,
Light, both intellectual and spiritual, in fact every
Op
good thing we undeservedly owe to white man...."
However one, as a colonial subject, might have felt about
Eritlsh rule, it had a certain legitimacy in the context
of its civilizing and modernizing functions.
Although a few chiefs sided with Chilembwe in the
rebellion, most of the traditional authorities would
probably not have supported him in such a violent cause
against the colonial government, with very few exceptions,
they must undoubtedly have preferred the rule of the
British, fully appreciating that the new emergent African
82. Y#T. Vwasi to Rev. A.G. MacAlpine, 7 April 1924 in
A#G. MacAlpine papers, Gen.766/2, University of
Fdinburgh Library.
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leadership threatened their favoured position. For
despite their having "become the subordinate civil servants
of the colonial administration, they were also finding
that the colonial regime was attempting to consolidate
their few remaining powers and preserve their traditional
role as representatives of African opinion. The risk of
revolt, therefore, was one that offered them little
advantage. Yet the fact that overtures were made to some
chiefs and that most of those who were approached did not
immediately betray him, indicates that Chilembwe's
relations with traditional authorities were not altogether
strained.
As for the vast majority of the population still
clinging to the customary modes of life, only a small
number of largely discontented labourers and tenants on
the A.L. Bruce estates were attracted to Chilembwe. Even
the onset of the first World War, with its large-scale
recruitment of Hyasas as carriers and soldiers and its
burdensome government levies on local peoples for food
and other services, was not to occasion the masses either
to protest or to rise up in revolt. Only one important
chief, the northern Ngoni paramount Chimtunga, was to
show himself hostile to these wartime exactions at a time
35
when the colonial masters were at a serious disadvantage.
A few possible explanations may be given here to suggest
why the masses could not be easily mobilized into a mass
rebellion and why there were not any peasant outbursts
83. 0.0.525/63, Smith to 0.0., 15 November 1915; 0.0.525/
66, Smith to C.O., 17 January 1916 with enclosures,
P.N.O., London.
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against the early colonial situation.
In the first place the hand of colonial rule was
comparatively light throughout most of the Protectorate.
The administration was a remote establishment whose
legislations hardly affected the lives of ordinary
Africans. The imposition of the hut tax was, of course,
a source of much complaint. In the southern region,
however, tax liabilities could be quite easily met by
most Africans as sufficient economic opportunities
existed for them to earn cash. But in the northern half
of Nyasaland thousands of Africans were forced to migrate
to neighbouring countries to earn cash to meet their hut
«
tax obligations. If there had been no such economic
safety-valve enabling tribesmen to work outside their
homeland, it is probable that a considerable force of
exasperation could have been built up among northern
Africans. Fhite settler pressures were also very slight
throughout much of the country. Europeans were not often
seen and for nearly five months of the year, during the
rainy season, most of the roads were usually unpassable.
Certainly there were acute land and labour grievances in
the Shire Highlands and Africans were subject to the
injustices and insults inherent in the growth of a settler
economy and culture. But Africans resident on white
estates lacked any effective political communicators.
The chiefs on private lands had lost their authority and
were no longer the real representatives of their people.
John Chilerabwe had attempted to perform this sort of role
but his influence had been confined to the disgruntled
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on the A.L. Bruce plantations. On the other white
estates in the southern highland districts of Cholo and
Mlanje there were no Africans either to act as effective
spokesmen or to mobilize the discontented residents for
political purposes. Perhaps the most important factor as
to why there was no mass rural disaffection was that
there was a lack of any heavy external burdens on the
tx'ibesaien in the Protectorate. Production methods and
land tenure, the most fundamental aspects of customary
life, continued to remain unchanged and unaffected by
direct governmental pressure. As a result there were
rarely any acute complaints to articulate on behalf of
most of the African cultivators in the rural areas. Many
years were to pass before a conjunction between the elite
and the mass in African politics was to be achieved in
Nyasaland and then there was to be launched a more
general and successful opposition to the white man's rule.
For the new men of the inter-war period, John
Chilembwe did not become a martyr as he would for later
African nationalist leaders. During the late 1950s,
African nationalists came to look upon him as a hero
84
though not as a messiah. But if the statements recorded
on Chilembwe in the 1920s are to be taken as representative
of the real views of the inter-war African politicians,
then the 1915 Rising evoked no sympathetic response from
them. Southern region Africans termed the Rising "a nasty
84. R»L. rishlade, Sectarianism in Southern Nyasaland
(London,1965), pp.153-9* See also Report of the
Fyasaland Commission of Inquiry, Cmnd.314 (1959),
pp.8-9.
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incident which should well be forgotten"^ and northern
Africans echoed these views by declaring that the revolt
was Ma black mark on the natives of the protectorate
Ogin general." As to how far these remarks corresponded
to the true feelings of the inter-war Africans is difficult
to know, particularly in view of the government's severe
suppression of the Rising and its forceful denunciation
of Chilembwe. tfany Africans must have secretly respected
Chilembwe for all that he had stood for and his memory
was never to die out. But it was also very clear to
Africans that the Rising had been absurdly abortive. Once
again the futility of rebellion had been demonstrated and
no significant redress of African grievances had been
achieved. The Europeans were to<? strong to be forced and
new and constitutional techniques of political action
were required to seek the betterment of African
conditions. Moreover, with the government having clamped
down on and suppressed most of the independent African
churches, non-religious vehicles of political action
were desirable. Although some African-controlled churches
were permitted to function, the close connexions between
religion and politics came to an end. For the politics
of the inter-war period, Chilembwe and his Providence
Industrial Mission provided little relevance and although
85. B1/5263/23* Minutes of meeting of the Nyasaland
Southern Province Native Association held on 14
August 1926, M.N.A., Zomba.
86. 81/1481/19, L.Z. Mumba to Superintendent of Native
Affairs, 27 June 1919 containing extracts from minutes
of meeting of the North Nyasa Native Association held
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African Groups and the Politics of Inter-War Native
Associations.
Native Associations as pressure groups
From the time that the North Nyasa Native
Association (N.N.N.A.) resumed its activities in June
1919 to the year 1924 when some educated Africans in the
southern region at last came to feel sufficiently secure
to form their own similar organizations, African political
activity was confined to northern Nyasaland. In 1920, the
West Nyasa Native Association (W.N.N.A.) recommenced its
meetings and, in the same year, Africans in the remaining
northern district started the Mombera Native Association
(M.N.A.). In that year also, the N.N.N.A. "made an effort
to get into communication with the Zomba and Blantyre
1
natives" but "no replies were received." Despite the
fact that immediately after the war a considerable number
of European settlers had entered the Shire Highlands and
that the total acreage under Crown lease had consequently
2
risen by just over a hundred thousand acres, southern
Africans, although undoubtedly anxious regarding the
security of their land and entertaining various other
1. Levi Z. Mumba, "Native Associations in Nyasaland,"
Zo Ona, 24 April 1924, p.1.
Report of a Commission to Enquire into and Report upon
Certain Matters connected with the Occupation of Land
in the Nyasaland I^otectorate, 10532 (Zomba,1921), p.
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grievances as well, could not be moved easily into
organized political activity. Swift and heavy retribution
had followed the Chilembwe Rising which must have left
many local Africans extremely apprehensive about engaging
in politics. Only in late 1923 was Levi Mumba, corres¬
ponding secretary of the N.N.N.A., with the aid of a
Church of Scotland missionary at Domasi, the Rev. James
Reid, instrumental in persuading educated southerners
that conditions were now more amenable for the formation
of Native Associations in their region. Mumba had
recently been transferred to Zomba to work as a store¬
keeper in the Public Yorks Department and his new
position brought him into closer and continuous contact
with the local African intelligentsia. Reid was at that
time the missionary responsible for African interests in
the Legislative Council and he seems to have seen the
need for an African body which he could consult regarding
southern African viewpoints, ^'ith the encouragement and.
advice of these two persons, Native Associations were now
established in Zomba and Blantyre and within a few years
similar bodies had been created in most of the other
southern districts. Native Associations made a late
appearance in the central region and then functioned for
only a short period; while no such organizations were
started in Yaoland. These latter areas were to remain
largely on the fringes of the new political developments.
They possessed no base to support sustained political
action being so bereft of the basic requirements of
social mobilization. In the north and south, however,
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durable secular vehicles had been set up by the late
1920s through which Africans in these regions were mainly
to pursue their modern-style political activities during
the two decades between the wars.
As the moving spirit behind these Native
Associations, Levi Mumba played a key role in the pro¬
liferation of a network of such communities within the
3
Protectorate. By maintaining a prolific correspondence
1L
with leading Africans throughout Nyasaland and by writxng
articles in the African vernacular newspaper, Zo Ona,
Mumba was able to urge his fellows to organize themselves
and to seek to better African conditions. Native
Associations, he claimed, would be able to assist the
colonial government to become "informed of native public
opinion" and would also be of great benefit to "the
native by representing him in all political matters, by
keeping him informed of and explaining the object of
3. The following are the Native Associations that I have
been able to trace as having operated within Nyasaland:
North Nyasa N.A. (N.N.N.A. - 1912); West Nyasa N.A.
(W.N.N.A. -1914); Mombera N.A. (M.N.A. - 1920);
Nyasaland Southern Province N.A. (N.S.P.N.A. -1923) later
the Zomba Province N.A. (Z.P.N.A. - 1927); Blantyre
N.A. (B.N.A. - 1924); Mlanje N.A. (M.J.N.A. - 1926);
Central Province N.A. (O.P.N.A. - 1929); Chiradzulu
District N.A. (C.D.N.A. - 1929); Kasungu N.A. (K.N.A. —
1930); Lower Shire N.A. (L.S.N.A. - 1931); Ncheu N.A.
(N.N.A. - 1933); Cholo N.A. (C.N.A. - 1933). All dates
refer to the year the Association was formed.
4. Mumba appears to have left a large part of his corres¬
pondence and personal papers to a son but this
invaluable documentation seems to have been destroyed.
Two close friends of Mumba, C.C. Chinula and I.M. Jere,
have, however, kindly made available to me a number of
his letters which they have retained over the years.
Some of these letters are referred to in subsequent
footnotes.
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legislations new and already in force." There was, he
insisted, "absolutely nothing treacherous" about such
political groups; "their very formation is proof, if one
be wanted, that the way native interests are being
looked after is not satisfactory in that the natives are
not consulted, and this has raised a desire to have a say
in matters touching them." This growing African desire
"to have a say" in matters affecting their lives was made
clear by Mumba in another passage:
"TO OUR RULERS, THE WHITE PEOPLE, I say - we
thank you for having brought us peace and
prosperity which have raised us to this stage.
But the civilization which you have taught us
forces us to aspire to greater things and we
ask for your sympathy in our undertaking. Those
of you who are looking after native interests
should take special interest in these Associations
and keep in close touch with them, encourage
them by getting through them native opinion
regarding any new legislation and so guide them
aright in their attempt to have a say in such
matters." 5
Miss Margery Perham has written of East Africa
that "after a few early and usually very local acts of
resistance and rebellion in all the territories, the
African peoples were outwardly acquiescent and politically
passive." Recent research has completely disproved the
validity of this statement for East Africa. Similarly, it
can be argued for Nyasaland that after the Chilembwe
Rising manifestations of African political initiative did
5. All quotations in this paragraph are from L. Z. Mumba,
op. ext., p.^1.
6. Tincent Harlow and E.M. Chilver assisted by Alison
Smith, eds., History of East Africa (Oxford,1965),
Vol.2, Introduction by Margery Perham, p.xv.
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not decline but found renewed expression in the activities
of the Native Associations. These political groups
displayed a growing sense of independent self-confidence
which may possibly have found its basis in the increasing
importance during the inter-war period of peasant
agriculture but was probably due more to the prestige and
assurance that the leaders of these Associations drew
from the fact that they were successful pioneers of the
new ways of life. The organizers of Native Associations
were the early product of a new order that was arising
and looked forward to taking what they considered to be
their rightful place within the new society. Through the
creation of Native Associations, educated Africans hoped
that the government would now seek to consult them before
making decisions on matters directly affecting the lives
of the indigenous population. "The natives of the country"
argued Mumba, "should be taken into the confidence of the
government as His Majesty's subjects like all others."
"(We) are aware that natives are considered as children in
these matters, and so they are, but it is as children
when they can better be initiated into what is demanded of
7
them when they grow up."' They wanted, for example, the
government to refer bills on African matters to the
Native Associations and receive suggestions from them "as
they do with Europeans." "If this is done it would create
a mutual feeling of trust and though in certain matters
we may not see eye to eye, and it is an impossibility to
7. Nat. 12/3, L.Z. Mumba to C.S., 10 April 1935* M.N.A.,
Zomba •
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do so in this world, yet the "benefit derived will
O
compensate for the differences." And even when they were
not consulted, associationists vigorously asserted
African aspirations and grievances and exerted pressure
on the colonial authority to "better African conditions.
Native Associations in Nyasaland between the wars were an
explicit expression of African political initiative and
indigenous determination not to accept submissively the
Q
colonial situation.
Non-tribal in purpose and outlook, the Associations,
whose meetings were transacted entirely in English, were
led by new men - primary school teachers, clerks in
government and commercial offices and ministers of
religion - fairly well-educated persons who were pre¬
dominantly the products of the two major Scottish
missions. A few of them had had experience of conditions
outside the Protectorate but the majority of them,
particularly the leading Association officials, had
always lived and worked within Nyasaland. Yet they all
shared common values and appealed to loyalties that "were
those of common membership of an embryonic national entity.
8. Memorandum by L.Z. Mumba, chairman of the Representative
Committee of Northern Province Native Associations, to
the Hilton-Young Commission on Closer Union, in
Memoranda and other papers circulated to the Commission,
Vol.4, F.C.O.' Library, London.
9. Three earlier discussions of the politics of Native
Associations in Nyasaland are contained in Richard
Gray, The Two Nations (London,1960), pp.163-178:
Robert I. Rotberg. The Rise of Nationalism in Central
Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts,^965), Chap.5; and
J. van Velsen, "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi,"
in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown, eds., The Zambesian
last (Manchester,1966), pp.376-412.
10. J. van "Velsen, 0£. cit., p.381.
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In no way did the Native Associations attempt to preserve
tribal identities; they were, as their names suggested,
district in character and successfully transcended the
pale of ethnic loyalties. Although some were based upon
tribal areas, such as the W.N.N.A. among the lakeside
Tonga, their activities were distinctly non-tribal in
orientation. Nor were members of these bodies entirely
the products of the two main Scottish missions though
these comprised the bulk of their membership and played
the key roles in their development. An Association like
the C.D.I?.A., for instance, included adherents of the
Blantyre Mission, the Montfort larist Fathers, the
Providence Industrial Mission as well as members of other
smaller sects. Tribalism and religion were therefore of
little consequence in the character and politics of the
Native Associations.
Structurally, the Associations were bureaucratic
in form with a president, a general secretary, a
treasurer and other officials specialized according to
function. All were formal organizations with written
constitutions and procedures for the accomplishment of
business. This was not mere show. Type-written minutes of
meetings were regularly circulated to all paid-up
members; elections were held periodically; and office¬
bearers removed for any misdeeds. Even such a well-known
and American-educated person like Frederick Gresham
11
NJilima, a son of Duncan NJilima, could be dismissed.
11. F.G. NJilima attended a high school in Mississippi and
colleges in Kentucky. He served with the British array
in France and was wounded in action. For details see
S51/2/1, Smith to C.O., 28 March 1922, M.N.A., Zomba.
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In 1925* N^ilima had his appointment as Secretary of the
N.S.P.N.A. "terminated" for "displaying little interest
for the work of the Association and many times you did
not attend meetings as you ought to have been doing and
more particularly since you wilfully spent...money
12
belonging to this body, on your private affairs."
According to Levi Mumba, "In order to get immediate
hearing from the authorities in local matters affecting
adversely, or having a hard bearing on the African
community, the organization of Native Associations have
been made with due regard to Administrative Districts
in the first place.At the same time, the Associations
presented their demands and views to the District
Commissioners for transmission to the central secretariat
in Zomba in the hope that they would be able to influence
the central government as well, particularly on issues of
an extra-district or territorial nature. It was hoped
that such a dual approach - exerting pressure on the
district and the central administration - would presage
the incorporation of district associations into one
national-wide movement. In 1924-, Mumba proferred the hope
that "before long these associations would assume national
importance by amalgamation under a central body." As
early as 1923* "negotiations were started among the
associations of the Northern Province with a view to
12. NS1/3/5» R. Namate, Vice-President of H.S.P.N.A., to
F.N. Gresham, 23 November 1925* M.N.A., Zomba.
13• L.Z. Mumba to H. Selby Msimang, General Secretary of
All African Convention, Johannesburg, 8 March 1937»
I»M. Jere papers. The underlining is mine.
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i JL
amalgamation." Such a unification was not realized at
the time but a Representative Committee of Northern
Province Native Associations (R.C.N.P.N.A.) was formed
in the south at Zomba in the following year. Under the
chairmanship of Mumba, the Committee was composed of
members of the three northern Associations who were
working mainly as civil servants in the government offices
located in the capital. The Committee was granted a
mandate to represent these northern bodies, "to act for
us by presenting the native point of view to the
15
Government." y With Professor J. van Velsen we may regard
the R.C.N.P.N.A. as the "forerunner" of the later
territorial-wide Nyasaland African Congress, in that it
"functioned more like a national pressure group" than as
an institution debating solely northern grievances and
16
subjects. Its manifold interests encompassed the whole
17
range of Malawi society, ' and because of its close
relations with both northern and southern Native
Associations it helped to promote political ties on a
14-. L.Z. Mumba (Native Associations), op. cit., p.1.
15. My date of the founding of the R.CTFT.PTTTTA. is based
on an article on this organization in the Bantu
Mirror (Eulawayo), 6 August 1936, p.1. This issue
also contains photographs of Levi Mumba and the
Representative Committee. I am indebted to I.M. Jere
(a secretary and chairman of the Committee during the
1920s and 1930s) for showing me hi3 copy of this
particular issue. See S1/3263/23, which mentions the
R.C.N.P.N.A. in the attendance list at a meeting of
the N.S.P.N.A. held on 21 November 1925* See also
Nat. 12/3 for authorisations from the three northern
Native Associations to the Representative Comraittee to
represent them. Both of these references are to files
in the M.N.A., Zomba.
16. J. van Velsen, 0£. cit., p.379.




Interaction between the Associations and informal
co-operation among their members were also common, which
added to the growing cohesiveness of African protest. This
was evident from the attendance at meetings of followers
from different groups, their frequent exchanging of
minutes and resolutions, and the identical nature of
their constitutions which contained as one of their
objects "to keep in touch with other similar Native
Associations." Again, Levi Mumba remarked that such co¬
operation was essential for "any representations to the
Government made without first consulting one or more of
these organizations are likely to meet with conflicting
views which may have been expressed by them." As far as
I am aware, despite the fact that Native Associations
debated many common issues, at no time were resolutions
passed by any group incompatible with those adopted by
other bodies.
Native Associations provided convenient platforms
for the airing and discussion of African grievances and
viewpoints, debating on an impressive range of subjects,
from relatively minor district topics to issues of
fundamental national importance such as that of closer
union of Nyasaland with the two Nhodesias. Southern
Associations, functioning in an area where land alienation
to white planters had been extensive, held numerous
18. L.Z. Mumba (Native Associations), 0£. cit., p.1.
discussions on problems arising from scarcity of land,
the poor living and working conditions of labourers on
private estates, racial discrimination and other features
consequent upon the settlement of Europeans. Native
19
Associations operated in most of the southern districts
but the most durable and important ones were the two
based in the townships of Blantyre and Z-omba, which were
run by a combination of civil servants, mission teachers,
pastors and small businessmen. In the northern region,
European settler intrusion was of little consequence and
the pattern of discrimination therefore less thorough¬
going than in the Shire Highlands. But economic oppor¬
tunities for work, were extremely limited and the northern
tribesmen were forced either to continue concentrating on
subsistence farming or migrate abroad ih search of
20
employment. Northern Native Associations thus urged
government to promote the conditions for rural and
agricultural development and pointed to the economic and
social evils consequent upon the migration of thousands
of men to the labour markets of Central and South Africa.
19. The following files in the F.N.A., Zomba are concerned
with the activities of the southern Native Associations:
S1/3263/23; S1/2104-/19; NS1/3/5; Nat.12/3; N.S.P.N.A.
later the Z.P.N.A.




20. The following files in the M.N.A., Zomba relate to the
northern Native Associations:
S1/14-81/19 ; NC1/3/4-; NC1/3/6: N.N.N.A.
S1/2065/19; NC1/3.A-S: W.N.N.A.
S1/210/20; NC1/3/4—5 ; NNM1/13/1; MN1/4-/1: M.N. A.
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They called for improvements in the extent of communi¬
cations and the distribution and number of markets and
also asked for the introduction of agricultural
instructors to teach the people better methods of farming.
Northern Associations had their base in the rural areas
and were led by teachers and pastors who worked mainly
within the extensive Livingstonia Mission network in the
region. In the central region, a few meetings were held
21
by the C.P.N.A. and some other Associations which
forwarded resolutions to the government on a variety of
subjects. The G.P.N.A. asked for the provision of more
markets and agricultural instructors, demanded improved
levels of education in the region, and sought to obtain
a reduction of rental obligations of African storekeepers.
The Association, which met in Lilongwe, does not appear
to have had any initial links with Native Associations
elsewhere in the Protectorate as is evident from the
differently-worded constitution it adopted. Its membership
was composed of a number of local traders but it was
directed by a Tonga businessman, G-.S. Mwase, whose
transfer to Blantyre to work in government service led
to the C.P.N.A. becoming moribund. Similarly, Native
Associations in Kasungu and Ncheu organized a few meetings
but soon foundered. The foundations for sustained and
21. The following files in the M.N.A., Zomba relate to the
central region Native Associations:




effective organization were lacking in the central region
in terms of leadership and political awareness.
Aside from matters of local or regional importance,
Native Associations frequently debated topics of national
interest on which they passed similar types of
resolutions. There were constant demands for more and
better social services with the Africans1 contribution to
the Protectorate's revenue being especially emphasized.
Such demands were incessantly for improved educational
facilities and the need for more and better government
hospitals. Together with education, economic development
was the subject of most persistent concern to the
Associations. Government was continuously urged to
provide the necessary infrastructure or else Nyasaland
could never hope to develop economically. In another vein,
they protested against laws which they believed were
discriminatory and condemned the actions of government
22
agents when they were felt to have behaved illegally.
In all this the R.C.N.P.N.A., led and guided by Wumba,
was in the forefront. As a link between northern and
southern Associations; because of its proximity to the
centre of government; and through its national interests,
it undoubtedly helped to keep the various bodies abreast
with new political developments as well as developing
territorial concerns among their leaders. The R.C.N.P.N.A.
was beginning slowly to move in the direction of
centralizing the activities of the Native Associations
22. 3ee J. van Velsen, 0£. cit., pp.331-4-04 for a more
detailed discussion of topics raised and debated by
Native Associations.
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even though on an informal level.
Levi Mumba and the character of Native Associations
Since the Native Associations revolved round Levi
Zililo Mumba to a very important extent, he deserves a
close attention. Little is known about his early life.
But from a very brief introduction by the Rev. T. Cullen
25
Young to an article penned by Ifumba himself, we know
that he was born about 1834- of mixed Ngoni and Senga
origin and that he grew up near Ekwendeni in the old
Mombera's district (now Mzimba). He received his early
education at the local Free Church school and had, by
1902, reached the highest class then available for
general education of Africans at the Overtoun Institution.
pa
On completing his standard six in October 1903, he
gained brief employment in the office of the veteran and
distinguished Dr. Laws of Livingstonia. But when a
commercial class was launched at the Institution in 1904,
Mumba was encouraged to enrol for the course. He was,
reported Cullen Young, a "brilliant pupil" and rapidly
acquired his certificate in book-keeping and other
subjects. Re-employed by the Mission as an assistant, he
"proved to be of immense value" in "all the business
work" of the Church of which he became an elder in the
23. An African (Levi Mumba), "The Religion of My Fathers,"
The International Review of Missions, 19 (1930),
Introduction by T. Cullen Young, p.362.
24. For further details of ""umba's educational performances
at the Overtoun Institution, see the Institution^
Boys Register, Vol.1, entry No.156, Church of Scotland
Office, Edinburgh.
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local congregation. In 1911, however, Mumba took a second
wife. Banished from the Free Church, he now found work at
the government hospital in Karonga and during the 1914--18
War served with the Red Cross in Tanganyika. In 1919 he
re-joined government service and was transferred to Zornba
in 1923.
IVfumba was at the forefront of inter-war African
political activity in Nyasaland. He attended meetings of
several Native Associations, espoused his demands for
African betterment at such gatherings and in conversation
with government officials, and expressed his ideas and
views in a stream of lucidly-composed memoranda to the
colonial authorities. The striking array of items that
Mumba discussed and debated covered the whole range of
government policy and clearly show that he was thinking
more in terms of 'national' interests than in terms of
particularistic regional or tribal issues. Borne idea of
this national focus and Mumba's lively interest in his
country's problems can be obtained from the evidence
which he gave on behalf of the R.C.N.P.N.A. to the Filton-
Young Commission in 1928.
"We natives of Nyasaland are men of ambition,
capable of development and enterprise, we are
in fact crying aloud for this, even seeking
opportunities outside our own land to the
detriment of our family relations and
territorial welfare....
The economic pinch is driving us out.
Even in our own country we are merely used as
labour for the Whitemen.... We have got land,
we are healthy, strong, and are able to work,
but it is useless to cultivate them beyond our
annual needs as there are no markets for
surplus produce. We want to be given facilities
for development near our own homes, given
markets with good prices for crops grown by
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ourselves. We want stores near our own homes
run by natives, encouragement to them in the
initial stage and to those who wish to start
other independent trades. For those who are not
able to produce on their own and have to work
for others we demand good wages and good
treatment, food and proper houses, as is found
in other Colonies and Protectorates; these are
real needs for us." 25
This evidence also displays Mumba's radical and
inquiring turn of mind. Clearly he was the most
articulate African spokesman of his generation in Nyasaland.
His powerful oratory supported by his stature, ability
and drive, enabled him to earn the confidence of his
fellow educated Africans throughout the Protectorate.
Pven among colonial officials, Mumba commanded respect
though his searching criticisms must have provoked some
irritation in government circles. He headed various
African deputations to the colonial authorities, submitted
memoranda to a number of commissions, and was asked in
1933 to serve as the first African on the government's
Advisory Committee on Education. Prior to the first
meeting he attended of this body, Mumba circulated a
memorandum urging the immediate introduction of secondary
education in Nyasaland and from then on the subject was a
regular feature every year on the Committee's agenda. It
appears that Rumba's persistent demands for further
schooling backed up by the petitions of the Native
Associations were instrumental in the government
26
formulating plans to meet these needs.
25* 'Memoranda and other papers circulated to the Hilton
Young Commission, 0£. cit., Vol.4.
26. Trevor Coombe, "The Origins of Secondary Education in
Zambia, *>• Anatomy of a Decision, 1937-1939," African
Social Research, 5 (1968), p.381.
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In many ways, fumba's articulation of African
educational needs displayed his deep concern for the
interests of all types of Africans and depicted his great
confidence in their ability to better themselves if
provided with the necessary opportunities. His memorandum
to the 1933 Advisory Committee makes clear his views of
the potentialities of an active policy of development as
did also his evidence to the 1928 Hilton-Young Commission.
In it he not only called for secondary education but also
a rural and vocational emphasis in school curricula to
enable Africans at all levels to become better equipped
to improve their conditions of life.
"We are agreed (he wrote) that the policy in
education should be based on the fact that the
majority of us will have to find means of
living in agriculture, which has been our
industry from time immemorial, to which should
be added present day industries to be under¬
taken by us independently in our villages and
in towns. We think that if this is done, some¬
thing near to the outlook in life which we see
among Europeans and Indians today might be
achieved which would in turn minimize the
danger of unemployment.... Hitherto the aim in
education has been to turn out men and women
with abilities to work as employees of
Europeans with the result that the supply has
exceeded the demand. (Those who are unable to
find employment) either go outside Nyasaland to
seek work or are absorbed in the village
communities with little benefit to themselves
or their localities. It is not their fault but
the education which has failed to arouse the
innate 3elf activities to sustain an independent
economic effort."
''hereas leading African spokesmen in neighbouring
territories were primarily urging the need for greater
emphasis on the academic and literary sides of the school
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curricula,~r Mumba saw the need for an increasing rural
and vocational emphasis as well. The following vigorous
plea concluded the 1933 memorandum:
"Educate for the employer, educate for service
with tribal communities, but MOST OF ALL
EDUCATE THE MASSES TO STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET.
Give us this chance and I can assure you that
within a period of a comparatively few years
the response of the Nyasaland African will be
surprisingly great." 28
This concern for the masses was reflected in the
activities of the Native Associations. Although essentially
elitist bodies they were not self-serving concerns. They
also saw their function as representing the views of the
ordinary people to the government. Many of the subjects
they raised for discussion concerned the interests of the
rural African whose problems and needs were constantly
brought to the attention of the colonial authorities.
Despite the elements of radicalism in his speeches
and writings as well as his self-confident and highly pro-
African spirit, Mumba also symbolized the essentially
gradualist approach of the inter-war African political
leaders in Nyasaland. He constantly stressed constitutio¬
nality, moderation of expression and political rectitude
attempting to ensure that Europeans would not be unduly
27* Terence Sanger, "African attempts to control education
in East and Central Africa, 1900-1939," Past and
Present, 32 (196$), pp.57-85.
28. Nat. 12/3, L.Z. Mumba to C.T,., 30 October 1933, M.N.A.,
Zomba. The report of the Education Department for the
year 1944-, p.1 made the following comment on urnba 's
educational efforts and activities: "He was a moat able
and zealous member of the (Advisory) Committee from
1935 to the last meeting and was deeply concerned with
all matters affecting African education."
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antagonized by African political activities and criticisms.
This desire to minimize apprehension among whites went
even as far as ftonba not wearing a hat and shoes in their
presence, with regard to the political strategy to be
followed, this was carefully adumbrated by Mumba in the
following terms:
"TO MY FELLOW NATIVES I would say, though the
situation is difficult, we are on the right
track. We have made mistakes in the past and
will make them in future; that is not a draw¬
back because by making them we learn how to do
better. But we must cultivate patience, moderation
of expression, and above all we must be loyal.
That is the only way we can hope to win the
confidence of the white people." 29
The "mistakes" of the past was probably a reference to the
Chilembwe Rising. In the wake of the 1915 insurrection, it
was essential for African political leaders to adopt an
approach that was not only non-violent and open but also
one that was, as far as possible, loyal and faithful to
the colonial order. The best way to advance African
interests, Mumba believed, was to act constitutionally, be
temperate and seek to co-operate as fully as possible with
the colonial government. Even in 194-1, he could write to
the chairman of the R.C.N.P.N.A.: "Thank you for copy of
your memorandum to Government. I think it is moderately
worded as not to give any offence."^0 His policy was
essentially one of reform through co-operation.
Yet there were occasions when the Native
Associations were very outspoken in their condemnation of
29. L.Z. Mumba (Native Associations), 0£. cit., p.1.
30. L.Z. Mumba to I.M. Jere, 2 May 194%" I.hit* Jere papers.
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particular features of the colonial situation. By no
means were they servile and their criticisms could he
pungently ventilated, especially when matters of African
pride and self-respect were involved. The most notable
example of this occurred when the Associations protested
against Section 129 of the 1929 Code of Criminal Law
which they claimed was discriminatory in that it
penalized illicit sexual intercourse between a white
woman and a black man. So vehement were their denunci-
31
ations of this law"^ that the District Commissioner of
Karonga came out with the following interesting remarks:
"It is a peculiar thing that almost every
highly educated native of the Livingstonia
Mission is politically minded and race conscious
and always on the look out for some stigma.
At the back of their minds is an intoler¬
ance of the Europeans and their creed is
•Africa for the Africans'. This product is
proof positive that education at Livingstonia
has been conducted on wrong lines in the past,
though the Mission is not entirely to blame.
There is a continuous contact with South Africa
and leading native members of the Mission here
are kept well informed concerning native
labour organizations and political organizations
in that country." 32
But these connexions with politicians in South
Africa do not seem to have introduced any important
strains of militant radicalism into Malawi African politics
in the years between the wars. Levi Mumba was a close
friend of the Tonga, Clements Kadalie, the founder of
■South Africa's largest African labour movement. On his
31. See, for example, S1/1431/19, I. Mkondowe, Secretary
of N.N.N.A., to C.S., 29 September 1930, M.N.A.,Zomba
32. ibid., D.C., Karonga, to P.C.N.P., 27 January 1931.
occasional trips to Nyasaland, Kadalie would 3tay with
¥umba in Zomba but the latter was never influenced to
eschew his gradualist and reformist approaches of
achieving political and social change. Similarly, Isa
Macdonald Lawrence, who was sentenced in 1926 to three
years * hard labour for importing into Nyasaland copies of
Kadalie's newspaper, The Worker's Herald, and issues of
the strident American Negro organ, The Negro World, was
not able to infuse politically-minded Africans in the
33
Protectorate with his radicalism. During the 1920s and
1930s, Lawrence was a member of the B.N.A. and C.D.N.A.
but was unable to introduce any extremist trends into the
politics of these Associations. To be sure, such external
connexions must have stimulated race pride among the
associationists but did not have any significant impact
on the approach and strategy of the Native Associations.
It would be wrong to assume, however, that because
there were no protests against Nyasaland's colonial
status or demands for ♦freedom1 that the associationists
accepted a subordinate role for Africans in the colonial
state. Their political strategy may have been moderate
and constitutional but their ideology was one of
incipient nationalism whereby they refused to accept
fully the idea of European dominance. The Native
Associations directly and persistently questioned the
33. See file S2/28/24 in the M.N.A., Zomba for Lawrence's
arrest and sentence. See also The Nyasaland Times,
24 September 1926, p.3, and C.0.525/125, no.35079,
Bowring to C.O., 20 June 1928, P.R.O., London.
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policies and actions of government and rejected the
racial and authoritarian scaffolding that was erected
over them. They sought to achieve reforms and change
without abandoning their dignity and independence. Thus
when occasions arose which affected African self-respect
and pride, the Associations could become highly critical
and very outspoken. Generally, however, they followed
Mumba's approach and remained constitutional in their
methods and moderate in their demands and criticisms.
When the moderate tenor of associationists did give way
to more extremist notes, and this was extremely rare,
then this was either an expression of deep concern over
particularly serious issues or an indication of deep
alienation with white rule and white people. The protest
over section T29 of the 1929 Code of Criminal Law had
provided one example of an issue provoking serious
criticism from the Native Associations. Another example
occurred in the same year when the W.N.N.A. commenced
censuring the government over its educational and land
policies at a time when its formidable Secretary, the
Rev. Yesaya Z. Mwase, was becoming increasingly dis¬
illusioned with Europeans.
From 1920 to 1929 the W.N.N.A. had met regularly
and discussed constitutionally the various grievances
affecting the local Tonga peoples. The passage of
numerous resolutions had provided no hint of extremism
and the tenor of deliberation had never been unduly
hostile or subversive. Quite suddenly, however, in a
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series of meeting held in 1929, the Association began
admonishing the colonial government and local Free Church
34
missionaries in a highly stickling manner. There can be
no doubt that lease's growing disenchantment and conflicts
with the Livingstonia mission, from which he was to break
as an ordained minister in 1932, provided part of the
background to this new militancy. But this waa also a
period of mounting alarm among the Tonga regarding the
security of their land. Persistent rumours of possible
land alienation in the district combined with studiously
vague statements by government officials led to the
W.N.N.A. voicing vociferous criticisms of the government's
land policy and the activities of European planters in
the country. As Secretary of the Association, Pwaae was
the leading light in this new vigorous denunciation of
white authorities - official, planting and missionary. It
was he who composed the minutes of the W.N.N.A. which
were transmitted to the government and the language he
adopted, with the approval of the Association, was
immoderate and outspoken.
Officials In the Zomba secretariat took exception
to some of the resolutions passed by "this very vocal
society". The Senior Provincial Commissioner deemed
?fwase'3 attitude as "offensive and impertinent" and asked
for more information about the constitution and membership
of the W.N.N.A.^ In his reply, the District Commissioner
34. 81/2065/19, Minutes of meetings of the W.N.N.A. held
on 9 February 1929 and 1-2 Pay 1929, P.N.A., Zomba.
35. ibid., official minutes nos. 43 (dated 25 Pay 1929)
and 49 (30 August 1930) and A.C.S. to A.P.C.N.P., 31
Pay 1929.
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could only report that headmen and councillors were
members of the body and that they had an equal voice
with such cantankerous commoners as Mwase.^ Nevertheless,
the Provincial Commissioner felt obliged to issue a
warning to the Association and its Secretary that "its
existence as a recognized Association may be imperilled,
unless a more moderate tone and more balanced reasoning
37
is discernible in its minutes."^' Eut the Association
still continued its new agitation for a clear decision on
land matters, also calling for better conditions for Tonga
workers on local European rubber estates and the provision
of improved educational facilities by the government as
the missionaries were unable to achieve much through lack
38 w
of funds and personnel. The accomodationist manner
expected of Native Associations was being seriously over¬
reached. Officialdom now considered preventing partici¬
pation by African civil servants in the activities of the
W.N.N.A. Finally, it was decided that if the organization
"continued in the way it has been for several months past"
39
then recognition of it should be withdrawn. Gradually,
however, as concern over land subsided and no alienation
to Europeans took place, the W.N.N.A. fell back into its
previous constitutional line and no further official
action against it was required.
36. ibid., D.C., Chinteche, to P.C.N.P., 19 June 1929.
37» ibid., P.C.N.P. to W.N.N.A., 15 January 1930.
38. NC 1/3/5* Minutes of meeting of the W.N.N.A. held on
22 January 1930, M.N.A., Zomba.
39. ibid., D.C., Chinteche, to P.C.N.P., 11 June 1930
an3T"P.C.N.P. to C.S., 11 August 1930.
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Despite expressing an incipient nationalist
orientation, Native Associations proved unsuccessful in
their objectives. Improvements were achieved in minor
types of matters but substantive changes in the character
of the colonial government were not effected. Native
Associations were never able to influence policy,
especially in the major fields of economic and social
development, in any significant way. Government also
continued to refuse to refer bills on African matters to
the Associations for consideration and nor did the
missionaries responsible for African interests in the
Legislative Council consult these groups for their views.
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that government
generally ignored petitions and resolutions from the Native
40
Associations and turned a deaf ear to their protests.
In fact, officials were attentive to criticisms levelled
by these bodies. Complaints were investigated and action
taken to redress legitimate African grievances, Moreover,
responsible advice was offered to the Associations and
encouragement given to them to continue promoting African
interests. Respectful consideration was also given to the
suggestions and viewpoints of the Associations on the
government's economic and social policies, and official
replies often contained detailed reasons as to why
greater development was not possible. But it was clear
that new techniques were required if the political
pressure of Native Associations was to be more effective.
40. R.I. Rotberg, 0£. cit., pp.118-120 argues in this vein.
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Native Associations were concerned with attempting
to modify the colonial situation as it impinged upon
African interests and did not threaten to overthrow the
colonial status quo. At no time did they seek the
political kingdom but instead resorted to constitutional
methods in their attempts to politely, but not
obsequiously, persuade government to better African
conditions. As far as I am aware, no demands were made
before 1933 with regard to African representation on the
Legislative Council, their most extreme request being that
an African should always be present at meetings at which
Europeans discussed native affairs. The practical
attainment of political power under their control was only
dimly apprehended and seemed so very remote. Moreover,
although the Associations operated like pressure groups,
they never succeeded in commanding a mass following.
Unskilled workers, traders and peasants may have attended
some meetings but Native Associations remained essentially
elitist bodies and never based themselves on wider
sections of the African community. Although they saw
themselves as representing the views of the bulk of the
African peoples, their membership was limited to the
educated elements.
Nevertheless, Native Associations are worthy of
study, as they were the precursors of the Ryasaland
African Congress and formed the backdrop to the rise of a
territorial-wide political movement, 'any of the
associationists later comprised the leadership of the
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N.A.C. Native Associations were the training ground, the
organisational apprenticeship for those who were later to
assume the direction of Congress. Nearly all the early
leadership of the N.A.C. had held positions of
responsibility and had been active in the protest politics
4-1
of the 1920s and 1950s. Moreover, the technical skills
of running an organization - the keeping of minutes,
maintenance of accounts, election of office-bearers,
direction and control of meetings - were all gradually
acquired. Associations also served as the chief agents of
political socialization in that their leaders developed a
substantive appreciation of political ideas from their
numerous attempts to ameliorate African grievances.
Finally, these voluntary associations contributed to the
widening of African horizons of loyalty beyond the
barriers of kin and village. They helped to combine the
literate with the semi-literate, brought together the
many ethnic and religious groups within a particular
4-1. Some examples of this are: L.Z. Mumba (Secretary of the
N.N.N.A. and later President of the R.C.N.P.N.A.)
became the first President of the N.A.C.; J.F. Sangala
(a leading member of the B.N.A. and Z.P.N.A. during
the 1930s; became President of Congress in 1954-; C.J.
Matinga (Secretary of the B.N.A. and also a member of
the Z.P.N.A.) became the second President of Congress;
C.C. Chinula (Secretary of the M.N.A.) later became
/ice-President of Congress; J.R.N. Chinyama (Secretary
of the C.P.N.A.) was elected President of Congress in
1950; C.W. Mlanga (member of the executive committee
of the B.N.A.) was subsequently a Secretary-General of
the N.A.C. ; I.M. Xjawrence (member of the B.N.A. and
the C.D.N.A.) was the first Treasurer-General of
Congress; J.D. Fhiri (Auditor of the R.C.N.P.N.A.) was
later an Assistant Secretary General of Congress.
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district, and enabled Congress leaders later to mobilize
important segments of the population out of which the
N.A.C. came to be established.
Native Associations, social change and the masses
During most of the inter-war years, conditions
were not amenable for Native Associations to turn their
organizations into genuine popular movements of political
and social change. A number of factors in combination
account for this situation. Of these contributory factors,
perhaps the most important was the nature of British
colonial policy. Up to the early 1930s, a basic tenet of
impepial policy was that each British colony should live
strictly within its own means; colonial governments were
not to be provided with grants or loans to carry through
modernization and economic development. This doctrine
entailed a severe limitation upon the power of the
Nyasaland Government to promote socio-economic change on
a substantial scale. The government's ability to mount
development programmes and expand social services was
always highly uncertain for, under the circumstances,
funds for such purposes were dependent upon whatever
surpluses the export sector could extract from an unstable
international market in primary products. Paucity of
resources and the lack of any positive direction from the
imperial government to occasion extensive changes in the
lives of African peoples encouraged a conservative
attitude towards change in African societies among
British colonial officials. It was realized that large-
scale change would dispel the apathy which enabled a
small number of white officers to rule millions of
Africans* and might also overtax the capability of the
government. As a result, throughout the entire gamut of
official policy, there ran the theme that stability could
be maintained with minimal effort by preserving the
integrity of tribal society as intact as possible.
In its economic policy, the Nyasaland Government
concentrated its efforts and limited resources upon the
export sector rather than on stimulating internal
development. The latter course would not only have
required staff and finance that were not available but,
more importantly, would have raised a potential conflict
between economic needs and political priorities. The
moving of sizeable numbers of Africans out of a
subsistence and into a market economy would have
necessitated far-reaching changes in their traditional
ways of life. Fortunately for the government, the effects
of large-scale migration of labour to Central and South
Africa were not too profound a source of social innovation.
For "the new experiences were dissipated, so to speak,
outside the tribe. The returning workers took back little
more than some cash, a few trade goods, and experiences
not easily transmitted to their fellow tribesmen." The
promotion of cash-crop agriculture, however, would have
engendered extensive changes in the tribal structure and
42
traditional social system. The same combination of
financial limitations and political priorities also led
to the colonial government devoting only limited
resources to African education and developing an
educational policy which ensured that Africans would play
a useful role in their own tribal environment rather than
attempt to transcend it. Major emphasis was placed upon
primary education which was concerned mainly with
imparting the rudiments of literacy, hygiene and
agriculture, and little attention was given to post-
45
primary training. Again, the policy of administering
Africans through chiefs was continued as it met the two
prime requirements of limited expense and little
disturbance of traditional society.
Native Associations, in their elitist forms, were
therefore in no position to induce the colonial government
to commit greater resources to economic and social
development. The possibilities of mass mobilization to
exert widespread and popular pressure on the colonial
regime were also absent. Only a very small fraction of
Africans had become involved in any form of social change
which removed them in some way from traditional life.
Even migrant workers were likely to remain very concerned
42. The quotation and part of the above argument is from
Hugh Stephens, The Political Transformation of
Tanganyika 1920-67' Qtew York,l968), pp.44ff.
43. C.O.555/119, Bowring to C.O., 25 January 1927,
enclosure memorandum on Education in Nyasaland by the
Director of Education, R.F• Gaunt, P.R.O., London.
See also Trevor Coombe, "The Origins of Secondary
Education in Zambia, 1. Policy-making in the Thirties,"
African Social Research, 3 (1967), pp.138-191.
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in the politics of their rural tribal home as this was
where they expected to find their ultimate security.
The mass of Africans therefore remained psychologically
within the small-scale, self-contained subsistence
economy of tribal life. According to Professor 3.M.
Lipset, it is in such conditions of stable poverty where
individuals are not exposed to the possibilities of
45
change that conservatism prevails. ^ The personal needs
of ordinary Africans were thus not altered and the
colonial government did not experience mass pressures for
greater services and opportunities. The needs of such
Africans could be adequately satisfied by tribal
government. "For the Native Associations, there was
therefore popular indifference to political change.
Nor were there any serious external burdens
imposed on the masses to provoke widespread rural
disaffection. Rnoduction methods and land tenure, the
most fundamental aspects of customary life, remained
unaffected by direct governmental interference. Africans
in the northern region, however, still found difficulties
in meeting their tax liabilities from local employment
or agriculture. Eut the existence of the economic
safety-valve of migration abroad was of crucial importance
in ensuring that mass discontent was not built up among
northerners on this score. Land and labour grievances
44. J. van Telsen, "Labour Migration as a "Positive factor
in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society," Fconomic
Development and Cultural Change, 3,3 (I960), pp.255-
278.
45. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London,1960), p.
63.
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also remained an important source of African unrest in
the Shire Highlands but they were left to simmer
undisturbed eventually erupting in brief disorders during
the 1940s and 1950s. The economic discontents of Africans
resident on white estates were invariably voiced by the
Native Associations but no decision was taken to lend
leadership to the agitated tenants for the purposes of
mass political action. It may be that because John
Chilembwe had sought to mobilize the discontented on
private estates, any similar attempts by the Native
Associations would be suspect to the colonial authorities.
Of equal importance may have been the fact that because
they were not concerned with seeking the overthrow of the
colonial order, the Native Associations were not moved to
create mass organizations. Mumba and his colleagues
believed that patient and constant pressure on government
through the passage of resolutions and petitions would
ultimately induce it to promote the desired political and
social changes. Peasant grievances could be articulated
but there was no need to build up a mass movement for
46
organizational purposes.
46. For a discussion of why political associations in
East Africa did not acquire mass followings during
the inter-war period, and which is also relevant for
Nyasaland, see J.M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of
Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of African
History, 9,1 (1968), pp.156-140.
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Native Associations and African churches
For reasons which we shall subsequently explain,
most of the Native Associations in the northern region
were moribund by the mid-thirties. Just as these
Associations were declining, however, a series of inde¬
pendent African churches were emerging in the region
founded by persons who had been prominent in the
activities of the secular pressure groups. These and
other African churches in the Protectorate^ require some
examination mainly to discuss their relations with the
Native Associations as well as to see if they played any
important role in the development of African politics.
From late 1932 a group of ex-ordained ministers of
the Livingstonia Mission started up a number of African
churches in the three northern districts of Nyasaland. In
part, their creation can be traced to such factors as
resentment at the behaviour and attitudes of white
missionaries; concern over the authoritarian tendency of
the clergy; and a growing African desire to have a greater
indigenous voice in the administration of the Church.
Underlying all this was the mounting African criticism of
Livingstonia'S educational standards which had declined
since the first world war, partly as a result of limited
financial resources and partly because of a changing
educational philosophy. As early as 1921, a future African
47. For previous general discussions of inter-war African
churches in Nyasaland, see R. Gray, 0£. cit., pp.145-9
and R.I. Rotberg, oj>. cit., Chap.6.
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minister of the Free Church had detailed some of these
grievances in a letter to the Livingstonia Mission
Council. The African, claimed T.M. Chibambo, was "not
regarded as a co-worker with the missionary"; was
"commonly called •boy'"; possessed "no voice in the
mission work"; and had no direct representation in the
Mission Council. A list of African educational criticisms
wa3 also catalogued which stressed the low salaries and
poor conditions of service for African teachers and
their not being provided with adequate teaching materials
h.Q
as compared with their European counterparts. Further
factors of African discontent were outlined in a statement
by the Rev. Yesaya Z. %ase in which he gave his reasons
for leaving the Livingstonia Mission. Mwase averred that
missionaries "have not come into native lands to plant
indigenous churches to be developed on the native and
nation line but to make them their perpetual subjects
under their permanent control." More fundamentally, he
held the conviction that no alien missionaries could make
institutionalized Christianity flourish in the Protectorate
as a permanent establishment. "I wish" declared Mwase,
"to naturalize and nationalize God, Christ faith in short
Christianity. There is no say that object and goal of
missionary enterprise is to naturalize and nationalize
the Christianity to grow out of its own soil, having its
own custom purified by the Gospel of Christ. An exotic
48. Livingstonia Mission Council Minute Book, Po.2, entry
dated 19 July 1921. See appendix for letter by Yesaya
M. Chibambo to "Mission Council, n.d. (but 1921),
Livingstonia Mission Archives, Livingstonia, Malawi.
Christianity will newer take vital root in the life of
the natives, it is a mistaken view to think that measures
of introducing initiatives of the indigenous church shall
49
he done hy the missionaries themselves."
After breaking with the mission in 1932, Mwase
founded the Blackman's Church of God which is in Tonga-
land. His deep nationalist feelings and pride in his race
were further demonstrated in a scheme he proposed called
the Nyasaland Blackman's Educational Society. Although it
never went beyond a paper venture, its aim was to "improve
or develop the impoverished condition of the Blackman -
religiously, morally, economically, physically and
intellectually by starting a purely native controlled
High School or College." In the meantime, two other
African ministers, who unlike Mwase had been dismissed
from the Livingstonia Mission, had formed their own
churches. In November 1932, a month after he had been
deposed for taking "Fhemba" medicine, Yaphet M. Mkandawire
founded his African Reformed Presbyterian Church near
Deep Bay in the North Nyasa district; and, in 1934,
Charles C. Chinula established the Eklesia Lanangwa (The
Christianity of Freedom) in Mzimba. Ghinula had been
dismissed for adultery in 1930 but was restored to the
mission church two years later. Subsequently, he decided
to leave the mission because of the way "suspended people
49. Unpublished manuscript by Yesaya Zerenje Mwase
entitled "My essential and paramount reasons for
working independently are as to effect:" dated 12
July 1933. I am indebted to Mr. J.C.W. Malifa for
showing me his copy of this document.
were treated" by it. Sinners, he claimed, were punished
too severely and the mission "lacked the forgiveness of
Christ" in its dealings with fallen converts."*0
In 1935» the three church leaders joined forces
and designed a new united church which became known as
the Mpingo ''a Afipa Wa Africa (The Blackman's Church of
Africa Mission, Presbyterian). Having asserted their
independence, the latent anti-European and anti-missionary
elements seem to have been largely forgotten by the united
church leaders. No doubt they were still there, but the
independents were ready enough to seek help from the
Department of Education and they remained on fairly
friendly terms with some local missionaries and officials.
The new church observed strictly Presbyterian codes of
worship and ideas such as polygamy were completely
rejected. Educationally, the church was not a great
success. A few vernacular schools were set up at the
three headquarters but they were not developed enough to
attract much government assistance for many years. Funds
were short and there was a lack of trained teachers.
50. For details of some of the events leading to Mwase'a
break with Livingstonia, see Minutes of the Presbytery
of North Livingstonia dated 27-3 July 1932; and for
details of Chinula and Mkandawire being dismissed see
the minutes for 27 November 1930 and 24 October 1932,
Livingstonia Mission Archives. Further information on
these churches i3 to be found in Miss. 12/10,
Historical Survey of Native Controlled Missions
operating in Nyasaland (December,1940), M.N.A., Zomba.
An incomplete copy of this report is also to be found
in the M.C. Hoole papers, MSS. Afr.s.997 in Rhodes
House, Oxford. I am indebted to Dr. K.J. McCracken of
the University of Stirling for providing me with a
photocopy of the whole of this important report. I am
also deeply grateful to the Rev. C.C. Chinula for his
many discussions on inter-war African church activity
and for his two memoranda to me on the formation of his
own church movement.
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Politically, too, the church was of little consequence.
The leaders played some part in local chiefs councils and
maintained their contacts with the remnants of the
northern Native Associations and the R.C.N.P.N.A. in
Zomba. But no attempt was made to use the church for the
promotion of political interests. The teachings and
activities of the leaders show the devotion with which
the church, precisely as an ecclesiastical - and not as a
political - institution wa3 served. Nor did the movement
become the basis for a national-wide African church as
may have been hoped. This latter role seems also to have
been envisaged for the African National Church which had
been formed in 1929 with congregations initially in the
North Nyasa and West Nyasa districts.
By the 1930s, branches of the A.N.C. were to be
also found in the Mzimba, Lilongwe and Ncheu districts
but it failed ever to penetrate into the southern region.
The founders of the church, S.K. Mkandawire, Paddy F.
Nyasulu and I.M. Kondowe, were educated northerners who
had been dismissed from the Livingstonia Mission for
marrying second wives. The constitution of the A.N.C.
"stated it was the aim of the church to "fit in with
manners and customs of the people and not that it should
impose on the African the unnecessary and impracticable
method of European countries." Polygamy was therefore
approved and African traditions, laws and customs given
due respect. The aim of the A.N.C. was to appeal to all
Africans, "The uplifting of the African mass taking in its
rise the old people who are at present being left out by
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religions of the north and its civilization, as well as
winning those who are considered bad because of polygamy
and drink, and are refused any latent qualities for
doing good any more."-^
The highly impressive statement of the constitution
and principles of the A.N.C. appears to have been drafted
mainly by Levi Mumba who, it will be remembered, had been
dismissed from Livingstonia for polygamy. Mumba and the
A.N.C. leaders, who were also active members of the
N.N.N.A., may have had some sort of conception of the
role which a national church could play in the creation
of a national consciousness. Africans of all tribes
would be able to join the church because its doctrines
were not alien to African traditions and ideas. But the
A.N.C. was never able to make effective its national
claims. Lack of funds restricted its influence to a few
areas in the northern region where it enjoyed fairly
considerable popular support. A few schools were started
and some financial assistance received from the government
but its educational schemes were not very successful.
Politically, as well, the A.N.C. was quite active though
not in any formal way. Links were developed with the
N.N.N.A. and Xondowe and Nyasulu were prominent leaders
51. The text of the 'Belief, Constitution, and Aims' of
the African National Church is contained in Monica
ilson, Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa (London,1959)»
pp.191-5 which also has a good discussion on the
church. See also T.O. Ranger, The African churches of
Tanzania (Nairobi,1969), Historical Association of
Tanzania' Paper, No.5* PP. 16-20.
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of that organization. Some of the Church's adherents may
have the Association and it is of interest to note
that this was the only northern tody that kept functioning,
though intermittently, through the 1930s.
There were two further churches in the central and
southern regions which provided another example of African
self-help in educational and religious matters, though
both were connected with American Negro organizations.
John Chilemb?;e's Providence Industrial Mission wa3 re¬
opened in 1926 under Dr. D.S. Malekebu, a Chiradzulu
African who had been trained as a medical practitioner in
the United States. Malekebu was the founder and leading
member of the C.D.N.A., which was virtually an extension
of the local P.I.M. congregations. This was always a
rather cautious Association and with its breakup in 1934
Malekebu completely eschewed political activity and
concentrated his efforts in developing the P.I.M. schools
and churches under conditions of some financial strain.
In 1924, a Cewa from Kasungu, the Rev. H.M. Phiri,
introduced the African Methodist Episcopal Church from
Northern Rhodesia into his home area in central Nyasaland.
Once again a few schools were started, aided by a limited
government grant and small sums from Negro backers in the
United States. But the funds proved insufficient and
Phiri was severely hindered in mounting any important
educational developments. As with the P.I.M., polygamy
and beer drinking were forbidden and orthodox religious
doctrines were pursued. Both churches operated within the
conservative framework of hard work and self-help and were
232
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essentially non-political in nature.
In many ways, however, this new wave of African
churches throughout the Protectorate represented another
form of African protest at the colonial situation and
symbolized the religious strand in the growth of African
nationalism. They were all eloquent manifestations of
protest against white domination and the status of
inferiority. They all depicted a growing African desire
to control their own affairs and have a greater say in
the working out of the new order. None of the churches
caused the colonial authorities any serious apprehension
but they were nonetheless symptomatic of an undercurrent
of frustration and grievance. Their failure to promote
successful educational and evangelical concerns enhanced
this resentment which ultimately found an outlet in
political protest by secular movements. A number of these
church leaders - Chinula, Mkandawire, Kondowe, Nyasulu
and Ihiri - were to participate in political activity
with the Nyasaland African Congress during the 1940s and
early 1950s. But the churches themselves were in no
position to offer an effective challenge to the Europeans
and, more important, were very far from being able to
unite in one inclusive movement. Unlike some other
countries in colonial Africa, therefore, political
developments were to proceed in Nyasaland without any
important background of support from independent
religious movements.
52. For a more detailed discussion of these two churches,
see Miss. 12/10, op. cit.,
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Even the Watch Tower movement, which aroused much
anxiety among colonial officials, came to eschew direct
political action. After the Chilembwe Rising, government
had severely suppressed Watch Tower, restricting the
importation of its literature into the Protectorate and
forbidding it to open new churches. Nevertheless, Watch
Tower continued to operate, albeit covertly, and large
quantities of documentation entered the country secretly.
Concerned about the dangers of driving the movement
further underground, the government decided from 1922 to
^frant it limited recognition by permitting a controlled
erection of churches and schools. It was felt that watch
53
Tower could thus be "more easily and closely watched."^
During this second phase, despite the fact that for many
years it had no European representatives, Watch Tower
gained a fairly considerable support under African control
and gradually spread southwards into the Shire Highlands
54
from the northern region. Companies of Watchtowerites
existed in most districts of Nyasaland by the 1930s though
there was no cohesion between them. Watch Tower literature
was received from abroad and used for preaching but no
schools were opened. But it is doubtful if "atch Tower,
53 • C.0.626/5, Executive Council Minutes dated 28 April
1922 and C.0.525/101, Smith to C.O., 5 June 1922,
P.R.O., London.
54. 0.0.525/116, Rankine to C.O., 15 September 1926,
P.R.O., London. See also J.R. Hooker, "Witnesses and
Watchtower in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland," Journal of
African History, 6,1 (1965), pp.91-106.
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despite its initially large following, played an
important mass role in Nyasaland as in some neighbouring
countries and it seems to have turned into a minority
religion with growing reactionary beliefs. From the
political point of view, with Watch Tower adherents
passively expecting the advent of the millennium and not
believing that it required active assistance, the move¬
ment came to pursue a rather obstructive and reactionary
ideology. It criticized and opposed not only the colonial
government but the idea of government at all. Its
solutions, however, depended not on direct political
55
action but on divine intervention at the millennium.The
political future of Nyasaland was to lie with the new men
who 3till .remained members of the two Scottish missions.
Native Associations, chiefs and government
Though regarding the traditional authorities as
the major indigenous political mechanisms, the government
had, during the 1920s, welcomed the Native Associations
and recognized their existence provided they were
"properly conducted and reasonably representative of local
native opinion."-^ Any initial doubts that the government
may have entertained about them were soon allayed by its
acceptance of the advice of the venerable Livingstonia
missionary, Dr. Robert Laws, that "the vast multitude of
the natives cannot be expected to remain dumb with regard
55• Miss. 12/10, op. cit.,
56. 81/1529/26, A.C.sTTo all P.Cs., 15 November 1926,
Zomba.
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to their own affairs, and safetyvalves for the expression
of their opinions are needed in the interests of peace
and safety."5? Tbe authorities had been particularly
concerned about whether the W.N.N.A. "would be likely to
strengthen and add cohesion to the Watch Tower 3ect"
which had a "considerable following" in the district and
which "has in the past been lacking in direction and
organization."^® Assured by Laws that the i'est Nyasa
associationists were not connected with "atch Tower, the
F.N.N.A. was then recognized and informed by the Governor
that he would "at all times give due consideration to any
representation (it) may make respecting the general Native
59
Community, its welfare and prosperity."
Government was also beginning to consider
associating the literate element with the traditional
authorities. The M.N.A. was informed in 1922 that
"His Excellency fully appreciates the interest
your Association takes in .all those matters
affecting the welfare of the people, and he is
glad to read the minutes of your meetings. He
asks you all as educated men with better
knowledge of what is required to advance the
moral and material well being of the inhabitants
to assist in the attainment of this by the
example you set and the influence you can bring
to bear on those amongst whom you live who are
not 30 enlightened." 60
5?« S1/2065/19* Laws to A.C.S., 12 January 1920. See also
extract from the Mombera District Report of January
1920 in which the Resident, Mzimba stated that it was
his"intention to give the (M.N.A.) every encouragement
to speak frankly of native affairs and grievances. It
should, on some subjects, be able to give useful
information and advice and its existence should be a
valuable safety valve for the escape of grievances
along the right channel." Eoth in M.N.A., Zomba.
53. ibid., A.0.3. to Laws, 5 December 1919»
59* itild., A.C.S. to Resident, Chinteche, 23 February 1920
and minute by Governor Smith dated 26 February 1920.
60. S1/210/20, A.C.S. to M.N.A., 19 December 1922, M.N.A.,
Zomba.
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After the 1914—18 War, the government had continued its
previous policy of working through the agency of paid
chiefs. It soon became apparent, however, that this was
proving an Inefficient and unsatisfactory system. Chiefs
"were in many cases conservative and not so well educated
61
as some of their people," and they were "not reliable
enough and do not possess the necessary influence with
62
their people." As a result, a revised District
Administration (.Native) Ordinance was enacted in 1924.
Principal Headmen remained the executive officers of the
colonial administration but it was proposed to create
district councils which were to be composed of chiefs and
other Africans to advise the Resident. Attempts were now
made "to bring into the District Councils a certain number
of educated or progressive natives to assist the Headmen."
The immediate result, according to a first-grade adminis¬
trative officer, J.C. Abraham, "has been an increase in
the interest taken by various Native Associations." It
"is that type of native we are endeavouring to introduce
on to the District Council to...enable the more progressive
ideas of the educated native to be carried out." deferring
perhaps to Levi IWuiaba, Abrahams declared that "a man of
his type can explain to hi3 own people, his own Chief, his
61. Notes of interviews with Governor Bowring dated 19
'?arch 1928 contained in minutes of oral evidence taken
by the Hilton-Young Commission, F.C.O. Library, London.
62. Governor of Nyasaland in September 1923 cited in
Timothy Kiel Barnekov, An Inquiry into the development
of Native Administration in Nyasaland, 1883-1939
(New York,1967)Syracuse University Program of Fast
African Studies Occasional Paper, No.48, p.56.
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own Council, better than we can, with a better prospect
of other natives carrying out the Government orders
willingly rather than simply because the District Officer
tells them to do so."^
It is doubtful if the district councils,
consisting of a majority of chiefs, proved very attractive
to many of the educated elements. Certainly very few of
them became members. The councils possessed only advisory
functions and had no powers of raising or spending money.
What was more, the District Commissioner, who was the
chairman, exercised close control and direction over the
meetings and the new men, although possessing an oppor¬
tunity to take part in discussions, must have come to see
themselves as a minority in a body of a much more
conservative character. Indeed, meetings of district
councils appear to have become mainly occasions for the
District Commissioner to express his wishes to the chiefs.
Writing in 1935, J.C. 4braham, now Senior Provincial
Commissioner, concluded that the "former District Councils
were unwieldy bodies, regarded by most District
Commissioners and almost all natives with little
enthusiasm. The District Commissioner did most of the
talking and the old men who really mattered slumbered
peacefully through the perorations of their more vocal
64-
juniors." By 1930, the councils had foundered and where
they existed were predominantly chiefly bodies with
little commoner participation.
II ■■ ■ I« I . .-LI. ■ I I .Ml I ■ ■ I, I— I — « ■ ■■ ■■
63. Oral evidence of J.C. 4braham dated 21 March 19-8 to
the Hilton-Young Commission, F.C.O. Library, London.
64-. Nat. 12/3, minute no.54- by 4braham dated 29 July 1935,
iM.N.A., Zomba.
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In the meantime, the associationists, though often
regarding chiefs as conservative, attempted to hring them
into their own movements as members, sometimes appointing
the more important ones as office-bearers and, in one
instance, even inserting a clause in the Association's
constitution whereby "The President shall be a Principal
65
Headman." ^ Associations also raised matters relating to
the improvement of the conditions of chiefs such as asking
66
government to provide them with robes of office, to pay
them higher salaries, and to ensure that provisions
were made for their comfort when visiting places outside
their district. Ey encouraging mutual co-operation
between chiefs and educated elements, Native Association
leaders may have hoped to make their political groups
more credible and representative in the eyes of the
colonial government. That was more, since some of the
chiefs had had access to education and had worked 33
civil servants or clerks in European firms before
assuming traditional office, their ideas and views often
coincided with those of the associationists. On many of
the subjects discussed by the Associations, the tra¬
ditional authorities were at one with the educated elite,
particularly over issues concerned with improved
65. NS1/3/3» Constitution of the C.D.N.A., article 5 which
was approved at a meeting held on 12 November 1929*
M.N.A., Zomba.
66. NS1/3/2, Minutes of meeting of the B.N.A. held on
5 ebruary 192?, M.N.A., Zomba.
67. NC1/3/4, Minutes of meetings of W.N.N.A. held between
1-2 May 1929, M.N.A., Zomba.
68. Sl/3263/23» Minutes of meeting of N.S.P.N.A. (Mlanje
branch) held on 25 September 1927» M.N.A., Zomba.
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educational facilities and economic development in the
69rural areas. But we should not exaggerate the political
ties between chiefs and Native Associations. Most of the
chiefs had little education, were highly conservative and
were closely attached to the tribal ways of life and
thought. Pew of them could actively participate in
meetings transacted in English and most were only
interested in tribal matters.
From the late 1920s, during a period when the
dogmas of 'indirect rule' were hardening, relations
between government and the Native Associations became
increasingly strained. The chiefs had hitherto been
mainly utilized as executive agents of the colonial
administration. Now, however, a growing body of colonial
opinion began advocating their use as agencies of local
rule to handle the new burdens of socio-economic change
that were asserting themselves. The Nyasaland Government,
looking for a more satisfactory method of native adminis¬
tration, decided to adopt a form of the system of 'indirect
rule' which had been introduced in neighbouring Tanganyika.
The system of 'indirect rule* was not officially started
in Nyasaland until 1933 but from about 1930 the government
had begun insisting that the chiefs were the premier
legitimizing force regarding African administration and
that the Native Associations could not be considered as
alternatives to the chiefly local government hierarchy.
At the same time steps were taken in hand not to grant
the literate element any legitimacy on its own account; it
could only be continued to be recognized if it worked in
69« See R. Gray, 0£. cit., pp.172-3.
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association with a traditional legitimacy. The Native
Associations naturally sought to preserve their
independent status as the authentic representatives of
African opinion in the Protectorate and thus came into
collision with government policy. The nature of this
collision and its results for African political activity
are now considered in some detail.
With the system of 'indirect rule' being considered
for introduction in the imminent future, government
officials felt, by 1930, that "if we are to lean in the
direction of restoring the prestige and authority of the
tribal chiefs, it may be preferable not to give any
unnecessary recognition or compliments to Associations
composed rather of the other type of 'influential person'
- i.e. clerks whose influence is new, rather than chiefs
whose influence is 'old'."^° The outspoken criticisms of
the ".N.N.A. during 1929 and 1930 al30 contributed to the
hardening of government'3 attitude towards the Native
Associations. In 1930, the Chief Secretary contended that
it was "highly undesirable" that "clamorous educated
natives, should in any way displace the District Council,
as the vehicle of public opinion in the District," and he
urged that their organizations should no longer be
71
encouraged.' Addressing the W.N.N.A. in March 1930, the
Governor stated that he "wished always to be kept informed
70. Nat.12/3, C.S. to Governor Thomas, minute dated 10
January 1930, M.N.A., Zornba.
71. Bee 31/2065/19, secretariat minute Nos.43-51 dated
26 and 30 August and 5 and 11 September 1930, M.N.A.,
Zomba.
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of native opinion but that the opinion he valued mo3t was
that expressed by tribal chiefs who in course of time
would be given a more responsible share in the governance
of the Protectorate....and the need for native
associations for the expression of native opinion on
public affairs will come to an end."^^ Rather than "try
to regulate or suppress them" it was decided to "pour
73
cold water on these Associations."' In an attempt to
limit their effectiveness, the government now decided to
deny them direct access to the centre of its administra¬
tive system, i.e. the Governor and the secretariat, and
to force them to work through the district councils
which were composed almost entirely of chiefs. Notices
were dispatched to the various Associations informing
them that their minutes and resolutions would hence¬
forward be ignored by the central government unless they
were first submitted through and adopted by their respec-
74
tive district councils.' In view of the impending
introduction of indirect rule and the further conster¬
nation aroused in official circles by the R.C.N.P.N.A.
and the N.N.N.A.'s protesting of the law penalizing gexual
intercourse between a white woman and a black man, the
government began enforcing rigorously its new 'tough'
policy against the Associations by restricting their direct
72. ibid., draft comments by P.C.N.P. to "'.N.N.A., 6
August 1930.
73. ibid., secretariat minute by C.S. no.50 dated 5
September 1930.
74. ibid., A.C.S. to P.Cs., 17 September 1930.
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access to the central secretariat. Resolutions of Native
Associations would not even "receive the Governor's
consideration, unless they are supported by their
75
respective District Councils,"'^ stated an official
directive in 193*1 •
The severing of direct lines of communication with
the central government created deep anxiety among the
leaders of the Associations. Not only were they not
members of the district councils which, because they were
chaired by District Commissioners, might reject the
resolutions of Associations, but they also saw the terri¬
torial government as the chief focus of their efforts.
Worried about the Governor not knowing "all that ho
should know in regard to his children" they were also
fearful of his agents 3uch as District and Provincial
Commissioners preventing their minutes, etc., from being
forwarded to him or reaching him intact. A statement by
the 25.P.N.A., almost certainly written by Levi Mumba,
illustrates these and other points of concern, and is
sufficiently interesting to bear extensive quotation.
"Most of the matters, if not all, submitted to
the government, are those considered of vital
importance to natives and which they especially
desire His Excellency to know. They therefore
siibmissively request that their minutes should
not be mutilated in transmission but submitted
in full to His Excellency.
It has always been the aim of the Native
Associations to try and place the benefit of
their education at the disposal of all their
people and for that reason nearly all the
75. NC1/3/5, A.C.S. to P.Cs., 30 January 1951, M.N.A.,
Zomba. Gee also J. van Velsen, 0£. cit., pp.399-400.
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chiefs and headmen are active or passive
members of the organization, whereas the
District Council is only a council of chiefs
with the District Commissioner in which the
educated natives as such are not represented.,,
in view of the District Council being a govern¬
ment establishment even if the Association is
represented they think that for a long time
that Council will lack initiative and real
expressions of views on the part of the natives
The Association naturally is alarmed to hear
that their minutes will only be considered if
approved and passed by the District Council
because they have no proof that the finding of
a District Council are free and representative
expressions of the views of the natives. The
Association is a body of men who are loyal and
law abiding as any subject of His Majesty can
be and who like others should be accorded the
liberty of expression allowed by British justic
They are not chiefly, they do not command nor
make any law but merely desire to help them¬
selves and their country by putting before the
government suggestions expressed in as free a
manner as can never be reached by a District
Council. A District Council and an Association
are distinct, one conservative and the other
progressive but both working for the good of
the country and should he fostered as such as
is done in other countries. The intention of
the Government to suppress the feeling of a
section of its children who are looking to her
for help to develop and who have done no wrong
would be taken as an act of malevolence...." 76
But "individualism (was) the antithesis of indirect
77
rule."" Accepting that the Native Associations were
entitled to communicate directly with the Governor, and
that there minutes and resolutions 3hould be forwarded to
the secretariat without mutilation, the government still
insisted that minutes, etc., be endorsed by the district
council otherwise no undertaking could be given that any
76. NS1/3/5, Z.P.N.A. to P.C., 13 June 1931. See also Nat
12/3, H.C.N.P.N.A. to C.S., 26 November 1935 for a
similar letter written by Levi Mumba which is quoted
in part by J. van Velsen, op. cit., p.405.
77. NS1/3/5, minute by C.S. dated "H July 1931.
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reply beyond a mere acknowledgement would be sent.
"Associations should work with the Councils and not
78
separately from them" summed up the official attitude.'
With the coming of indirect rule in 1933, a circular was
issued to all Native Associations in the following year
outlining procedure for the new situation. District
councils had now been abolished and Associations were
informed that the government would not be prepared to
take any action on their resolutions unless adopted by a
Native Authority (who was generally the old Principal
Headman) or, in some cases, a council of chiefs, inutes
could, however, be submitted direct to the Governor for
79
his information.' J But about a year later, in 1935» with
a new Governor, Bir Harold Kltterma3ter, having replaced
Sir Hubert Young, doubts began to be expressed by him
regarding his predecessor's policy of attempting to
"suppress" Native Associations and remove them from the
political scene.
In a minute dated May 4, 1935* Kittermaster wrote
to the Chief Secretary, "I am not sure whether I agree
with the circular issued last year. It is a difficult
80
subject. I should like to see Mumba...." At the
subsequent interview, Mumba reiterated the views of the
73. Nat. 12/3, P.Cs. to Native Associations, 30 July 1931.
Bee also C.S. to R.C.N.P.N.A., 21 March 1934.
79. ibid., C.3. to P.Cs. and all Native Associations
enclosing circular entitled "Submission of Matters for
the Consideration of Government by Native Associations."
80. ibid., minute no.45. Levi Mumba had discussed the
circular of 1934 with the 3.P.O. in June 1934.
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Associations. The Governor disputed that all Native
Authorities were conservative hut admitted that "there is
some truth in what he says." Of greater interest were the
Governor's comments expressing concern that official
policy might drive the Associations into political
activity of an unconstitutional kind. "It should he"
minuted Kittermaster after the interview, "the work of
the more educated natives to induce the Native Authority
to move forward. In any case it is highly impolitic to
act in such a way as to force these associations into an
attitude of opposition as has happened in Kenya particu¬
larly among the Kikuyu. We should try to use them hy
encouraging their activity if possible on useful lines."
"Vfumba had claimed that the Native Associations did not
get an opportunity to speak at meetings of Native
Authorities and Kittermaster therefore thought that it
might he "no bad thing if the old District Councils were
revived" though not given any statutory form. Associations
would he allowed "to nominate representatives to attend
these meetings if (the) Native Authority accepted the
persons nominated" and all classes of Africans would be
Q/l
provided with a chance to speak.
The "danger" was "the development along divergent
82
lines of two different political organizations." Under
the new system of indirect rule the Native Associations
81. ibid., minute no.4-7 by Governor Kittermaster to C.S.,
T2-May 1935.
82. S1/3263/23, minute by J.C. Abraham, S.P.C., dated
15 August 1935* M.N.A., Zomba.
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could not be granted any separate recognition as
representatives of African opinion. The governmental
system had to continue to be founded on the basis of the
chiefs. But to obviate against the possibility of an
antagonistic educated African elite emerging and to ensure
that Native Associations remained overt and constitutional
in their approach, the government sought to associate the
new men with its local administrative structure. •Pro¬
gressive' Africans were now invited to attend and speak
at meetings of informal district councils composed of
chiefs.^ This association had to be achieved without in
any way undermining the authority of the chiefs. Native
Authorities were thus still required to support minutes
and resolutions of Native Associations before these could
be acted upon by the central government. One important
exception was made to this ruling. Perhaps because the
R.C.N.P.N.A. functioned "outside of, and far away from
the Districts to which its members belong(ed), who
consequently have no access to their own Native
34-
Authorities" the government proposed not to insist that
its minutes, etc., be endorsed by any Native Authority on
most matters and agreed to them being sent directly to the
85
central secretariat. ^
83. NC1/3/6, circular letter to all D.Cs. dated 23 August
1935* M.N.A., Zomba. For government attempts to pro¬
mote legitimate political activity in Kenya, see J.M.
Lonsdale, "European Attitudes and African Pressures:
Missions and Government in Kenya between the Wars,"
Race, 10,2 (1965), pp. 14-3-144-.
84-. Nat.12/3, minute no.54- by J.C. Abraham, 3.P.O., to
C.S., 29 July 1933.
85. ibid., C.S. to R.C.N.P.N.A., 20 May 1935.
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With the government's insistence that all Native
Associations (other than the R.O.N.P.N.A.) should work
with and have their minutes confirmed by a Native
Authority, many of them soon began to lose their momentum.
Those operating in the northern and central regions, where
a number of important paramount chieftaincies existed,
either disappeared or survived, but with little political
energy, or merged with local tribal councils. In Mzimba
and Ncheu, the M.N.A. and the N.N.A. were fused with
their respective Ngoni councils. In Tongaland, the W.N.N.A.
became moribund or at least inactive after the creation
of the Tonga Tribal Council, being also riven by internal
ryr
conflicts. Occasional meetings were held by the M.N.A.
and the N.N.N.A. but they showed little vigour and seem
to have left the R.C.N.P.N.A. in Zomba to act for them.
Conditions were different in the southern region. Not
only were there no recognized paramount chiefs to form
district-wide councils as in Mzimba and Ncheu but many of
the chiefs were weak and possessed little authority. More¬
over, a number of Native Authorities were to be found in
all of the southern districts, and in the absence of
district councils of chiefs, as in Tongaland, the govern¬
ment agreed to consider Association minutes provided they
were countersigned by any one Native Authority. This seems
86. NC1/3/6, contains reports by D.Cs. on the effects of
indirect rule and government policy on Native
Associations. See also S.P.C. to the Superintendent
of R>lice, 21 November 1939. For the W.N.N.A., see J.
van lelsen, "The Establishment of the Administration
in Tongaland," in Historians in Tropical Africa
(Salisbury,1962), p."-f55.
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to have "been easily achieved and the Associations there¬
fore remained politically active with the exception of
the C.D.N.A. which appears to have collapsed after
87
troubles in 1934 over the abscondence of funds. '
It was therefore in the south that the Native
Associations remained politically active and it was here
that the Nyasaland African Congress was to be founded. It
was in the towns of Blantyre, Litnbe and Zomba that the
main influences which directed educated Africans to form
a united front were inspired. Although the groundwork for
the formation of Congress had been laid throughout the
country, the final stages in its evolution were to be
completed in the administrative and commercial centres of
Nyasaland.
87. S1/3263/23, B.N.A. to C.S., 14 June 1935 and C.S. to
B.N.A., 10 September 1935> M.N.A., Zotnba.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Move to the Politics of Representation and Union.
«
Colonial change and local administration
Under the Native Authority Ordinance and Native
Courts Ordinance of 1933» powers were conferred on the
Native Authorities, who were generally the old Principal
Headmen, to enact rules providing for the "peace, good
order and welfare" of their areas; to raise revenue and
expend such monies on specific local services; and to
establish Native Courts with extensive powers of civil
and criminal jurisdiction. Basic socio-economic change
had necessitated modification in the previous system of
local administration whereby chiefs had been organized
to deal mainly with problems of law and order. New
problems had begun to confront local administration by
the late 1920s which required that chiefs be able to
perform a wider set of functions. It was hoped that under
the new 1933 ordinances the chiefs would be able to
handle such problems as those of sanitation, water supply
and general social welfare and thereby acquire greater
status in local affairs.
Native Authorities did not have any formally
constituted councils but had councillors who were
generally local headmen or court assessors on whose advice
or support they were in varying degrees dependent. Among
the two main Ngoni groups, however, administrative bodies
were established on a district level. In both of these
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groups, the Ngoni pararaounts were recognized with
subordinate Native Authorities under them. They were the
only indigenous rulers in Nyasaland to have subordinate
Native Authorities under them. A biannual tribal indaba
was organized in the Mombera district. Called the Mbelwa
Jere Administrative meeting, it was attended by the para¬
mount chief, his traditional advisers, the subordinate
Native Authorities and large numbers of commoners
including the educated elements. It dealt with a variety
of subjects of mainly local interest. There was no
similar formally constituted council among the southern
Ngoni. Instead, a conference known as the Ngoni Highlands
Association met annually at the grave of paramount chief
Gomani's father who had been executed by the British in
1896. It too was a forum at which the people could
express their views on matters concerning the Ncheu
district generally. Both of these district-wide meetings
discussed a wide range of local problems and petitioned
the government for improvements and developments along
similar lines to the previous Native Associations which
had now become merged with the local authorities. Both
councils continued the demand for better educational
facilities and criticized the poor conditions of service
for African teachers and the small governmental expen¬
diture on education. Because the two paramount chiefs
were mission-educated and because they utilized the
skills and knowledge of the educated elements in their
councils, the policies of the two Ngoni administrative
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bodies echoed those of the new men in the Native
Associations. Educated Africans also seem to have advised
the chiefs of the lakeside Tonga who established the
Tonga Tribal Council. Here, too, many local subjects were
debated and resolutions followed the modernizing lines of
the now moribund West. Nyasa Native Association.
No similar district-wide councils were formed
elsewhere in the Protectorate until after the second
world war. Without doubt, however, many Native Authorities
must have asked educated men to serve as their advisers
or councillors. But the role that enterprising Africans
such as teachers, evangelists and traders could play in
local affairs was very limited. Even the Native Authority
systems, as agencies of local development, possessed
little power and influence. The system of 'indirect rule'
adopted in Nyasaland in 1933 was much weaker than that
introduced in neighbouring countries. Native Authorities
were not empowered to collect taxes and to administer
government revenue as was the case in Tanganyika. Any
expenditure that they were to control was to be met
primarily from local rates, dues or fees which could only
be levied with government approval. Their capacity to
finance and undertake modern social services for the
local populace was consequently severely undermined, and
most of them only had sufficient funds to pay for their
own small salaries and for the staff to administer their
areas. Moreover, Native Authorities were only part of the
machinery of local government; central government depart¬
ments remained responsible for the initiating of develop-
1
ment policies and programmes. The result was that the
European district officers tended to use the chiefs as
little more than their agents and they were also the
source of most of the orders and rules that were passed.
Native Authority staff was given little pay and less
training and the efficiency of the Native Authorities,
who were also not provided with an adequate salary for
the maintenance of their position, varied with the
?
qualities of the individuals concerned. Furthermore, it
was becoming obvious that the major problems facing
Africans were not local but national and the Native
Authorities were impotent over such issues.
For this was the time when metropolitan thinking
on colonial administration generally had begun to advocate
that the central government take greater action in all
fields of economic and social development. From the early
1930s, there was increasing central government inter¬
ference in local affairs, primarily to expand agri¬
cultural production and improve welfare services. There
were, for instance, a growing number of marketing controls
and the first tentative attempts to change traditional
1. Timothy Kiel Barnekov, An Inquiry into the Development
of Native Administration in Nyasaland, 1388-1939 (New
York,1967), pp.7l-5t 85» See also lord Haile.y, Native
Administration in the British African Territories
(5 parts. London,1950), 2, pp.22, 77-59. Until 19^9
the Native Authorities did not levy a local rate and
then it was fixed at only 1s. per taxpayer.
2. H.S. Hudson, Report on Development of Local Government
in Nyasaland (Colonial Office, London,1951)» p.2. See
also T.D. Thomson, Domasi Community Development Scheme
1949-19^4 (zomba,1935), pp.23-4•
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African methods of land usage. One result of this new
policy was that the departmental experts became more
important than the Native Authorities as regards the new
modernization programmes. It was they who now began to
deal with all aspects of the initiation and implementation
of policies thus reversing any ideas that may have been
entertained of the chiefe playing any important role in
a decentralized scheme of government. The problems were
considered to be far too technical and, as we shall see
in the next chapter, especially in the case of soil
erosion, much too urgent to allow local preferences to
interfere with the central planning of the government
departments. As more and more Africans came into
increasing contact with the machinery of central govern¬
ment, they began to find that the solutions of tra¬
ditional life were inadequate and inapplicable. The
chiefs were in no position to perform any purposive roles
in the fields of economic and social development; they
were merely governmental agents. The colonial government
had moved from district administration to the concept of
territorial government. The remaining African political
organizations were to follow suit by seeking direct
African representation on such institutions as the
Legislative Council and all other boards directly
affecting the lives of the indigenous population. The
political impotence of the local chiefly councils; the
dissatisfaction that must have existed among progressive
Africans from their failure to be admitted, in any
significant way, to the exercise of power in local affairs;
- -
and the increasing intervention of the central government
in rural development, all contributed to African political
demands focussing on representation in the key decision¬
making institution in the central political system, i.e.
the Legislative Council.
Closer union and political representation
In the meantime, Native Associations in the
southern region were still continuing their activities.
Indeed, some of them were becoming more active and
perhaps more trenchant in their criticisms of the colonial
situation, especially as a younger generation of educated
Africans assumed their leadership. The two major
Associations were the R.C.N.P.N.A. and the B.N.A., with
the Z.P.N.A. showing some activity on occasions. All the
other previous Associations at Mlanje, Port Herald and
Chiradzulu were now moribund though some of them continued
to hold a few irregular meetings into the early 1940s.
Borne of them would also send delegates to Blantyre to
participate in discussions of important topics. One
example of this occurred in July 1935 when the B.N.A.
organized a meeting to discuss the question of 'closer
union' with the two Rhodesias which had been mooted by a
recent meeting of Europeans in the region. Representatives
from a number of southern district Associations attended
and were joined by some Native Authorities and headmen.
Together they drafted a petition to the Colonial Office
in which they expressed their absolute opposition to any




The B-.N.A• became during the 1930s the major forum
for the expression of views of southern Africans. A
'second-generation* of mission adherents, most of whom
had been born during the early years of the century,
gradually entered into the leadership positions of the
Association and turned it into a more vigorous body.
Certainly the tenor of some of its minutes became more
critical of government failures in the fields of economic
and educational development. Attempts were made to bring
the local Native Authorities and headmen into its
deliberations and a revised set of rules was adopted in
1936 one of which stated that the object was to "assist
Native Authorities by advising them in the management of
local government and in the administration of native law
lL
and customs and in the preservation of native rights."
Efforts were also made to develop links with African
spokesmen in the other southern districts and B.N.A.
minutes were dispatched to them for comment and consi¬
deration. All this was reflected in the growing number of
issues of general interest that the Association debated
such as those relating to cotton and tobacco growing,
passes for Africans and the recruitment of labour for
employment abroad. On some of these and other subjects,
ideas were exchanged with Africans in neighbouring
3. NS2/1/5, Annual report of the P.C.S.P. for the year
1935» M.N.A., Zomba.
4. 81/3263/23, Revised rules of the B.N.A. dated 3
October 1936, M.N.A., Zomba.
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districts and occasionally joint meetings were held to
present a united demand to government. The case of 'closer
union' has already been cited. Another instance occurred
in September 1937 when delegates from the M.J.N.A.
attended a B.N.A. meeting at which it was decided to
petition the government to set up a High School in
Nyasaland.^ Thus even if the B.N.A. remained mainly the
forum of expression for locally-based Africans, it was
beginning to bring to its deliberations the views of
people in some of the surrounding districts; and through
its widening contacts it was coming to constitute the
instrument for co-ordinating the views of many Africans
in the southern region.
As we have seen, the introduction of 'indirect
rule' in 1933 led to the decline in the importance of the
northern Native Associations. All of them further suffered
from the discontinuity of membership due to emigration
and the transfer of African clerks. Moreover, many of
the major African political leaders who remained now
came to be fully engaged in building up the new African
churches in the region while others participated in the
councils of the local Native Authorities. The M.N.A. and
the N.N.N.A. continued, however, to hold meetings,
generally once a year, to discuss matters which were
mainly suggested to them for consideration by the
R.C.N.P.N.A. But they were not very active and seem to
have left the Representative Committee in Zomba to expound
5. ibid., Minutes of meeting of B.N.A. held on 25
September 1937*
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their points of view. The archives reflect nothing more
about these two bodies after 1936 and it may be that they
both came to an end around that time. As for the W.N.N.A.,
displaced by the Tonga Tribal Council and also torn by
personal rivalries, it had become defunct around 1933. In
1938, an attempt was made to reactivate it and a new
constitution was drafted. Y.Z. Mwase and E.K. Kamwana
were invited to Join but declined to do so and the orga-
nization does not appear to have proceeded any further.
It was therefore left to the R.C.N.P.N.A. not only to
centralize but give continuity to the activities of the
northern Native Associations.
Under the chairmanship of Levi Mumba till 1936 and
I•M• Jere to 194-1, the small group of northerners
constituting the Representative Committee were the most
energetic Africans engaged in politics in the Protectorate.
Regular monthly meetings were held and numerous repre¬
sentations made to government on a wide range of subjects
of interest to Africans throughout Nyasaland. Detailed
memoranda were submitted to commissions such as the
Committee of Enquiry on Emigrant Labour and to the Finance
Commissioner, Sir Robert Bell. Both of these documents
spelt out plainly the inadequacies of the government's
economic policy, detailed ways of promoting economic and
social development, and urged the colonial authorities to
7
ensure that the lot of migrant workers was improved.
6. NC1/3/6, Minutes of meeting of W.N.N.A. held on 19
February 1938, M.N.A., Zomba.
7. R.C.N.P.N.A. to Committee of Enquiry on Emigrant Labour,
22 July 1935, and R.C.N.P.N.A. to Financial Commissioner,
15 October#1937» in I.M. Jere papers.
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Close contacts were also maintained with the B.N.A. and
the Z.P.N.A. and all three bodies exchanged minutes and
resolutions as well as ideas and information. But even ~
though Mumba continually voiced the demand for closer
co-operation and unity, the shift to a united movement of
Native Associations was not immediately forthcoming. On
the occasion of his giving up the chairmanship of the
R.C.N.P.N.A. as he was being transferred to Blantyre and
then to Lilongwe, ?5umba declared that "it is our fervent
hope that future years may see the birth of an amal-
8
gamated Nyasaland African Political Congress". In 1936,
however, there was little determination to follow up this
bold idea. What was needed was a cause big enough to bring
the Associations together into a concerted movement. In ~
the late 1930s, the question of 'closer union' was to
draw the educated Africans together.
Throughout the inter-war period, the uropean
community in Nyasaland was extremely small. In the late
1930s it numbered about 1750, of which about 300 were
engaged in planting and around 250 in commerce and
industry. Moreover, from the mid-1920s, with the collapse
of a nuiflber of white planters and the gradual expansion in
African peasant production, there could have been few
doubts that Europeans would always remain a very small
minority in the country. The Protectorate's broken and
8. Bantu Mirror (Bulawayo), 8 August 1936, p.1 in I.M.
Jere papers. See also Nat.12/3, for a letter by Mumba
read at the general meeting of the Z.P.N.A. on 24
July 1937 in which he suggested the possible union of
Native Associations within the next few years, M.N.A.,
Zomba.
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uncompleted line of communications, its limited areas of
healthy uplands, and its lack of mineral wealth, ensured
that there was little possibility of any extensive white
settlement in Nyasaland. Throughout the 1920s, the
settler-owned Nyasaland Times continuously emphasized the
fact that Nyasaland could never become a white man's
q
country. According to Professor R.C. Pratt, a similar
situation of small numbers of Europeans in Uganda had led
to the white community there never developing strong
political ambitions as a racial minority. Similarly,
during the 1920s, Europeans in Nyasaland "ignored the two
main preoccupations of a self-conscious and politically
ambitious racial minority - increased immigration and
1 o
increased political representation." When they did act
politically, and this applied only to the non-evangelical
and non-governmental sections of the community, it was
generally to promote their several economic interests
rather than to enhance their collective influence as a
racial minority.
This was demonstrated very clearly in the reactions
of the various Nyasaland settler organizations to the
proposals for 'closer union' which were widely canvassed
in the 1920s. Many Europeans in neighbouring territories,
particularly Kenya, were becoming convinced that the best
9. See, for example, editorials in the following issues
of the Nyasaland Times. 4 May 1916, p.1; 9 March 1922,
pp.2-3; 15 and 16 September 1927, p.2.
10. R.C. Pratt, "Administration and Politics in Uganda
1919-1945," in Vincent Harlow and E.M. Chilver assisted
by Alison Smith, eds., History of East Africa, Vol.2
(Oxford,1965), p.511.
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hope for their future lay in creating a larger territorial
unit. Such unions of British territories in East and
Central Africa were expected to increase both the
11
economic and political influence of Europeans. vhites
in Nyasaland, however, were not particularly enthusiastic
about a Central African union which, they feared, would
be dominated by Europeans in Southern Rhodesia for their
own ends. Tor a number of years, they had advocated some
form of merger with Northern Rhodesia, especially with
12
its eastern province, but were uncertain about any
alignment with Southern Rhodesia. As for union with the
three East African territories, this appears to have
attracted little or no comment, perhaps because it was
never a feasible proposition. The Chamber of Agriculture
and Commerce of Nyasaland, which represented the trading
interests and larger agricultural companies, believed
that the "ultimate federation of the British Territories
in Tropical East and Central Africa" was "a desirable
object." But it felt that Nyasaland was not yet ready to i
Join in any such federation until its communications had
been improved and the economy greatly expanded. As a first
step, however, it was desirable to "re-unite Nyasaland
and North Eastern Rhodesia." In its memorandum to the
1923 Hilton Young Commission, which was examining the
11. For a survey of these proposals between the wars, see
Robert I. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in
British East and Central Africa, 1389-1953," Journal
of Commonwealth Political Studies, 2 (1964), pp.141-
wr.
12. C.0.525/69$ Smith to C.O., 11 December 1916, enclosure
Nyasaland Chamber of Agriculture and Commerce to C.S.,
2 December 1916, P.R.O., London; The Nyasaland Times.
7 September 1916, p.1; S1/1455/27» Nyasaland Chamber
to A.C.S., 7 October 1927, W.N.A., Zomba.
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problem of •closer union1, the Chamber declared that it
was "strongly of opinion" that union with the two
Rhodesias alone "would be against the best interests of
the Protectorate, chiefly because the policy of Southern
Rhodesia and of the Railway corridor of Northern Rhodesia
is similar to that of South Africa, and is unsuited to a
Protectorate such as Nyasaland." The "development of
Nyasaland hitherto" it continued, "has been on the Dual
Policy with equal rights for all races, without dis¬
tinction of creed or colour, and it is believed that this
policy is the most suitable and the only Just one for
tropical territories with large and progressive native
populations, and where so much of the country is unsuited
to colonization by European races." It also apprehended
that any amalgamation with the Rhodesias "would simply
mean that Nyasaland would become a recruiting ground."
Finally, it opposed the delegation of any of the powers
of the imperial government to a settler-dominated
Assembly as had been advocated by Europeans in Kenya. The
Chamber concluded that it was "impossible for the Colonial
Office to divest itself in any manner in favour of a local
European population of its declared trust on behalf of the
natives of these territories, and that meantime, any
suggestion of an elected local European majority or any
local or federal legislature is inconsistent with such
trust."15
13. Undated memorandum submitted by the Nyasaland Chamber
to the Hilton-Young Commission, in Memoranda and other
papers circulated to the commission. Vol'.'4, F.C.O..
Library, London.
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If this was the voice of the larger European
economic interests in Nyasaland, then the smaller farmers
and planters organizations were also uncertain about any
merger with Southern Rhodesia, being particularly
concerned that the Protectorate would become a reservoir
of labour for richer neighbours. The Cholo Planters
Association, for example, believed that the interests of
Nyasaland were more closely allied with the Rhodesias
than with Blast Africa but did not advocate any immediate
union with them until safeguards had been established
against the recruitment of Nyasa labour for outside
employment. The Nyasaland Planters' Association and the
South Nyasa Planters' Association joined the Cholo body
in favouring amalgamation with North-Rastern Rhodesia but
"1 lL
were opposed to any merger with Southern Rhodesia.
The Hilton-Young Commission was itself divided
over the future of the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. Eventually, after lengthy consideration of
its report, the British Government decided to rule out
amalgamation for the time being and little was heard of
the matter for a few years. By the early 1930s, however,
there was, in the words of the Nyasaland Chamber of
Agriculture and Commerce, "a considerable change of
opinion" among local European settlers. Support for the
idea of closer union with the Rhodesias now came to be
14. ibid., Memoranda submitted by the Cholo Planters
Association dated 14 March 1928 and undated memoranda
by the Nyasaland Planters' Association and the South




increasingly voiced by the Chamber, v by the recently-
formed Convention of Associations, which represented
unofficial European opinion in the Protectorate, and by
17
the settler-owned Nyasaland Times. The serious economic
depression at the time was a key factor accounting for
this new attitude. It was widely believed among the
European unofficial community that closer union of Central
Africa would lead to administrative economy, reduce tax¬
ation and promote greater economic co-operation so vital
to forward the prosperity of Nyasaland. In the Legislative
Council unofficials levelled charges of extravagance and
inefficiency at the government and condemned it for main¬
taining the country in a state of economic stagnation.
Closer association with the Rhodesias was thus now ad¬
vocated as the only means of promoting the economic and
social development of a small and remote agricultural
territory which had for years been neglected by a par¬
simonious imperial government.
Allied to these economic factors were racial and
political reasons for favouring amalgamation with the
Rhodesias. Unlike the Europeans in Uganda, those in Nyasa¬
land were not unimportant as primary producers of wealth.
Moreover, those planters who had survived the economic
difficulties of the late 1920s and early 1930s had become
15. See Nyasaland Times, 16 December 1930, p.2 for reso¬
lutions passed at meeting of 9 December 1930.
16. ibid., 10 December 1931, p.4.
17. lEIS., 12 April 1929, p.2; 24 October 1930, p.2; 13
February 1931, p.2; and 2 December 1932, p.2.
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rooted in the country and thought of themselves as
permanent settlers. But in an overwhelming black country,
they entertained a basic insecurity and fear of what
would happen in the future. Increasingly, they had grown
concerned about the 'West African' policy of the Nyasaland
Government which, they believed, ignored the interests of
18
Europeans. Amalgamation with a country like Southern
Rhodesia was thus seen as a way of establishing in
Nyasaland a regime of prosperity and security for them¬
selves and their children.
They formed in 1935 a Greater Rhodesia League in
19
Nyasaland and though their ultimate political objectives
were conveniently vague they spoke enthusiastically of
responsible government and a British Central African
20
Dominion. The Nyasaland Times argued that the fact that
the Europeans were so overwhelmingly outnumbered by
Africans in Nyasaland made a Greater Rhodesia that much
more desirable. With some form of closer association
"this disproportion would disappear for the stubborn
policy of opposition to white settlement would be re-
21
placed by European development schemes."" W. Tait Bowie
(later Sir William), a leading settler and unofficial
member of the Legislative Council, posed the question for
18. ibid., 5 February 1932, p.4 for minutes of meeting of
Oholo Planters' Association. See also issue of 2
February 1932, p.4 where the Cholo Planters' Association
resolved to call itself the Cholo Settlers' Association
to emphasize that Europeans had come to settle perma¬
nently "in this country of our domicile."
19. ibid., 24 June 1935, pp.1-2, 5-6.
20. ibid., 2 December 1932, p.2 and 30 November 1934, p.2.
21. ibid., 20 June 1935, P.4 and see also 19 August 1935,
p.4.
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whites in Nyasaland as follows i "Do we consider the ideal
is one strong British self-governing community in Central
Africa, or do we wish to remain for ever the vassals of
the Colonial Office?"22
Recognition of the fact that they were too few in
number to secure independence from the Colonial Office
had now led many white settlers in Nyasaland to seek pro¬
tection of their interests in a united European dominion
in Central Africa. Simultaneously, the 1930s saw Europeans
seeking to improve their position within the Protectorate
itself. Hyasaland was not to be a planter's country but
Europeans still had an important economic role to play in
its development. Their production of tobacco and tea
greatly supplemented African production which could not
alone support the Protectorate unless communications were
expanded considerably. Tea was becoming a major export
crop and the government sought to assist white estate-
owners to bolster its production. Capital development was
also dependent upon Europeans and the colonial government,
extremely anxious about economic development, began again, »
during the 1930s, to favour white interests as far as
possible. In response to European pressures, settler
strength in the Legislative Council wa3 increased and
increasingly Europeans participated on various boards and
committees that were recommending policy over a wide range
of social and economic subjects, including land, labour,
transport and agriculture. There was no talk among
22» ibid*. 30 «*ay 1938, p.5.
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European settlers of achieving self-government hut they
clearly sought greater control over the machinery of
government. Amalgamation, however, would secure more
effectively their key political interests.
So intent were the supporters of amalgamation on
"breaking away from the 'dead hand' of the Colonial
Office" that the Nyasaland Times argued that no "close
analysis of the 'advantages' has ever been made." With
the advent in 1938 of a Royal Commission to examine the
possibility of closer union in Central Africa, the settler
organ claimed that few of the advantages which had
generally been propounded could in fact be "sustained"
pg
under closer investigation. ^ The Convention of
Associations also recognized that closer union would not
immediately solve all the problems of local European
settlers, particularly those of an economic nature.
Settlers voiced fears that the dominant group in a united
Central Africa would be the larger Southern Hhodesian
white community whose economic interests conflicted with
those of planters in Nyasaland. Further fears focussed on
white farmers to the south monopolizing cheap Nyasaland
24
labour for their own interests. Any sense of a common
political and racial cause uniting whites throughout
Central Africa was overridden by the fact that the economic
23« ibid., 2 June 1938, p.4.
ibicf., 9 Way 1938, pp.5-6 for memorandum on closer
co-operation prepared by a special sub-committee of
the Convention of Associations. See also the issue
of 30 May 1933, pp.5»8, for report of proceedings of
the Convention's general meeting.
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interests of European planters and traders in Nyasaland
would suffer under such a larger union. In the end, the
settlers' memorandum to the Eledisloe Commission only
proposed "ultimate amalgamation." But in line with their
attempts to obtain greater participation in Nyasaland's
decision-making process, they asked that "provision
should "be made for the creation of an unofficial majority
(in the Legislative Council) in all matters not directly
relating to native affairs.
African evidence to the 1923 Hilton-Young
Commission was vague and probably ill-considered,
especially those aspects of it which pertained to the
question of closer union. Closer union during the 19203
had not yet become an explosive issue in the Protectorate
and the Native Associations seem to have hardly debated
the subject. Only the two Associations based in Zomba,
the R.C.N.P.N.A, and the Z.P.N.A., appear to have sub¬
mitted memoranda to the Commission and these seem to have
been drafted by Levi Mumba. Indeed, federation was given
some support although only so far as it enabled Nyasaland
workers to continue finding employment in surrounding
26
territories. In view of the subsequent overwhelming
African opposition to amalgamation this support is rather
surprising. It may well be that Mumba and his colleagues
25. ibid., 27 June 1938, pp.5»6, for Convention memo¬
randum to the Bledisloe Commission. See also issue of
30 June 1938, pp.5-6 for record of Convention oral
evidence before Commission.
26. Minutes of meeting of the Z.P.N.A. held on 18
February 1928 submitted to the Hilton-Young Commission
in Memoranda and other papers, op. clt., Vol.4.
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saw the closer union proposals of the 1920s as encom¬
passing not solely the two Rhodesiaa hut the three East
African territories as well. The pro-native policies
pursued in Tanganyika and Uganda may therefore not have
created any alarm as an exclusive union with the
Hhodesia3 would have probably done. The distinction was
not made clear in the African memoranda but, nonetheless,
a warning was sounded. "When federation comes and a
federal council is established we hope that precautions
will be taken so that our interests will not be under¬
mined and that the common authority so constituted will
not flood Nyasaland with vexatious and unnecessary laws
07
and with the surplus populations of other countries.
By the mid-1950s the situation had changed
immensely. Africans had become increasingly concerned and
suspicious of the persistent white demands for a Central
African union. Ho longer were any suggestions being made
for Nyasaland to merge with the territories of East
Africa; closer association only with the Rhodesias was
being advocated. African reaction to such a scheme was
predictable. On no account were they prepared to see
their country joined with Southern Rhodesia. Africans in
Ryasaland knew Southern Rhodesia well because they went
there in their thousands to work and they were adamant in
their opposition to union with a country which they knew
was being run for the benefit of Europeans. In Nyasaland,
under the Colonial Office, they knew that the country was
27. ibid., undated memorandum submitted by the R.C.N.P.N.A.
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ultimately theirs and was being primarily run for their
benefit, even though they did not always agree with the
policies and methods adopted by the colonial government.
The advent of the Bledisloe Commission, therefore, called -
forth the clearest manifestation of African unity and
revealed a growing national unity as educated elements,
traditional authorities and the ordinary people in the
rural areas were brought together to defend their status
as a protected people who should be allowed to develop on
their own and not in conjunction with a white settler-
dominated state. Meetings were held at Blantyre, Zomba
and Lilongwe, attended by large numbers from all over the
Protectorate, at which memoranda were approved for sub¬
mission to the Royal Commission. All of these memoranda
detailed reasons why amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia
was not wanted as, in the words of the Blantyre document,
"what is going on in that territory as far as Africans are
pQ
concerned is a mild form of slavery."™
"'hen the Bledisloe Commission published its report
in 1939, it accepted the idea of eventual closer
association in principle but discounted that immediate
steps be taken to achieve it. All three Central African
territories, it considered, would in time become
increasingly interdependent but for the present no formal
link should be established between them. The differences
between the native policies followed north and south of
28. See COM.3/1, M.H.A., Zomba for African memoranda
submitted to the Bledisloe Commission, particularly
those by the R.C.N.P.N.A. (dated 31 May 1933) and the
B.N.A. (17 May 1933).
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the Zambezi obviated against immediate amalgamation.
Overwhelming African opposition was also of crucial
importance. The passionately expressed opposition and
aversion of northern Africans to any association with
Southern Rhodesia so impressed the Commission that it
declared:
"If so large a proportion of the population of
the combined Territory were brought unwillingly
under a unified Government, it would prejudice
the prospect of cooperation in ordered develop¬
ment under such a Government." 29
Such a conclusion might well have been remembered fifteen
years later.
But if the issue of 'closer union' had called
forth a feeling of African national unity it did not lead
in 1933 to the creation of a national-wide political
organization. It is just possible that such a movement
may have been formed quite soon had other events not inter¬
vened. For there wa3 a growing feeling that such a terri¬
torial and united African organization offered a more
promising way for solving the problems of African sub¬
ordination and poverty. The stimulus for African co¬
operation provided by the European demands for amalga¬
mation had led to fundamental results in that African
unity had clearly influenced the outcome of the 'closer
union* issue. The outbreak of the second world war was
perhaps the most important factor which postponed the
formation of a national African political body. Another
was the serious split which arose in the B.N.A. and which
29. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmd. 594-9
(-1939), p.Sia. ^ —
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diverted the attentions of southern region Africans to
local associational concerns.
Africans were increasingly beginning to recognize
the new significant role of the Legislative Council in
the Protectorate's decision-making process. From the
early 1930s, with the government taking greater action in
all fields of economic and social development, the
legislature had become a decisive political instrument in
Nyasaland, being involved in the enactment of a growing
number of laws affecting the lives of Africans. It was
therefore not surprising that Africans soon sought to
obtain an indigenous and more effective voice on the
Legislative Council than that provided by the missionary
representative and government officials. At the same time,
the ineffectiveness of the Native Associations to influence
the central secretariat and the inability of the Native
Authorities to exercise much influence on the expanding
central government interference in local affairs, was
leading Africans to search for new techniques for the
solution of their problems. As suggested already, one way
was to create, in the words of Levi **umba, "a united
front of all African opinion in a Congress." Such an
African movement operating on a territorial level would
not, like the district-based Native Associations, have to
work through the Native Authorities and would seek to
influence the Legislative Council and all other bodies
directly affecting the lives of Africans. Linked to this
was the idea of direct African representation on the
Legislative Council. "Politically," wrote "'uinba to Dr.
H.K. Banda in Edinburgh in 1939* "Africans are more and
more clamouring to be heard, not being content to be
represented by other races.If Mumba does not seem to
have expressed the need to have Africans in the central
legislature or to have gone beyond stressing the impor¬
tance of establishing a "Congress" which would represent
African opinion to the colonial government, others,
particularly in the B.N.A., were beginning to demand
direct African representation in the Legislative Council.
It appears that there was to be a final general
meeting of the B.N.A. to approve the memorandum to be
submitted to the Bledisloe Commission and it was hoped,
by a number of members, that this would incorporate a
demand for African political representation. This new
demand may have been partly stimulated by the European
memorandum to the Commission which asked for an unofficial
white majority in the. legislature in all matters relating
to non-African affairs. But of greater importance in
determining this request was probably the fact that the
lives of Africans were increasingly being affected by
decisions made in the Legislative Council and it was
therefore imperative that their interests should be
adequately represented on it. This, it was believed, could
only be accomplished by Africans themselves. It was felt
that legislation affecting African well-being was often
slanted in favour of the white community and Africans
consequently wanted to look after their own interests.
30. L.2. "fumba to H.K. Banda, 15 February 1939, in I.!?.
Jere papers.
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All this was "brought out in the 'minority' memorandum
which some members of the B.N.A. sent to the Commission.
are troubled because.. .our small European
community has more power with the Government
than all of us Africans together. "ve see that
even with a majority of official members of the
Legislative Council the unofficial members are
allowed to arrange things in the interest of
the Europeans, and that native development is
hindered unless it is also for the benefit of
Europeans."
The 'minority' memorandum then proceeded to give an
example "of our trouble."
"Many of our people grow tobacco. The Native
Tobacco Board regulates this industry. But it
is not native. We have no say in the election
of its members, and on the Board are those who
buy oiir tobacco. Also it is now law that all
our tobacco must be sold on the auction floors
of a private company. We were not consulted or
we should have asked that the Government should
take the control of that company in our inter¬
ests. Such questions are decided in the
Legislative Council." 31
Allegedly for reasons of time, the B.N.A. memo¬
randum prepared by the President, K. Ellerton Mposa, and
some of his colleagues on the executive committee was not
discussed by the whole Association at a general meeting
before being presented for consideration to the Bledisloe
Commission. A large number of members, led by the lev.
Thomas Masseah, thereupon decided to draft another memo¬
randum which would be more representative of the views of
the B.N.A. It was this second memorial which contained a
demand for greater African participation in all bodies
which directly concerned African affairs 3uch as the
Native Tobacco Board. It also asked the Commission "to
31. Memorandum cited in full in the Nyasaland Times, 30
June 1938, pp.2-3.
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consider whether the time has not come when educated
Africans should be allowed to elect half the members of
the Legislative Council so that our interests will be
properly looked after and advanced. We do not ask that
members be Africans, but only that we should be allowed
32
to choose those we know and trust to represent us."^ The
Nyasaland Government may not have viewed the 'minority1
memorandum with much enthusiasm and it may well have
attempted to ensure that the more radical members of the
B.N.A. did not get an opportunity to represent their
views to the Commission. Mposa was selected by the Senior
Provincial Commissioner to lead a delegation of southern
region associationists to meet the commissioners and he
was to be the major African spokesmen. Mposa was the head
clerk of the S.P.C. and it is possible that the government
hoped he would have a moderating influence on the
delegation and would forestall precipitous demands.
In the words of one of the two hundred Africans who
listened to the open interview between the Commission and
the African delegation, Mposa "was totally senseless." In
a letter to Levi Mumba, who was then working in Lilongwe
where he was making preparations for Africans of the
northern region to meet the Commission there, the writer
claimed that "Nobody else other than Mposa could speak"
at the Blantyre interview. When asked whether Africans
desired representation on the Legislative Council, "(I)
very much regret to inform you that the man (Mposa) said
32. ibid., The present discussion is also based on inter¬
views with Messrs. K.E. Mposa and J.P. Sangala in
Blantyre, Malawi.
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•No we want a European as usual."1 Mposa even declared
that he could not recommend one qualified African who
would he ahle to understand and contribute to the work of
the legislature. The writer pleaded with Mumba to get one
of the delegates at the Lilongwe meeting to raise the
question of direct African political representation. Mposa
had absolutely failed to do this. The "P.O. might have
buttered Mposa in all ways, in the face that his services
since the natives would have their own representatives in
the Legislative Council his services might be of no value
or not required.This latter suspicion is difficult to
verify but it is worth noting that during the interview
the chairman of the Commission asked the Senior Provincial
Commissioner to withdraw as his presence might deter
34
Africans from speaking their minds freely. The chairman
seems to have been well aware of the differences within
the B.N.A. and suggested that "you have in the Association
what might be described as a right and left wing." As a
result, the Rev. T. Masseah was questioned briefly about
his memorandum and in his evidence he claimed that the
government was "too largely influenced by the small
European community of the country" when African interests
were concerned. During the interview, Masseah made an
unequivocal demand for "direct representation" by Africans
33* Letter by unknown African to L.Z. Mumba, 27 June 1933,
in I.M. Jere papers. This report of Mposa's attitude
and behaviour is confirmed by the record of oral
evidence heard by the Royal Commission at Blantyre on
24 June 1933, Vol.3 in F.C.O. Library, London.




The development of the Masseah/Mposa factions
within the B.N. A, led to serious differences in the
Association which diverted the energies of the Blantyre
intelligentsia which might otherwise have gone into the
"building up of a national-wide political movement in
concert with other Native Associations. Throughout 1933
and 1939* the Blantyre associationist3 remained embroiled
in local associational matters. Nevertheless, the Masseah
faction, which now led the Association, continued to voice
its demands for African political representation and was
supported by the R.C.N.P.N.A. in Zomba. Several chiefs
also appear to have Joined the educated elements in
expressing a desire for some regular means by which
Africans could make their views known before legislation
36
was passed which affected them. The Nyasaland Government
refused to grant Africans direct representation in the
Legislative Council. Instead, reported Lord Hailey, the
government "ha3 adopted the procedure of consulting
Native Authorities in certain cases about bills which are
to be considered in the Council." While Hailey thought
that this was "of value in itself" it was liable "to
provoke some irritation on other occasions when laws are
35* ibid.. See also Nyasaland Times, 30 June 1933, pp.2-3
forevidence.
36. Nat.12/39* C.O. to Mackenzie-Kennedy, 15 October 194-1,
enclosure confidential report by Lord Hailey entitled
Native Administration and Political Development (1940-
42), section 16 of Chap.&, irt.N.A., Zomba. A copy of
this report can also be found in the F.C.O. Library,
London.
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passed (as sometimes they must be) without consulting the
Native Authorities, or some body on which their views are
represented." He made no recommendations regarding
African representation on the Legislative Council but
noted simply that the "official view appears to incline
to the institution in the first instance of provincial
37
councils•
To accommodate the new political demands of
Africans, the government was thus seeking to widen the
scale of African politics from the district to the
provincial level. But Africans, in demanding direct
political representation at the centre, had already moved
to political agitation on a national level. Indeed, the
Native Associations had from their inception seen the
territorial government as the cfcief focus of their
efforts. They had for years attempted to influence the
officials at the central secretariat and also induce them
to refer bills on African matters to the Associations for
comment and consideration. But such an approach had
achieved no substantive reforms. Now, however, with
Europeans demanding increased political representation
and central government legislation increasingly regulating
local African affairs more closely, the remaining Native
Associations had recognized the need for direct African
participation in the central legislature. At the same time,





The formation of the Nyasaland African Congress
Like many other educated Africans in Nyasaland,
James F. Sangala, the acknowledged founder of the
Nyasaland African Congress (N.A.C.), was fortunate in
being employed in the civil service, in positions of some
responsibility which were in neighbouring countries
filled by Europeans and Indians. Whilst employed as a
filing clerk in the D.C.'s office in Blantyre between
1930 and 1936 and as a clerk in the S.P.C.'s office in
the same town from 1938 to 1939, Sangala was placed in a
position to gain access to information as to the govern¬
ment's political intentions and socio-economic policies.
Together with a number of other African civil servants,
Sangala was thus able to acquire the knowledge which was
to make him one of the leading participants in southern
African pressure group politics of the 1930s. At the same
time, hangala was placed in an occupational environment in
which he and his fellow government colleagues incessantly
discussed and debated ways and means of bettering African
conditions. In civil service offices in Blantyre and
Zomba, Sangala had met and conversed with his life-long
friend and President of the B.N.A., K. Ellerton Mposa,
who was for years the trusted head clerk to the S.P.C.;
come into closer contact from 1939 with fellow High
Court colleague, Lewis Bandawe, whose long connexions
38. For earlier discussions of the formation of the
N.A.C., see Richard Gray, The Two Nations (London,
1960), pp.336-34-5, and 3obert" I. Rotberg, The Rise of
Nationalism in Central Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
W5), PP.-W1-195.
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with and experience of the Blantyre Mission was unrivalled
among African government servants; and also become
acquainted with Levi Mumba and his northern colleagues
39
during his period of employment in Zomba in 1937»
The most notable of the other associationists who
became the initiators of Congress were Charles Mlanga,
4-0
Charles J, Matinga and Isaac M. Lawrence. All of them
were products of the Blantyre Mission, were well known
throughout southern Nyasaland, and were leading members
of the southern Native Associations. Mlanga was the main
African editor of the local vernacular newspaper, Zo Ona
(known from 1937 as Nkhani za Nyasaland), and as a
result of his father's connexions, his own occupation,
and also through membership of the B.N.A. had come Into
contact with many Africans all over the central and
southern regions. ,i!atinga, a close friend of ?Tlanga, was
initially an assistant storekeeper at the Zomba Public
Works Department working under the head storekeeper,
Levi Mutnba. An office-bearer of the B.N.A. and later the
Z.P.N.A., Matinga was also in touch with the R.C.N.P.N.A.
and was one of the most prominent of the second generation
Africans involved in southern politics. Lawrence, an
Kgoni from Ncheu in the central region, worked with the
39• This paragraph is based on interviews with Messrs.
J.F. Sangala, L. Bandawe and the late K.B. Mposa,
Blantyre, Malawi. Cangala was employed as chief typist
at the Medical Headquarters in Zomba during 1937* In
1939 he was transferred from the S.P.C.'s office to
the High Court in Blantyre where he became a clerk/
typist.
40. 19a/53, Annual report of the Blantyre district for
the year 1943» M.N.A., Zomba includes these three
persons in its listing of the key figures in African
political activity in the southern region.
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railways in Limbe as a clerk and had for long been
acquainted with African political movements both at home
and abroad. Having married the sister of Dr. D.S.
Malekebu, the head of the Providence Industrial Mission
and founder of the C.D.N.A., Lawrence was al30 closely
tied to the Chiradaulu district and its powerful history
41
of protest.
All of these afore-mentioned persons were leading
southern African spokesmen. But, as has been suggested,
they were not without any close contacts with northern
Africans. The coming together of fairly well-educated
men from all over Nyasaland in the townships of Blantyre
and Liiabe enabled individuals from different backgrounds
to realize their shared problems and to discuss the
possibility of common action for redress. The links which
developed between the B.N.A., Z.P.N.A. and the R.C.N.P.N.A.,
particularly during the 1930s, not only fostered closer
connexions between educated elements from the different
regions but helped to forward the creation of a united
African political movement. By the time of the outbreak of
the second ™orld War, the close occupational and political
ties existing between the leaders of these southern-based
Native Associations virtually made them a single and
unified political force. Indeed, James Sangala has
suggested that he wa3 seriously considering organizing
41. See 32/25/34, M.N.A., Zomba, for details of Lawrence's
connexions with the P.I.M. and his political activities
in neighbouring territories including his links with
the militant American Negro movement led by Marcus
Garvey. Gee also the Nyasaland Times, 24 Gepteaber
1926, p.3 for some biographical information.
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these Native Associations into an inclusive political
movement especially after they had become so united
during the 1933 campaign against 'closer union'. With the
outbreak of the war, however, he was forced to shelve
such plans as the government would not, under the
circumstances, have permitted the emergence of a new
African organization involved in agitational politics.
During the early war years, all of the Native
Associations in the southern region were on the decline.
Only occasional meetings were held by the R.O.N.P.N.4.
which was suffering from discontinuity of its key leader¬
ship due to the transfer of Levi Mumba, J.D. Phiri and
I.M. Jere to other parts of the Protectorate between 1937
and 1943. The B.N.A., torn by personal differences
resulting from the 1938 split, was practically moribund
and organized no further meetings after 1941, Yet
Africans continued to preserve and develop the contacts
which were to build up that corporate spirit so essential
for later African political activity. Foremost among
these Africans was still Levi Mumba.'From his new centre
of employment at Mzimba, he maintained a large corres¬
pondence with persons both at home and abroad, exchanging
ideas and encouraging Africans in their work and
political activities. Some of these letters, written to
Africans throughout the Protectorate, urged them to
realize the need for wider unity. A paragraph in a letter
to Native Authority Mwase, the major Cewa chief in
Nyasaland, is apposite in this context.
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"But my chief it is not enough that we should
merely get our people into such positions
(Mwase had recently been appointed to the
Native Welfare Committee and to the Central
Labour Board); we have got to work hard both
on these councils and outside them; we have
got to keep in touch with the views and re¬
quirements not only of our own districts but
of all our African community in Nyasaland so
that we may have their full confidence, and if
it were possible all recognized leaders of
political, educational and religious thought
should at times come into conference to ex¬
change our experiences and views and learn
from each other and thus be able to plan for
best ways of procedure in our efforts to stand
for our people and country." 42
On learning that "things are flat politically" with the
Representative Committee in Zomba, Mumba replied to his
close friend and chairman of the R.C.N.P.N.A *, I.M. Jere:
"These are times of thinking of future recon¬
struction and it is well if our people were
ready with their views. I hope at the meeting
which they called for the 6th. December they
talked of something important in the
rebuilding of a strong organization." 43
Similar ideas of unity and reconstruction were
being propagated by African civil servants and others in
the southern townships of Elantyre and Zomba but wartime
conditions most likely prevented them from translating
such ideas into action. In June 194-1» for example, after
a football match at the Fdirande Welfare Club, one Mlenga,
who had recently returned home from Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa, informed those present that "the most
interesting thing there was not the Tea and Scones they
ate but that they met together as one people of one
42. L.Z. Vumba to Native Authority Sam C. Mwase, 3 May
194-1, in I.M. Jere papers.
43. L.Z. Mumba to I.M. Jere, 20 December 1941, in I.M.
Jere papers.
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nation. What really the country needs is cooperation.
Unite and do things together. This place 3hould "be called
ti h
a field where you would build up a greater Ryasaland."
Schemes of 'closer union', travel and migration abroad,
and increasing interaction with fellow Nyasas in Elantyre
and Zoiaba, were all contributing to the development of a
strong national consciousness among many Africans. Ideas
of unity were in the air and any of the leading African
associationists could have inspired the formation of an
organization to provide a forum for this nascent
nationalism. But it was James Sangala, with his long
experience of forming and organising social groups such
as the Ndirande v'elfare Club, spurred into action at
the right moment by the attitude of the Anglo-African
community, who will go down in history as the chief
progenitor of the Wyasaland African Congress.
It may be asked why Levi Mumba and his northern
associationists in the R.C.N.P.N.A., who had for years
been preaching the need for unity, did not themselves
initiate any direct moves towards the establishment of a
territorial-wide political body. It seems as if only-
southern African leaders could successfully launch such
a movement. African political leaders resident in the
northern region had few direct links with their southern
44. Cited in R. Gray, 0£. cit., pp. 341-2.
45. During the 1930s, Sangala was instrumental in starting
up and organizing a number of social groups such as
the Mirande Welfare Club which made him well known
in Blantyre. Be also organized the multi-racial Elack
and T'hite Club and was Secretary of the highly
successful Shire Highlands Football League.
region counterparts to attempt creating a national
political organization. This was not the case with the
politically active northerners working in the Shire
Highland townships. These, however, were always a
minority who may have felt that their role was to stimu¬
late local Africans to commence such an organization
which they could then expand to other parts of the
Protectorate. Moreover, with the transfer of Mumba and
other leading Representative Committee officials to other
regions, no prominent northern Africans were left in the
south who enjoyed the respect and authority to unite
southern and northern Africans successfully into a single
body.46
It would, of course, be a mistake to try and
explain the founding of Congress simply in terms of
personal political initiative by Sangala. The formation
of Congress coincided at that moment with the interests
of other Africans. Nevertheless, it is of interest to
examine the motives which inspired Sangala to launch the
new movement.
In 194-31 the Goloureds through their Anglo-African
Association successfully memorialized the Governor and
C.W.M. Cox, the Secretary of State's Adviser on Education,
who was then visiting Nyasaland, demanding separate
schools of their own, independent from those of Africans.
They resented being classified as Africans or natives,
4-6. This paragraph is based on interviews with Mr. J.D.
Hiiri (who was the Auditor of the R.C.N.P.N.A.),
London, England.
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desired to be treated more like Europeans, and were
willing to pay European rates of tax if they could secure
official recognition of their higher status. Their
condescending attitude towards Africans annoyed Sangala.
Their criticism of African educational standards confirmed
him in his belief that not only had Africans to strive
for improved educational facilities but that African
pressures for change and reform would only prove effective
if they were presented by a unified African force. For
years, Sangala, an ex-teacher at Domasi Mission School,
had been concerned about African education and had in 1938
set up the Educational Parents Association one of the
objectives of which was to challenge the decision by the
Blantyre Mission not to permit African girls to study
47
beyond standard three. ' It was, however, Coloured unity
to promote their cause that stirred Sangala into action.
If Coloureds could unite and if Europeans had already
successfully done so in their Convention of Associations,
why could not Africans too organize themselves and
collectively express their views and in concert seek their
salvation?2^®
Consulting his friend Mposa, seeking the advice of
colleague Bandawe, and touring the five villages near
Ndirande where the bulk of the educated southern Africans
47. See NSB5/1/4-, Annual report for Blantyre district for
the year 1938 for details of this Association, M.N.A.,
Zomba.
48. This and the following paragraphs are based on
interviews with J.F. Sangala, L. Bandawe and K.E.
Mposa, Blantyre, Malawi.
- 236 -
lived,^ the popular and well-known Sangala began
searching for organizational ways in which to express his
newly-formed political thoughts. Through his social and
welfare activities, Sangala had come to possess a wide
circle of acquaintances who now encouraged him in his
plans to form a united African movement. With the tide of
events turning in favour of the Allies in the War, thus
eliminating any possible conquest of Africa, Sangala
decided to launch his 'Educated African Council'.
Realizing that John Chilembwe's complaints and protests
during the early months of World War 1 had turned the
colonial authorities hostile to African criticism, he
wanted to be certain that the government would look
sympathetically upon his proposed Council and consequently
visited and obtained favourable assurances from the
Senior Provincial Commissioner, Eric Smith.
With official toleration providing a favourable
milieu, Sangala invited twenty-one people from Blantyre-
Limbe to attend a meeting on August 19, 194-3, at which it
was decided to form the Nyasaland Educated African Council,
and to hold another meeting soon to put the idea before
50
the people.-^ A few weeks later, on September 2, a
49. These five villages, all in very close proximity to one
another, were Maunde, Masangano, Citendere, Makata and
Matope, and situated around Ndirande. Nearly all the
prominent B.N.A. members and begetters of Congress
lived there. These included Sangala, Matinga, Mlanga,
Lawrence, A.J. Mponda, L. Makata. Sangala also dis¬
cussed his ideas with K.T. Motsete, a Tswana-speaking
teacher at Blantyre Secondary School.
50. Although a comprehensive list of those who attended
this meeting is not available, it probably included
the following: Matinga, Mlanga, Lawrence, Bandawe, A.I.
Ndovie, T.R. Grant, A.J. Mponda, H. Chokani, K. Thipa,
J. Fhambala, G. Ngolleka, H. and C. Machinjili.
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general meeting was held attended by over ninety Africans
from Blantyre and Limbe townships, at which the whole
scheme was approved, though it was decided to drop the
51
term 'Educated1 from the title of the new organization.
To fulfil the conditions of the title it was decided to
get in touch with "Africans in all other Districts in
Nyasaland," and Sangala subsequently saw the local District
Commissioner, Eric Barnes, about the possibility of
publishing a circular letter in the Nyasaland Times,
Nkhani za Nyasaland and other newspapers. Permission for
this to be done was granted, the letter was published and
the movement launched.
Dated October 1, 194-3, the circular letter, which
was also sent privately to leading African politicians in
the Protectorate, explained that the "chief reason" for
forming the Council was "because experience has taught
that unity is strength." Now was the time for Africans
"in this country to fight for their freedom, progress and
development of Nyasaland from one field." Africans in
Blantyre and Llmbe had therefore started the Council
"which should be the mouthpiece of the (educated)
Africans." Unlike the inter-war Native Associations, the
Council would deal with "matters affecting the Protecto¬
rate generally," and that meetings would be held "once or
twice every year at which all the Districts (would) be
51. Ass. 4/13, J.F. Sangala to S.P.C., 3 September 1943,
M.N.A., Zomba. It should be noted that the original
file containing correspondence and official minutes on
the formation of Congress (Nat.34/1) is missing from
the Zomba Archives. The file Ass.4/13 contains
duplicates of some of the original letters but no
government minutes.
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represented." It would continue the tradition of
operating constitutionally and would "cooperate with the
Government, Commercials, Planters, Missionaries and
Native Authorities in any matters necessary to speed up
the progress of Nyasaland." In conclusion, the long
letter called for as many Africans as possible to "enlist
themselves for membership" to "make our voice heard" so
that "our race should have a place amongst the civilized
races." ^
A new sense of urgency and militancy could be
detected in this letter. Concern was aroused in official
circles by the use of such phrases as "to fight for their
freedom." When questioned about this phrase, Sangala
replied that he had not meant to convey the idea of
Africans entering "into armed conflict against the
Europeans for the sake of obtaining self-government" but
that "as self-government eventually must come...the
sooner they started to do something for themselves the
better." If a struggle was to occur, Sangala maintained,
it would be among Africans themselves "to stir the people
out of their lethargy." But even though the government
may have been reassured of the constitutionality of the
new organization, the new mood of urgency was still very
apparent in Sangala's subsequent remarks. The existence
of pass restrictions and the complete absence of African
representation in the Legislative Council showed clearly,
he averred, that "the Nyasaland Natives (were) a
52. ibid., J.F. Sangala to P.Cs., Blantyre and Lilongwe,
1 October 194-3 with enclosed circular letter.
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subordinate race" and so they would remain if "they (did)
53
nothing themselves to improve their lot." ^
After Sangala had made the required amendments to
54
his original circular letter, the government reiterated
its satisfaction with the new movement but proposed that
it be called the Nyasaland African Association (Ny.A.A.)
as the term 'Council1 conflicted with the business of
55
chiefs and was likely to cause confusion. ^ Levi iWumba
concurred in this reasoning and in a letter drew Sangala's
attention to the fact that "a council is a body appointed
by government. Missions or municipalities" and it would
therefore not be an "appropriate" name for "our
organization." He suggested that either Congress or
Convention (after the European body in Blantyre) be
adopted instead. Mumba may also have shared the govern¬
ment's concern regarding the new militant spirit evident
in the circular letter for he asked Sangala to consider
"asking government for a body as the Representative
Council in South Africa" which was "a government appoint¬
ment representing both chiefs and educated people." Such
a body, he suggested, "should meet say once a year
together with Europeans as guiders and pass their
recommendations for government consideration." Nevertheless,
despite this strong moderate gloss, Mumba congratulated
Sangala on his "bold bid" to get "African intellectuals
53. ibid., B.C., Blantyre, to P.C., Blantyre, 8 October
194-3 relating interview with Sangala.
54. ibid., J.F. Sangala to P.Cs., Blantyre and Lilongwe,
11 October 1943.
55. ibid., C.S. to P.C., Blantyre, 20 October 1943.
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to unite" and proposed that the dormant Native
Associations be circularized and revived at once, "and
56
when they have risen to get them to unite." ^
Sangala's circular letter had also invited
suggestions regarding the aims and constitution of the
new body. After these had been received, both from within
Nyasaland and without, Levi Mumba was asked to draft the
constitution which he presented for discussion and
approval to the select committee of the Ny.A.A. in
February 194-4-• Following his recommendations, the name of
the movement was changed to that of the Nyasaland African
Congress and it was agreed that "Existing District
Associations, Societies and other bodies which are not
functioning at present should be reorganized." It was
probably realized that by reviving them and rallying them
around the new organization, they would thus provide it
with ready-made blocks of popular support and thereby
serve as instruments in spreading its influence throughout
the Protectorate. At places "Where there are no Societies,
the Congress constitution would "be forwarded to the head
of the communities who thereafter shall organize branches.
Other influences were at work in guiding the
leaders of this newly-founded political group. A week
after the circular letter had appeared in the local press,
Oangala was visited by W.H. Tiacke, a well-known European
56. L.Z. r,/!umba to J.F. Sangala, 16 October 194-3, in C.C.
Chinula papers.
57. Txnutes of a meeting of the select committee of the
Nyasaland African Association held on 11 February
194-4, in I.M. Jere papers.
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settler, who had for a number of years been championing
the rights of Africans and critically commenting on the
character of European rule. Levi Mumba had conferred
with Timcke on a few occasions and urged other Africans
to do so as well a3 "he is very much interested in the
upliftment of the African." ^ Sangala had had no
previous personal acquaintance with Tiracke who now
offered his services to the leaders of the new movement
and began to provide them with sympathetic advice and
some funds. He introduced Sangala to the prominent south
African trade unionist, W.G. Ballinger, who began trans¬
mitting tracts and pamphlets on trade union and political
topics. Soon Timcke was helping to correct and draft some
of the many letters which Sangala and others were having
to write; urging Sangala to look carefully at how the
European Convention of Associations functioned; and
assisting Congress leaders in the voicing of African
grievances either to the government or to individuals
abroad, such as Arthur Creech Jones, sincere Afrophile
and founder and president of the Fabian Colonial Bureau
59
in London.In Britain again, Dr. H. Kamuzu Eanda, then
practising medicine at South Shields, was sending letters
58. L.Z. Mumba to I.M. Jere, 27 October 1937, in I.M.
Jere papers. See also Ass.4/13 for speech by C•J.
Matinga, president of the N.A.C., delivered on 23
September 1945 on Timcke's role as "a champion of the
African cause." For some background details on Timcke,
see NSE 1/15/1, W.H. Timcke to D.C., Cholo, 17 April
1939» M.N.A., Zomba.
59. For further details on Timcke aiding Sangala, see 8.1.
Rotberg (Nationalism in Central Africa), op. cit.,
pp.132-6.
of encouragement and advice to Sangala and assisting the
new organization with small hut useful financial contri¬
butions. These contacts with Dr. Banda were to be the
most important external links for the subsequent develop¬
ment of Congress and it would be convenient here to
consider briefly his career and contribution to Nyasaland
politics up to 194-5.
Born around the turn of the century near Kasungu,
in the central region, Banda had left Nyasaland for South
Africa in 1915 after only completing standard three
education at the local Free Church school. Working
initially as an ordinary labourer and later as an inter¬
preter in a compound on the Rand goldfields, he Joined the
African Methodist Episcopal Church in 1922 which, three
years later, sponsored his Journey to the United States
to enable him to further his education. After attending
high school in Ohio, Banda took a degree at the University
of Chicago and qualified as a doctor at the Meharry
Medical College in Tennessee in 1937* The following year
he arrived in Britain "with a view to qualifying for a
British medical diploma, which is essential for regis¬
tration in the United Kingdom and, consequently, in
61
Nyasaland." At his third attempt, Fanda secured the
necessary qualifications in 194-1 but wartime conditions
60. For more detailed biographical information on Dr.
Banda, see R.I. Rotberg (Nationalism in Central Africa),
op. cit., pp.186-9; T. Cullen Young and Hastings
Banda, eds., Our African Way of LIT® (London, 194-6), pp.
26-7; and Edwin S. Munger, "President Kamuzu Banda of
Malawi: Bridgebuilder of Africa," American Universities
Field Staff (Central and Southern Africa Series), "13,
-1 (1%9).
61, C.0.525/177, No.44-034-/8, H.K. Banda to C.O., 29 June
1939, P.R.O., London.
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prevented him from taking up a colonial medical appoint¬
ment in Nyasaland. Instead, he set up a private practice
on Tyneside. Throughout these years Banda kept up a
regular correspondence with many Africans in Nyasaland.
He sent them small sums of money, paid for their subscrip¬
tions to British newspapers, and continuously encouraged
gp
them in their activities. He also kept in close touch
with political developments within the Protectorate and
in 1933, whilst in Britain, submitted a memorandum to the
Bledisloe Commission. In his homeland, his return was
awaited with interest. "We are looking forward with great
expectation to have you as our Aggrey" wrote Mumba in
1939.^ His failure to return did not diminish his
interest in his country's affairs. Banda Joined Congress
from the start though he probably had little direct
influence beyond encouragement on it3 organizational
emergence in 1944.
All of these growing influences and contacts not
only helped to guide and direct the actions of Sangala
and the select committee of the Ny.A.A. but also main¬
tained and perhaps stimulated the new militant spirit
which had been developing 3ince the time of the Bledisloe
62. Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for
year ended 1938, p.60 where it is reported that Chief
wfwase receives the Manchester Guardian Weekly from Dr.
Banda. I am indebted to the Rev. H.M. Phiri of Kasungu,
Malawi, for showing me a number of letters to him
from Dr. Banda during the 1930s and 1940s.
63. L.Z. Mumba to H.K. Banda, 15 February 1939 in I.M.
Jere papers. For a discussion of Dr. Aggrey in alifyasaland context, see George Shepperson, "Nyasaland
and the Millennium," in Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed.,
Millennial Dreams in Action (The Hague,1962), pp.144-5.
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Commission. Persistent European demands for amalgamation,
both in the 1930s and during the war years, had heightened
64
African fears about their future. The high idealism and
intellectual ferment of World War 11, which was to be
found in such documents and pronouncements as the widely-
publicized Atlantic Charter, may also have operated to
provoke among educated Africans a new attitude of
impatience with the rate of political and socio-economic
change in Nyasaland. The new militancy and urgency was
clearly evident at a meeting of the committee of the
Ny.A.A. held in January 1944 to prepare for an interview
with the Anglican Bishop of Nyasaland who had recently
been appointed to represent African interests in the
Legislative Council. Missionaries were roundly condemned
for having done nothing in recent years "to improve our
conditions." They "never bother to suggest how the '
Africans would be relieved from the land shortage"; know
"that the Code doing with the education i3 low but they
still carry on in the same way"; and that they "are
supposed to be the Africans' agents to help checking these
mass emigrations and instead of doing so they decline to
pay the Africans a living wage." No longer could Africans
"trust them" to "be our mouthpiece to the matters which
we suffer oppression" and they wanted "to see their own
64. Nat.12/38, 3.P.C. to C.3., 20 July 1942, enclosure
extract of minutes of the Mianje Native Association
held on 25 April 194-2, M.N.A., Zomba. These minutes
stated that Africans in Nyasaland were "always
alarmed to hear about the proposed amalgamation
question" and that means other than union with
3outhern Rhodesia should be found to develop the
country.
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African chosen (to represent them) who understands the
65
position." ' At the subsequent interview with the Bishop,
which was held in the presence of government officials,
missionaries and unofficial members of the Legislative
Council, Charles Matinga, who had been asked to prepare
a statement, went even further in ventilating African
criticisms of the attitudes and behaviour of missionaries
in recent years. After paying tribute to the work of the
early missionaries whom Africans had looked upon "almost
as their fathers and guardians," he denounced those who
bad arrived during the inter-war period as having
"introduced colour prejudice" and discrimination. Although
they "know how we suffer," they have, Matinga declared,
"never tried to propose any scheme to relieve us from
poverty and diseases." "In fact" he claimed, "any thing
that makes a race progress have been denied us and what
has been done is to tell us to look for things that are
in store in the next world while others so privileged
because of their fair colour are making use of all and
everything in this world." Africans could now not accept
"anything short of an African representative in the
Legislative Council." In a radical departure from
traditional utterances, Matinga even demanded "majority
representation" for Africans in both the central
65* Ass.4/13t Minutes of meeting of the select committee
of the Ny.A.A. held on 21 January 194-4-. See al30 A.C.
Ross, The Origins and Development of the Church of
Scotland'"Mission Blantyre, Kyasaland 1875~1926, Ph.D.
Edinburgh, 1968, p.34-5: "...the new missionaries of
the 1920s and 1930s did become much more out of touch
with African feelings."
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legislature and all other "Boards that affect our welfare
in the country," though it is not clear if he saw this as
an immediate requirement, 'fatinga further called for more
responsible positions in the civil service and in
commercial sectors, salaries equivalent to those "enjoyed
by Europeans," better teachers and "not evangelists," the
right to organize trade unions and the return and resto¬
ration of land taken away from Africans and which
remained undeveloped.^
This vehement tenor of African protest took
government aback. The bitter racial criticisms were
unprecedented. Officials feared that the language of
moderation was in danger of giving way to a new note of
militant radicalism and discussion took place to decide
whether government should reconsider its decision to
permit the movement to continue operating. Congress
leaders were henceforward closely watched and their
meetings carefully investigated. Sangala's mail was
intercepted and scrutinized and police detectives were
assigned to report on the proceedings of any gatherings
he held. Realizing that he was under surveillance and
that the future of the movement was threatened, Sangala
sought to ensure that any anxieties were quickly allayed.
"Whatever we do is above board" he wrote to the Chief
Secretary. "We have the honour" he continued, "to assure
the Government that it will have nothing to fear from us."^
66. Ass.4/13, report of a meeting between Bishop Thorne
and a delegation of the Ny.A.A. held on 23 January 1944.
67. ibid., J.F. Sangala to C.S., 24 February 1944.
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Fortunately for "angala, a number of influential
administrators, whom he had worked for over the years,
declared themselves satisfied that he was not a political
danger and a person liable to foment subversive activity.
As for the new Congress organization, once again, as in
the case of the Native Associations during the 1930s, it
was feared that repression might serve to force the move¬
ment underground. Instead, it was hoped that with the
creation of the proposed provincial councils the widening
of constitutional channels would help to "train" the
educated Africans "the way we want them" and that many of
68
the reasons for forming the Congress would be absolved.
The government had, however, already lost the initiative
to Sangala and his colleagues though the latter had
probably become aware of the need for less radical
articulation of their demands.
after the February 194-4- meeting which approved the
aim and constitution of the Congress, Sangala and others
commenced touring the Protectorate advertizing the N.A.C.
and urging people to unite and support the movement.
Considerable emphasis was placed on gaining the support
of the chiefs as well as the educated elements. In May
194-4, for instance, a large meeting was convened for the
purpose of introducing Congress "to the Native Authorities
and the people of Blantyre and Chiradzulu Districts," at
which it was agreed to support the N.A.C. morally and
63. P.I. Potberg (Nationalism in Central Africa), op. cit.,
pp.191-2.
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financially."^9 similar, though smaller, meetings seem to
have "been held in other districts throughout the country.
Congress leaders had thus begun the onerous task of
erecting the basic apparatus for the growth of a nation¬
wide movement partly through the revival of political
consciousness among the remnants of the inter-war Native
Associations and partly through trying to win the support
of traditional authorities. But few chiefs were present at
the inaugural meeting of Congress which was held in
Blantyre in October 19-4-4-. Nevertheless, delec3ates from
branches from all over Nyasaland were present including
representatives from a few interest groups which had
70
become affiliated to the N.A.C. It was therefore
already a national organization largely representative of
educated Africans and the more prosperous farmers. It had
yet to be seen whether Congress could acquire the backing
of the Native Authorities and the masses.
Levi Mumba was elected the first President-General
of the Nyasaland African Congress. His ability and
reputation continued to be widely recognized. Over two
hundred and fifty Africans heard Mumba deliver his last
69. Ass.4-/13» Minutes of a general meeting of the N.A.C.
held on 20 May 194-4-.
70. There were Congress branches within Nyasaland at
Blantyre, Limbe, Mlanje, Cholo, Zomba, Port Johnston,
Lilongwe, Malimba, Dowa, Dedza, Nkhota-Khota, Mzimba,
and Karonga. There was also a Johannesburg branch in
South Africa. Other delegates represented the *»orabera
Dairies Cooperative Society, the Mlanje Foodstuff
Growers' Association, the Nyasaland Railways Social
and Recreation Association. And there were also
representatives from Native Associations which were
still active at Livingstonia, Likoma Island, Port
Herald and Chiromo.
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major speech before hia sudden death on January 23% 194-5.
He spoke at length, vigorously but with characteristic
moderation. He voiced the demand for African political
representation, declared that Africans desired "full
citizenship" with all the other racial groups and stated
that they wanted "opportunities for all regardless of
race, colour or creed." He protested against discrimination,
condemned schemes of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia,
and urged government to provide better educational
facilities. But the idea of self-government and
independence still remained unuttered. Mumba and the early
71
Congress leaders continued to look to government to
better African conditions. The N.A.C. constitution stated
that the aim of Congress was "To work for unity of the
aborigines of Nyasaland....in order that a well-digested
native opinion may be available and ascertainable by the
Government and other constituted bodies working for the
72
uplift and development of the African people." Only much
later did petition and constitutional protest give way to
a more militant nationalism seeding a new political and
social order.
lor the time being, however, Congress represented
no radical departure from the Native Associations. There
71. C.J. atinga became vice-president general; C.W.
"flanga, secretary-general; J.D. Phiri, assistant
secretary-general; H.R. Tung'ande, second assistant
secretary-general; I.M. Lawrence, treasurer-general;
and H.B. Lallah, assistant treasurer-general. Sangala,
it should be noted, had been transferred to the D.C.'s
office in Pedza in September and was unable to attend
the inaugural meeting of Congress.
72. Nyasaland African Congress; Constitution of the
Organization (Blantyre, 194-4-).
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was continuity in leadership and approach. Although a
territorial movement it did not seek territorial control
and continued to direct its demands to the colonial
authority. Its language was still loyal and its organi¬
zation lacked a mass following. But its ambition was new
and it had assumed a new role of urgency.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Beginnings of the Politics of Mass Nationalism*
The frustrations of early territorial African politics
Two main subjects dominated the deliberations and
efforts of the Nyasaland African Congress during the
first five years of its existence - education and
political representation. A chain of resolutions was
passed and a medley of memoranda dispatched to the
colonial authorities urging them to improve the quality
and scope of African education and also to appoint
Africans to the Legislative Council. Delegations were
arranged to meet the Governor on these two topics and a
deputation was sent to London to place before the
Colonial Office ''our educational needs." Both of these
subjects were crucial elements in any discussion of
African progress and they constituted the key planks in
Congress* broader strategy for social and political
advance.
Congress wanted African education to "be taken over
entirely by the Government" as the mission societies "are
unable to establish adequately staffed and properly
supervised schools owing to lack of sufficient funds."
Reasons were also detailed as to why "our relations with
the Missionaries are not happy ones" and it was conse¬
quently felt that "we can no longer entrust our education
and the future of our country to them." This did not mean,
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a Congress memorandum declared, that Africans did not
"realize the necessity of maintaining Moral Instruction,"
and it was hoped that religious instruction would
continue to be provided in government-controlled schools
"because it gives the pupils a better background in their
character," A further Congress proposal propounded that as
Byasaland was "becoming more westernized," the medium of
instruction in African schools, even at the very lowest
levels, should be in English, finally, in accordance with
the new demand for greater African participation in
boards and councils directly affecting the lives of the
indigenous population, Congress called for majority
African representation on the Advisory Committee on
Education.
As far as direct African political representation
was concerned, N.A.C. leaders hoped that the Governor
would "agree with us that there are many matters
affecting our welfare which, if Government wants to do
Justice, require our explanation and participation in the
Legislative Council." And they proceeded to specify at
length the many matters which needed rectifying,
cataloguing a formidable indictment against the British
and their neglect of African welfare and development.
These were of territorial or national concern to African
interests and welfare and were cited a3 follows:
1. Ass.4-/13» N.A.C. memorandum on education and political
representation submitted to the C.S. for the consid¬
eration of the Governor, 16 May 194-5* M.N.A., Somba.
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"For instance emigration of male African adults
and the breakdown of family life in the
villages; the unbearable poverty among our
people; lack of agricultural development; the
deplorable health and increasing infant
mortality among the African people; the in¬
efficient system of education which has led to
neglect of our girls * education and has kept
the country unprogressive; colour bar and
misunderstandings between Africans and members
of other races in the country; complete lack of
social services among the African people;
failure to introduce a cost of living allowance
for Africans; the welfare of African soldiers;
absence of trading facilities for Africans in
this country; juvenile delinquency; filthy and
congested system of communication in this
country; low wages for African teachers and
labourers; unorganized village settlement among
the African people; the prison system of the
country, etc.,"
Since it regarded itself as a body representing all
African associations in the country, the N.A.C. wanted to
"nominate four members and submit the names to Your
Excellency for their appointment and Your Excellency
should appoint two members from the panel of chiefs so
that there shall be six African representatives on the
2
Council."™ This proposal, if accepted, would have made
the number of Africans in the legislature equal to the
number of European unofficials, one of whom was the
missionary representative.
The colonial government gave careful consideration
to Congress demands on both of these subjects. The
immediate acceptance of the proposal that responsibility
for African education should be assumed by government was
deemed impracticable for financial reasons. On the other
issue, Congress was informed that the Governor would soon
set up a Protectorate Council (composed of representatives
2. ibid..
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from the recently-created Provincial Councils in which
chiefs comprised the majority of members) from which he
would attempt to find a suitable candidate to serve on
the Legislative Council.^ The N.A.C. was dissatisfied
with these responses and at its second annual conference
in 194-5 called for the appointment of a Royal Commission
IL
to enquire into African education. Even when this
suggestion was also rejected, Congress leaders remained
undismayed. In the following year, the annual conference
decided to appeal to Nyasas throughout the Protectorate
and abroad to subscribe money to send a deputation to
Britain "to bring to the notice of the British Parlia¬
ment... this state of African education in Nyasaland."^
Before leaving for London, the Congress President, C.J.
Matinga, led a delegation to the Governor to discuss with
him a statement of the matters which the N.A.C. intended
to raise in England. Together with the Director of
Education, the Governor was able to revise some of the
Congress arguments, mainly on financial grounds, but they
were unable to deal satisfactorily with a number of other
g
matters raised in the educational memorandum. Congress
therefore went ahead with the sending of two delegates to
London. Here they were Joined by Dr. H.K. Banda, who had
3. ibid., C.S. to N.A.C., 15 November 194-5.
4. ibid., Minutes of annual conference of N.A.C., 16 and
19 (October 1945.
5. ibid., Minutes of annual conference of N.A.C., 23-6
September 1946.
6. ibid., Record of meeting between the Acting Governor
and deputation of N.A.C., 24 September 1947.
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in 194-5 been appointed the official Congress represen¬
tative in London, and together they interviewed the
Secretary of State.
Congress leaders also criticized the new official
provisions for the appointment of Africans to the
Legislative Council especially as the N.A.C. would not be
directly involved in their selection. It thus asked Dr.
Banda to draw the "attention of the Secretary of 3tate...
7
of this discrepancy." ' Banda, whom members of the
Congress executive committee commended in 1946 for his
"encouragement and his concrete advices," continued
actively to promote the Nyasa cause in Britain. He made
contact with and lobbied several Members of Parliament
who raised questions about Nyasaland in the House of
Commons, and he was constantly in touch with and assisted
by the Fabian Colonial Bureau. He further prepared a
memorandum covering matters discussed at the 1945 annual
conference of Congress and submitted it to the Secretary
Q
of State. At the 3ame time, Banda continued to correspond
regularly with leading Congress officials and donated
small sums of money not only to the N.A.C. but to other
institutions of African development such as the Blantyre
Night School. For instance, he provided C.C. Chinula, Vice
President of Congress, with some financial assistance to
run his independent African schools and also paid for him
to become a member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau and
7. ibid., Minutes of executive committee conference of the
!HT7C., 20 April 1946.
8. ibid., Minutes of annual conference of N.A.C., 23-6
September 1946.
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receive its publications. "I want you and other Congress
leaders" wrote Banda, "to know what goes on outside
Nyasaland. Such publications as the Reap ire and others,
Q
keep you in touch with the outside world." 7
But the bulk of Congress agitation proved fruit¬
less. Although the government recognized the N.A.C. and
agreed to consider its viewpoints, it did little to
placate general Congress anxiety about African welfare
and development and introduce the social and political
reforms that were being demanded. The influence of
Congress upon government policy was negligible. Indeed,
the government felt that Congress1 aim was "to make
political capital for their own organization rather than
to bring constructive criticism to bear on the problems
10
to which they have turned their attention." Dismay
with the pace of change led to a certain disillusionment
in the N.A.C. by 1949, especially after the initial
flush of enthusiasm. In fact, only five years after its
inception, Congress had become a far cry from its
original confident and zealous self.
Governmental insistence that native policy should
continue to rest primarily on the Protectorate's
9. H.K. Banda to C.C. Chinula, 5 March 1947, C.C. Chinula
apers. At the executive committee meeting of the
• A •(/., 8-9 April 1950, J.F. Sangala, the provisional
president, thanked Dr. Banda "not only for sending
donations to Congress and the Blantyre African Night
School, but because of his frequent correspondence
giving Congress full cooperation." Minutes of this
meeting are contained in the Nyasaland Times, 1 May
1950, p.2.
10. Ass.4/13, Acting Governor Brown to C.O., 10 May 194-7
and C.O. to Brown, 10 July 194-7* M.N.A., Zoraba.
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indigenous institutions was partly instrumental in
retarding the early development of the N.A.C. as the
major forum for the expression of African views. The
formation of Congress had quickly provoked the government
into establishing its own large-scale structures for
African opinion. By the end of 1944, Provincial Councils
had been set up and, two years later, the Protectorate
Council held its first meeting. Members of these Councils
consisted of representatives from the Native Authorities,
who ?/ere in a majority, and also some commoners, most of
whom were Congress supporters. It was clear that the
government was thus beginning to see the need to widen
the basi3 of political participation, particularly for
the articulate new elite, but it continued to insist on
the chiefs constituting a majority of members in its new
constitutional channels for the expression of African
opinion. The Protectorate and Provincial Councils
possessed purely advisory roles and were not expected to
interfere with the actual working of Native Authorities.
Because of their semi-official character, as a result of
government influence in their proceedings, Congress
leaders regarded the Councils as ineffective instruments
for the representation of African views. Congress leaders
considered that the Councils were in no position to
prosecute the African case forcefully as they considered
necessary. Nevertheless, their creation provided an
alternative forum to the N.A.C. and may have diverted
energy which might otherwise have gone into the activities
of Congress. The Congress President, Charles Matinga, also
308 -
believed that the progress of the N.A.C. had been hindered
by the formation of these Councils with their official
status as they had "acted as a check on the part of the
Chiefs (as leaders of the people) not to co-operate with
the masses" and not to support "our movement." And he
further felt that district officers were in some places
"dividing the opinions of the people by encouraging Chiefs
11
to misapprehend the schemes of our local branches."
Through the creation of its new Councils and through the
actions of its officials, the colonial government was
still determined not to encourage the new African elite
to claim rights as spokesmen for the mass of the people.
But the most important factors which precipitated
the decline of Congress were of an internal nature and
revolved particularly round its leadership. A severe blow
had struck the Congress executive from the start. Tithin
a few months of its inaugural meeting, it had lost the
services of both its leading and experienced officers -
Levi Mumba and Isa M. Lawrence, President and Treasurer
respectively, "ithin eighteen months, Congress had also
lost the services of W.H. Timcke when he was drowned in
the M.V. Vipya disaster on Lake Nyasa. Forthwith, the
N.A.C. came to be characterized by weak and inefficient
leadership. C.J. Matinga and H. Tung*ande, who had
respectively replaced "lumba and Lawrence, were in 194-8
forced to resign from their offices, one for embezzlement
of Congress funds, the other for sheer ineptitude. In the
11. ibid., Presidential address to annual conference of
I757C., 22-5 September 194-7.
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same year, Matinga was also found to have conspired to
prevent the Vice-President of Congress, the Rev. C.C.
Chinula, from taking his rightful place on the
educational deputation to London, an action which dis¬
credited the movement even further. Some of Matinga's
shortcomings may now he looked at briefly.
In early 194-8, Matinga was reported to be in
serious financial distress, being in debt to the sum of
at least &150. Writing confidentially about this, the
Congress Secretary stated that Matinga "has a High Court
Judgement, heavy various bills apart from the maintenance
12
of his foreign wife, etc.," To make the trip to London
as a member of the educational deputation, Matinga was
granted leave from his civil service post but without any
pay. The N.A.C. decided to grant him a disturbance
allowance but Matinga appears to have asked also for
Congress to indemnify him from court action regarding his
debts before he agreed to proceed to London. He seem3 to
have held the view that his hard work for the movement
and the expenses he had personally incurred on its
business Justified the organization helping him in his
13
present moment of need. Congress, however, was in no
financial position to help him and Matinga seems to have
been very desirous of going to England. Shortly before
12. A.J. Mponda, Secretary-General, to C.C. Chinula, Vice-
President General, 7 April 1948, C.C. Chinula papers.
13. A.C.S. to A.J. Mponda, 19 March 1948; Mponda to
Chinula, 7 April 1948; and C.J. Matinga to Mponda,
5 April 1948, all in C.C. Chinula papers.
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his departure for London, therefore, he appropriated 1162
from the educational appeal fund. A3 to why Matinga took
the Congress Secretary, A.J. Mponda, with him to England
even though C.C. Chinula, the appointed delegate, followed
them both to Cape Town and attempted to make them change
their minds, i3 more difficult to explain. Arguments of
tribalism have been put forward aa both Matinga and Mponda
were fellow Yao as well as being close friends. It is
also possible that Matinga may have taken some of the
educational funds with the knowledge of Mponda whom he
rewarded with a trip to London. Whatever the reason,
Chinula wrote subsequently in a manner which conveyed
some of the tragedy of the whole case: "After much hard¬
ship, I reached Cape Town on 23«4.48. I was at the docks
early at 6a.m. on the 24.4.4-8. The Bwanas reached the
docks at 11 o'clock. They found me waiting for them, and
without telling me they were to leave me again, and
without supplying me with a half-penny even - and worst
of all - without bidding me good-bye - they left for
14
London." These events rocked the Congress for a while
especially as they involved three leading officers of the
15
movement.
Coupled with a weak and occasionally corrupt
leadership was a loose federal political organization
whereby Congress branches enjoyed complete autonomy
14. Chinula to J.F. Sangala, Acting Secretary-General,
31 August 1948, C.C. Chinula papers.
15. For a more detailed account of these events, see
Minutes of a Central Body Advisory Committee meeting
of the K.A.C. held on 27 June 1948, C.C. Chinula
papers.
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without any effective attempt by central leaders to hold
them together under a nationally-directed policy. The
N.A.C. had officers and an executive committee chosen by
its branches at an annual conference but co-ordination
between the centre and the branches remained weak. Since
most of the N.A.C.'s income was raised locally, the
absence of effective financial arrangements encouraged
opportunities for misappropriation of funds by officials
at all levels. Yet when Dr. Banda suggested in 194-6 that
Congress monies be centralized, "kept in one bag," and
local branches not be permitted to determine their own
financial affairs, the executive committee remained
unimpressed. When Dr. Banda, again, volunteered to pay
the salary of a full-time organizing officer, Congress
16
defeated the proposal. Banda had realized another
weakness of the movement; it lacked paid officers on a
full-time basis. But the need for professional efficiency
and organization were still not appreciated by Congress.
Failure to recognize their importance constituted a major
source of weakness of the N.A.C. and contributed to the
Matinga crises of 194-8. More importantly, it reflected
Congress' approach to political change which was proving
16. Ass.4/13, Minutes of executive committee conference of
N.A.C., 20 April 1946 and Minutes of annual conference
of N.A.C., 23-6 September 1946. See also Robert I.
Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa
(Cambridge^ Massachusetts,1965), pp.177-9. Rotberg is
not correct in assuming that Congress agreed to Dr.
Banda's first proposal. In fact, it was defeated by
15 votes to 8. With regard to his second proposal, a
sub-committee of the Congress recommended that the
Secretary-General be paid an annual salary of ls60 plus
h3 house allowance. This was defeated by 24 votes to 3
by delegates at a general meeting. Instead, a request
was made to Banda to buy a typewriter and provide a
sum of fe18 per annum for the salary of the Secretary-
General and his assistants.
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ineffective in achieving any significant reforms.
Little interest seems to have been shown by the
Congress leadership in 3uch prosaic matters as organi¬
zation. Up to 1951» Cpngress minutes record only two
occasions when administrative organization was debated
and both of these were the result of Dr. Danda'3 afore¬
mentioned proposals. It is clear from this attitude that
Congress leaders did not appreciate the extent of the
African struggle to obtain social and political reforms.
In terms of method and strategy, the N.A.C. continued to
be reminiscent of the Native Associations operating
within the colonial frame of reference and continuing to
direct its demands to the colonial government. Congress
believed that patient and constant pressure on government
through the passage of resolutions and the dispatch of
memorials and petitions would ultimately induce it to
grant Africans their rights and lead to increasing
African acceptance into the modern world. Such a gradualist
approach invoked no need to reorganize Congress on a
different basis. There was no appreciation of the need to
build up a popular movement and adopt a militant and
uncompromising approach to political change. This was
clearly illustrated in the negative reaction of Congress
to a letter which it received from a retired European
administrative officer, C.A. Cardew, who outlined ways in
which the movement could become more popularly based and
more efficiently organized.
"Congress needs a monthly paper to disseminate
information," recommended Cardew, particularly as Africans
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"in the outlying parts of Nyasaland know nothing of
Congress." He also proposed the construction of official
buildings as they "will lend dignity to your organization
....inspire confidence and increase efficiency. The people
will then take a pride in their Congress." Cardew further
suggested the payment of adequate salaries to office¬
holders, clerks and assistants "so that they may give
their whole time and attention to their work." Furthermore,
"Paid agents should be stationed in the various Districts
and should travel about...and should instruct and
17
encourage the people to do their duty by Congress." '
Copies of this letter were circulated to members of the
executive committee but no formal discussion seems to
have taken place on its contents. Even Cardew'3 detailed
suggestions as to how greater funds could be raised to
finance Congress operations evoked no comment or dis¬
cussion, although the N.A.C.'s financial position was
rather precarious. Only during the 1950s, after constant
failure to achieve significant reforms, did petition and
constitutional protest give way to a more militant
nationalism in seeking to forward African progress
through organized African strength on a mass scale.
Hy 1949» Congress had a broken political leader¬
ship, an essentially unorganized collection of branches
and affiliated societies, and an atmosphere of dismay and
disillusionment pervading it consequent upon its
ineffectiveness to achieve significant change. In early
17* C.A. Cardew to the Secretary-General, N.A.C., 22
January 1947, C.C. Chinula papers.
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1948, it was also reported that "the Central Body is at
present insolvent and only lives on the Education
18
Deputation Fund.'1 Had it not been for the 1200 legacy
that W.H. Timcke left to Congress becoming available in
mid-1948, it is suggested that the movement would have
probably collapsed. Yet the N.A.C. had begun to obtain
support from a very wide area both within Nyasaland and
abroad. Branches had been opened in most of the districts
throughout the Protectorate and a number of other
economic and social groups were affiliated to it. Support
was also coming from Congress branches which JTyasa
migrant workers had started up in neighbouring countries.
All this indicated that there were many people outside of
headquarters who saw the need for a national-wide
African organization and wanted to see Congress continue
functioning. Although Congress did not command a mass
following, it was clear that many of its branches were
beginning to expand while some were becoming more militant
as a result of growing mass discontent, we shall examine
the main sources of mass discontent in some detail
subsequently but it is important to note here briefly
that there was developing a hostility towards the
European which was to become sufficiently general by the
early 1950s to provide Congress with large-scale support.
There had been little open hostility to Nyasaland's
participation in the second World War. Africans had
affirmed their loyalty and many thousands had enlisted
18. A.J. ¥ponda to C.C. Chinula, 7 April 1948, C.C.
Chinula papers.
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for service. Nobody bad attempted to exploit Britain's
position to secure political concessions. Moreover,
despite the pessimistic prognostications of some officials,
the ex-servicemen did not come to constitute a politically
restless element in post-war African society. Thousands
of Africans, many of whom had fought outside Africa,
flooded back to Nyasaland during the years of demobili¬
zation from 1944 to 1946. For Kenya, Rosberg and
Nottingham have argued that the wartime involvement and
experiences of large numbers of Africans were of great
importance in the development of post-war mass political
19
activities. In Nyasaland and a number of other African
territories, the government was largely successful in re¬
introducing soldiers into their homes and families and
the ex-serviceman did not become an important political
90
factor." Nevertheless, under the surface, many things
were beginning to happen in Nyasaland during the 1940s
which were to sharpen the conflict of black and white.
There was, in the first place, a simmering African dis¬
content in many areas provoked not only by such things as
land shortage but also by government neglect of the rural
areas. The formidable Congress indictment cited at the
beginning of this chapter represented a growing mood of
popular dissatisfaction with lack of welfare and social
19* See, for example, Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John
Nottingham, The "yth of *Mau Mau' (New York,1966), pp.
191-5.
20. For a comparative study, containing some useful in¬
sights for the Nyasaland situation, see Eugene P.
Schleh, "The Post-"ar Careers of Ex-Servicenien in
Ghana and Uganda," Journal of Modern African Studies,
6,2 (1968), pp.203-22^
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services. Personal experience by thousands of Africans,
as migrant workers, of the contrast between their un¬
developed country and those south of the Zambezi,
together with the wartime experiences of large numbers
outside Africa, was leading to mounting pressures on the
government for greater services and opportunities. But of
greater importance for the political emergence of the
masses were a series of further factors which were to
become prominent in the early 1950s. Yet,already,
advocation of schemes of amalgamation and talk of Euro¬
pean settlement and further land alienation had aroused
deep African fears and hostility, while the enforcement
of unpopular agricultural legislation was leading to
unrest in the rural areas. It was these various issues
which were to create widespread African discontent by the
early 1950s and which were to provide the opportunities
for the development of a mass nationalist movement.
The subsequent rise of the rural masses was to
give depth to the demands of Congress leaders, who were
then beginning to challenge the legitimacy of the
colonial state, and enable the national appeal to strike
home along a broad front. By continuing to remain in
existence, the N.A.C. ensured that the framework for
national integration was available when the drive to
acquire national power began.
The imposition of the Central African Federation
Federation was a key issue in uniting Africans as
a whole in Nyasaland and providing the N.A.C. with a
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significant cause to obtain a mass following. "For years
Africans in the Protectorate had been implacably opposed
to any political ties with countries to the south. They
distrusted partnership with the Europeans and disliked
schemes of union which involved Southern Rhodesia. Chiefs,
very few of whom had been supporters of the N.A.C. before
19^9» now came to join with the new political leaders in
presenting a united African front to attempts to form a
federated Central Africa. Traditional authorities feared
loss of power and prestige because of the direct rule
policies which, they believed, were pursued in Southern
Rhodesia. Together with the educated elements in Congress,
they saw African hopes of eventual self-government and
control of their affairs being threatened by white domi¬
nation. Thousands of ordinary Africans, too, regarded
federation with hostility. Eor over forty years, Nyasas
had been migrating to Southern Rhodesia in search of work
and as a result of the harsher treatment being meted out
to Africans there had come to develop a greater regard
for their own homeland. Experience of European-controlled
territories south of the Zambezi had made Nyasas deter¬
mined not to permit the extension of such settler-oriented
situations to their own country with their resulting
discriminations, insults and tensions. Between 194-8 and
1953, the campaign for a Central African Union was
resumed with greater determination by whites in the two
Rhodesias and their supporters. Now the struggle was
waged under the new banner of federation which many
believed was the only possibility with any chance of
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securing the backing of the British Government; the
previous formula of amalgamation was not acceptable
because it would not provide sufficient safeguards for
African rights and interests. Africans also now intensi¬
fied their opposition and Joined the political battle.
Discussion of the events leading up to the for¬
mation of the Central African Federation readily available
21
elsewhere, still merits some detailed attention here.
"Under existing circumstances," which referred to the
divergent native policies north and south of the Zambezi,
the British Government had in 194-4- concluded that
22
amalgamation was not then "practicable." Yet at the
same time it had proposed the creation of an inter-
territorial council to facilitate co-operation between
the three Central African governments on matters of
common concern without, of course, compromising the
British Governments own special responsibilities in the
two northern protectorates. The new Central African
Council was an advisory body which did not involve the
three territorial governments giving up any of their
powers to it. Nonetheless, it proved quite successful in
promoting co-operative programmes, ranging from agric¬
ulture to air services, and gave lie to the argument that
21. R.I. Rotberg, op. cit., Chap.9; Colin Leys and Cranford
Pratt, eds., A New Deal in Central Africa (London,1960),
Parts 1-2; and J1. Gus Liebenow and Robert I. Rotberg,
"Federalism in Rhodesia and Nyasaland," in W.S.
Livingstone, ed., Federalism in the Commonwealth: A
Bibliographical Commentary CLondon,1963PP.195-222.
22. Quoted in A.J. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias and
Nyasaland (London,1960), p.243.
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political union was essential for closer and more
effective economic and administrative development in the
three territories. But despite a brief period of
enthusiasm at the beginning, the white politicians of
Southern Rhodesia remained dissatisfied with the Council.
They were concerned about it becoming a substitute for
amalgamation and only viewed it as a step in that
direction.
The new post-war Labour Government in Britain,
however, was adamant in its refusal to countenance out¬
right amalgamation though it appears that it was not
averse to any proposals for federation which might be
forthcoming. It was willing to consider any system which
provided the benefits of economic interdependence with
the protection of African rights. By 1943, white settler
politicians in the two Rhodesias had come to accept a
federal solution as the more convenient though limited
aim. Some more acceptable formula for closer association
had to be found if white supremacy in Central Africa was
to be maintained. The threat of advancing African
nationalism in the continent and the existence of a
British Government which was more amenable to nationalist
demands, brought whites in Central Africa together to
search for ways of maintaining their power and influence.
Union with South Africa was not seriously considered
because of that country's Afrikaner culture and control.
But federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was
desirable, the more so on economic grounds. Southern
Rhodesia was short of development funds which could be
- 320 -
obtained from the expanding Northern Rhodesian copper
revenues while Nyasaland could provide the necessary-
labour which might otherwise be attracted to the Rand
mines. On the other hand, Northern Rhodesia, with its
still very small European population, saw closer
political ties with its internally self-governing
neighbour as a means of acquiring greater political
control for its white settlers. Poor and undeveloped,
Nyasaland was usually peripheral to any serious discuss¬
ions of Central African unity. Nevertheless, white
settlers in the Protectorate also held a deep distrust of
the colonial policy of the Labour Government and on a
number of occasions approved, in principle, the idea of
federation and a "Greater African Dominion." Although some
doubts were expressed about the immediate creation of a
federal state, it seems that the racial and political
reasons for joining with the Rhodesias were beginning to
outweigh any initial economic disadvantages that Europeans
23
in Nyasaland would suffer from such a wider union. ^
In the Colonial Office, too, the need for some
federal scheme for the three Central African territories
was gaining ground in the late 1940s. A single large
state could attract greater capital and more successfully
implement the necessary development programmes without
such heavy reliance on the British taxpayer. In late 1948,
Roy Welensky (later Sir Roy), leading unofficial member
in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, and Sir
23. The Nyasaland Times, 23 February 1948, p.4, and 28
April ^949» p.7.
Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern), the Prime Minister
of Southern Rhodesia, were encouraged to take the
initiative in producing a solution.
The result was an unofficial conference of white
leaders from the three territories held at Victoria Falls
in early 194-9. Agreement was reached upon a federal
solution for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland which would, it
was hoped, preserve white control but no detailed scheme
25
was formulated. ^ Alarmed at the reports of the secret
discussions at this conference, Africans in the two
protectorates and those abroad commenced to ventilate
their condemnation of any scheme which involved closer
ties between their countries and Southern Rhodesia. For
them amalgamation and federation were the same; both
would subordinate their own interests to those of the
white settlers. Federation, wrote Dr. Banda in a memo¬
randum to the Colonial Office, was the "thin end of the
wedge of amalgamation" - the "same old pill of amalga¬
mation coated with the sugar of federation to make it
easier for the Africans and the Imperial Government to
swallow." In Nyasaland itself, Congress leaders, chiefs
and members of other groups also protested vociferously
24. L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days
to 1953 (London,4964), p.404.
25. R.I. Rotberg, 0£. cit., pp.220-3» and the Nyasaland
Times, 21 February "194-9, p.1 for details of con¬
ference and views of Nyasaland's three white delegates.
26. Memorandum by Hastings K. Banda and Harry Nkumbula
entitled Federation in Central Africa dated 1 May 1949.
This was published privately as a booklet in February
1951.
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against any political bonds with white-dominated Southern
Rhodesia, reiterating their contention that Africans
would thus be subject to new forms of indignity and dis¬
ability and that federation was a device to perpetuate
and rivet white control in Central Africa.
In spite of the intensification of African
opposition, officials in Britain seem to have been more
concerned about a threat by Southern Rhodesia in 1950 to
leave the Central African Council if some decisive move
was not made to forward federation. A new Labour Colonial
Secretary, James Griffiths, called for a fresh examination
of the federal question. An exploratory conference of
civil servants of the four governments concerned met in
London in 1951 and produced a report which agreed upon
the need for some form of closer association of Central
Africa. It was felt that a federation would prevent the
spread of South African racial policies into the Rhodesias
and also provide a rational foundation for greater
economic development. More controversially, they minimized
the differences in existing native policies of the three
territories, concluding that whatever divergences still
existed need no longer stand in the way of closer
association. Provided, however, that adequate safeguards
for African interests were devised, the officials thought
that Africans might well come to realize the substantial
27
advantages of federation. ' At another Victoria Palls
conference in September 1951* white settlers and govern¬
ment officials from the three territories met with
27. See Cmd. 8235, 8234-, and 8235 (1951).
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African representatives and the Secretaries of State for
the Colonies and the Commonwealth in an attempt to produce
a workable federal scheme on the basis of the London
conference recommendations. Perhaps for the first time,
the British politicians were made clearly aware, both at
this meeting and on their tours of the protectorates, of
the extent and force of African opposition to federation.
At the conference, agreement was arrived at on the
principle of federation with the exception of the African
representatives. But it was also evident that the Labour
politicians now appreciated the overwhelming African
concern and wished to ensure that African suspicions were
allayed and African rights and interests securely
pQ
protected before any federal scheme was adopted.
The October 195*1 general election in Britain
altered the situation dramatically. The new Conservative
Government announced its support for federation and
declared that it was convinced that an urgent need existed
for it. African hostility was acknowledged but it was felt
that the advantages of federation would outweigh its
29
possible disadvantages for Africans. 7 Despite continuing
African protests, the British Government arranged for
talks at Lancaster House in April 1952 to press ahead with
closer association. Africans from the northern protecto¬
rates boycotted the conference. Nevertheless, a draft
federal scheme was prepared; the British Government
28. James Griffiths, Pages From Memory (London,1969)« PP.
112-119.
29. Cmd. 3411 (1951).
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30
appeared determined to go ahead with federation.
African opposition in Central Africa grew more vociferous.
Upto 1952, District Commissioners had "been instructed to
maintain an attitude of strict neutrality regarding the
question of federation and to refrain from making any
opinion as to its merits and disadvantages. Now, suddenly,
administrative officers began freely offering their
advice and urging Africans to accept federation. The
Nyasaland Government published a pro-federation booklet
in the vernacular languages and its information news-
sheets carried articles stressing the economic benefits
for Africans of a federated Central Africa. All this,
however, made federation even more suspect among Africans.
A delegation of chiefs from the three provinces toured
Britain and attempted to petition the Queen. On the
advice of the Conservative Government, the Queen declined
to see them. Liberals in Britain also voiced their
protest. But federation was virtually a fait accompli.
The Imperial Government viewed federation as a
great opportunity to build a multi-racial state in
Central Africa and believed that it would also promote
rapid economic development in the area. It discounted
African fears of white political control being consoli¬
dated on the grounds that African rights would be pre¬
served. In the final scheme, safeguards for Africans were
contained which ensured the maintenance of protectorate
status in the northern territories, excluded matters
30. Cmd. 8753 (1952).
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directly affecting Africans from federal purview so that
they remained a territorial responsibility, and estab¬
lished an African Affairs Board with certain powers to
refer discriminatory legislation to the Secretary of
State. The final inter-governmental meeting took place in
London in January 1953. Once again Africans boycotted the
•51
talks.J In June, Parliament approved the federal scheme.
Motions approving the scheme were also passed in the
Legislative Councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasalaad
and a predominantly white electorate accepted the pro¬
posals in a referendum in Southern Rhodesia, In September
1953» the Federal Constitution came into being.
Land and African discontent
The issue of federation touched a most sensitive
fear on the part of Africans in Nyasaland - the fear of
losing their land. It was fear that closer association
would result in the loss of tribal land to Europeans - a
view widely shared by Africans - that made this the most
emotional reason for African opposition to federation.
Thousands of lyasas had lived and worked in Southern
Rhodesia and knew that land alienation had gone much
further there than in their own country. But this fear of
large-scale land alienation not only alarmed Africans but
exacerbated already deep African discontent regarding
land in Nyasaland.
31. Cmd. 8753 and 3754 (1953).
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In his lengthy and important report on land
matters in Nyasaland, Sir Sidney Abrahams stated in 194-6
that the land issue was "more urgent today." The "problem"
he declared, had been "intensified by very much greater
pressure on the land" and had been "exposed in its
seriousness by the failure of the Legislature to settle
the differences between estate owners and resident
natives." What was more, "native grievances in respect
of land and the people on it are receiving form, direction
and force from organized bodies comprised of the more
intelligent members of their community." Seven years
later, serious riots broke out in several districts in
the southern region over land and allied questions. Local
Congress members were accused of "inciting and fomenting
XX
the disturbances," ^ which coincided with the imposition
of the Federal Constitution. African land grievances
were a fundamental source of mass discontent and provided
the N.A.C. with a significant issue to acquire widespread
support. It is therefore important to trace the develop¬
ment of these land grievances and to discuss the role of
Congress in lending support to the agitated rural masses
in order to understand the growth of a mass nationalist
34
movement in Nyasaland during the 1950s.
32. Land Commission 1946, Vol.1, Report by Sir Sidney
Abrahams (Zomba, 194-7), p.7.
33. Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners 1953
(Zomba,19p41, p.3.
34. For earlier accounts of land problems in Nyasaland,
see land Commission 1946, op. cit., ; Philip Mason,
"Land Policy" in Richard Gray,TKe Two Nations
(London,1960), pp.72-34; and B.3. Krishnamurthy, Land
and Labour in Nyasaland 1391-1914, Ph.D. London, 1964,
Epilogue, pp.343-353.
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The Commission which enquired into the Chilembwe
"Rising of 1915 had noted that African land grievances had
been one element behind the rebellion and it had
recommended the taking of action by the government "to
regulate the position of native tenants on European
estates." But neither the Rising nor the wider public
interest that was aroused in the land and allied labour
questions appears to have had any important influence on
35
the policy of the government. Immediately after the
1914-18 War, a considerable number of European settlers
entered the Protectorate attracted by the boom in prices
of cotton and tobacco, and the number of planters was soon
more than double what it had been at the end of the war.
Whereas in March 1919 the amount of land held under Crown
lease had been 13,753 acres, by March 1921 it had risen to
36
118,504 acres. Further alienation of land to white
settlers appeared likely when the 1921 Land Commission
reported that there was a surplus of 2.7 million acres of
land in the Protectorate of which 700,000 acres was con¬
sidered suitable for European settlement even after
providing for African needs for the next thirty years.
Philanthropists were alarmed by these trends in policy.
African anxiety over the question of their tenure was
noted by the Ormsby-Gore Commission of 1925 which saw the
35* George Ghepperson and Thomas Price, Independent
African (Edinburgh,1953), pp.392-6.
36. Report of a Commission to Enquire into and Report upon
(Certain Matters connected with the Occupation of Land
in the Nyasaland Protectorate, 1C532 (Zomba,1921), p.
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urgent need for a clear definition of African land
37
rights. ' But the 1921 Land Commission had been opposed
to the creation of specific reserves for Africans. As a
result, in the absence of any effective alternative
arrangement, alienation of land to Europeans continued,
creating greater insecurity and uneasiness in African
minds. Governor Thomas may have claimed in 1930 that
there was "little apprehension in the mind of the native
as to his future security on his land," and reported that
a number of areas had been proclaimed as set aside for
33
African U3e; but continuing alienation to Europeans
combined with a governmental policy of ascertaining ?/hat
land was available for alienation to non-Africans ensured
that deep African fears remained in existence.
In 1933, to coincide with a new era of official
indirect rule, it was decided that Native Authorities
should be given a more direct interest in land. Based on
the recommendations of the Ormsby-Gore Commission, a new
policy was announced whereby land which had not yet been
alienated would be vested in the Secretary of state, to
be administered by the Governor subject to the former's
approval, "for the use or common benefit, direct or
indirect, of the natives of the Protectorate." But this
new policy, embodied in the Nyasaland Protectorate (Native
Trust Land) Order-in-Council of 1936, did not entail any
37. Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387 (1925),
v$W.
38. C.0.525/136, No.33513, S.W. Thomas to C.O., 13
November 1930, P.R.O., London.
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significant departure from previous land policy. The
Governor, Sir Hubert Young, hoped to see the emergence of
a "mixed state," where reserves on the basis of race were
objectionable but where enough land would be held for the
benefit of Africans without excluding alienation to
European settlers. The procedure introduced was one which
"while giving the natives a direct interest in the land
ensures that they can neither dispose of it against their
own interests nor stand in the way of it being disposed
of to their own real advantage." The "development of the
agricultural and mineral resources of the Protectorate by
non-natives" Young declared, "is in the interest of the
natives themselves," and it was therefore clear that
xq
alienation to Europeans would not be abandoned. y
The 1936 Order-in-Council offered no solution for
the land shortage that had become acute in the Shire
Highlands. By 194-6, 87*25 per cent, of land in Nyasaland
was Native Trust Land and only 5*1 per cent, was held in
freehold, the remainder being forest reserves, townships
and leasehold Crown land. Yet although the area of land
held in freehold had thus been reduced from the original
40
fifteen per cent, of the whole of the Protectorate, a
large number of Africans, approximately 200,000 or ten
per cent, of the African population, still resided on
these private estates which were predominantly based in
the 3hire Highlands, the most crowded part of Nyasaland.
39* 0.0.525/148, Ho.5342, H. Young to C.O., 3 February
1933, P.R.O., London.
40. This reduction was achieved through renunciations
especially the three million acres in the North Nyasa
district by the British Couth Africa Company in 1936.
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And it was on these estates that conditions for African
tenants were becoming intolerable.
As a result of recommendations of the Commission
which enquired into the Chilembwe Rising and because of
certain abuses brought to light by the investigation, an
Ordinance was promulgated in 1917 which forbade FAiropean
landholders from requiring labour instead of rent from
Africans and laid down that they pay the wages of em¬
ployees in cash and not in kind. But the landowners wanted
labour and not rent. In practice, tenants were charged
rent and their tenure depended upon their working for the
landowner. If they failed to perform labour services they
were ordered off the land. And as there was practically no
Crown land in the Ahire Highlands to which Africans could
move, they were consequently forced to accede to the ex¬
actions of the landlord. The provisions of the 1917
Ordinance were ignored and the basic position of Africans
41
on the estates remained as before. The situation was
made even worse after the first 'orld far with the advent
of more white settlers. Private estates were divided up
and transferred to new settlers by existing owners. The
calls on tenants for labour therefore became heavier and
often six months work was demanded during the year. The
new white landlords also did not always wish to retain
people on their newly-acquired land and Africans were
either moved elsewhere onto the estate or evicted.
According to Governor Bowring in 1924, this new situation
41. Land in the Hyasaland Protectorate (1921)* op. cit..
pp.15-14.
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had led to "the creation of a homeless, wandering and
disaffected class" as a result of their being evicted
from private estates either for refusing to render the
required labour services to landholders or for being
42
resident on land which was now being developed. Three
years later, the Acting Governor reported "A feeling of
insecurity which had rarely existed formerly, became
43
fairly general" and Bowrlng also had recorded "that the
insecurity of tenure to which they are subjected is
keenly felt by the natives concerned and I fear that it is
a position which is liable to cause trouble if it is
allowed to drift."
In the meantime, the rapid growth in population,
the result of both natural increase and large Lomwe
immigration, added considerably to the congestion in the
Shire Highlands. By 1945 the Lomwe were estimated to
number 373»000 while the total population of the whole
southern region was 916,000. In the Mlanje and Oholo
districts, where most of the Lomwe were concentrated, they
numbered 230,000 out of a total of 329,000. The density
of population of the ihire Highlands had by 1945 increased
to over 150 to the square mile. The Oholo district, of
which two-thirds was included in private estates, had the
highest density with 192 to the square mile. 4s population
pressure became greater, the landholders became
42. G.0.525/107, Bowring to C.O., 14 May 1924, P.R.O.,
London. See also NSE 2/1/1, Annual reports on Cholo
district for years 1923-5, M.N.A., Zomba.
43• C.O.525/119, Sankine to C.O., 23 February 1927,
enclosure memorandum on natives on private estates in
Nyasaland, P.R.O., London.
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increasingly more assertive in the protection of their
property rights. Some of the ways in which they asserted
themselves conflicted with African customs. A son was not
allowed to remain with his family when he came of age
unless he had the permission of the landholder. In a
matrilineal and matrilocal society, a husband was often
not allowed to settle in his wife's village. The treatment
of tenants also continued to be harsh on many estates and
Abrahams reported that "there is a strong feeling of
44
injustice felt among resident natives."
As we have suggested, the question of his rights
to the land assumed paramount importance in the mind of
Africans. Tn his desire for a settlement, he was
supported to some extent by missionaries and philanthro¬
pists abroad. The government, too, was aware of the
problem and in 1920 it had appointed a commission to
investigate and make recommendations. The commission
recognized that it was essential to establish security of
tenure. ,,T"e think that...every native tenant accepted by
a landowner...should be deemed to have been accepted as a
tenant for a definite period of 4- years, subject to the
performance of the terms of the agreement of tenancy." On
the expiry of a tenancy, it proposed that it should be
made law that only a limited proportion of the tenants on
an estate could be evicted at one time. It also proposed
that the period of labour which the tenant should perform
44. Land Commission 1946, Vol.1, pp.15-16 for details of
African grievances.""See also Land Commission :,videnoe,
Vol.2, for the evidence of B.C. Barnes, Acting Labour
Commissioner, dated 13 September 1946.
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be prescribed and recommended a maximum period of two
4-5
months during a specified season of the year. But
nothing came of these and other recommendations of the
commission. In spite of the urgency of the matter, the
whole problem was left in abeyance until it was re-opened
4-6
by the Ormsby-Gore Commission. Presumably as a result of
its criticisms, the whole question of the position of
Africans on private estates was reconsidered during 1926
and 1927* and in the following year another ordinance was
enacted to settle this matter once and for all. Under this
new ordinance, rent was fixed at not less than the
equivalent of two months' and at not more than that of
three months' average pay of agricultural workers. The
landholder was required to provide facilities for tenants
to work or grow economic crops in lieu of rent, and, if
he did not, he lost his claim to rent. Further, the land¬
holder was only allowed to evict one-tenth of his tenants
after every five years after giving six months' prior
notice•
At the end of every five years, the situation
became tense but nothing serious happened until 194-3.
During the period of depression there were few evictions
but when agricultural prices rose during the second world
War estate owners were anxious to develop their lands and
4-5. Land in the Uyasaland Protectorate (1921), op. cit.,
pp.15-16.
4-6. Report of the Fast Africa Commission, op. clt., p. 109.
- 334- -
in 194-3 large numbers of Africans were served with
notices to quit.^ "Severe incidents" occurred on certain
estates in the Blantyre area owing to several hundreds of
Africans refusing to move. Two years later, in 194-5*
there resulted "an awkward situation" in the Cholo
district when two landowners attempted to evict a consid¬
erable number of Africans on the ground that they had not
paid rent for .some years. Around 1,250 Africans were
involved and their resettlement on Native Trust Land
would have proved difficult for the government. Eventually,
the District Commissioner managed to reduce the numbers
to be evicted to about one hundred and twenty. But his
efforts disclosed a series of serious grievances felt by
Africans residing on the estates, some of which we have
already noted. Some tenants complained of having to pay
rent when the government did not charge rent on Native
Trust Land. Others criticized estate owners for having
reduced the size of their gardens and for not allowing
their children to build huts and open up gardens. Further
points of discontent focussed on the owners not permitting
resident Africans to possess cattle or to cut down timber
4-8
for the purposes of firewood and hut construction.
The only solution, as both the Ormsby-Gore and
Abrahams Commissions had suggested, was that land should
be bought back from European landholders for the re¬
settlement of Africans. The 194-7 Planning Committee
declared that this was not a practicable proposition and
4-7. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (rev.ed., London, 1957)»
P.711.
4-8. Land Commission 194-6, Vol.1, o£. cit., pp.14—16.
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it was only after 1954- that more effective steps were
taken to re-acquire land. Before then, African fears of
further land alienation were aroused when the European
Convention of Associations publicized its post-war
schemes for the settlement of white soldiers on undeveloped
land. The settler body was of the "opinion that Nyasaland
needs more British settlers of the right type," a view
that was supported by the Planning Committee which
believed that the economic development of the Protectorate
49
was dependent upon the introduction of white planters.
Sir Sidney Abrahams wrote vividly of African fears at the
time. Such schemes of European settlement had led to
"antagonism in the districts of the Southern Province
where the natives, feeling land hunger sharpened by resent¬
ment at the existence of large private holdings of un¬
developed land, and aggravated by the addition of the
grievances of the resident natives, might fear that they
would lose still more land."^0 But the government did
nothing to allay African fears about alienation or seek
to ameliorate their various grievances regarding conditions
on white estates.
African discontent over the land question was
constantly voiced by the N.A.C. from the mid-194-Os.
Further European settlement was opposed and demands made
to have all undeveloped lands revert to Native Trust Land.
49. hand Commission Evidence, Vol.2, op. cit., Memorandum
on European settlement in Nyasaland by the Convention
of Associations. See also Report of the Planning
Committee (Zomba, 194-3).
50. Land Commission 194-6, Vol.1, 0£. cit., p.31»
- 356 -
Calls were made to ensure that landlords accepted rents
in cash or produce rather than through work, and condem¬
nation was heaped upon planters for burning the huts of
Africans, for not permitting tenants to own livestock,
and for forcing elderly people and widows to pay rent.
Congress agitation mounted when Europeans resumed the
campaign for federation. Congress articulated African
opposition to any closer association with Southern
Rhodesia on grounds that Africans feared further land
alienation. African discontent was also aggravated by the
1952 Ordinance which replaced that of 1928. In 1953 the
Cholo riots erupted and, at last, government realized the
extreme seriousness of the African land situation in the
Shire Highlands.
Abrahams had aptly described the Cholo district as
"one of the storm centres where resident natives are to
be found." ^ For years, District Commissioners had been
commenting on the uneasy situation prevailing in the
district and reporting on the constant friction between
European landholders and their African tenants. In 1952,
it was acknowledged that the discussions on federation
had "added to the uneasiness of the African population
and increased the instability of the Native Administration"
in the district. "This resulted in a general lack of
discipline." A number of "incidents" occurred on the
51. See, for example, N.A.C. to Abrahams, 10 August 194-6,
in Land Commission Evidence, Vol.2, op. cit.,
52. Land Commission 194-6^ Vol.1, oj>. cit., p.20.
53. See Annual Reports of Cholo District in N3E 2/1/1-3
and also file NSE 1/8 for details, M.N.A., Zomba.
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British Central Africa Company's estate in December
"partly due to the increased rent" payable under the new
1952 Ordinance. From the middle of 1953» with federation
having been virtually approved, "the tension increased."
Taxes came in very slowly and people increasingly refused
to pay various kinds of fees and to attend native courts.
Unauthorized cultivation and cutting of trees also
54
commenced on a number of white estates in the district.
Local Congress leaders were involved in attempting
to promote civil disobedience in the district which
manifested itself initially in a very successful African
boycott of the coronation celebrations. This was followed
by a campaign against payment of taxes and an attempt to
assert land rights by widespread trespass on private
55
estates.In August 1953, an unfortunate incident
occurred which brought matters to a head. Two Africans
were caught stealing oranges on the Tennett estate at
Luchenza. Their cries for help brought neighbouring
villagers to the scene and their European captors, fearing
trouble, hurriedly released the two prisoners and fled.
In the meantime, another European who had gone to fetch a
car, arrived on the scene, picked up the sacks of oranges,
loaded them into the car and drove off. The villagers
thought that the objects being lifted into the car were
human bodies and that the Africans had been killed and
taken away for European consumption. Rumour spread that
54. Report of a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the
Governor on the 20th. August 1953 (Zomba,1953)« P«3»
55* For details, see Arthur Westrop, Green Gold (Bulawayo,
n.d.), pp.342-34-5.
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two Africans had been killed by the sons of Tennett, who
was intensely disliked by many of his tenants on account
of his harshness and eviction of Africans of long¬
standing. Associated with this was the African notion of
56
Chifwamba or man-stealing. Nearly one thousand Africans
converged on the Tennett estate armed with spears, sticks
and stones and the evergrowing crowd smashed windows and
cut telephone wires. Police reinforcements eventually
managed to disperse the crowd but only after serious
57
clashes in which one African was accidentally killed. '
For the next week, small groups of Africans,
probably local Congress supporters, moved about the Cholo
district attempting to create an atmosphere of disorder.
Labourers on private estates were urged to go on short
strikes; trees were felled across roads; telephone wires
were cut; and the court houses of moderate chiefs burnt
down. Congress-directed raiders further attacked the
Seventh-day Adventist station at Malamulo, fired its
gates, drove all the servants away and terrified the white
staff. A few plantations were also molested, pumping and
lighting plant being wrecked on one estate and tea
C Q
plants and trees being cut down on others. Police
reinforcements were brought in from neighbouring terri¬
tories but they saw little service in the district. The
56* ibid., pp.34-9-350. For a further discussion of the
notion of cannibalism and man-stealing in Nyasaland,
see G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African.
op. cit., pp.9-11.
57. Report of Commission of Inquiry 1953. op. cit., passim.
58. A. Westrop, op. cit., pp.359-3o1»
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disorders gradually subsided in Cholo but spread to
neighbouring districts and will be discussed in the next
section of this chapter.
From 1954-, the government began the policy of
acquiring land from the European landholders. By 1960
the amount of freehold land had been reduced to 750,000
acres which was Just over three per cent, of the total
area of the Protectorate. In 194-6 the number of families
resident on private estates had been nearly fifty
59
thousand; by 1959 this figure had been reduced to 16,500.
Nevertheless, high rents, evictions and other grievances
and restrictions continued for many tenants and their
case was widely advertised by Congress during the 1950s
in its attempts to secure popular support for a movement
striving to achieve independence which, it wa3 suggested,
would provide a permanent and favourable solution to the
problem of African land rights in the Shire Highlands.
Nor had anything been done to improve the position of
Africans living on private estates in the central region
who in 194-6 numbered about 10,000 families. In many ways,
their position was even more insecure than tenants in the
south. They made an annual contract with the landholder
who provided them with seed and other forms of assistance
to enable them to grow tobacco which he then sold on
their behalf, taking an agreed share of the proceeds. But
if the landlord refused to enter into a new contract, the
tenants were obliged to leave the estate at the end of
59. A.J. Hanna, 0£. clt., pp.212-213.
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59* A.J. Hanna, ojd. cit., pp. 212-213.
_ 340 -
the year. To "be sure, Nyasaland's land problem was eased
during the 1950s but it had by no means been solved. At
the same time, government interference with African
methods of land usage was leading to further unrest and
outbursts of resistance in the rural areas.
Enforced agrarian change and rural disaffection
Increased interference by the colonial authorities
in African methods of farming, through the introduction
of a series of agricultural laws which were rigorously
imposed from the late 1940s, gave rise to considerable
indigenous unrest in the Protectorate. For the first time,
government was stipulating the manner in which the rural
cultivator should conduct his daily business and this
intervention created intense and widespread dissatis¬
faction. Already traditional farmers openly defied un¬
popular agricultural rules and the resulting fines and
punishments added fuel to the fire of resentment and
protest being kindled in the souls of many Africans by
the imposition of federation and the existence of in¬
tolerable conditions on white estates in the Shire
Highlands and elsewhere.
During the period of the great depression of 1929»
the price of most tropical commodities in Nyasaland had
slumped drastically. The government concluded that
African production had to be increased if incomes were to
60
be maintained and prosperity promoted. With the passing
60. Ns 1/2/2, Circular No.15 of 1934 dated 6 June 1934
entitled "Production of Native Economic Crops." See
also Hall to C.O., 12 June 1934, M.N.A., Zomba.
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of the years, however, the problem of increased production
came to be overshadowed by another problem of still
greater and more permanent import. It was realized,
during the 1930s, that the growing of more crops was
threatening to exhaust the land. Attention had been drawn
to the menace of soil erosion as early as the 1920s but
it was only in the next decade that the magnitude of the
danger was revealed. African farmers occupying the large
bulk of the land of the Protectorate and multiplying at a
rate that doubled the population every twenty-five year3,
posed the major problem of soil erosion. The vast majority
of Africans were still essentially subsistence cultivators
whose agricultural practices remained very backward.
Cultivation continued to be of the shifting, slash-and-
burn type; systematic rotation of crops and the application
of manure scarcely existed. It was this combination of a
rapidly rising population and increasing cultivation in
inefficient ways that had led to soil erosion becoming a
61
serious problem in Nyasaland.
Tentative attempts were made before the second
World War to tackle soil erosion in parts of the southern
6?
region and in the highland areas of Dedza and Ncheu. ~ But
in view of the small field staff of the government's
61. C.C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life
1902-45," in Vincent Harlow et al, eds., History of
East Africa (Oxford,1965), Vol.2, pp.251-9; R.W.
fCettlewell, "Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 1945-
1960," Food Research Institute Studies of Tropical
Food and Agriculture, 5,3 M955). pp.237-240; Report
of the Agricultural Survey of the five most Northerly
Districts of Nyasaland (Zomba,1933)§ especially Part
17; and An Outline of Agrarian Problems and Policy in
Nyasaland (Zomba,1955)» PP-1-2.
62. NS1/2/3, P. Topham, Soil Erosion Officer, to S.P.C.,
15 August 1937» M.N.A., Zomba.
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agricultural department, little was achieved. The 1939-
194-5 War itself severely handicapped efforts to deal with
the various agrarian problems. Indeed, wartime emphases
on internal self-sufficiency of food requirements and on
the increase of export crops needed for Britain's war
effort led to severe soil deterioration in many areas by
1945• With an acute shortage of the necessary staff who
could provide adequate supervision of agricultural
developments, soil erosion was accelerated by increasing
production. The problem was further aggravated by postwar
imperial policy which sought to expand production in the
colonial territories to enable Britain, facing acute
food-shortages, to tackle the tasks of reconstruction.
Shortages of personnel and equipment meant that soil
erosion was speeded up even more by continuing efforts to
boost agrarian productivity.
The late 1940s therefore saw the urgent application
of rules for soil conservation and land usage as well as
the recruitment of a larger establishment to check the
64
advance of soil deterioration. A Natural Resources
Ordinance was enacted in 1946. This was replaced by a new
instrument in 1949 which was supplemented in 1952 by
further rules which gave the government wider powers of
enforcement. Initial emphasis, both before and immediately
after the war, was placed on introducing contour ridge
cultivation and tie-ridges which made good progress in
63. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, op. cit., pp.1033-35•
64. Report of the Post-War Development Committee (Zomba,
1946;, p.7.
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many districts. But they had important limitations and
had to "be replaced by other measures such as contour
bunds which were not so popular. With the advent of Sir
Geoffrey Colby as Governor of Nyasaland in 194-8, there
began a more intensive phase of enforcing protective
measures. From this time on, a regimen of rules, regu¬
lations and restrictions required African villagers to do
this and not do that. Farmers had to construct contour
bunds, plant at certain times and clear and pull out old
crops by certain dates after harvest. They had also to
refrain from cultivating on steep hillsides and river
banks and abstain from cutting trees without a permit. By
the time Colby left the Protectorate in 1956, gross
erosion had been halted. It was, however, according to
the Director of Agriculture of the time, "won hardly and
65
at the price of much misunderstanding and unpopularity." ^
Opposition to agricultural rules "had become a powerful
focus for African nationalist sympathies. Everyone, being
a cultivator, could be relied upon to support it, and
obstruction of government agricultural policy became one
66
of the chief planks of nationalist campaigning."
To persuade peasants to change their methods of
cultivation is, the world over, a usually slow and
difficult process. Such was the urgency of the problem of
soil erosion in Nyasaland, however, that insufficient
time was allowed for experiment and demonstration. It was
not surprising, therefore, that already conservative
65. R.W. Kettlewell, ££. clt., p.257.
66. ibid., p.240.
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African farmers were reluctant to forsake a proven system
for others which were less certain. Traditional methods
embodied the inherited wisdom of the past and the new
agricultural experts in the Protectorate were not as yet
fully equipped with the detailed knowledge that was
relevant to different local conditions. Occasionally, the
new regulations, though fundamentally sound, had un¬
fortunate consequences. Their enforcement led sometimes
to lower yields which would deter many from implementing
them again. The Tonga and the Upper Shire Yao found other
reasons for opposing contour ridging, one because of fear
that waterlogging would cause cassava tubers to rot and
the other because it encouraged white ants in the gardens?^7
The conservatism and stubborness of African farmers was
aggravated by the compulsory nature of the new measures.
The urgency of the agrarian problem had led the government
to conclude that an element of coercion was necessary and
justified for the common good. Accordingly, anyone failing
to comply with soil-conserving methods of land use was
liable to fines or imprisonment or even uprooting of his
crops. The various rules were often harshly and clumsily
imposed and punishment served only to increase African
resentment.
African resentment was further based on the extra
work involved in carrying out the measures and also on
the need to adopt them during a traditional period of
67. ibid., p.256, and J. Clyde Mitchell, "The Political
Organization of the Yao of Southern Nyasaland," African
Studies. 8,3 (194-9), p.159.
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relaxation "between harvesting one crop and planting the
next. Contour ridges and tie-ridges involved little extra
work and their advantages were easily perceived. But
bunds were "less easily understood...and less acceptable
to traditional cultivators." They were "an innovation
necessitating additional work" to the extent of anything
from a fortnight to a month, and were "unquestionably
arduous for the small African farmer equipped only with
hand tools." The situation was made even worse by the fact
that most of the work of construction had to be done
during the dry season which was not only the traditional
period of rest but the time of the year when the ground
68
was very hard. Moreover, in the majority of cases, the
fragmentation of land holdings over a wide area made the
work of constructing bunds and of keeping them in good
repair much heavier than if the land was in one compact
69
block. J And in a country where such large numbers of
adult able-bodied males were absent in neighbouring
countries, much of the burden of work fell upon the
womenfolk and created many new and severe problems.
Many other African objections to the new agrarian
changes may be cited. Generally, however, it was the
coercion and compulsion that was opposed being especially
detested as European farmers were given advice and not
70
forced to comply with the new laws.' Close European
68. R.W. Kettlewell, o£. cit., pp.240, 256.
69. T.D. Thomson, "Soil Conservation - Some Implications,"
Journal of African Administration, 5,2 (1953), p.67.
70. W.K.M. Chiume, Nyasaland Demands Secession and
Independence (London,1959), pp.l7-lS.
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supervision of African agriculture and consequent control
of the African's daily life was another source of
criticism# Indeed, to many Africans the agricultural
regulations symbolized the gradual encroachment of
Europeans on their land# Behind much of their opposition
was this further fear for their land. African fears about
the security of their land rights led them to disregard
and defy agricultural regulations in order to demonstrate
their intention to resist any further European encroach¬
ments. "To a suspicion-ridden people" wrote an experienced
government official, "it is obviously a preparation, at
their expense, for their land to be taken over by
71
foreigners."' As disturbing as the agricultural rules
themselves was the environment in which they were intro¬
duced. Development entailed a large increase in European
technical personnel in the rural areas at a time when the
Convention of Associations was advocating further European
settlement and the scheme for federation was being
imposed. African reactions to the postwar agricultural
laws have to be related to their deeper fears of
increasing European encroachment on their land.
With the coming of federation, African fears
regarding their land were heightened and expressed them¬
selves in more widespread opposition to agricultural
regulations. During the late 1940s, Congress branches had
shown "open hostility" to the government's bunding




campaigns. Now, local Congress leaders were directly
involved in promoting disturbances though the many out¬
bursts lacked any central direction and co-ordination.
Chiefs in the Cholo, Port Herald, Chikwawa and Chiradzulu
districts were molested for enforcing agricultural rules
while at Domasi, in late 1953» two hundred armed Africans
attempted to prevent the local District Commissioner from
taking a village headman to court for disobeying farming
laws. The police were stoned and the crowd fired upon,
two Africans being killed in the clash.' Chief Gomani of
Ncheu, the paramount of the southern Ngoni, provided the
most dramatic incident of African transgression of the
unpopular laws. For a number of years, Gomani had been
recognized as an energetic promoter of better agrarian
and animal husbandry practices. Now, however, to demon¬
strate his rejection of the despised federation, he
instructed his people to disregard all agricultural,
forestry and veterinary laws and also refuse to pay taxes.
Gomani was arrested and deposed but not before a series
74
of riots had been precipitated requiring police action.'
"Troubles on agricultural rules" also broke out in
72. See, for example, Annual Report of the Provincial
Commissioners for 1948 (Zombat1949.). p.4.
73. The Nyasaland Times, 5 October 1953» p.2 for a
summary report of the various disturbances.
74. Michael Scott, A Time to Speak (London,1953)» pp.282-4.
See also R.H. Keppel-Compton to L.B. Greaves, 18
November 1959 with enclosure entitled "A factual
account of the events leading up to and immediately
following the deposing of Philip Gomani as Chief in
the Ncheu District of Nyasaland in 1953»" dated 17
November 1959 in Mss.Afr.s.864, Rhodes House Library,
Oxford.
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Nkhota-Khota in 1953 and 1954-. According to the African
nationalist journal, Tsopano, these troubles "existed all
along the lakeshore up to Nkata Bay and led to the with¬
drawal of the Agricultural staff to other areas."^ Such
were the disturbances in all of these areas that the
government admitted that "Native Administration in large
parts of these Districts virtually ceased."^ Greater
governmental involvement with the rural African's daily
life, his land and his agricultural practices had created
a broad undercurrent of resentment and discontent which
gave a marked impetus to nationalist politics.
Congress and mass political mobilization
In 1950, the activities of the central Congress
body were transferred from Blantyre to the town of
Lilongwe in the central region. This was the centre of
the growing peasant tobacco farming industry and the new
Congress President, J.R.N. Chinyama, was also chairman of
the African Farmers' Association. Apart from Sangala, who
was now Vice-President, and a Tonga, A.J.M. Banda, the
new Congress executive was composed of persons from the
central region who had not been prominent in the previous
African political action. Some of them, like Chinyama, had
been members of the short-lived Central Province Native
Association while others may have participated with Levi
Mumba in the Lilongwe African Welfare Society which he had
75* Tsopano, 5 (1960), p.13. See also Annual Report on
Native Administration 1954- (Zomba,1955)» p.18.
76. Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners for
-1953 (^ombat-l934). P.3.
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started during the late 1930s. Thus some connexions
existed with the previous political leaderships and many
of the new central N.A.C. leaders were probably the pro¬
ducts of the two Scottish missions. But they came from
different occupational sectors than those African leaders
of the inter-war and early post-war years, with business¬
men, traders and prosperous peasant farmers taking the
place of the civil servants and clerks. It would appear
that after the Matinga crisis the government had sternly
enjoined participation by all African civil servants in
any but the most inocuous organizations. Congress leader¬
ship was now assumed by retired persons like Sangala or
independent African businessmen and farmers working and
coming mainly from the hitherto politically acquiescent
77
central region. ' But the African clerks and school¬
teachers remained, now in the background, as advisers of
the new Congress leaders and local branch officials.
Among these civil servants was a newer generation of
better-educated Africans. Two of them, O.E. Chirwa and
W.M. Chirwa, both of whom were Tonga, were university
graduates and they played fairly influential roles
behind the scenes.'7®
77. 27a/111, ?Tinutes of executive committee meeting of the
N.A.C., 8-9 April 1950 and minutes of annual conference
of the N.A.C., 5-7 August 1950, M.N.A., Zomba. The
following were elected new office-bearers: J.R.N.
Chinyama (Lilongwe) as President-General; J.F. Sangala
(Blantyre) as Vice-President General; A.J.M. Banda
(Nkhata Bay) as Secretary-General; K. Yobe Nyaka
(Lilongwe) as Treasurer-General; J.E. Mjojo and W.R.
Moses (both of Lilongwe) as assistant secretary-
generals; and B.A. Corner (Lilongwe) as assistant
treasurer-general.
78. Interviews with Mr. J.R.N. Chinyama, Lilongwe, Malawi.
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Congress, however, remained loosely organized and
still had no full-time political organizers possessing a
singular vocational commitment to politics as a way of
life. The N.A.C. also continued to lack a precise
programme of action towards a long-term objective and it
was mainly concerned with bringing African grievances to
the attention of the government for redress. Emphasis was
still on economic and social injustices and, although
"direct representation of the African Congress in all
public bodies" was called for, it had barely begun to
formulate its ideas for political transformation. The
demand for self-government was not yet explicit and the
N.A.C. leaders were more suppliants than revolutionaries.
Paid-up membership had also fallen off during the post-
Matinga interlude and the movement lent itself to the
criticism of not being broadly-based and of enjoying the
confidence of a decisive majority of the African popu¬
lation. But the revived Congress was fortunate in being
provided with an almost immediate stimulus to growth in
the form of the moves towards a Central African Federation.
The federation proposals greatly stimulated
African political activity. Congress and the chiefs were
brought together for Joint political action* mass
meetings were organized to voice the overwhelming African
opposition to closer association with Southern Rhodesia;
and officials appointed to collect funds throughout the
country to send delegations of chiefs and Congress
spokesmen to England to present their views directly to
the British Government. In April 1953, a meeting was held
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at which the N.A.G. leaders, Native Authorities and
others openly resolved to meet the imposition of any
federal scheme by "the strongest non-violent resistance."
They threatened a national withdrawal of African labour,
the non-payment of taxes and the boycott of district,
provincial and other councils. A Nyasaland Supreme
Council was set up which included a number of chiefs to
79
direct the campaign against federation.'
But the articulation of African opposition to
federation was one thing; giving force to that viewpoint
through effective action was something else. Up to August
1953» there appeared to be some possibility that Congress
and the chiefs could work together and implement their
various proposals for non-co-operation. Fifteen Native
Authorities handed in their resignations and others
encouraged defiance of government regulations. Congress
leaders successfully urged Africans to boycott the
coronation celebrations in many districts and were also
involved in the organization of a few minor strikes. But
the outbreak of the Cholo disturbances and the spreading
of dissension to other parts of the southern region
brought non-co-operation to an end. The Cholo type of
rural radicalism was anathema to the central body of
Congress. Indeed, the disorders may well have frightened
the central leadership. Government accusations that
Congress had inspired the disturbances by its declared
programme of non-co-operation, brought fear to an
79. The Myasaland Times, 9 kpril 1953» p.1.
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essentially moderate leadership especially when it was
threatened with imprisonment and restriction. Already a
few Africans had been detained for sedition and for
attempting to undermine the lawful authority of Native
ftO
Authorities. The outcome was that the Congress
executive under J.R.N. Chinyama rejected violence and
O/l
abandoned its campaign against federation. This was
followed by a similar decision of the chiefs and ten
of them were persuaded to withdraw their resignations as
Native Authorities.
Nevertheless, considerable bitterness was felt by
op
at least African intellectuals at this time. k number
of them now commenced to call into question the very
legitimacy of the colonial system. They felt that the
colonial government did not represent or heed the views
of Africans and that only through they themselves gaining
control over their own affairs would their needs and
demands be effectively realized. Congress, too, had begun
to voice the new demand of eventual self-government and
now asked for immediate equal representation of Africans
with Europeans on the Legislative Council. But despite
this growing militant trend, J.F. Sangala, President of
the N.A.C. from 1954- to the end of 1956, stressed that
Africans hoped to achieve their objectives by following
proper constitutional channels.
80. ibid., 24 August 1953* P-7«
31. ibid., 17 September 1953$ p.9.
82. See John Gunther, Inside Africa (London,1956), pp.
605-6•
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Of greater immediate importance was the reluctance
of the central Congress leadership to turn their movement
into a mass-based organization. Despite mounting unrest
in the rural areas, Congress leaders had hardly begun
peering at the possibility of lending leadership to the
agitated rural populace. It seems that the Congress
executive continued to make no attempt to recruit at a
popular level during the years 1954- and 1955« This may be
because Congress headquarters was, after the southern
region disturbances, more concerned with securing control
of the existing branch organization rather than seeking
mass support. Mass involvement at that time may have
provoked disorder in the countryside which was the last
thing that a moderate leadership wanted to see. But
central Congress leaders were in no position to control
effectively the various branches which despite central
pressures continued to act independently and increasingly
radically. Mounting mass unrest was leading Congress
branches to become involved in mass action and, at the
grass roots level, it is clear that from 1954- there was a
growing expansion of the political movement. The frame¬
work for a popular political movement in Byasaland
already existed and it was now to be gradually filled out
and energized by the local branches with local support.
The popular appeal of the N.A.C. between 1954- and 1956
depended almost entirely on local initiative.
The 'mass factor* in African political change is
one of the most neglected features of the study of
- 554- -
African colonial politics. Research on how the local
communities entered into a form of modern political
organization and activity in colonial Malawi has hardly
begun and what follows is necessarily conjectural being
based on a few interviews with Congress branch officials
and also on ideas derived from literature on other
85
African territories.
Malawi is a poor country. Throughout the colonial
era, the vast bulk of the population remained subsistence
cultivators growing maize, millet, cassava and some rice.
It is true that two important cash crops were developed:
tobacco in the central region (and in the Shire Highlands
to some extent) and cotton in the Lower Shire /alley.
African villagers grew one of these crops but the amount
per grower was always very small. A few 'master farmers'
grew more and received larger incomes but rarely was more
than £*10-15 per annum received by the majority of the
population through such cultivation. Cash cropping did
not therefore lead to the development of a wealthy class
in Nyasaland and the range of economic differentiation
among those dependant upon cultivation for their liveli¬
hood was limited. Nevertheless, a limited socio-economic
33• "For some studies on the role of the masses as a
political factor in colonial Africa, 3ee Martin
'ilson, Political Change in a West African state
(Cambridge, Massachusetts,1966), pp.11?-123» 179-192,
234-6; and J.M. Lonsdale, "Rural Resistance and Mass
olitical Mobilization amongst the Luo of Western
Kenya," East African Academy paper 1965» For an ana¬
lytical discussion, see John 5. Saul, "Africa," in
Chita lonescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism
(London,1969), pp.122-150. The most useful comparative
3tudy for Nyasaland appears to me to be G. Andrew
#'agulre, Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania (Cambridge, 1959)•
I have relied heavily on some of its insights for the
discussion in the following paragraphs.
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differentiation did take place within rural society and a
petty bourgeoisie emerged Composed of poorly-paid teachers,
/
clerks in Native Administration, the more prosperous
34
farmers, traders, hawkers and some contractors. During
the pre-1953 period, some of these groups such as those
of school-teachers, clerks and ministers of religion had
participated in the modern-style politics of the Native
Associations and the Congress branches in the rural
areas. Now, during the 1950s, it was not so much the
teachers and clerks who organized the Congress branches -
both were subject to dismissal for involvement in
political activity - as African traders and farmers.
It was the rural petty bourgeoisie which lent the
frustrated and agitated masses a more literate and
articulate leadership and which linked populist forces
organizationally with the central organization of
Congress. Many of these local politicians had been active
in the local Congress branches and they now began
representing 'the grievances of the ordinary Africans and
recruiting them into the Congress movement. A network of
contacts was developed between the Congress branch head¬
quarters in the district and the countryside. The inter¬
mediaries who kept political activity going at the grass
roots level once the branch headquarters had made the
initial contacts in outlying areas were probably a low
84. For some comments on African tobacco farming in
Malawi and socio-economic differentiation in rural
society, see Edwin Dean, The Supply Responses of
African Farmers (Amsterdam,1966;.
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level teacher and clerk, acting secretly, a local trader
who travelled occasionally to the district "boma and others
who had more than local exposure and interests. Local
Congress leaders therefore "became the spokesmen for the
peasantry and for all those aggrieved by the chiefs in
other ways.®''
The rural bourgeoisie could not have performed
this role if the traditional authorities had remained the
effective guardians of African rights and the main spokes¬
men for their interests. The role of the Native
Authorities a3 mere agents of the central government had
become progressively more evident as the colonial
authority expanded its efforts to modernize the rural
economy. The Native Authorities* role in enforcing un¬
popular measures such as the various regulations governing
soil erosion, stock improvement and disease control
worked to discredit them; complaints against regulations
went hand-in-hand with criticisms of the chiefs. There
was a deepening alienation of the masses from their
chiefs. Furthermore, enterprising Africans such as clerks,
teachers, farmers, traders, etc., found little opportunity
to promote their own interests and express their own
ideas and initiatives within the existing local govern¬
ment system. Even when the executive functions of the
Native Authorities were transferred to elected District
Councils in many districts from 1954, enterprising
Africans continued to remain dissatisfied with the role
85* See R.L. "ishlade, "Chiefship and Politics in the




they could play in the councils. The role of the central
government in local affairs was still strong. A disen¬
chanted middle level local elite therefore joined with
the ordinary Africans to achieve their objects through
Congress. African interests could not be served within
the local government system with its impotent Native
Authorities and its strong central government control and
direction; their case could only be promoted by a
political body such as Congress.
By April 1957» 60,000 Africans were said to hold
Congress cards and the movement was expanding. The
profound frustration and resentment at the level of the
mass consequent upon the enforcement of unpopular agrarian
laws and the imposition of federation, is perhaps the key
to understanding the astounding politicization of a large
part of the countryside in so brief a period of time.
Although there appear to have been virtually no •incidents*
between 1954- and 1953, there was clearly a broad under¬
current of discontent and many thousands of Africans were
fined or imprisoned during this period for disobeying
farming laws. Agricultural regulations could only be
enforced under the threat of force. In 1953, colonial
86. In line with postwar British colonial policy, local
government bodies were given more democratic form. See
African Studies Branch (Colonial Office), "A Survey of
the Development of Local Government in the African
Territories since 194-7, 1 • Nyasaland," Journal of
African Administration. 4-,1 (1952), supplement, pp.1-6.
See also R.S. Hudson, Report on Development of Local
Government in Nyasaland (London.1951). P. 5."For the
new District Councils, see H.G. Graham-Jolly, "The
Progress of Local Government in Nyasaland," Journal of
African Admihistration. 7,4- (1955), pp.133-192 and
R.W. Robins, "Development of Rural Local Government
for Nyasaland," Journal of African Administration, 13
(1961), pp.148-15&•
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administration broke down in many areas when villagers
increasingly violated the rules and it became evident
that colonial rule could not be maintained much longer
without increasing use of force. The unworkability of the
colonial authority structure was being dramatically
demonstrated in the rural areas. Meanwhile, at the centre
of the colonial political system, Congress leaders and
African politicians were challenging the colonial regime
as well.
From mid-1956» there seems to have begun greater
initiatives from Congress headquarters towards mass
organization. It was at this time that the Congress
leadership was becoming influenced by a group of more
radical elements headed by two young University-educated
Africans, Henry Masauko Chipembere and M.W. Kanyama Chiume,
who had both returned home in 195^- after studying abroad.
Both had soon come into contact with rural grievances
through their occupations. Chipembere was in the service
of the government as the District Assistant at Dedza and
Chiume, after being refused permission to teach at
Livingstonia, had taken to coffee farming and organizing
co-operative societies in the northern region. In March
1956, they were among the five African supporters of the
N.A.C. who were elected to the Legislative Council by the
provincial councils,®"'7 and it is from this time, as full-
time politicians, that they devoted their energies to
arousing a more positive nationalism in Nyasaland. In late
87. Colin Leys, "An Election in Nyasaland," Political
Studies, 5 (1957), pp.258-280.
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1956, they were Joined in the Protectorate by Dunduzu
Chisiza who was deported home to Karonga from Southern
Rhodesia for his role in agitational politics in that
country. Armed with zeal and determination and influenced
by the successes of nationalism in West Africa, these
three now sought to urge the essentially moderate Congress
leadership to commit itself entirely to the idea of
creating an independent African state based on majority
rule. Freedom and not partnership, the young militants
felt, should be the goal and such freedom should not be
begged for but be wrested. For this it was necessary to
harness popular forces and make the N.A.C. a mass
nationalist movement.
Even though they were not office-bearers of the
N.A.C., the young militants were gradually successful in
eliciting a more positive response from the Congress
executive. A national flag was created and the slogan of
Kwaca (meaning dawn, i.e. freedom), which had been
introduced during the early 1950s in the battle against
federation, was now adopted by the N.A.C. to connote a
more militant and nationalist stance. In view of the
later nationalist symbols, it is interesting to note that
no mention appears to have been made publicly during the
period 1955-7 of the early African resistances which
would link the past with the struggles of the present. No
laudatory articles were published at this stage on
Chilembwe, Domingo and Kamwana, and the memories of such
men appear to have been revived only from late 1958 and
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early 1959. But even if the techniques and symbols of
a mass nationalist movement were still to be fully
developed, Congress was rapidly acquiring a popular base.
This seems to have been due mainly to the activities of
the rural bourgeoisie and the more radical elements of
the central Congress leadership and African members of the
Legislative Council. By April 1957» some 60,000 members
39
held Congress cards and estimates of income for that
year totalled &13»550. Expansion of the movement was
taking place as the masses led by local politicians came
into contact with central Congress organization. Even in
areas of no history of modern-type political activity,
Congress was growing in membership. The leaders and
people were joining, the nucleus of a mass and anti-
colonial movement existed, and nationalism had begun in
Kyasaland.
The main problem now was not so much the expansion
of the movement but of holding it together at both the
central and local levels. At Congress headquarters,
differences were becoming strained between the young
radicals and some other Congress leaders and supporters
38. Although many Africans had certainly heard of Chilembwe
Domingo and Kamwana, their knowledge of these men and
of their resistances was probably not very detailed
or precise. Congress leaders and the young militants
were also not ignorant of these early resisters but
probably did not possess sufficient information about
them to revive their memories for political purposes.
Is it possible, then, that the publication of Indepen—
dent African by G. Shepperson and T. Price in 1953
provided the opportunity for the memories of these
early men to be revived as national heroes? For a
discussion of this subsequent revival, see George
Shepperson, Myth and Reality in Malawi (Evanston,1968),
pp.15-18.
39. N.A.C. Circular, 1,3 (April 1957).
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who were les3 clearly committed to the new radical
approach. The ma^jor question of division at this time was
concerned with the position of the two Nyasaland members
of the Federal Parliament. The young militants refused to
compromise in any way with the federal political system
and when their more moderate colleagues, W.M. Chirwa and
C. Kumbikano, accepted seats in the federal legislature a
serious split was provoked in the central Congress. To
the radicals, even to take one's seat in such a white-
dominated assembly implied a measure of acceptance of it;
to the moderate elements participation was a way of
bringing down federation. The radicals demanded that the
federal members should resign; they resisted and were
supported by the moderate elements in the N.A.C. In mid-
1957* however, a memorandum prepared by Dr. Banda, who had
since 1953 been resident in Ghana, appears to have "had a
decisive effect" at the annual Congress conference and
the federal members were expelled from the movement. But
perhaps of greater importance was the fact that Banda's
views coincided with the militant attitudes of the rural
Congress leaders. As medicant resolutions seemed to have
no influence with the authorities so discontent with the
moderate leadership of the Congress executive had
gradually developed. The 1957 annual conference, composed
of central and local Congress leaders, also resolved, at
the behest of the young militants, that Dr. Banda be
invited to return to Nyasaland for the purpose of aiding
the N.A.C. in its struggle for self-government, and it was
clear that the movement was now fully committed to the
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idea of independence and majority rule.
During 1956 and 1957 many people in Nyasaland had
been urging Dr. Banda to return home. Chipemhere in
particular was very conscious of the need for new leader¬
ship for he felt that he himself, Ghiume and Chisiza were
too young and inexperienced. Banda's absence abroad had
enabled him to avoid the strains and factionalism of
recent Congress politics and he alone possessed the
qualifications necessary to bring coherence and success to
91
the nationalist drive for independence. And, indeed,
new life, unity and confidence was provided to the
African struggle by the return of Banda in July 1958 and
his becoming President of the N.A.C. the following month.
An even greater mass movement was now built up and
Congress "transformed" "from an organization of about 83
disorganized branches to one with 200 disciplined branches
in the country and several more outside.in leadership,
membership, organization and ideology, Congress, by 1959»
had achieved the status of a full-scale nationalist
movement.
Banda's vehement denunciations of federation, his
vigorous attacks on the government's land and agricultural
policies, and his vociferous cry for 'freedom,' combined
with the forceful campaigning of his young militant
90. Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry. Cmnd.
814 (1959;, pp.13-14.
91. ibid., pp.12-13.
92. W.K.M. Chiume, ojd. cit., p.35.
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lieutenants, led to widespread disturbances, the
declaration of a state of emergency in March 1959* the
93
banning of the Congress and the arrest of its leaders.
Q/i
But the day of British rule was virtually over. Faced
with the choice of maintaining control through the
continued use of force (over fifty Africans were killed
in disturbances) or of abdicating .its authority, the
imperial government decided on the latter alternative.
The release of Dr. Banda in April 1960, and the presence
of a permissive colonial authority amenable to radical
political change, allowed the Congress (now the Malawi
Congress Party) to substantiate constitutionally in the
1961 elections the claim it had put forth in rebellion.^
Malawi was to become an African state and it was but a
question of time before the country seceded from the
Federation and reached independence.
93. Cmnd. 314, 0£. cit., passim.
94. See W.P. Kirkman, Unscrambling An Empire: A Critique
of British Colonial Policy 19?6-1966(London,1966),
PP»39» 49-51, etc.,




This thesis has been a study of colonial Malawi
concerned with the development of African politics at the
territorial level. There emerge from the above discussion
some main points which may be stated in summary and
conclusion.
In seeking to exercise administrative control over
its African wards, the British administration sought to
create points of contact with the subject peoples. The
intermediaries who were found to establish and maintain
contact between the colonial power and the African
populace were the traditional authorities. But the
destruction of the power of the more substantial pre-
colonial chiefdoms consequent upon the imposition of
British control, combined with the existing political
fragmentation of much of the Protectorate, was not only
to make 'indirect' rule through the chiefs difficult but
also to render them unsuited for dealing with the new
challenges of colonialism.
During the first two decades of British rule, the
tribal system was breaking down and the authority and
power of the chiefs declined. Although this was viewed as
a good thing by the colonial authority, it realized that
it could not operate effectively in the rural areas
without the co-operation of the chiefs. From the early
1900s, therefore, the government attempted to ensure that
the administrative duties of the officially-recognized
chiefs were not made too onerous to destroy whatever
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utility they still possessed for administrative purposes.
At the same time, from 1912, the colonial government
sought to build up again the prestige and influence of
the chiefs to enable them to function effectively along
new lines. Because their administrative duties were so
light as scarcely to interfere with the preceding social
pattern, so the traditional authorities also remained in
close relationship with the local African tribesmen.
Meanwhile, the impact of western forces, some of
which like western education had been operating since the
late 1870s, were leading to a gradual cultural trans¬
formation among a number of African societies. Particularly
in the northern region and the Shire Highlands area, a
small minority of fairly well-educated and independent-
minded Africans was emerging who believed themselves to
be the successful pioneers of the new way of life and who
looked forward to taking what they considered to be their
rightful place within the new European-dominated society.
In the eyes of the mission-educated elite, the traditional
authorities had become civil servants and no longer the
real representatives of their people. When the government
therefore enacted the District Administration (Native)
Ordinance of 1912 whereby the chiefs were confirmed as the
agents of the colonial administration and also regarded
officially as the authentic channels of communication
between the people and the colonial authority, the
educated elements were naturally alienated. Seeing them¬
selves as more effective intermediaries between Africans
and Europeans, the new elite began to assert its own
— 3S6 —
claims to represent the feelings and aspirations of the
African people. They began forming Native Associations
which were to become the main avenues for African
political agitation during the inter-war years.
At the same time, some other educated Africans
were pursuing political activity of a modern type through
independent African churches. These church leaders
protested against the abuses, frustrations and injustices
that ordinary Africans were being made to suffer as a
result of settler, missionary and colonial enterprises. 1
One of these church movements, led by the Rev. John
Chilembwe, attempted forcibly to drive out many of the
hated white men from the country in 1915* But, as with
the primary resistance to the introduction of colonial
rule in the 1890s, the futility of rebellion was
demonstrated once again. Africans were made abundantly
aware that if they were to challenge white authority or
even try to regain their independence, then different and
essentially non-violent means were required.
During the inter-war period, the colonial govern¬
ment was in no position to commit any substantial resources
to economic and social development in Nyasaland. There
were consequently no important economic and social
changes which tended to undercut the relationship between
chief and people. The chiefs continued to be closely
attached to the tribal ways of life and the mass of
Africans remained psychologically within the small-scale,
self-contained subsistence economy of tribal life. The
chiefs also continued to remain the favoured agents of
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the colonial authority and the government regarded them
as the premier legitimizing force regarding African
administration. Educated elements in the Native Associ¬
ations saw the chiefs as being little more than the
agents of district officers but they were themselves
unable to gain admission to the official exercise of
power in local affairs. Nor were the Native Associations
very successful in changing the character and policies of
the central government and were, further, essentially
elitist bodies, never commanding a mass following. None¬
theless, their efforts and the organizational structures
they established, helped to prepare the way for the more
effective political undertakings of a later day. From
1930, the Associations were obliged to work in association
with the chiefs if their views were to continue to receive
attention from the government, and most of them now
declined.
From the 1930s, however, the central government
began to take greater action in all fields of economic
and social development. Government controls began to
proliferate particularly in the economic sphere and the
mass of the people in the rural areas were gradually
brought into individual contact with the machinery and
personnel of the central government. The people now began
to find that the solutions of traditional life were
inapplicable and that the capabilities of chiefs were
inadequate or irrelevant. At the same time, the educated
elements had moved towards the formation of a national-
wide political organization and had begun seeking direct
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African representation on the Legislative Council and all
other boards directly affecting the lives of the in¬
digenous population. The lives of Africans were in¬
creasingly being affected by decisions made in such
territorial bodies and it was important that African
interests should be adequately represented on them. In
the post-194-5 period, the central government expanded the
scope of its operations. By having to enforce a number of
unpopular measures such as the regulations governing soil
erosion, the chiefs were further discredited as the mere
agents of the colonial government. The way was being
opened for the new men to lend leadership to the masses
who had become disaffected on a large scale by the
government's agrarian and land policies. The imposition
of the hated Central African Federation over the over¬
whelming opposition of the Africans in Nyasaland also led
many to call into question the legitimacy of the colonial
system. The Nyasaland African Congress, which had been
founded in 1944, provided the framework for the coming
together of the educated elite and the masses. A rural
petty bourgeoisie organized branches of the Congress,
recruited the masses into the movement and linked
populist forces organizationally with the central
organization of the N.A.C. From the mid-1950s, greater
initiatives towards mass organization developed from
Congress headquarters. Expansion of the political move¬
ment took place, nationalism began in Nyasaland and was
soon to prove triumphant.
The transition from colonial rule to independence
- 369 -
characterized in Nyasaland by the absence of determined
opposition to African nationalism from any of the sources
which existed elsewhere in colonial Africa. The Pro¬
tectorate was spared a struggle between the national
movement and tribal sub-nationalisms. The fragmented,
small-scale social structure prevalent throughout the
country, combined with widespread rural poverty, prevented
the formation of any coherent, self-sustaining movement
possessing separatist political goals. Nor did the
traditional authorities pose any serious threat to the
political organizations of the new educated elite. As the
central government expanded the scope of its operations,
the chiefs began to fall into eclipse.' Moreover, in the
post-1945 era, the government gradually commenced under¬
cutting the already limited power of the chiefs by trans¬
ferring their executive functions to more democratic
district councils as part of its programme to make the
native authorities over into modern units of local
government.
This study also demonstrates that while the N.A.C.,
which grew out of the inter-war Native Associations, was
nurtured into existence by a very small group of educated
Africans, a successful political movement only arose when
the Congress came to command the support of the masses.
Massive opposition in the rural areas brought local ad¬
ministration to a standstill in many areas and the un-
workability of the colonial authority structure was
demonstrated in the countryside rather than in the
Legislative Council. Not only did the African villagers
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challenge the colonial system hut they transferred their
support to the N.A.C. and provided its leaders with
inspiration and confidence to strive for national inde¬
pendence. No African political movement could have
obtained independence without the massive support of the
rural masses. The British Government would not, in
principle, have agreed to transfer power to a leadership
group that was not broadly based.
But it must be emphasized that a sizeable portion
of Congress' adherents were persons whose interests were
such that their commitment to the long-term aims of the
nationalist leadership - as distinct from opposition to
colonial rule - were probably of the most nominal kind.
For it seems that Congress was seen by many as a means of
ridding themselves of some of the constraints of modern
government. Even if Malawi is fortunate in not being
greatly troubled by 'tribalism' the apparent homogeneity
of interests within the African community, as against
those of the colonial regime, will be exceedingly
difficult to maintain in the post-colonial era.
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NOTE ON SOURCES
1. Malawi National Archives, Zomba, Malawi
The following files were examined:
(a) Manuscripts on early African church leaders and
movements to 1916.
S1/873/33, S1/1179/19. S1/1179"/19, S1/927/19, 31/1304/19,
S1/3049/22, S2/29/22, 32/3/19, S2/8/26, S2/28/24, S2/22/34,
S2/68"/l9, 32/68/23, S10/1/1, S10/1/4, GOA 2/4/12-1.3, and
J2/9/2.
(b) Manuscripts on the inter-war Native Associations.
S1/1529/26, S1/1481/19, S1/3263/23, 31/2065/19, 31/1593/29,
S1/210/20, S1/2104/19, 31/247/36, Nat.12/33, NC1/3/2-6,
NC1/23/1, NC4/1/1, NS1/3/2-5, N3E1/2/3, N3P1/13/1,
NN1/4/1, NNM1/13/1.
(c) Manuscripts on the Nyasaland African Congress to 1950.
1a/1424 or Nat.34", 1a/1449 or Ass.4/13, and 27a/111.
(d) Provincial Commissioner, Southern Province Series.
Correspondence: NS1 Reports: NS2.
(e) District Commissioners, Southern Province Series.
NSB1, NSB2, N3B5, NSD1, NSE1, N3E2, NSP1.
(f) A few files on Native Administration, Education,
uropean political organizations and Closer Union were
also seen.
(g) Issues of the African newspaper, ZoOna, were
examined for the years 1924-1928, and also the complete
numbers of the African nationalist news-sheet, Kwaca,
1955-1956. 1
2. Livingstonia Mission Archives, Livingstonla, Malawi
The following documentation was examined:
(a) Minutes of the Presbytery of North Livingstonia
1899 to 1944.
(b) Livingstonia Mission Council Minute Books, Nos.1-2.
1. The Malawi National Archives also holds irregular
numbers of Zo Ona for the rest of its years of publi¬
cation, 1925-1936.
- 372 -
3. Blantyre Mission Archives, Blantyre, Malawi.
(a) Minutes of the British Central Africa Missionary
Council of the Church of Scotland, 1890-1900.
(b) Issues of the Blantyre Mission journal, Life and
V/ork in British Central Africa, 1892-1900, were also
seen. 2
4. University of Malawi Library, Chancellor College,
Limbe, Malawi.
Photocopies of the following papers were examined:
■Z
(a) H.H. Johnston papers. .
(b) Seventh Day Baptist papers.
Issues of the Livingstonia Mission news-sheet, The
Aurora, 1397-1902, and the African nationalist journal,
Tsopano, 1959-1961, were also consulted.
5. Public Record Office, London, England.
The following correspondence and documentation was examined:
(a) Foreign Office Slave Trade Series (F.0.84), 1890-92.
(b) Foreign Office British Central Africa Protectorate
Series (F.0.2), 1393—1904.
(c) Foreign Office Confidential Print (F.0.403)» 1891-1904.
(d) Colonial Office Nyasaland Protectorate Series (C.0.525)»
1904-1939.
(e) British Central Africa Gazette (C.0.541), 1394-1907
(published).
(f) Nyasaland Protectorate Executive Council Minutes
(C.0.626), 1907-1940.
6. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, London,
England.
The unpublished oral and manuscript evidence to the
following Commissions was examined:
(a) Hilton-Young (1929); (b) Bledisloe (1938); and (c)
Abrahams (1946).
2. The University of Edinburgh Library hold3 issues of
Life and Work....' for the years 1892-1916.
3. The originals are to be found in the Rhodesian National
Archives, Salisbury, Rhodesia.
4. The originals are to be found in the Seventh Pay
Baptist Historical Society, Plainfield, New Jersey,
U.S.A.
373 -
7* Rhodes House Library, Oxford, England.
This Library has a collection of a number of papers on
Malawi the details of which may be obtained from Louis
B. Frewer, Manuscript Collections of Africans in Rhodes
House Library Oxford (1968). The following papers were
found most useful for the present study:
(a) R.H. Keppel-Compton papers on the deposition of Chief
Gomani in 1953, Mss.Afr.s.864-.
(b) J.C. Abraham papers on Native Administration,
Mss.Afr.s.938.
(c) M.C. Hoole papers on Lilongwe Native Administration
and Native-Controlled Missions, Mas.Afr.s.997*
8* British Museum Newspaper Library, Colindale, England.
The following newspapers were examined:
(a) The Central African Times, 1399-1908.'' ft
(b) The Nyasaland Times, 1911-1939, 194-7-1954-•
9. Church of Scotland Office, Edinburgh, Scotland.
The Overtoun missionary Institution Boys' Register, Vols.
1-2 were examined.
10. University of Edinburgh Library, Scotland.
The following items were examined:
(a) Fhpers and diaries of the Rev. A.C. MacAlpine, (Gen.
766). 7
(b) The Central African Planter, 1395-6.
11. National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Issues of the Livingstonia Mission newspaper, The Living-
stonla News, were consulted for the years 1903-09. 3
5. Issues for the years 1398-9 are missing.
6. Issues for the years 1908-10, 194-0-6 and 1954—6 are
missing.
7. A volume of the Central African Planter for the rest of
its period of publication, 1396-7, is to be found in
Few Gardens.
8. The National Library also holds issues from 1910 to
1918.
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12. Private African Papers.
The following Malawians kindly made available to me some
of their private papers:
(a) The Rev. C.C. Chinula (Embangweni) (b) I.M. Jere
(Ekwendeni) (c) J.C.VvT. Malifa (Blantyre) (d) The
Rev. H.M. Phiri (Kasungu).
13 • Interviews with Malawiana (select list).
Interviews were conducted with the following persons
between 1966-9:
l?;.P. Chigamba (Chiradzulu); Miriam J. Chilembwe (Chirad-
zulu); The Rev. C.C. Chinula (Embangweni); L.M. Bandawe
(Blantyre); J.R.N. Chinyama (Ncheu); H.W.L. Chopi
(Blantyre); C.B.B. Kancunjulu (Blantyre); I.M. Jere
(Ekwendeni); Dr. D.S. Valekebu (Chiradzulu); J.C.W. Malifa
(Blantyre); the late R.G. Nyirenda (Karonga); P.H. Moyo
(Loudon); the late K.E. Mposa (Lirangwe); W.B. Mtambo
(Chiradzulu); Chief Mwase (Kasungu); G.P. Ngolleka (Chileka);
H. Ng'oma (Chinteche); Y. Masanjala (Chiradzulu); J.A.
Fhambala (Chilomoni); J.D. Phiri (London); the Rev. A.M.
Fhiri (Kasungu); J.F. Sangala (Blantyre): S.B. Somanje
(Elantyre); K. Thipa (Zomba); R.I. Ziba (Loudon).
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